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Abstract 	This	dissertation	delves	into	the	legal	and	labour	history	of	Hashemite	Iraq	(c.	1921-1958)	to	explore	the	role	international	law	and	its	institutions	played	in	Iraq’s	state	formation,	as	well	as,	the	imperial	control	of	the	semi-peripheral	region	of	the	Middle	East.	By	highlighting	the	historical	specificity	of	the	 semi-periphery	 in	 international	 legal	 history,	 it	 shows	 how	 Iraq	 was	 a	 laboratory	 for	experimentation	with	the	concept	of	sovereignty.	A	unique	doctrine	of	‘semi-peripheral	sovereignty’	was	skillfully	developed	by	the	Permanent	Mandates	Commission	of	the	League	of	Nations	in	Geneva	and	 embedded	 in	 the	 1930	Anglo-Iraq	 Treaty	 to	 ensure	 Iraq’s	 ‘independence’	 in	 1932	maintained	geopolitical	 and	 imperial	 interests	 that	 were	 specific	 to	 the	 region,	 especially	 the	 extraction,	production	and	transportation	of	Iraqi	oil	to	the	Mediterranean.			The	material	effects	of	this	international	legal	doctrine	on	the	everyday	lives	of	working	class	Iraqis	is	traced	by	looking	at	how	it	intersected	with	British	imperial	law,	land	law,	the	transnational	law	of	oil	 concessions	 and	 pipeline	 agreements,	 criminal	 law	 and	 emergency	 law.	 The	 spaces	 and	 semi-colonial	enclaves	of	capitalist	production	and	trade	of	the	oil	fields	in	Kirkuk,	the	railways	in	Baghdad	and	 the	 Port	 of	 Basra,	 and	 their	 corresponding	 governing	 structures	 are	 then	 detailed	 in	 micro-histories	with	the	aim	of	analyzing	the	manner	in	which	the	oil,	port	and	railway	workers	organized	against	 the	 semi-colonial	 and	 imperial	 legality	 that	 was	 imposed	 upon	 them.			The	dissertation	ends	with	an	analysis	of	the	massive	1948	Wathba	uprising	against	the	revision	of	the	1930	Anglo-Iraq	Treaty.	The	Wathba,	successfully	prevented	the	re-imposition	of	imperialism	in	Iraq,	and	would	turn	into	the	seed	of	the	July	Revolution	in	1958.	It	is	situated	here	within	the	wider	history	 of	 decolonization	 in	 the	 Third	 World	 to	 advance	 a	 novel	 methodological	 approach	 of	 the	‘conjuncture’	to	understand	anti-colonial	and	labour	agency	in	relation	to	international	legal	history.	This	 study	 illustrates	 that	 undertaking	 a	 ‘conjunctural	 analysis’	 illuminates	 how	 the	 agency	 of	 the	ordinary	peoples	of	 the	Third	World	 influenced	 international	 legal	 transformation.	The	doctrine	of	semi-peripheral	 sovereignty	 and	 all	 juridical	 forms	 of	 semi-colonialism	 would	 be	 unequivocally	rejected	 through	 the	 Iraqi	 contribution	 to	 the	 drafting	 of	 the	 1960	Declaration	 on	 the	Granting	 of	
Independence	 to	 Colonial	 Countries	 and	 Peoples.	 This	 dissertation	 therefore	 reveals	 the	 unique	constitutive	 relationship	 between	 international	 law,	 imperialism,	 and	 capitalism	 in	 the	 semi-peripheral	 Middle	 East,	 while	 maintaining	 the	 importance	 of	 integrating	 the	 history	 of	 ‘class	formation’,	‘agency’	and	‘labour’	into	international	legal	history.										
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Introduction 
 
 
No country could owe more to imperialism than does Iraq.1   
~ Sir John Troutbeck  
 
Mesopotamia as a whole is so rich…yet so defenseless and tempting as to prescribe organized government 
as the only means of guarding the riches it contains. We must expect therefore to find that 
Mesopotamia…will impose order and civilization on those who hold it.2  
 
~ Sir Mark Sykes  
 
 
There are no miracles in nature or history, but every abrupt turn in history, and this applies to every 
revolution, presents such a wealth of content, unfolds such unexpected and specific combinations of forms 
of struggle and alignment of forces of the contestants, that to the lay mind there is much that must appear 
miraculous.3   
 
~ V.I. Lenin 
 
 
 
I.  The imperial lines of the law & the invisible lines of agency 
 
In a meeting in 10 Downing Street in 1915, the young mid-level British officer and 
advisor to the War Office, Sir Mark Sykes was asked by the foreign secretary Arthur Balfour 
what kind of arrangement he envisaged with the French concerning the Arab territories of the 
Ottoman Empire at the Great War’s end. He responded by pointing on a map he had brought with 
him, ‘I should like to draw a line from the “e” in Acre to the last “k” in Kirkuk’.4  Herbert 
Kitchener, the secretary of state, who was present, intervened, ‘I think that what Sir Mark Sykes 
means is that the line will commence at the sea-coast of Haifa’.5 In less than twenty years, 																																																																				1	The	National	Archives	of	the	United	Kingdom	(TNA).	FO	371/110991.	VQ	1015/82.	John	Troutbeck	(British	Embassy,	Bagdad)	to	Anthony	Eden	(FO,	London)	December	9,	1954.	2	Mark	Sykes.	The	Caliphs’	Last	Heritage:	A	Short	History	of	the	Turkish	Empire,	 (London:	Macmillan	and	Co,	1915),	at	8.	3	V.I.	 Lenin.	Letters from Afar, First Letter, “The First Stage of the First Revolution”, in Lenin Collected 
Works (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1964), at 297–308.  4	TNA,	 CAB	 24/1,	 “Meeting	 held	 at	 10	 Downing	 Street,	 on	 Thursday,	 16	 December	 at	 11:30am,	Evidence	of	Lieutenant-Colonel	Sir	Mark	Sykes,	Bart,	MP,	on	the	Arab	Question,”	as	quoted	in	James	Barr.	A	Line	in	the	Sand:	The	Anglo-French	Struggle	for	the	Middle	East,	 (London:	W.W.	Norton	&	Co,	2012),	at	7.			5	Ibid.	
	 2	
analogous lines would demarcate the oil pipelines of the British-owned Iraq Petroleum Company, 
which originated in Kirkuk, transporting Iraqi oil westward through Syria, Lebanon and Palestine 
and ending at the ports of the Mediterranean in Haifa and Tripoli. The drawing up of ‘lines’ on 
maps and the ‘carving up’ of territories by European powers and oil cartels6 is a powerful image 
that is commonly invoked when one thinks of the Middle East. It could be said that the modern 
history of the geopolitical space known as the ‘Middle East’7 is a history of ‘lines’ – straight lines 
drawn on maps by (white) European hands.8 Such a statement would not necessarily be a truism 
if it did not intentionally disregard other ‘lines’ in the history of the region; living lines – the 
conjunctural lines of agency, working-class movements, organizational anti-colonial struggle, and 
revolutionary action.  
 
This dissertation is an attempt to ‘redraw’ the historical narrative of the region above by 
examining the history of Iraq in two interconnected ways: first, by emphasizing that the act of 
imperial line-drawing is a juridical act par excellence. The law could be found paralleling these 
imperial lines drawn on the maps of the region and must therefore be (re) traced in detail. In fact, 
the underlying claim of this work is that imperialism and semi-colonialism were only able to 
operate within this space as a result of international and transnational law and juridical 
arrangements being assembled in certain ways. The law therefore played a significant role in the 
production of unique geopolitical and economic spaces for imperialism to function in the Middle 
East. Moreover, international law’s contribution to the formation of the Iraqi state itself had wide 
repercussions for the entire region.   
 
																																																																				6	Another	 episode	 of	 line	 drawing	 on	 maps	 is	 that	 of	 the	 famous	 ‘Red-Line	 Agreement’	 signed	between	 the	 partners	 of	 the	 Turkish	 Petroleum	 Company	 on	 July	 31,	 1928.	 The	 story	 goes	 that	Calouste	Gulbenkian,	 the	 famous	Armenian	philanthropist,	 ‘took	a	 thick	 red	pencil	 and	drew	a	 line	along	the	boundaries	of	the	now-defunct	Turkish	empire…	Within	the	red	line	were	eventually	to	be	found	all	the	major	oil-producing	fields	of	the	Middle	East,	save	for	Persia	and	Kuwait.	The	partners	bound	themselves	not	to	engage	in	any	oil	operations	within	that	vast	territory	except	in	cooperation	with	the	other	members	of	the	Turkish	Petroleum	Company…It	set	the	framework	for	future	Middle	Eastern	oil	development…’	Daniel	Yergin.	The	Prize:	The	Epic	Quest	for	Oil,	Money	and	Power,	 (New	York:	Simon	&	Schuster,	1991),	at	204,	205.	7	See	Michael	E.	Bonnie,	Abbas	Amanat,	and	Michael	Ezekiel	Gasper	(eds).	Is	there	a	Middle	East?	The	
Evolution	of	a	Geopolitical	Concept,	 (Stanford:	 Stanford	University	Press,	 2012),	 for	 a	discussion	on	the	evolution	of	the	concept	of	the	Middle	East.	8	Related	 to	 these	 simplistic	 historical	 accounts	 of	 the	 region	 are	 those	 who	 refer	 to	 individual	Europeans	(such	as	Mark	Sykes,	Gertrude	Bell	or	T.E.	Lawrence	for	instance),	as	having	‘invented’	or	‘made’	 the	modern	Middle	 East.	 This	 is	 not	 a	merely	 highly	 orientalist	 version	 of	 history,	 but	 also	completely	inaccurate	in	its	description	of	the	region	as	a	tabula	rasa	for	European	agency,	while	the	local	populations	are	portrayed	as	completely	passive.		
	 3	
Second, this study is essentially an attempt to retrace the invisible lines of resistance and 
struggle in the region (specifically that of Iraq) and to demonstrate that these living lines of 
revolutionary action, movement agency and their conjunctures played a lasting role on the history 
of the region, the Third World and ultimately international law itself. This study is therefore one 
that endeavors to use Iraqi history as a lens to understand the role of international, transnational, 
and imperial law in the region. It is hoped that by situating the history of Iraq in such a manner, 
one would in turn better grasp how agency could be written into the history of international law.          
 
II. The specificity of the geo-political space of the Middle East & the economic logic of 
Sykes-Picot 
 
Soon after his visit to London, Sykes met with his French counterpart Georges Picot in 
secret to negotiate and draft the scandalous Sykes-Picot Agreement (May 1916) between Great 
Britain and France, which divided the region into spheres of influence.9 This document made 
public by the Bolsheviks in Izvestia and Pravda soon after they came to power in 1917, included 
a map, which showed the French portion marked as ‘A’ and the British marked as ‘B’.10 
Although the agreement envisioned the existence of a Confederation of Arab states within its 
spheres of influence, it was in direct contradiction with British assurances to the Sharif of Mecca, 
Hussein Bin Ali in the Hussein-McMahon Correspondence (1915-1916), which promised Arab 
independence in return for the Arabs waging a revolt against the Ottoman Empire.11  
 
 The Sykes-Picot Agreement ultimately failed to materialize as envisioned, and the 
borders of the new states that settled after the war were different and in fact shaped by political 
compromises and unpredictable post-war changes, such as the rising unformidable Arab 
nationalism across the region, the discussions at the (more transparent) conferences in Paris 
(1919), San Remo (1920) and Cairo (1921); and the emergent Turkish state. The discourse 
surrounding Sykes-Picot, however, is alive and well and continues to creep into the historical 
narrative of the region, presented as a kind of ‘originary moment’ of imperial intervention in the 
																																																																				9	See	The	Sykes-Picot	Agreement	May	1916,	Oxford	Public	 International	Law,	and	Umut	Özsu,	Sykes-Picot:	the	treaty	that	carved	up	the	Middle	East,	OUPBLOG	(May,	2016).	10	See	 Figure	 2.	 Britain’s	 sphere	 of	 influence	 included	 Basra	 and	 Baghdad	 in	 Mesopotamia,	 while	France	 included	 Syria,	 Southern	 Anatolia	 and	Mosul.	 Palestine	was	 designated	 as	 an	 international	zone.		11	See	 Elie	 Kedourie.	 In	 the	 Anglo-Arab	 Labyrinth:	 the	 McMahon-Husayn	 Correspondence	 and	 its	
Interpretations,	1914-1939	(Routledge,	2000).	
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region and its corresponding post-war state formation.12 It is especially evoked to further the 
argument that Iraq and Syria are artificial creations of European powers.13 One need not mention 
how such a (orientalist) narrative of ‘line-drawing’ by Europeans on ‘empty maps’ ultimately 
takes away from any agency of the local population and erases all traces of resistance. Sara 
Pursley has already showed how this ‘artificiality thesis’ was a narrative concocted by the British 
in the 1920s to legitimize their continued control of Iraq, and the reality was that both the Cairo 
and San Remo conferences were responses to nationalist demands by the local inhabitants of Iraq 
and Syria for independence, expressed in popular uprisings and armed resistance.14 Iraq therefore, 
‘is no more artificial that any other country with borders drawn as a result of a variety of reasons 
including wars, treaties, compromises, backroom deals, internal and external pressures, and plain 
chance’.15 
 
The Sykes-Picot Agreement would be more accurately perceived as one that denotes the 
specificity of the geopolitical space of the Middle East as a whole. It was accordingly not 
necessarily about the actual carving up and division of the region, but rather about the economic 
exploitation of the entire Middle East. In this way it remains relevant to the subsequent Mandate 
period in question. Although it was decided that the Mandate system would be the manner by 
which these territories would be disposed of, making it seem that the nineteenth century 
imperialist spirit of Sykes-Picot – sanctioning the old practices of annexation, colonial plunder 
and secret diplomacy– were over. However, as will be shown in this study of Iraq, the economic 
vision of Sykes-Picot continued to permeate deep in the impetus of the Mandate system and 
Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations16, except that now it was legal, transparent 
and governed by international law.  Karin Loevy has aptly made the point that Sykes-Picot 
comprised new imperial imaginings of a regional ‘geospace’ of economic development. It 
evoked, she writes, ‘a powerful imperial image of a region that is opening up for innumerable 
																																																																				12	Sara	Pursley.	‘Lines	Drawn	on	an	Empty	Map’:	Iraq’s	Borders	and	the	Legend	of	the	Artificial	State’,	
Jadaliyya,	June	2	2015.		13	Ibid.	14Ibid.		15	Thabit	Abdullah.	Dictatorship,	Imperialism	&	Chaos:	Iraq	since	1989,	(London:	Zed	Books,	2006),	at	2.	16	Article	22	of	the	Covenant	of	the	League	of	the	Nations	was	the	legal	basis	of	the	mandate	system:	“To	those	colonies	and	territories	which	as	a	consequence	of	the	late	war	have	ceased	to	be	under	the	sovereignty	of	States	which	formerly	governed	them	and	which	are	inhabited	by	peoples	not	yet	able	to	stand	by	themselves	under	the	strenuous	conditions	of	the	modern	world,	there	should	be	applied	the	principle	 that	 the	well-being	and	development	of	 such	peoples	 for	a	 sacred	 trust	of	 civilization	and	that	securities	for	the	performance	of	this	trust	should	be	embodied	in	this	Covenant.”				
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future possibilities for development and for the management of broad strategic concerns’.17  
These economic concerns were reflected in its provisions that referred to ‘free ports’, the 
establishment of norms for free trade, the transfer of water, lines of transportation, 
railroads…etc.18  
 
In his introduction to the American Journal of International Law Symposium on the 
centenary of Sykes-Picot, Antony Anghie emphasizes these continuities when he makes the point 
that inter-imperial arrangements were always concerned with free trade and navigational rights 
and that therefore this illustrates that, ‘questions of governance and sovereignty…were 
inextricably linked in such agreements with trade and commerce’.19  Edward Said has analyzed 
Sykes-Picot by reference to its ‘peculiar epistemological framework,’ one whereby, ‘the Orient 
was seen…as a geographical…entity over whose destiny they [i.e. the European powers] believed 
themselves to have traditional entitlement’.20 Such ideological frameworks with regards to the 
Orient and its corresponding economic logic went hand in hand with the ‘civilizing mission’ of 
European imperialism in the Third World, and both were re-conceptualized and translated into the 
language of international law and its new post-war institutions. As this study will show, despite 
the novel rearrangements occurring in the international legal order at the time, these conceptual 
frameworks with its economic linkage continued unabated in the semi-periphery. In fact, the 
same economic preoccupations of free trade that imperial powers were concerned with in The 
Treaty of Berlin of 1885 and which emanated in the spirit of Sykes-Picot continued in the 
Mandate system in a very subtle way (especially within the guise of new forms of sovereignty 
and ‘independence’) and it is these legal intricacies that this study of Iraq is concerned with. 
 
III. Four underlying interventions & arguments  
 
There are four major interventions and arguments that run throughout this work. The first 
is that critical international legal scholars of the Third World have overlooked the semi-periphery 
																																																																				17Karin	Loevy.	 ‘The	Sykes-Picot	Agreement’s	Regional	Moment:	Drawing	Lines	of	Development	 in	a	New	 and	 Open	 Space’	 Symposium	 on	 the	 Many	 Lives	 and	 Legacies	 of	 Sykes-Picot,	 AJIL	 Unbound,	Vol.110,	2016,	at	122.			18	Ibid.		19Antony	 Anghie.	 ‘Introduction	 to	 Symposium	 on	 the	 Many	 Lives	 and	 Legacies	 of	 Sykes-Picot’,	September	 28,	 2016,	 AJIL	 Unbound,	 https://www.asil.org/blogs/introduction-symposium-many-lives-and-legacies-sykes-picot	at	106,	emphasis	added.		20	Edward	Said.	Orientalism.	(NY:	Vintage,	1978),	at	221.	
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and its significance in the history of international law and its institutions.21 In other words, the 
literature has for the most part maintained a strict dichotomy between the periphery and the core, 
while the semi-periphery, which has a unique history, has been ignored. It is only by exploring 
the semi-periphery in historical detail that its specificity becomes clear and the operations of 
international law in the Middle East can be understood.22 The analytic ambiguity associated with 
the region demonstrates how the law – i.e. a combination of international, transnational and 
imperial law – operated in a manner that obscured reality. The imperial powers, through the 
Permanent Mandates Commission (PMC) in Geneva, experimented with the concept of 
sovereignty in Iraq. This was meant to allow for the making of a unique form of ‘semi-peripheral 
sovereignty’ in international law for the region that would be compatible with the economic 
exploitation not only of Iraq, but the entire semi-peripheral Middle East. Iraqi oil being the jewel 
in the crown of the Middle East could only be exploited in this manner. In this sense, a focus on 
the spatial and geopolitical characteristics of the semi-periphery makes it easier to understand 
why it was that from an imperial viewpoint, necessary to designate the ‘A’ Mandates, where 
‘independence’ was provisionally recognized, as such.  
 
The semi-periphery was a laboratory for legal experimentation with the concept of 
sovereignty with the hope that the advent of independence in the region, as upheld by the new 
post-war international legal order based on Wilsonian notions of self-determination, would still 
license imperialism through the uninterrupted flow of capital and oil extraction, ensuring its 
continued operation in a subtle but legitimate manner. International law was therefore deployed in 
the region for specific geopolitical purposes, in particular the maintenance of European influence, 
imperial control and access to oil. Iraq was at the heart of this experiment. It would ultimately 
become the only mandated territory that would be proclaimed as independent under the Mandate 
process of international law. Of course, as this study will show, this ‘independence’ was a sham – 
a mere figment that was maintained through the law.  Only a deep historical analysis of the law in 
the semi-periphery, and in Iraq in particular, can reveal how this figment was maintained, its 
exploitative effects on the peoples of the region, and its implications for international law.         																																																																				21	Antony	Anghie	for	instance	relies	on	a	dichotomy	of	the	periphery	and	the	centre	in	his	history	of	international	 law	without	 any	 reference	 to	 the	 semi-periphery	 at	 all.	 Antony	 Anghie.	 Imperialism,	
Sovereignty	and	the	Making	of	International	Law,	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2004),	at	314.		22	The	literature	on	the	role	of	the	semi-periphery	in	international	legal	history	has	only	just	begun	to	emerge:	See	Umut	Öszu,	Formalizing	Displacement:	International	Law	and	Population	Transfers		(New	York:	Oxford	University	 Press,	 2015);	Arnulf	Becker	 Lorca.	Mestizo	 International	Law,	 (Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2014);	Mai	Taha.	Nation	and	Class	Subjectivity	in	International	Law	and	
its	Institutions	in	the	Middle	East	(1919-1939),	SJD	Dissertation,	University	of	Toronto,	2015.		
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    The second argument of this study is that the history of international law must be 
analyzed from a materialist perspective if one intends to uncover its connections with 
capitalism. 23  Luis Eslava and Sundhja Pahuja have emphasized the need for a new 
methodological turn towards an understanding of how international law operates in everyday life. 
The point in this study is not merely to do this, but in addition to grasp its interconnected role in 
the capitalist mode of production affecting the material lives of the peoples of the Third World. It 
is for this reason necessary to incorporate the category and lens of class and its formation in this 
analysis.  This study is consequently a critique of the ‘cultural turn’ within critical international 
legal scholarship, which mirrors the turn taken by scholars of subaltern studies in particular and 
late post-colonialism in general.24 The materiality of international law emphasizes the manner by 
which the peoples of the Third World were directly affected by the imperialism embedded in 
international law and its institutions. It connects international law to the everyday lives of the 
colonized. It emphasizes how international law and its institutions in the semi-periphery 
contributed not only to state formation, but to the capitalist modes of production, which in turn 
structured class formation.25  
 
 Consequently by inserting class as an analytic lens to understand the materiality of 
international law, this study will elucidate how the unique capitalist spaces of production that 
were produced by international law, its institutions and instruments in Iraq (the Mandate, the 
Anglo-Iraq treaties, and the doctrines of sovereignty) violently impacted the Iraqi working class. 
These workers would eventually unite and organize to fight against these constraints and the 
violent effects of international law that they experienced directly in their workplaces and 
everyday lives. My focus on labour as a site of agency is used here for several reasons, one of 
which is that the Iraqi worker, similar to his counterparts in the region, at the specific conjuncture 
of (early) decolonization and within these colonial and semi-colonial spaces allowed him or her to 
experience the violent contradictions of capitalism, semi-colonialism and imperialism from a 																																																																				23	Luis	 Eslava	 and	 Sundhja	 Pahuja.	 “Beyond	 the	 (Post)Colonial:	 TWAIL	 and	 the	 Everyday	 Life	 of	International	 Law”,	 Journal	 of	 Law	 and	 Politics	 in	 Africa,	 Asia	 and	 Latin	 America	 -	 Verfassung	 und	
Recht	in	Übersee	(VRÜ),	Vol.	45(2),	2012,	at	195-221.	24	See	 Nathaniel	 Berman.	Passion	and	Ambivalence:	 Colonialism,	Nationalism,	 and	 International	 Law	(Leiden:	Martinus	Nijhoff	Publishers,	2011),	at	404;	Martii	Koskenniemi.	From	Apology	to	Utopia:	The	
Structure	of	International	Legal	Argument	(New	York:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2006),	at	7,	12.		25 A	 materialist	 understanding	 of	 international	 law	 has	 been	 undertaken	 by	 several	 critical	international	legal	scholars,	the	most	prominent	being	China	Mieville	and	his	reinterpretation	of	the	work	of	Bolshevik	legal	theorist	Evgeny	Pashukanis.	China	Mieville.	Between	Equal	Rights:	A	Marxist	
Theory	of	International	Law,	(Chicago:	Haymarket	Books,	2006).		
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unique location.26 This consequently gave the worker a unique vantage point for struggle, 
allowing him or her to connect his or her material conditions to imperialism. Tracing agency 
through the question of labour therefore allows this study not to lose track of how agency moved 
from these confined spaces of capitalist production to the wider spaces of anti-colonial nationalist 
struggle, which were in turn transformed into a total rejection of the international legal order that 
was imposed on Iraq. Hence, the imperialism and semi-colonialism of international law in Iraq 
did have material effects on certain classes more than others, and scholars would be amiss to 
ignore this fact. Putting it differently, the sovereignty granted to Iraq by international law, was a 
(limited) sovereignty granted to a specific class. A focus on labour (and class analysis), then, 
would clarify the constitutive connection between international law, imperialism, and capitalism 
in a more grounded way. 
 
Considering that this study is not only an international legal history of Iraq, but also a 
labour history of Iraq (as it aims to connect the histories of agency of labour and anti-colonial 
struggle to international legal history), it is not surprising that the second argument above is not 
only aimed at international legal scholars who emphasize culture over social relations, but is also 
a response to the principal arguments of the Subaltern Studies historians27 in their analyses of 
labour in the history of India and Eastern societies in general. The history of the Iraqi working 
class as presented in this study will demonstrate the continuing relevance of the concept of ‘class’ 
and will show that despite their tribal and peasant backgrounds, Iraqi workers formed (at certain 
critical conjunctures) a unique class-consciousness and bonds of class solidarity in waging their 
struggles against semi-colonization and imperialism. The subaltern approach, which discards 
Marxist categories (such as class), and prefers a post-structuralist –cultural – notion of difference 
(through its category of ‘the subaltern’) will be seen to be quite unsuitable for understanding the 
history of Iraq and the Middle East. For culture on its own should never be the underpinnings of 
any understanding of Iraqi (or Eastern) society.  																																																																				26	Here	I	am	referring	to	a	narrow	section	of	 the	Iraqi	working-class,	which	 is	still	a	minority	–	 the	more	 advanced	 sections	 of	 the	 working-class,	 who	 worked	 in	 the	 colossal	 industrial	 enterprises,	which	were	 foreign-owned	and	administered.	These	were	 the	most	 ‘proletariatized’	 sections	of	 the	working-class	and	are	the	focus	of	this	study:	the	oil,	port	and	railways	workers.	The	point	is	that	at	these	 strategic	 locations	 capitalism,	 semi-colonialism,	 and	 international	 law	 had	 a	 clearer	manifestation.	27The	 initial	Subaltern	group	came	together	 in	 the	1970s	and	consisted	of	Partha	Chatterjee,	David	Hardiman,	 Gyanendra	 Pandey,	 Sumit	 Sarkar,	 and	 Dipesh	 Chakrabarty.	 For	 good	 summaries	 of	 the	group’s	 history	 see:	 Ranajit	 Guha,	 “Introduction,”	 Selected	 Subaltern	 Studies	 (New	 York:	 Oxford	University	 Press,	 1988);	 Dipesh	 Chakrabarty,	 “Subaltern	 Studies	 and	 Postcolonial	 Historiography,”	Nepantla:	 Views	 from	 South	 1:1	 (2000),	 9-32;	 David	 Ludden,	 “A	 Brief	 History	 of	 Subalternity,”	 in	Ludden,	ed.,	Reading	Subaltern	Studies	(London:	Anthem	Press,	2002),	1-39.	
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The third underlying argument is that the imperialism and semi-colonialism of 
international and transnational law in the semi-periphery would be better grasped by emphasizing 
the significance of its spatiality, especially considering that the semi-periphery has continuously 
been viewed as a highly geo-strategic location for imperial powers in the first place.28 Iraq’s 
uniquely strategic location was one reason for the emergence of certain capitalist spaces and 
enclaves that were essentially severed from the governing capacity of the Iraqi state. It was in a 
way the existence of these spaces that characterized the (constricted) Iraqi semi-peripheral 
sovereignty, which emerged out of the Mandate process. This study will not only explore these 
spaces – namely the oil fields of Kirkuk, the railway workshops of Baghdad and the port of Basra 
– in micro-histories, but also most significantly detail how Iraqi workers were affected by these 
imperial and semi-colonial spaces, and in turn organized against them, at times producing their 
own counter-hegemonic spaces. This argument of course relies on those scholars who have 
developed economic analyses of space (and time) under capitalism, and who have maintained that 
space is a social construct that must be taken seriously by disciplines other than geography.29  
 
The point here, however, is to maintain the interconnection between international law, 
capitalism, space and the human workers materially affected by these processes. As Tayyab 
Mahmud has clarified in his work on indenture labour, ‘…international law [is] unavoidably 
entangled with hierarchal positionings of bodies and spaces by global operations of capitalism.’30 
It is however the specificity of the semi-peripheral Middle East that is most interesting to this 
study as the region was itself a spatial construct, as we have seen above with the framework used 
to draft Sykes-Picot with its underlying economic logic. It is therefore the semi-periphery’s 
																																																																				28	The	 connection	 between	 geography	 and	 imperialism	 must	 be	 made	 as	 well.	 It	 not	 merely	 the	drawing	of	lines	that	characterizes	an	imperialist	action,	but	so	is	the	production	of	maps.	As	Morag	Bell,	Robin	Butlin	and	Michael	Heffernan	have	written,	‘the	principal	geographic	tool	was	the	map.	By	representing	the	huge	complexity	of	a	particular	physical	and	human	landscape	cartographically	in	a	single	 image,	 geographers	 provided	 the	 European	 imperial	 project	 with	 arguably	 its	 most	 potent	device.’	 Morag	 Bell,	 Robin	 Butlin	 and	 Michael	 Heffernan	 (eds.).	 Geography	 and	 Imperialism	 1820-
1940,	(Manchester:	Manchester	University	Press,	1994),	at	4.	29	See	David	Harvey.	The	Limits	of	Capital,	(London:	Verso,	1999);	Harvey.	Spaces	of	Global	Capitalism:	
A	 Theory	 of	 Uneven	 Geographical	 Development	 (London:	 Verso,	 2006),	 and	 Henri	 Lefebvre.	 The	
Production	 of	 Space,	 (London:	 Blackwell,	 1978).	 Harvey	 spatializes	 Marx	 and	 demonstrates	 how	space	 is	 produced	 by	 and	 also	 shaped	 by	 capitalism.	 For	 an	 overall	 analysis	 of	 his	work	 see,	 Eric	Sheppard.	“David	Harvey	and	Dialectical	SpaceTime”,	in	Noel	Castree	and	Derek	Gregory	(eds),	David	
Harvey:	A	Critical	Reader,	(New	York:	Blackwell,	2006).	30	Tayyab	Mahmud.	 “Cheaper	 than	 a	 Slave:	 Indenture	 Labor,	 Colonialism,	 and	Capitalism”,	Whittier	
Law	Review,	(2013),	Vol.	34.2,	215-243,	at	216.			
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unique spatiality that is what makes it vital for imperialism.	31 It would only make sense then that 
the corresponding juridical structures of international and transitional law that penetrated the 
region, which is the concern of this study, would also approach it and manifest in such a spatial 
manner. As will be shown, Iraqi (labour and anti-colonial) agency had to consequently use this 
spatiality strategically in their organized struggles against imperialism and this is quite revealing.  
 
Finally, the fourth and most central argument underlying this work is concerned with the 
question of agency in international legal history. In other words, it is an attempt to answer the 
following question: how could one write the history of the agency of the ordinary peoples of the 
Third World into that of international law? It will be argued that a methodological approach 
borrowed from Marxist theory of the international conjuncture needs to be inserted into critical 
legal scholarship, so as to properly assess the question of agency in relation to international legal 
transformation. This approach takes the ‘conjuncture’ as the starting point of any analysis of 
agency, emphasizing that acts of resistance, especially revolutionary action, are contingent to the 
international legal structures in question. The concept of the conjuncture refers to the 
potentialities of action in the historical arena and it analyzes agency in relation to the structures in 
question rather than in isolation from them. The point is that at certain conjunctures in history, the 
specific alignment of political (domestic and international) forces and structures brings about 
counter-hegemonic spaces where action becomes possible and where agency is more conducive 
to historical transformation and development.  Action and agency have more effect on historical 
transformation in these cases. By making the correct connections, agency would be analyzed in 
relation to these (historical) conjunctures and grasped more fully, while keeping the present 
conjuncture in mind. 
 
The argument here is a response to how some streams of Third World Approaches to 
International Law (TWAIL) scholarship have theorized agency in their work by romanticizing the 
plurality of law, its spontaneity and its non-violence. It is moreover a manifestation of the 
‘cultural turn’ mentioned earlier. TWAIL analyses of anti-colonial agency or their preferred 
notion of ‘resistance,’ discards revolutionary action, which has generally been violent, organized 
and party-oriented. Such sanitization of the history of revolutionary agency also completely 
ignores the fact that not every action is effective as it depends on its contingent relation to the 
structure in question. It assumes that in the creative and cultural uses of law, movements could 																																																																				31	Such	as	 its	 significance	 in	air	 communications,	 as	a	 centre	between	East	and	West,	 the	 ‘route’	 to	India,	and	of	course	its	oil	deposits.		
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wage an effective struggle against imperialism and its manifestations in international law, at 
anytime. This study of Iraqi labour agency, however, shows how structure and agency are in fact 
interconnected, and so one must understand how a conjuncture containing revolutionary potential 
of a counter-hegemonic space emerged in the first place – a conjuncture that allows a movement 
room to wage an effective and organized struggle. To do this, a wider international perspective of 
agency and action is needed, situating it more broadly in opposition to the (international, legal 
and natural) unity of imperialism to understand why it is that targeting one location on the 
imperial map at a certain time is effective, while another is not. 
 
IV. Chapters’ overview 
 
 It is now appropriate to briefly outline the chapters of this study. Chapter 1 begins in rural 
Iraq and describes how a system of semi-feudal capitalist production was established and 
structured through the operations of British administrative techniques and imperial law. The 
chapter looks at two interrelated narratives: the British invention of tribal customary law, and the 
land tenure system that entrenched capitalist relations in Iraq. It illustrates how the British 
imported certain legal colonial administrative techniques from their experience in India (and 
elsewhere in the Empire) to secure their imperial interests and bolster the semi-colonial Iraqi 
state. This created a fragmented positivist duality in Iraqi law, as the British institutionalized a 
separate tribal legal system that was removed from the jurisdiction of the state. It will be shown 
how this fragmentation in law served British interests and the Iraqi ruling class through the 
consolidation of the semi-colonial Iraqi state. The second part of the chapter explores how 
capitalist (semi-feudal) relations were established in Iraq through the British land policy and 
corresponding legislation, which concentrated land into a small number of landowners, 
transforming selected sheikhs into landlords, while their tribesmen became peasants and later 
bonded serfs, and would ultimately flee to the cities to become wage earners. The main argument 
of this chapter is therefore that the law played a significant role in capitalist transformation and 
the structuring of underdevelopment in Iraq. 
 
 Chapter 2 moves to the city of Baghdad to explore the early history of the labour 
movement, in particular the first such organization: the Jamʿīyat aṣḥāb al-	ṣināʿa. The purpose of 
the chapter is to contextualize the history of the Labour Law of 1936, arguing that it was passed 
by the Iraqi state partly as a concession to pacify the working class and its movement due to their 
first experiments in strike action in 1930 and 1931. It will be shown that despite the fact that the 
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Labour Law was to become merely black ink on paper, not to be applied for the next twenty-two 
years until after revolution, both the early and later communist-led labour movement would 
appropriate its language and use it as a reference point in making their demands in nearly every 
strike to come. The main argument here is that the law – even a dead law of a semi-colonial state 
– was a useful (but limited) tool to advance a counter-hegemonic struggle as it provided a 
language for the workers to advance their demands. 	
 
Chapter 3 details the role of international law in the formation of the Iraqi state and the 
making of a unique Iraqi sovereignty out of the Mandate process in Geneva – what I call ‘semi-
peripheral sovereignty’, which I define as a sovereignty that is constructed for geopolitical 
purposes pertaining to the semi-peripheral region of the Middle East, in particular its economic 
exploitation and especially to (legally) extract and transport Iraqi oil to the Mediterranean. The 
chapter begins by exploring the principles behind the Mandate system, moving to an examination 
of the significance of the ‘A’ mandates. It then attempts to explain how British legal practices, 
such as treaty-making, were used to reconcile certain aspects of international law, constructing 
Iraqi independence and its sovereignty in 1932 through the ratification of the 1930 Anglo-Iraq 
Treaty – which was to become the legal manifestation of imperialism in Iraq throughout the 
Hashemite period.  
 
The central argument of this chapter is that only by tracing the economic dimensions of 
this semi-peripheral sovereignty could one grasp its relevance for the region. To do this, I analyze 
how the members of the Permanent Mandates Commission (PMC) in Geneva, who were making 
international law in their sessions, reached the conclusion that Iraq was ready for independence. I 
explore the contradictions in their reasoning, especially concerning the economic principle of 
economic equality, also known as the ‘open door,’ which was meant to prevent monopolization 
and exploitation. The Iraqi oil concessions, however, were intentionally differentiated and 
separated from the discussion of political sovereignty. It will be shown that the economic aspects 
of Iraqi sovereignty and its effects on the region are to be found in the PMC’s deliberations on the 
oil pipeline agreements that dealt with the effects of the oil pipelines on the mandates of Palestine 
and Syria. These discussions contained further contradictory logic in that the open door principle 
was circumvented as oil was allotted exceptional status under international law. This legal 
reasoning was necessary to legitimate the operations of imperialism in the region.  
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Chapter 3 then shows how the pipeline agreements were intimately connected to the Iraqi 
oil concession, and in turn, how the oil concession was intimately linked to Iraqi semi-peripheral 
sovereignty. Iraqi semi-peripheral sovereignty would be accepted as a part of international law 
until the unremitting struggle waged by the Iraqi people (first manifested in the 1948 Wathba 
uprising) broke its fetters after the 1958 July Revolution, leading to the unequivocal rejection of 
this legal figment on the international stage through the Iraqi contribution to the drafting of the 
1960 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.     
      
 Chapters 4 and 5 are mini-histories that describe the spaces that were intrinsically linked 
to capitalism and its modes of production, and depict the conditions of the workers who lived and 
worked there. These imperial and semi-colonial enclaves were central to the operations of 
capitalism and imperialism in Iraq: the oil fields of Kirkuk, the Iraq State Railways concentrated 
in the Schālchīyyah workshops in Baghdad, and the port of Basra. I will begin with a description 
of the legal structures that governed these spaces – through the 1930 Anglo-Iraq Treaty and the 
oil concession– which detached them from the Iraqi state. The oil fields were governed by the 
British-owned Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) under a concessionary agreement. The company 
was allotted wide discretionary powers to manage the space of the oil fields that it had significant 
economic impact on the city of Kirkuk and its surroundings as a whole. The railways and the port 
were semi-autonomous enclaves governed by British administrators. These chapters are therefore 
meant to show how international law, transnational law and imperial law produced these spaces 
and how they directly affected the lives of Iraqi workers, while describing how labour agency 
operated to free the workers from its socio-economic constraints.  
 
Chapter 4 describes the miserable conditions of the workers of the oil fields, where 
colonial relations were maintained even after independence. I go on to describe how the workers 
united to form a trade union with the guidance of the Iraqi Communist Party and organized 
massive strikes against the company in 1946 (centered around the Gāwūrbāghī gardens) and later 
in the K3 pumping station in 1948.  I show how these strikes were violently crushed through the 
complicity of the company, the British Embassy and the Iraqi state. I argue that the legal 
arrangements at the intersection of the concession and semi-peripheral sovereignty permitted the 
company, British officials and local police to collude to use violence against the workers in 
Gāwūrbāghī. Iraqi law and justice were unable to penetrate the imperial concessionary space 
governed by the oil company to hold anyone accountable for the cold-blooded murder of workers. 
The chapter ends with a detailed analysis of the K3-pumping station strike (a major part of the 
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Wathba uprising), whereby the workers used spatiality as strategy, disrupting the oil pipelines on 
the imperial map of oil extraction to assert their material demands.   
 
Chapter 5 details the struggle of the railway and port workers to improve their conditions 
and challenge the legal structures of semi-colonialism that governed their workplaces. This 
chapter illustrates the organizational strategies and tactics used by these workers in forming 
independent trade unions to struggle against semi-colonial legality and for the implementation of 
the labour law, waging organized strike actions in 1945, 1946 and 1948. I show how the Iraqi 
state through the advice of British labour experts responded to these strikes by undermining the 
workers’ efforts, but also by promoting certain social and labour reforms (such as replacing their 
independent trade unions with workers’ committees) with the aim of upholding British semi-
colonial hegemony rather than allow for real structural change. The British labour experts’ views 
of workers and trade unionism in Iraq will be explored through a detailed analysis of British 
labour reports. The chapter argues that workers used the law inventively as a rhetorical and 
strategic tool against the semi-colonial order, while British experts devised legal reforms as a way 
to undercut any real structural change in Iraqi society.  
 
     Chapter 6 is an examination of the violence underlying semi-peripheral sovereignty. It 
details how the Iraqi state used criminal law, martial law and the doctrine of emergency to crush 
any form of dissent. After delving into the historical origins of the doctrine of emergency, the 
chapter argues that the Iraqi state used this colonial method to institute a de facto permanent state 
of emergency after the 1952 Intifāda, and maintain its hegemony and the semi-colonial order. It 
was to become a technique of semi-colonial governance in Iraq. The doctrine of emergency was 
ingrained into the institutions of the Iraqi state and the constitution itself. Furthermore, draconian 
criminal legislation, such as the amendment to the Baghdad Penal Code of 1938, was analogously 
used to suppress any form of dissent or any call for change. The military courts relied on the 1938 
amendment to imprison thousands of protestors and strikers, while communist leaders were 
executed after the Wathba uprising. This history of repression and the role of law in it will be 
recounted. The chapter ends with the debates in and out of parliament, especially focusing on the 
work of the renowned Iraqi legal scholar Hussein Jamīl revealing the limitations of his social 
democratic liberalism. The point here is not only to show that semi-peripheral sovereignty and the 
doctrine of emergency were two sides of the same coin, but also to emphasize that it was only by 
defeating the entire semi-colonial order that the state of emergency finally ended and not through 
the safeguarding of the rule of law per se. 
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Finally, Chapter 7 is a recounting of the massive 1948 Wathba uprising, initiated by 
workers and students and encompassing a wide stratum of Iraqi society, who came out to the 
streets of Baghdad to protest the imposition of a revised treaty between Iraq and Britain. The 
proposed revision of the 1930 Anglo-Iraq Treaty was meant to redefine the semi-colonial Iraqi 
order to make it consistent with the newly emerging international order and the UN Charter. 
However, the provisions of the revised Portsmouth Treaty in fact entrenched Iraq further into 
imperialist control. This chapter is concerned with understanding how agency could be analyzed 
and written into international legal history through a close analysis of the Wathba uprising. After 
assessing the contents of the Treaty, the narrative moves to the streets to explain how workers and 
students organized and just over three weeks successfully prevented the imposition of this treaty 
before the uprising was violently crushed.  
 
The central argument of this chapter is that the Wathba was a manifestation of a 
conjuncture against the imperialism of international law. As mentioned earlier the argument will 
be presented within the historical context of the Wathba to emphasize that critical international 
legal scholars, especially TWAIL scholars, must undertake conjunctural analyses to grasp how 
agency plays a role in international legal transformation.  The Wathba is situated into the wider 
history of decolonization in the Third World. The argument in this chapter therefore brings the 
entire historical narrative of this study together. The oil, port and railway workers utilized their 
previous experiences in strike action and sabotage within their confined workplaces for a wider 
anti-colonial struggle. Organized people’s coordination committees sprang up. The workers’ 
consciousness of the connection between their material conditions and imperialism was conveyed 
by the Iraqi masses during the Wathba, who displayed a clear understanding of how imperialism 
functions through law and how law obscures reality.   
 
Through their very actions, the Iraqi urban poor, students and peasants rejected the entire 
semi-colonial order, in particular the doctrine of semi-peripheral sovereignty, denoting their 
demand to control their own destinies. The Wathba would become the seed of the July Revolution 
of 1958, as every uprising after it would call for its renewal until the revolutionary overthrow of 
the semi-colonial order by the Free Officers a decade later.  
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V. A note on sources & the limits of writing a legal & labour history of the Middle East               
 
It should be mentioned that this historical work was the product of the painstaking 
weaving together of the fragmented sources on Iraq. In other words, it was the best that could be 
done considering the circumstances and so a lot of questions remain due to the problem of the 
fragmentation and unavailability of sources on the region. The extensive archival research that 
was conducted for this international legal and labour history of Iraq include the following: British 
records from the National Archives at Kew; the company records of the Iraq Petroleum Company 
located in the BP Archive at Warwick University’s Modern Records Centre in Coventry; the 
reports of the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations; and the Muḥātharāt 
Majlis al-Nūwwāb (Iraqi parliamentary records) held at the Nami Yafet Memorial Library of the 
American University of Beirut in Lebanon. Despite visiting other archives, such as the ILO 
Archives in Geneva and the US National Archives in Maryland, I did not end up using these 
records for various reasons. A future book project would certainly refer to these sources to paint a 
more complete picture. To reconstruct Iraqi labour history, I relied on a variety of sources, in 
particular memoirs of communist, nationalist and labour leaders; working class, nationalist and 
communist newspapers (especially the communist al-Qāʿida and the social democratic Ṣawt al-
Ahāli); communist pamphlets; Iraqi Marxist journals, such as the cultural ICP journal, al-Thaqāfa 
al-Jadīda (‘The New Culture’) held at Yale University Library; and selected records from the 
British Communist Party Archives, amongst others.  
 
It is unfortunate that I was unable to go to Baghdad to delve into the Iraqi National 
Archives, due to the security situation and the difficulty of getting access in the first place. The 
possibility of conducting oral interviews was also regrettably grim, since a significant number of 
the participants in the labour and communist movements of the period (if not executed by the 
Baʿath party in 1963) have either long passed or were unable to meet for health reasons. I did, 
however, get a chance to briefly correspond with several old Iraqi communists, including, Ara’ 
Khājādwr, ʿAzīz Sbāhī, and Ghānim Ḥamdūn. They have all since passed. I am ever so grateful 
for their input and generous guidance.  
 
 
Turning from the historiography of international law to that of labour, it has been said 
that ‘it is nearly impossible’ to find the necessary primary sources to build a labour history of 
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Iraq.32 Although it has certainly been quite difficult to write this history, I do not think that the 
mere fragmentation of the primary sources should prevent scholars from at least attempting to 
weave together a labour history of the region. Although this study is not a classic labour study, its 
focus on international law and its institutions allows Iraqi labour history to be situated in a novel 
way. Such a methodological shift in the study of labour could be argued to be in itself an original 
contribution to the overall literature and labour historiography of the Middle East. Still, I hope 
that I have contributed in some small way in weaving together a historical study of labour in Iraq 
for future generations of Middle East scholars to build on.  
    
   
 
 
 
 
 	
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                              
 
 
 																																																																				32	Kevin	 M.	 Jones.	 “Unmaking	 the	 Middle	 Eastern	 working	 classes:	 labour	 and	 the	 politics	 of	historiography”,	Social	History,	2015,	Vol.	40,	No.	2,	145-156;	at	150	
	 18	
Chapter 1: The Semi-Colonial Uses of Positivist Duality in Law or How Law 
Underdeveloped Iraq 
 
 
 
[I]n Iraq the rule of law was the rule of two laws…one… for an ordinary civilized nation…the other for armed savages 
given up… to the barbaric concepts of honour.	33 
 
~ Caractacus 
 
We have a bizarre law…called the Tribal Criminal and Civil Disputes Regulation … created by the occupiers… for the 
purpose [of furthering] the politics of occupation…35 
 
~ Maki Jamil 
 
Oh Planter of fruit, full of hope for reward 
Abandon your effort for its fruit is sadness 
Uproot it, for the delicious fruit is forbidden 
For the planter and permissible only for the strong.37 
 
~ Ahmad al-Safi al-Najafi 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the role of the law in the underdevelopment of 
Iraq. How was a system of ‘semi-feudal’ capitalist production established in modern Iraq? 39 The 
history of Iraq and its colonization has generally been approached under the guise of different 
broad economic theories, while the role of law in the narrative has been marginalized or entirely 																																																																				33	Caractacus	 [pseudonym	 of	 Norman	 Daniel].	 Revolution	 in	 Iraq:	 An	 Essay	 in	 Comparative	 Public	
Opinion	(London:	Gollancz,	1959),	at	37.	35	Makī	Jamīl.	Tʿlīqāt		ʿla	Nithām	Diʿāwy	al-‘shāʿir	wa	Tʿdīlātahu	[A	commentary	on	the	Tribal	Criminal	and	Civil	Disputes	Regulation	and	its	amendments],	(Baghdād:	Matbaʿa	al-Karakh,	1935),	at	120-121. 37	Ahmad	al-Sāfī	al-Najafī,	al-Amwāj	(Bayrūt:	Dar	al-‘llm	li	al-Malayīn,	1961),	8-13.	39	The	concept	of	‘semi-feudalism’	is	used	in	this	study	merely	to	illustrate	that	certain	characteristics	that	 are	 not	 generally	 compatible	 with	 the	 capitalist	 mode	 of	 production	 (such	 as	 unfree	 labour	relations)	could	still	exist	in	harmony	with	capitalism.	It	is	therefore	not	meant	to	suggest	that	Iraq	was	in	‘transitory’	state	of	pre-capitalism	that	was	disrupted	by	semi-feudalism.	On	the	contrary,	the	concept	 of	 ‘semi-feudalism’	 in	 Iraq	 suggests	 that	 capitalism	 could	 exist	 as	 such	 with	 certain	contradictory	 forms	 of	 ‘semi-feudalism’.	 	 As	 Jairus	 Banaji	 has	 argued,	 ‘…there	 might	 be	 historical	situations	where	in	the	absence	of	a	specifically	capitalist	mode	of	production	on	the	national	scale,	capitalist	 relations	 of	 exploitation	 may	 nonetheless	 be	 widespread	 and	 dominant.’	 J.	 Banaji,	“Capitalist	 Domination	 and	 the	 Small	 Peasantry:	 The	 Deccan	 Districts	 in	 the	 Late	 Nineteenth	Century”,	in	Theory	As	History:	Essays	on	Modes	of	Production	and	Exploitation,	(Chicago:	Haymarket,	2010),	 at	 282.	 	 For	 an	 extensive	 critique	 of	 the	 concept	 of	 ‘semi-feudalism’	 and	 its	 corresponding	thesis	and	an	overview	of	the	literature	see,	Tom	Brass.	“Rural	Labour	in	Agrarian	Transitions:	The	Semi-Feudal	Thesis	Revisited”	Journal	of	Contemporary	Asia,	Vol.	32,	No.	4	(2002),	456-473.					
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ignored. The law however was a crucial instrument in the structuring and instituting of the 
economic, social and power relations that emerged to constitute the modern Iraqi state. The 
underlying claim here is therefore to emphasize that the law is not merely a ‘superstructure’ that 
should not be taken as seriously as the economic ‘base,’ to use one Marxist terminology.  
Although I am not claiming that law determined these economic relations, I am suggesting that it 
played an essential role in the overall process that tends to be overlooked. My argument 
concerning the law in the colonies (or more particularly the semi-colonies) will be made in the 
context of two interrelated historical narratives in Iraq: the British tribal policy and the invention 
of customary law on the one hand, and the land tenure system on the other. The British and the 
Iraqi state used the law and certain administrative techniques to impose a (so-called) modern 
‘semi-feudal’ system, which was advantageous to and served British imperial interests and the 
capitalist world economy in general. This process led to a significant rearrangement of the socio-
economic structures of Iraqi society, as well as its tribal composition. Traditional property 
relations were significantly altered, while the invention of customary law through the 
institutionalization of a separate tribal legal system ensured the transformation of the social and 
power relations of the tribes in Iraq, and the entrenchment of capitalism in the region.  
   
II. The ‘invention’ of the customary law of the tribes of Iraq 
 
The tribes of Mesopotamia have been the source of romantic fascination of many a 
European traveler at least since the nineteenth century. It was no doubt the orientalist views 
chronicled by these travellers of the bedouin that influenced the formation of tribal policy when 
the British found themselves in control of this region in 1916-1917. Furthermore, the British had 
to improvise in circumstances of limited financial assistance from London, while considering the 
military weakness of the new Iraqi state that was run by a small number of ex-Sharifian40 officers 
with the newly selected King Faisal in Baghdad.41 The British administration and later the Iraqi 
state had no real control over its rural areas, which made up the majority of the country - its 
borders and frontiers controlled by various heavily armed tribes. This multitude of nomadic and 																																																																				40	The	 ex-Sharifian	 Officers	 were	 those	 officers	 who	 participated	 in	 the	 Arab	 Revolt	 against	 the	Ottoman	Empire	during	World	War	I	(1916-1918)	and	were	led	by	the	Sharif	Husayn	ibn	‘Ali.	They	would	later	play	a	prominent	role	in	the	establishment	of	the	Iraqi	state.		A	‘Sharif’	is	one	who	claims	descendance	 from	 the	Prophet	Mohammad	and	holds	 a	position	 in	 society	 on	 this	 basis.	 The	 term	commonly	used	in	Iraq	is	‘Sayyid’.									41	Hanna	Batatu.	The	Old	Social	Classes	and	the	Revolutionary	Movements	of	Iraq:	A	Study	of	Iraq’s	Old	
Landed	 and	 Commercial	 Classes	 and	 of	 its	 Communists,	 Ba‘thists	 and	 Free	 Officers,	 (London:	 Saqi,	2004),	at	88.	
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semi-nomadic tribal sections and confederations, which previously had an almost fluid character 
in that they had been in constant movement throughout their existence, needed to be brought 
under the purview of British administrative control and eventually Iraqi state control in an 
efficient but inexpensive manner. As will be shown, this was done through several approaches 
and strategies whereby the law eventually played a significant role. Although it is important to 
realize that the ‘tribes’ were not homogenous in any way, but rather made up of a diverse 
nomadic, semi-nomadic and settled groups that lived in differing topologies and environments – 
whether it was from Kūt and ʿAmārah on the Tigris river to Muntafiq, or Dīwānīyah and Hillah in 
the central and lower Euphrates. In that sense, one must avoid essentializing the ‘tribe’ qua tribe 
as they were too diverse. So, although it would be wiser to study the specificity of a particular 
tribe in question before making any wide generalizations, it is still necessary to make some useful 
general observations about tribal organization for the sake of analytic argument, while 
recognizing their heterogeneity and avoiding essentialism.42   
 
Samira Haj has argued that the very dichotomy between the urban townsmen and rural 
tribesmen that is so prevalent in Iraqi historiography was in itself an essentialism that is 
misleading as the two have always overlapped and interacted throughout their existence.43 In fact, 
the tension between tribal and state organization was much more intricate and dynamic than is 
generally perceived; this has previously been understood by Ibn Khaldūn44 who emphasized the 
cyclical character of early Islamic history, whereby tribalization and settlement were processes in 
constant alternation and flux.45 As Richard Tapper has explained, (centralized) ‘government 
control is clearly an important determinant of tribal political organization, but it is not simply an 
external force; its impact depends on how it is internalized by the tribespeople and how they react 
to it.’46 The tribe may for example internalize certain aspects of state centralization – ‘elements of 																																																																				42	Samira	Haj,	The	Making	of	Iraq	1900-1963,	(New	York:	SUNY	Press,	1997),	at	13.	43	See	 Samira	Haj.	 “The	 problems	 of	 tribalism:	 the	 case	 of	 nineteenth-century	 Iraqi	 history,”	 Social	
History,	(1991)	Vol.	16:	No.	1,	pp.45-58.	44 	Ibn	 Khaldūn,	 ʿAbd	 al-Rahmān	 ibn	 Muhammad	 (d.1406).	 An	 influential	 Arab	 historian,	historiographer,	and	social	philosopher.	He	held	numerous	public	positions	 in	Tunis,	and	moved	to	Cairo	 in	 1392,	 where	 he	 taught	 and	 served	 as	 a	 judge	 until	 his	 death.	 His	 major	 work	 is	 the	
Muqaddimah	(Introduction	 to	 history),	 which	 traces	 his	 thoughts	 on	 sedentary	 and	 desert	populations,	 dynasties,	 and	 the	 caliphate.	 In	 the	Muqaddimah,	 Ibn	 Khaldūn	 stated	 that	 he	 had	established	 a	 new	 science,	 ʿilm	 al-ʿumran	 (the	 science	 of	 social	 organization);	 he	 is	 accordingly	regarded	as	the	father	of	sociology.	See	Oxford	Dictionary	of	Islam.	 45	See	Saleh	Haider,	“Land	Problems	of	Iraq”,	(Unpublished	PhD	Thesis,	University	of	London,	1942),	at	22.	46	Richard	Tapper,	 “Anthropologists,	Historians,	 and	Tribespeople	 on	Tribe	 and	State	Formation	 in	the	 Middle	 East,”	 in	 Philip	 Khoury	 and	 Joseph	 Kostiner	 (eds.),	 Tribes	 and	 State	 Formation	 in	 the	
Middle	East	(Berkley:	University	of	California	Press,	1990),	at	67	
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state could be found within every tribe’ and vice versa.47  This as we shall see was precisely what 
happened with the tribal policy that was institutionalized by the British administration. Ironically, 
despite its intention of ‘preserving’ customary law and tribal tradition, this British policy turned 
out to have somewhat invented something unique instead through the construction of a separate 
tribal legal system that was sanctioned by the state and its institutions.  
 
Before embarking on a detailed analysis of the British tribal policy and its implications, it 
is necessary to briefly explain the character of tribal organization – its basic structures and 
institutions.  The tribe, as the only socially organized unit in the desert and rural countryside, 
functioned as a necessary safeguard for the nomad-tribesmen and the settled cultivator-peasant 
alike. This was generally the case before the Ottomans attempted to strengthen the central 
government based in the cities, intentionally breaking down the power of the tribes and their 
cohesion in the late nineteenth century.  Generally, under the tribal system the tribe held land 
communally and although the Shaikh divided parts of the tribal land provisionally among the 
families of the tribe, private ownership was not absolute.48  The division of land was done 
according to certain principles and criteria that ensured that the land would always remain within 
the tribal dīrah.49  Therefore, despite the existence of certain forms of private property, depending 
on the shaikh’s (provisional and rotating) assignment of land, and although the tribesman’s 
attachment to his tribal dīrah was strong enough that he was willing to die to defend it, he lacked 
any sense of individual ownership of any particular plot of land in the dīrah.50 It is in this way 
that the idea of absolute private property, including profit was alien to the tribe.51 I will return to 
the complicated question of land in more detail in the second part of this chapter.  
 
An important point that needs to be emphasized early on is that the migration of tribes 
from Northern Central Arabia (Najd) or present-day Saudi Arabia eastward or southward into 
Iraq and the coastal Arabian Gulf was a relatively recent phenomenon that could be traced to the 
late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. As Hala Fattah has shown, certain clans and tribes 																																																																				47Ibid,	at	68.	48Haider,	supra,	ft.	45,	at	88.	49Doreen	 Warriner.	 Land	 and	 Poverty	 in	 the	 Middle	 East,	 (1948)	 (London:	 Royal	 Institute	 of	International	Affairs),	 at	 18.	The	dīrah	was	 an	 area	of	 land	which	was	 ‘habitually	 occupied’	 by	 the	tribe	or	which	was	‘its	preserve’	as	long	as	it	could	militarily	defend	it.			50Haider,	supra,	ft.45,	at	316.	Batatu,	supra,	ft.	41,	at	71.	As	Paul	Dresch	writes,	“The	tribal	term	dīra,	in	keeping	with	 its	Bedouin	origins,	 conveyed	more	of	 a	 sense	of	 the	domain	over	which	 the	 tribe	exercised	 sovereign	 rights	 rather	 than	 exclusive	 ownership”;	 Paul	 Dresch,	 Tribes,	 History	 and	
Government	in	Yemen	(Oxford:	Clarendon	Press.	1989),	at	343.		51Batatu,	supra,		ft.41,	at	73.	
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dissociated themselves from their traditional tribal confederations whether by force or for 
political or socioeconomic circumstances.52 Migrating, they re-formed themselves anew and 
regrouped into more powerful tribal configurations in Iraq. In that sense, it should be kept in mind 
that tribal custom in Iraq was certainly not in any way an ‘ancient’ tradition as the British 
believed it to be, but rather partly formed out of a modern historical process of tribal 
reconfigurations and movements. It was no wonder that the renowned Iraqi sociologist ʿAlī al-
Wardī argued that this historical process was the root of a ‘cultural paradox’ that shaped the Iraqi 
personality, and explained the common Iraqi’s general ambivalence to state authority.53 al-Wardī 
argued that the Iraqi psyche contained an internalized tension between tribal and urban modes 
that produced a ‘schism of the Iraqi personality’.54 This ‘schism’ would operate depending on the 
circumstances – in times of war, Iraqi society reverted to tribal values of ʿasabīyya,55 while in 
times of peace sedentary values prevailed. As I will detail below, it could be argued that the 
British, consequently, took advantage of this ‘schism’ or duality in the ‘nature’ of Iraqi society, 
and it was for this reason somewhat a effective strategy of colonial and semi-colonial control.          
 
The position of the shaikh of a tribe was attached to his office rather than his person. In 
other words, the sheikh himself was merely considered primus inter pares (‘the first among 
equals’) with neither privileges nor authority.56 The shaikh’s responsibility was vast and included 
conducting the tribe’s relations with outsiders, the declaration and undertaking of wars, and 
dealings with (central) governments. He was also responsible for the maintenance of social 
functions57 within the tribe, including the extension of hospitality in his mudhif (guesthouse) to 
the tribesmen, which is considered the center of political deliberations, and where he exercises his 
																																																																				52Hala	Fattah,	The	Politics	of	Regional	Trade	in	Iraq,	Arabia,	and	the	Gulf	1745-1900,	(New	York:	SUNY,	1997),	at	28-29.	One	major	reason	was	the	birth	and	spread	of	Wahhabi	revivalist	movement	in	the	late	 eighteenth	 century,	 which	 attempted	 to	 forcefully	 bring	 into	 submission	 townsmen	 and	tribesmen	to	the	Wahhabi	‘aqida	(credo),	forcing	certain	tribes	to	migrate.		53‘Ali	al-Wardī.	Shakhṣīyat	al-Fard	al-ʿIraqi	[The	Nature	of	the	Iraqi	Personality].	(Amman:	Dar	al-Warrāq,	2009),	at	44-45.	 54	Ibid.	55	ʿAsabiyya	 is	 a	 term	 that	 refers	 to	 ‘social	 solidarity	 with	 an	 emphasis	 on	 group	 consciousness,	cohesiveness	and	unity’.	 It	was	first	coined	and	popularized	in	Ibn	Khaldun’s	Muqaddimah.	See	The	
Oxford	Dictionary	of	Islam.		56	Clinton	 Bailey.	 Bedouin	 Law	 from	 Sinai	 &	 the	 Negev:	 Justice	 without	 Government.	 (2009)	 (New	Haven:	Yale	University	Press)	at	14.	This	is	the	reason	that	the	shaikh	traditionally	viewed	his	office	as	a	burden	as	the	proverb	goes,	‘a	shaikh	is	rag	on	which	everyone	wipes	his	dirty	hands’.	57	A	third	or	even	half	of	the	cultivated	area	of	the	dīrah	was	set	aside	as	revenue	for	the	mudhīf	so	that	the	shaikh	could	discharge	his	functions.	Ibid.	
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judicial function of resolving disputes amongst his tribespeople. 58  Robert Fernea has 
characterized the tribe as a ‘jural community,’ whereby the mudhif of the shaikh is the ‘center of 
jural activities’: ‘[i]ndividual crimes which conspicuously violated the moral code of all 
tribesmen…might result in physical punishment as described by the shaykh and ajāwīd (or 
elders) of the tribe, or in banishment of the defendant and the kinsmen who supported him’.59 The 
notion of justice for the bedouin is one that emphasizes the notion of ‘right’ as one of entitlement.   
 
When an injustice has occurred a tribesman generally has a right to rectify that injustice 
within the context of his tribe’s customary law. So, if murder occurs for instance the tribesman of 
the victim could enforce his right by killing the murderer or the murderer’s clansmen with 
impunity.60 In bedouin eyes, the restoration of justice could only occur in this way within the 
difficult and dangerous environment of the desert where there is no central authority to protect 
him. As for the settled tribesman not living in a desert environment, it was the restoration of the 
honour of his tribe, which remained the paramount function of a vendetta. The bedouin concept 
of justice therefore should be understood in relation to both the importance of security and 
deterrence in a desert environment, and the importance of honour in tribal culture. It is in this way 
that ‘bedouin law…seeks to deter violations by endorsing the principle of mutual liability, 
according to which every man is accountable for the actions of his clansmen and is subject to 
punishment for them.’61  
 
The perfect example of this is that of the settlement of a blood-feud by giving a woman 
of one tribe to another, what is referred to as faṣl. Although a cash payment is sometimes 
permitted, it is the latter that is usually what ‘herald(s) real peace between the disputing 
segments’ as the offspring of these marriages is real proof that the feud has truly been settled.62 
The point to be made here is that while certain actions of tribesmen could be conceived as 																																																																				58	Kamil	Mahdi.	State	and	Agriculture	 in	 Iraq:	modern	development,	 stagnation	and	 the	 impact	of	oil	(2000),	 at	 73.	 Shakir	 Salim	 writes	 that	 the	mudhif	 serves	 as	 a	 ‘social	 center,	 political	 conference	chamber,	and	a	court	of	 justice’.	 Salim.	Marsh	Dwellers	of	the	Euphrates	Delta	(1962)	 (University	of	London:	 Athlon	 Press),	 at	 72-82.	 It	 has	 been	 described	 elsewhere	 as	 akin	 to	 a	 ‘parliament’	 for	tribesmen.	al-Barāzī,	Nurī	Khalīl.	al-Badāwa	wa	al-Istiqrār	fī	al-ʿIraq	[The	Bedouin	and	Settlement	in	Iraq],	(Cairo:	Mʿhad	Bihūth	wa	al-Dirāsāt	al-ʿArabīya,	1969),	at	100.		 59	Robert	Fernea.	Shaykh	and	Effendi:	Changing	Patterns	of	Authority	Among	El	Shabana	of	Southern	
Iraq,	(1970)	(Cambridge:	Harvard	University	Press),	at	93	60	Bailey,	supra,	ft.	56,	at	16,	17.	61	Ibid,	at	18.	62	Fernea,	supra,	 ft.	59,	at	112.	 It	 is	usually	only	after	bearing	a	child	 from	such	a	marriage	that	the	woman	could	return	to	her	family	if	she	so	desires,	although	this	is	not	always	the	case	as	it	depends	on	the	custom	of	the	particular	tribe.		
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evidence of ‘lawlessness’ in the deserts, this is an oversimplification and an incorrect 
characterization, as the tribal system in fact comprised an intricate and effective system of 
customary law, which performed specific social functions. Here, one could also refer to the 
practice of raiding in the desert, which should not be confused with theft, for the bedouin resorts 
to the collective act of raiding only as a means of sustenance in an environment that ordinarily 
lacks rainfall, drinking wells and pastures. Raiding is therefore not equivalent to thieving or even 
war, but rather is a part of the bedouin’s traditional way of life.63  
 
 
III. The Tribal Criminal & Civil Disputes Regulation: its origins, juridical characteristics & 
wide implications 
 
 
The British approach to dealing with the tribes of Iraq was the complete reversal of the 
detribalization policy of the Ottomans that was aimed at the destruction of the cohesiveness of the 
tribes, with an attempt to render them under the control of the Ottoman state.64 The British 
Political Officers sought to find the appropriate balance of ‘internal political forces’ by 
consolidating a firm connection between the Sharīfian ex-officers running the state and certain 
selected tribal sheikhs.65 They therefore began rebuilding the tribal system from the outset of 
their occupation, selecting ‘official’ shaikhs, who were made responsible for peace and order in 
their tribes to ensure the protection of British interests lines of communication and property.66 
This strategy was based on the notion that entire tribes could be controlled through the influence 
of their shaikhs. As Attiyah illustrates, ‘[i]n the long run, both policies [British and Ottoman] had 
similar consequences – a schism in tribal institutions – but they arose from different sources: the 
British alienated the Shaykh from his tribe, while the Turks multiplied the number of Shaykhs to 
the detriment of tribal unity and solidarity…the Turks… tried to alleviate the position of his 
																																																																				63	Fuad	Baali.	Relation	of	the	People	to	the	Land	in	Southern	Iraq,	 (Gainesville:	University	 of	 Florida	Press,	1966),	at	5.	64	Albertine	 Jwaideh.	 “Tribalism	 and	 Modern	 Society:	 Iraq,	 a	 Case	 Study”	 in	 R.M.	 Savory,	 ed.,	
Introduction	to	Islamic	Civilization,	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	1976),	at	165.	65	See	David	Pool.	 “From	Elite	 to	Class:	The	Transformation	of	 Iraqi	Political	 Leadership,”	 in	Abbas	Kelidar	(ed.),	The	Integration	of	Modern	Iraq	(London:	Croom	Helm,	1979),	63-87.	Pool	refers	to	this	as	the	‘great	bargain.’	(at	81).	Batatu,	supra,	ft.	41,	at	88,	91.		66	Phillip	Ireland.	Iraq:	A	Study	in	Political	Development	(New	York,	The	McMillian	Co,	1938),	at	94.	
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tribesmen as against that of his Shaykh, but the British reversed the emphasis by upholding the 
Shaykh’s interest against those of his tribesmen’.67   
 
To institutionalize their policy, the British drafted and imposed the (legal) instrument of 
the Tribal Criminal and Civil Disputes Regulation (TCCDR), extending it into ordinary state law 
in 1924, and enshrining it in the constitution. The TCCDR was first issued during the British 
occupation of southern Iraq in 1916. It was, in other words, initially drawn up as an instrument of 
colonial administration and pacification, yet ultimately, ‘what may have begun as an 
administrative expedient ended as political necessity’.68  The TCCDR constructed a separate 
tribal legal system that was severed from civil and criminal courts of the state. The jurisdiction of 
the national courts was therefore institutionally restricted. The TCCDR guaranteed that the 
selected shaikh would dispense the administration of justice amongst his tribespeople according 
to customary law and tribal tradition.	69  It therefore maintained ‘the tribal law as the law of the 
tribal land,’ while ‘enhancing the jural role of the sheikh,’ reinforcing primacy in his person 
rather than his office.70  The TCCDR defined a tribesman broadly as follows: ‘“Tribesman” 
means a member of a generally recognized tribe or tribal section which has been accustomed to 
settle its dispute by recourse to the arbitration of elders or shaikhs and not be recourse to the 
Courts of the land as ordinarily constituted.’71 The authority of the selected shaikh (who now 
gained political and economic power through tax subsides, land and seats in parliament) was now 
dependent on British colonial power and particularly the Iraqi state rather than his tribesmen. This 
had a tremendous transformative effect on the social and economic relations between the shaikhs 
and their tribesmen, eventually opening the door for the institutionalization of capitalistic 
exploitation and accumulation in rural Iraq and as will be shown the TCCDR transformed the 
very customary laws that were intended to be ‘preserved’.   
 
Before turning to the wide implications of the TCCDR in Iraq in more detail, it is 
important for this analysis to trace the origins of this piece of legislation and colonial instrument. 
The TCCDR could be directly traced to the administrative methods developed by Sir Robert 																																																																				67	Ghassan	Atiyyah.	Iraq:	1908-1921.	A	Socio-Political	Study,	(Beirut:	The	Arab	Institute	for	Research	and	Publishing,	1973),	at	235.	68	Batatu,	supra,	ft.	41,	at	88.	69	The	shaikh	would	in	turn	select	supposedly	‘neutral’	tribal	elders	or	ʿarifeh	who	are	familiar	with	customary	law.	These	elders	were	close	advisors	of	the	shaikh	and	so	were	not	actually	‘neutral’. 70	Pool,	supra,	ft.	65,	at	78.	71	TNA.	Lt.	Col.	E.B.	Howell,	Revenue	Secretary	 to	 the	Civil	Commissioner,	 “Land	Revenue	Demand:	Theory	and	Practice,”	Administrative	Report	on	the	working	of	the	Revenue	Dept.	for	the	year	1919;	CO	696/2,	Iraq	Administrative	Reports,	1919.			
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Sandeman in the North-West provinces (present-day Baluchistan –in Pakistan- and Afghanistan) 
in the late nineteenth century, which were aimed at the pacification and in turn protection of 
British interests in the frontiers surrounding India.72 Sandeman’s methods (which were first 
successfully used in 1876) were not necessarily unprecedented, but were still a unique synthesis 
of approaches of indirect rule applied elsewhere in the Empire.73 These were based on some basic 
premises: first, know and befriend the tribes. Second, adhere to tribal custom as much as possible 
and work with tribal leaders and chiefs. Third, bind the tribe to the government by payment for 
tribal service. Finally, peaceful methods must prevail, although overwhelming force must be used 
when necessary.74  
 
In this way, Sandeman hoped to ‘knit the frontier tribes into our imperial system and 
make their interests as ours… [so as to] certainly depend upon them being on our side’.75 
Sandeman, therefore, believed in preserving and rebuilding the tribal system in Baluchistan that 
he saw as being in decay. The aim was that by appealing to the tribes’ own customs and 
traditions, they would perceive themselves to be under their own rule, and as long as this served 
British imperial interests, this administrative system would cheaply run itself.76 As the Viceroy of 
India, Lord Curzon once declared in a speech made in honour of Sandeman, ‘I want them [the 
native leaders] to unite with the British Raj in the settlement of their feuds and in defense of their 
own country… I want them to become … the trusted soldiers and feudatories of the Great Queen, 
and to realize, that while there is no use of fighting us, because we are so strong as always to 
defeat them in the end, their religion, their traditions, even their independence are most safe when 
they enter into friendly relations with the British government…’ 77  
 
These basic principles were indeed considered to be useful for other parts of the Empire 
and were in turn diffused in such a manner. In a lecture given to The Royal Central Asian Society 
in 1932, Colonel C.E. Bruce, argued for the universalization of the Sandeman policy, which he 
saw as a method that should be put into practice around the world: ‘That Sandeman’s policy is 																																																																				72	See	 T.H.	 Thorton,	Col.	 Sir	Robert	 Sandeman:	His	 Life	 and	Work	on	Our	 Indian	Frontier.	A	Memoir,	
with	Selections	from	His	Correspondence	and	Official	Writings	(London:	John	Murray,	1895).	73	Approaches	of	‘indirect	rule’	include	that	of	Joseph	Gallieni	in	Senegal,	Tonkin	and	Madagascar	and	Fredrick	Lugard	in	Asia	and	Africa.	74	Tripodi,	 Christian.	 Edge	 of	 Empire:	 The	 British	 Political	 Officer	 and	 Tribal	 Administration	 on	 the	
North-West	Frontier	1877-1947	(London:	Ashgate,	2011),	at	57-58.	75	R.G.	Sandeman,	Memorandum	entitled	Relations	with	Frontiers	Tribes.	See	Thorton,	supra,	at	356-359.	76	Tripodi,	supra,	ft.	74,	at	58.		77	See	 George	 Curzon.	 Lord	 Curzon	 in	 India:	 being	 a	 selection	 from	 his	 speeches	 as	 viceroy	 and	
governor-general	of	India,	1898-1905,	(London:	Macmillan	and	Co,	1906)	at	411.			
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equally applicable to every tribesman whether Baluch, Pathan, Arab, Kurd, or African; whether 
he lives in Indo-China, Burma, Morocco, Tripoli, Aden, the Sudan, or East West, South Africa, is 
I think, absolutely proved from the fact that every colonial administrator has, wittingly or 
unwittingly, taken him as their example or followed in his footsteps.’78     
 
The pillar of Sandeman’s system was based on the development and reliance on certain 
customary legal structures and institutions, namely the tribal councils (also known as ‘council of 
elders’) or jirgas. These jirgas, which were institutionalized in law under the Frontier Crimes 
Regulation of 1887 (and later revised in 1901)79, ensured that the tribes were governed under the 
tribe’s own legal customs (or ‘tribal usage’). Moreover, the jirgas did not apply the rules of 
evidence of a colonial court (generally derived from British law), and were completely separated 
from the general legal system of the colonial state.80 The Regulation reserved the Deputy 
Commissioner’s power to overturn a decision issued by a jirga, retaining the colonial 
administrator as ‘ultimate arbiters of tribal tradition.’81 Nevertheless, almost all decisions of the 
jirgas were beyond the right of appeal to ordinary courts.82  
 
Marsden and Hopkins have argued that the Sandeman system and its implications shaped 
a ‘traditionalizing modernity,’ which rather than integrate and ‘civilize’ the tribesman of the 
frontiers as their imperial Indian counterparts, sought to ‘contain, conserve and traditionalize’ 
them in separation of the colonial state.83 Their argument goes on to describe these methods 
(including the use of law in this context) as a form of ‘frontier governmentality,’ which created 
order by excluding the tribesman from the laws and norms of the colonial state; administrating 
rather than enforcing difference as defined by the colonial state: ‘Thus the ethnographic [colonial] 
state was about control through division while frontier governmentality was about order through 
exclusion.’84 What is interesting for our purposes is the fact that these administrative and colonial 																																																																				78Colonel	 C.E.	 Bruce.	 “The	 Sandeman	 Policy	 as	 Applied	 to	 Tribal	 Problems	 of	 To-day,”	 (1932)	 in	
Journal	of	the	Royal	Central	Asian	Society,	19:1,	45-67,	at	60.			79	This	regulation	was	amended	several	times	1887	and	1901.	80	Sir	William	Barton.	India’s	North-West	Frontier,	(London:	John	Murray,	1939),	at	59.	81	See	 Marsden,	 Magnus	 and	 Hopkins,	 Benjamin.	 Fragments	 of	 the	 Afghan	 Frontier	 (New	 York:	Columbia	University	Press,	2011)	at	69-70.	82 Willard	 Berry,	 Aspects	 of	 the	 Frontiers	 Crimes	 Regulation	 in	 Pakistan,	 (Duke	 University	Commonwealth-studies	Center,	Monograph	number	three,	1966),	at	40.	83	Marsden	 and	Hopkins,	 supra,	 ft.	 81,	 at	 63.	 The	 ideological	 underpinnings	 of	 the	 preservation	 of	traditional	and	tribal	custom	could	be	found	in	the	works	of	Henry	Main.	See	Karuna	Mantena.	Alibis	
of	Empire:	Henry	Main	and	the	Ends	of	Liberal	Imperialism,	 (New	Jersey:	Princeton	University	Press,	2010).	84	Ibid,	at	64.	
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methods that were devised specifically for the frontiers rather than an actual system of 
government per se were later on used in a variety of contexts. In that sense, the essence of the 
Sandeman system of frontier administration and governance as institutionalized by the Frontiers 
Crimes Regulation was flexible enough to be diffused and implanted into other parts of the 
Empire, extending well beyond its original intent of mere frontier administration.85  
 
As will be shown, these imported methods allowed the Iraqi state to have political control 
over the countryside despite having constricted its legal jurisdiction in the tribal areas. It therefore 
maintained a juridically weak Iraqi state with a certain measure of political control despite 
(theoretically) being unable to enforce its legal hegemony throughout the land. Such 
fragmentation occurred in the context of a semi-colonial legal order that was clearly Western in 
character despite the appearance of such a traditional form. In other words, the fragmentation of 
the law (as state and tribal) occurred within an all-encompassing semi-colonial order that was 
Western in form.  
 
Most historians of Iraq tend to focus on the manner in which this dual legal system 
allowed for a political bond to be established between the state and the tribes, while the British 
were able to extend its control. The juridical implications of the TCCDR are not dealt with in 
proper detail. However, my argument entails that the juridical implications of the TCCDR and the 
dual legal system must be explored in detail to understand that it was in fact an illusory legal 
separation. It was the inability to completely sever the townsmen and the tribesmen that led to the 
political and economic tensions that would eventually explode in the form of unrest. Moreover, 
this legal duality was a form of governmentality in itself; one that was used by the British to 
maintain its indirect influence. The ‘frontier governmentality’ mentioned earlier was therefore 
converted into a form of semi-colonial governmentality in the context of Iraq which, despite an 
attempt to construct a duality in law through the separation of state and tribal jurisdictions, was 
neither entirely successful nor efficient. 
 
Sir Henry Dobbs, the High Commissioner in Iraq at the time, who himself served in the 
Northwestern frontiers (namely Baluchistan) between 1909 and 1911 under the Agent-General 
A.H. McMahon, was a firm advocate of the Sandeman system of tribal administration, and so 																																																																				85	Berry,	supra,	 ft.	82,	at	8.	 In	Pakistan,	the	remnants	of	colonialism	is	still	evident,	considering	that	this	regulation	is	still	in	force	today	as	it	is	used	as	a	method	of	pacification	in	the	frontiers,	although	the	legal	ramifications	of	this	have	been	quite	significant,	considering	how	this	regulation	contradicts	the	constitution	in	Pakistan.		
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strongly supported the application of the TCCDR to the extent that he sent H.M. Drower, the 
Advisor to the Ministry of Justice, a circular on Baluchistan written in 1907 to ‘explain his point 
of view’.86 Dobbs quoted directly from the circular the words of McMahon, who emphasized the 
efficiency of the use of customary and tribal law as an ‘…instrument for the suppression of crime 
which in simplicity and effectiveness can be surpassed by no other legal system which we can 
invent, for the simple reason that it is based on the character, idiosyncrasies and prejudices of the 
people among whom it has originated and by whom it has been evolved during long periods of 
time to meet their own requirements and remedy their failings.’87 Therefore, on the one hand, a 
tested strategy in the Northwestern frontiers was brought into the Iraqi frame for the same 
intended purpose of pacification, and on the other hand, British officials believed that they were 
in fact preserving a deteriorating ‘ancient’ legal tradition that was a ‘natural’ part of the tribes in 
Iraq.   
 
On the other hand, it was the idea that Western standards of justice could not be imposed 
on the tribes in any direct manner that warranted the emergence of this separate tribal legal 
system. Here, one is reminded of Arnold Wilson’s claim of the difficulty of imposing any notion 
of Western law on the tribes of southern Iraq when he first arrived in Basra: ‘[t]o impose the rule 
of law upon these dissonant and intractable elements was by far the most difficult of the many 
problems of civil administration in Basra wilayat.’ 88  Of course, this process of legal 
transformation must be understood within the broader historical context of the previous Ottoman 
order, which locals were accustomed to, for the tribesman did not find the duality of law as a 
foreign construct. There was already a ‘duality’ during the Ottoman period between Shar‘ia 
(religious) law and Kanūn (secular state) law for instance.89 Competing legal systems, including 
																																																																				86	TNA.	 CO	 730/103,	 Iraq	 1926,	 vol.	 12.	 Residency,	 Baghdad,	 18	 October	 1923	 to	 E.M.	 Drower,	Advisor	to	the	Ministry	of	Justice,	Baghdad.				87	Dobbs	to	Pulley	(Interior)	D.O.,	S.O.	2140	of	28	September	1924.	Delhi,	British	High	Commissioner	Files,	 New	 Delhi,	 Justice,	 File	 8/4,	 as	 quoted	 in	 Peter	 Sluglett,	Britain	 in	 Iraq:	 Contriving	King	 and	
Country,	(New	York:	Columbia	University	Press,	2007),	at	171.	88	Arnold	Wilson.	Loyalties,	Mesopotamia	1914-1917,	(London:	Oxford	University	Press,	1930),	at	294.	89	Avi	Rubin	has	questioned	such	a	notion	of	‘duality’	in	Ottoman	legal	historiography	suggesting	that	the	notion	of	legal	plurality	is	better	suited	to	understand	the	manner	in	which	Kannun	and	Shar‘ia	law	interacted	during	the	Tanzimat	period.	He	argues	that	Ottoman	duality	was	merely,	‘a	matter	of	doctrine	rather	than	praxis’.	See	A.	Rubin.	Ottoman	Nizamiye	Courts:	Law	and	Modernity,	(New	York:	Palgrave	McMillan,	2001),	at	56.		The	case	of	Iraq	affirms	this	argument,	as	a	positivist	duality	rather	than	a	more	flexible	Ottoman	legal	plurality	was	not	present	until	the	British	arrived	and	constructed	it	 to	 further	 their	 interests.	 Hence,	 as	 Karen	 Barkey	 has	 shown,	 the	 legal	 order	 of	 the	 Ottoman	Empire,	‘powerfully	contributed	to	a	political	culture	of	diversity	and	toleration,’	and	in	that	way	its	legal	pluralism	was	‘a	tool	for	the	management	of	diversity’.	The	British	Order	of	legal	duality,	on	the	other	hand,	was	rather	meant	as	an	instrument	of	semi-colonial	control.	See	Karen	Barkey.	“Aspects	
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tribal custom, co-existed before the arrival of the British and so one should not exaggerate the 
British role in bringing about a dual or plural legal order. For this reason, the tribesmen 
considered some form of duality as a natural part of the order of things and therein lies the British 
ingenuity in imperial and semi-colonial control: the British built on what was already there, while 
infusing their own notions of justice and legal positivism. Nonetheless, the British strategy of 
duality should still be considered as an invention, but it was melded quite organically onto the 
layers of the preceding Ottoman order. In the end, however, the intention of keeping state law 
based on ‘British ideas of justice’ removed from tribal customary law did not actually work as the 
tribal legal order itself turned out to be a hybrid creation of the very hegemonic western legal 
tradition that it was meant to be severed from. 
 
 A closer look at the provisions of the TCCDR illustrates how this piece of legislation led 
to a significant amount of abuse. It was drafted in a way that ensured that the shaikh had wide 
powers that were unchecked and provided no safeguard.  Just like its archetype in the 
Northwestern frontiers, there was no recourse to or process to appeal an order made under the 
TCCDR.90 Nor was there habeas corpus. Furthermore, the finality of any decision under the 
TCCDR could be brought into question and revisited under sections 11 and 50 for up to two years 
after it was made. Initially, the Political Officer responsible for the administration of the district, 
and later the mutassarifs (governors) had very wide discretion under section 40 to elect to try a 
citizen under the tribal system rather than the national courts.91 This infamous provision led to 
considerable injustice and arbitrary effects. For example, dissident (non-tribal) townsmen were 
occasionally tried under tribal law rather than state law, and subsequently put into a form of 
‘internal exile’ by an administrative order specifying where one was to reside.92 It is not merely 
the trying of a townsman under tribal law that was arbitrary and unjust, but even the removal of a 
tribesman or an entire tribe93 from a specified district as a form of punishment.94 The role of the 																																																																																																																																																																																																									of	 Legal	 Pluralism	 in	 the	 Ottoman	 Empire,”	 in	 Lauren	 Benton	 and	 Richard	 J.	 Ross	 (eds.),	 Legal	
Pluralism	and	Empires,	1500-1850,	(New	York:	New	York	University	Press,	2013),	at	85.			90	In	theory,	an	appeal	in	the	form	of	a	petition	to	the	Ministry	of	Interior	is	available,	but	this	is	not	an	 appeal	 per	 se	 and	 the	Ministry	 rarely	 if	 ever	 interferes	 in	 such	matters.	See	Mohammed	Fadhil	Jamali.	The	New	Iraq:	Its	Problem	of	Bedouin	Education,	(New	York	City:	The	International	Institute	of	Teachers	College,	Columbia	University,	1934),	at	Appendix	F	at	143-144.		91	Batatu,	supra,	ft.	41,	at	93.	92	The	 TCCDR	 was	 used	 in	 this	 manner	 to	 deal	 with	 those	 who	 agitated	 during	 the	 anti-Zionist	demonstrators	against	General	Maude,	as	well	as,	the	strikers	during	the	1931	General	Strike,	Ibid.	93	This	 could	be	 compared	 to	 the	Bengal	Criminal	Tribes	Act	 of	 1871	 that	 essentially	 had	 the	 same	function	in	India.	94	The	Iraqi	state	in	such	a	situation	was	merely	following	the	colonial	practice	of	the	British	of	using	certain	aspects	of	customary	law	for	their	own	political	purposes.	Here,	William	Barton’s	reference	to	
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administrative official according to the TCCDR was to affirm a TCCDR order and ensure that it 
was enforced. The fact that these officials had such wide discretion made them susceptible to 
bribery from shaikhs who wanted to influence a certain outcome.95 It is for this reason that Batatu 
has fittingly referred to the TCCDR as more of an ‘arbitrary administrative regulation’ in the 
context of its uses and interpretation, especially in relation to the cities.96 The TCCDR has been 
criticized, even at times by some shaikhs for giving too much discretion in the hands of these 
administrators, who were neither trained in Iraqi (state) law nor tribal law and custom.97 In that 
sense, the TCCDR was, using the words of Mamdani, referring to the customary legal institutions 
enforced by the British in Nigeria, ‘the triumph of techno-administration under the guise of 
indirect rule through customary law…[That is,] a retreat into legal administration’.98 The rule of 
law turns into the rule of legal administration (i.e. a concern for ‘law and order’ in the tribal area), 
as the whole purpose of such structures was the administering of (semi-colonial and imperial) 
power through the enforcement of tribal custom and tradition.     
 
IV. The positivist ‘duality’ of law in Iraq & its limitations 
 
My main argument here is that the legal duality that was created by the British was in fact 
quite illusory, not only because it was incomplete or did not reflect reality on the ground, but also 
because the executive used the tribal system for its own advantage, often to avoid the implications 
of Iraqi law. I have already shown how the TCCDR was used as an instrument of administrative 
control and oppression by the Iraqi state. What is also interesting is that tribesmen did not hesitate 
to use the national courts when it was in their interest to do so.  According to one shaikh, the only 																																																																																																																																																																																																									‘tribal	responsibility’	in	the	frontiers	is	fitting.	It	illustrates	that	one	could	enforce	a	remedy	against	an	 entire	 tribe	 rather	 than	 the	 responsible	 tribesman,	while	 reminding	 the	 reader	 that,	 “It	 is	 their	own	 custom,	 not	 a	 British	 invention”	 (Barton,	 supra,	 at	 60).	 The	 reality	 of	 course	 was	 that	 by	enforcing	it	in	such	a	manner	(through	the	Frontier	Regulation),	it	ceased	to	be	‘their	own	custom’	as	such.					95Muhammad	Tawfīq	Husayn.	Nihāyat	al-Iqtāʿ	fi	al-ʿIraq:	(The	End	of	Feudalism	in	Iraq:	A	study	of	the	
conditions	of	the	Iraqi	peasant	&	the	Agrarian	Reform	Law),	(Beirut:	Dar	al-ʿlim	lil-malayeen,	1958),	at	79. 96	Ibid.	Willard	Berry	had	a	similar	conclusion	 in	relation	to	Pakistan’s	Frontier’s	Crimes	Regulation:	“A	 total	 consideration	 of	 the	 Regulation	 reveals	 that	 it	 was	 neither	 derived	 from	 custom,	 nor	endowed	with	the	guarantees	of	due	process	and	equal	protection	which	characterized	the	Western	system	of	adjudication,	and	it	was	the	specific	intent	of	the	Government	to	bestow	a	large	portion	of	discretionary	power	upon	local	administrators.	The	Regulation	cannot	be	conceived	as	an	instrument	of	justice	in	either	the	traditional	or	Western	sense	nor	can	it	be	considered	a	substitute	for	either.”	Berry,	supra,	ft.41,	at	41.					97	Jamali,	supra,	ft.	90,	at	144.	98	Mahmood	Mamdani.	Citizen	and	Subject:	Contemporary	Africa	and	the	Legacy	of	Late	Colonialism,	(New	Jersey:	Princeton	University	Press,	1996),	at	125.		
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reason why a tribesman preferred the tribal courts was that he hoped to receive the monetary 
remedy (‘ransom’ was the word he used) that was owed to him under customary law.99 In reality, 
however, not unlike the preceding Ottoman order, the tribesman found strategic ways to exercise 
his rights under state law by disguising himself as a townsman when it was to his advantage to do 
so.  M.N. Kadhim (who started out his career as a deputy prosecutor, becoming a criminal court 
judge and eventually a member of the Court of Sessions) argued that Iraqi state law was 
continuously encroaching into the tribal legal system.100 Kadhim had the following to say from 
his experience as a long-standing member of the bench: ‘[t]he author in his career has seen 
tribesmen living in towns or near towns sue one another in civil as well as in criminal courts in 
towns. When some of them raised the question of tribal customs for one reason or another and 
asked that the case should be referred to the Administrator, the opponent would immediately 
reject the suggestion and say that they had nothing to do with tribal customs: they had become 
“civilized townsmen” and they wanted the “Government” to give them their “rights” or to punish 
their opponents.’101 In the reverse situation, powerful townsmen would claim to have tribal roots 
to get away with certain crimes, in particular murder.102 These instances are quite revealing as 
they illustrate that the ‘dichotomy’ between the tribesman and the townsman in Iraq that was 
constructed in law was not only misleading, but were both in reality encroaching into each other. 
It shows that the tribesman was not ‘primitive’ and ‘uncivilized’ as the British believed in the 
sense that he was too attached to his tribal roots to rely on the state rather than his tribal customs. 
The fact was that the tribal and state legal structures existed in tandem and in an overlapping 
manner, for one reinforced the other (as they were interdependent) within an overarching semi-
colonial Iraqi state and order. It was therefore the function of such a positivist duality that one 
should focus on, which was to further and strengthen the Iraqi state and in turn British interests 
after all.  
 
 To what extent then was customary and tribal law ‘invented’ in Iraq? The literature on 
the ‘invention of tradition’ and customary law is vast, especially in the context of the history of 																																																																				99	Jamali,	supra,	ft.	90,	at	144.		100	M.N.	Kadhim,	Reaction	to	Crime	Under	Tribal	Law	and	Modern	Codification	in	Iraq,	(D.Phil.	Thesis,	Oxford	University,	1961).	101	Ibid,	at	317-318.		102	An	 example	 of	 this	 occurred	 when	 Abdullah	 Beg	 al-Sani,	 Director-General	 of	 the	 Minister	 of	Interior	 was	 murdered	 in	 his	 office	 by	 Abdullah	 Falih	 Beg	 al-Sa‘dun.	 Although	 the	 murderer	 was	sentenced	to	death,	on	appeal	he	explained	that	he	was	defending	the	honor	of	his	family	as	al-Sani	married	the	daughter	of	the	late	Prime	Minister	Abd	al-Muhsin	al-S‘adun	under	opposition	from	the	S‘adun	 family.	He	 argued	 that	 he	was	 entitled	 to	be	 tried	under	 the	 jurisdiction	of	 the	TCCDR	and	customary	 law.	 	 His	 plea	 was	 successful	 and	 his	 death	 sentence	 commuted	 to	 a	 term	 of	imprisonment.	See	Sluglett,	supra,	ft.	87,	at	172.					
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colonial Africa.103 Terence Ranger who was the first to coin such an analysis, argued that what 
was referred to as ‘customary’ tradition (including customary law) was an invention devised by 
Europeans who believed that they were ‘respecting age-old African custom’.104 This analysis was 
eventually expanded, influencing a plethora of legal scholarship (especially in legal 
anthropology), in particular the work of Martin Chanock on customary law in Malawi and 
Zambia; Sally Falk Moore’s work on colonial law in Chaggaland, as well as, Sally Engel Merry’s 
study on law and colonialism in the context of the history of Hawaii.105 The overarching concern 
in this diverse body of work was the effect that colonialism had on the legal structures of 
indigenous societies – the general claim was that the customary law that emerged during these 
periods of colonization was not a residue of the past (as was believed to be the case) but rather 
emerged out of the colonial encounter itself. It is in this (strict) manner that it was ‘invented’ 
rather than ‘discovered’.106 This line of reasoning was a direct challenge to the dominant 
(evolutionary) understanding in legal anthropology of what has generally been termed as 
‘primitive law’.107  Customary law is not primitive law, but rather (for the most part and at least 
structurally) modern (semi-)colonial law in customary garb. Chanock for instance has argued that, 
‘the law was the cutting edge of colonialism, an instrument of the power of an alien state and part 
of the process of coercion. And it also came to be a new way of conceptualizing relationships and 
power within African communities, which were undergoing basic economic changes…The 
customary law, far from being a survival, was created by these changes and conflicts. It cannot be 
understood outside of the impact of the new economy on African communities. Nor can it be 
understood outside of the peculiar institutional setting in which its creation takes place….’108 																																																																				103	The	 main	 text	 that	 started	 this	 inquiry	 was:	 Terence	 Ranger,	 “The	 Invention	 of	 Tradition	 in	Colonial	Africa,”	in	The	Invention	of	Tradition,	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	1983).		104	Ibid,	at	250.	105	See	Martin	Chanock.	Law,	Custom	and	Social	Order:	The	Colonial	Experience	in	Malawi	and	Zambia,	(Cambridge:	 Cambridge	 University	 Press,	 1985);	 Sally	 Falk	 Moore,	 Social	 Facts	 and	 Fabrications:	
“Customary”	 law	on	Kilimanjaro,	 1880-1980,	 (Cambridge:	 Cambridge	 University	 Press,	 1986);	 Sally	Engel	Merry.	Colonizing	Hawaii:	The	Cultural	Power	of	Law,	(New	Jersey:	Princeton	University	Press,	2000);	Francis	G.	Snyder.	“Colonialism	and	Legal	Form:	The	Creation	of	‘Customary	Law’	in	Senegal”,	in	Crime,	Justice	and	Underdevelopment,	(London:	Macmillan	&	Co,	1982),	pp.90-121.		106	There	are	 limits	 to	 the	notion	 that	customary	 law	was	 ‘invented’	tout	court.	This	has	been	dealt	with	elsewhere,	but	the	point	here	is	that	one	must	approach	the	word	‘invention’	with	caution,	for	customary	law	was	never	invented	out	of	thin	air.	Moreover,	the	natives	and	tribes	had	a	role	to	play	in	 its	 development,	 for	 it	wasn’t	merely	 a	 European	 invention	 per	 se,	 although	 it	was	 used	 to	 the	benefit	of	Western	hegemony	and	domination.	My	use	of	 the	 term	 ‘invention’	 is	 therefore	made	 in	this	 strict	 narrow	 rather	 than	 literal	 sense.	 	 For	 a	 critique	of	 the	notion	of	 invention,	See:	 Thomas	Spear,	“Neo-Traditionalism	and	the	Limits	of	Invention	in	British	Colonial	Africa,”	Journal	of	African	
History,	44	(2003),	pp.3-27.	107	See	 E.	 Adamson	 Hoebel.	 The	 Law	 of	 Primitive	 Man:	 A	 Study	 in	 Comparative	 Legal	 Dynamics,	(Harvard	University	Press,	1954).	108	Chanock,	supra,	ft.	105,	at	4.	
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Customary law was therefore a unique product of the colonial encounter itself and cannot be 
explained otherwise. It must therefore be understood as being molded by the historical processes 
of colonialism and capitalism. Nevertheless, it must always be emphasized that this British 
‘invention’ was not applied on a tabula rasa, but rather molded into a preexisting Ottoman order.    
 
The ‘customary law’ of the tribes of Iraq should be approached in a similar analytic 
manner, for it emerged out of and was transformed by British colonial policies, rather than being 
a restoration of an ancient tradition from the past. It is true that the ‘corpus of law’ that was 
applied under the jurisdiction of the TCCDR was ‘uniquely Arab,’	109 but one would need to 
explore the underlying changes within the semi-colonial Iraqi order to expose the transformations 
that these legal processes were both undergoing and stimulating. Historians of Iraq have generally 
been aware of the fact that the customary and tribal law that was applied under the TCCDR was 
somewhat different from what was there before the arrival of the British and their institutions. As 
I have already mentioned, there are limits to the notion that the British ‘invented’ this customary 
law tout court, for they contributed to this invention by molding specific features of such law so 
as to make it compatible with their imperial agenda. By doing so they created a unique positivist 
duality in Iraqi state law.   
 
What was it exactly then that was different about British ‘duality’ as opposed to Ottoman 
‘duality’? The law has generally been approached in a strictly functionalist manner, and what was 
generally said (usually in passing) was that tribal institutions and law contained a ‘fluidity’ that 
was ‘frozen’ and which was made ‘rigid’ by a process of institutionalization. To a certain extent 
this is true, but a much more in-depth analysis of the law is needed here. One would need to ask 
more specific questions, for instance: how did this process occur and what does it reveal about the 
nature of colonial and semi-colonial legality? It was mainly modern legal positivism that the 
British brought into the fold. It was surely this positivist characteristic of modern (Western) law 
and its legal form that brought about such transformation (or even mutation) to indigenous legal 
traditions. The positivist semi-colonial legality ensured that the social and political relations that 
were altered would be reconciled with the capitalist system turning certain customs (as well as 
non-customs110) based on practice and usage into systematized formal legal rules backed by a 
coercive state. It is in this way that such ‘customary law’ was in fact a part from modern (state) 																																																																				109	See	 Hanna	 Batatu,	 “Of	 the	 Diversity	 of	 Iraqis,	 the	 Incohesiveness	 of	 their	 Society	 and	 their	Progression…”	in	Hourani	and	Khoury	(eds.),	The	Middle	East:	A	Reader,	(1993).	110	As	Mamdani	writes,	‘customary	law	consolidated	the	non-customary	power	of	chiefs	in	colonial	administration’.	Supra,	ft.	98,	at	110.			
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law rather than a past (primordial) tribal tradition. Its function was (ironically) to strengthen the 
centrality of the Iraqi state, while furthering British imperial interests. So, the duality that was 
imposed in Iraq by these institutions and structures should be approached in such a rounded 
manner – the TCCDR (including the corpus of tribal law that was applied and interpreted through 
this instrument) was itself entirely apart of the general institutions of the modern (positivist) law 
of the state. It did not necessarily bring about a space of suspension of law (through 
administrative legality) per se, but rather following Esmeir it allowed for ‘positivist elasticity’.111  
The positivist character of the modern (semi-colonial) law defined the parameters of the tribal 
legal system and its institutions, and despite having no jurisdiction in tribal matters, the state 
retained through such elasticity considerable influence. Consequently, the duality of law in Iraq 
recounted above that has generally been perceived as a characteristic of British indirect rule turns 
out to actually contain pervasiveness despite its fragmentation, which allowed the Iraqi state 
room to maneuver and in turn invade the social/political spaces of townsmen and tribesmen 
alike.112     
 
V. Land tenure, property & the origins of capitalist relation in Iraq  
 
 I will now turn to the complex question of land tenure to explore the socio-economic 
aspects of this historical narrative. An analysis of land tenure and its legal dimensions is 
necessary if one is to grasp how the peasant was dispossessed of his tribal land becoming a mere 
tenant (and later, a bonded serf), and the manner in which the shaikh became an absentee 
landlord. In this section, I will briefly narrate this transformative process in the context of land 
tenure in Iraq, which could be considered as the principal source of injustice and inequality 
during this period in its history. Before dealing with the approach of the British and the Iraqi 
state, I will begin by briefly describing the customary law relating to land, and the manner in 
which the Ottomans intervened igniting the massive transformative changes to come. I will then 
turn to an analysis of the significance of law in these processes and how it has been unfortunately 
overlooked in the historiography of Iraq, while considering the wider implications of an approach 
that would take colonial and semi-colonial law seriously.    
 
																																																																				111	Samera	Esmeir.	“On	Coloniality	of	Modern	Law,”	Critical	Analysis	of	Law,	2:1	(2015),	at	22.	112	Ibid.	
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 A tribe’s traditional attachment to their land rested on certain customary legal practices 
that were varied and multiple depending on the region and environment in question.113 One thing 
that these varied practices did have in common, however, was that they were based on very 
distinctive indigenous notions of property. I have already mentioned earlier how land was 
traditionally held communally by the tribe, and that absolute property was an alien concept to the 
tribesmen.114 Instead, it was the tribal dīrah, a term that conveyed ‘the sense of the domain over 
which the tribe exercised sovereign rights, rather than that of exclusive ownership,’ which was so 
different from the notion of ownership and yet bore ‘a more profound sense of property’.115  A 
good example of such tribal customary law relating to land was the lazma, which was a form of 
corporately held real property by the tribe. It was claimed in perpetuity (as long as it was able to 
defend it) and did not depend on the continuous maintenance of the land through pasture or 
cultivation.116 As long as the land was either initially brought into production by its toil or 
forcibly taken by conquest, the land became the communal property of the tribe.117 In this 
manner, tribal lazma was ‘a form of collective holding paid for by either the toil or the blood 
expended by the tribe rather than by a purchase price or its equivalent.’118  The land was 
henceforth clearly as of yet outside the market and commercial transactions.119 The shaikh 
commonly assigned the tribesmen a saham (or share) of the cultivated areas of the land in 
accordance with the tribe’s needs, and so land tended to be distributed in a more equitable 
manner. Furthermore, the rights attached to lazma allowed for more freedom of use, as it was not 
dependent on continuous cultivation and remained valid long after the land was abandoned.120  
 
The main policy of the Ottomans towards the tribes from the early nineteenth century 
onwards was that of a policy of detribalization as the tribal order was considered as an obstacle to 
its state authority, especially with regards to the revenue collection of its Empire. Customary laws 																																																																				113	There	are	generally	two	main	zones	with	very	different	agricultural	conditions:	the	rain-fed	zone	in	the	North	and	the	irrigation	zone	in	central	and	southern	part	of	the	country.	This	section	will	be	focused	on	the	latter,	as	this	is	where	the	system	of	‘semi-feudalism’	eventually	became	concentrated.	114	Haider,	supra,	ft.	45,	at	316.	115	Albertine	 Jwaideh,	 “Aspects	 of	 land	 tenure	 and	 social	 change	 in	 lower	 Iraq	during	 late	 ottoman	times”	 in	 Tarif	 Khalidi	 (ed.),	 Land	 Tenure	 and	 Social	 Transformation	 in	 the	 Middle	 East,	 (Beirut:	American	University	of	Beirut,	1984),	at	334.	 	 Jwaideh	details	these	traditional	customary	practices	relating	to	 land,	such	as	 talla‘iyya	 (‘choice-lands’)	a	 form	of	 tenancy	widely	practiced	 in	 the	middle	Euphrates;	 and	 naqasha,	 which	 she	 describes	 as	 ‘possibly	 the	 oldest	 form	 of	 prescriptive	 right	 in	continuous	practice	known	to	man’,	at	343.	116	Ibid,	at	335.	117	Ibid,	at	336.	118	Ibid.	119	Mahdi,	supra,	ft.	58,	at	73.	120	Jwaideh	,	supra,	ft.	115,	at	337.	
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and practices were never recognized by the Ottoman authorities, which considered all land as 
being within the domain of the state. Nevertheless, Ottoman wālīs (governors) based in the towns 
continuously failed to extend its authority into the rural areas due to vigorous tribal resistance.121 
Hence, Ottoman legal structures continued to coexist with these traditional tribal customs until 
the Ottoman (administrative, military and legal) reforms or the Tanzīmāt were initiated in the mid 
nineteenth century. The Tanzīmāt began the process of integrating the three provinces of Iraq 
(Baghdad, Basra, and Mosul) into the purview of centralization from Constantinople. It also 
aimed at modernizing the state, while reforming the economy in line with expanding international 
and foreign trade.122 Part of the reforms included the Ottoman Land Code of 1858, which aimed 
at strengthening the financial viability and in turn the power of the Ottoman state.123 This Code 
categorized landholding into several designations, the two of which concern us here are mīrī 
(state un-alienated land) and mūlk (freehold land).124 The Code provided a framework for the 
registration of individual land rights, granting taxpayers tapū sanads (title deeds), in turn creating 
a new tenure over land (tapū). The main intention of this piece of legislation was to weaken tribal 
institutions by connecting individual cultivators directly to the state, allowing them to obtain 
rights to usufruct mīrī land on the condition of tax payment and cultivation, as well as providing 
an incentive for higher production.125  
 
The Code was clearly in direct contradiction with customary law and tribal principles, 
which were based on the notion that a tribe held land communally as long as it could be militarily 
defended against encroachment by other tribes, rather than dependent on the recognition of the 
state. The Code, expressly forbade communal ownership, and only recognized prescriptive rights 
of individuals who could prove possession and cultivation of a plot for at least ten years.  It was 
therefore generally almost impossible for a semi-settled cultivator (or a customary lazma holder) 
to meet such an evidential threshold and gain a prescriptive (tapū) right. Moreover, a tribesman 																																																																				121	Albertine	 Jwaideh,	 “Midhat	 Pasha	 and	 the	 Land	 System	 of	 Lower	 Iraq,’	 	 (1963)	 in	 St.	 Antony’s	Papers	Vol.	XVI,	Middle	Eastern	Affairs	No.	3,	pp.	106-137,	London,	at	112.	122	See	 Ebubekir	 Ceylan.	 The	 Ottoman	 Origins	 of	 Modern	 Iraq:	 Political	 Reform,	 Modernization	 and	
Development	in	the	Nineteenth	Century	Middle	East,	(IB	Taurus,	2011).		123	Marion	 Farouk-Sluglet	 and	 Peter	 Sluglet.	 “The	 Transformation	 of	 land	 Tenure	 and	 Rural	 Social	Structure	in	Central	and	Southern	Iraq,	c.	1870-1958,”	International	Journal	of	Middle	East	Studies	15	(1983),	 pp.491-505,	 at	 493.	 This	 Code	 was	 not	 put	 into	 practice	 in	 Iraq	 until	 1869	 during	 the	governate	of	Midhat	Pasha.	124	The	 other	 categories	 were	waqf	 (religious	 endowments);	metruka	 (land	 for	 common	 use	 and	easements,	such	as	roads	for	example),	and	mewat	(uncultivated	land,	ownership	of	which	was	with	the	government).	See	Herbret	 J.	Liebesny.	The	Law	of	the	Near	and	Middle	East:	Readings,	Cases	and	
Materials,	(New	York:	SUNY,	1975).	125	See	Matti	Moosa.	 “The	Land	Policy	of	Midhat	Pasha	 in	 Iraq,	1869-1872,”	 Islamic	Quarterly,	 Jul	1,	(1968);	12,	3,	pp.146-159.	
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not only saw no reason to pay to gain title to his traditional land, but also was highly suspicious 
of the state, especially the potential of getting conscripted for its military. In this way, the 
application of the Code brought about the unintended consequences of the distribution of tapū 
sanads to city merchants, tax-farmers and a few tribal shaikhs, who went ahead and registered 
their names to certain lands (often through fraudulent methods and bribery) as they realized the 
value in ‘the possession of slips of paper’.126  
 
Most bedouin tribesmen, however, did not understand the value of written law or the 
power of contractual documents. This is reflected well in one response of a shaikh when asked 
why he did not obtain tapu to formally define the boundary of his land in a legal document, “…he 
drew his sword and said, ‘My sword is my boundary, and I don’t want a better one, yes that’s it a 
sword is the thing and no nonsense about writings…’”127 Although the Code accelerated the 
already ensuing detribalization process, it destroyed the military confederations, replacing them 
with a ‘multitude of antagonistic tribal sections,’ creating a new socio-economic impetus that 
altered the old tribal structure. This sometimes occurred in an atmosphere of violent resistance 
from tribesmen, who were becoming consciously aware of how their ancient landholding 
customary rights were slowly being taken away from them.128   
 
The tribesman was now alienated from his land as this new legal tenure system turned 
him into a mere tenant (at will) – an agricultural worker cultivating the land for his shaikh, who 
now became a landlord (or an absentee landlord living in the cities).129 Tapū grants were 
eventually abolished in 1881 as the Ottomans realized the unintended effects of the Code, which 
merely entrenched the powers of a new class of tapū-holders with no real incentive to pay taxes. 																																																																				126	Farouk-Sluglet	 and	 Sluglet,	 supra,	 ft.	 123,	 at	 495.	 What	 consequently	 emerges	 was	 a	 ‘total	divergence	between	registered	titles	and	actual	possessory	titles	that	could	be	supported	at	 law	by	the	doctrine	of	prescription’.	See	Farhat	J.	Ziadeh.	Property	Law	in	the	Arab	World	(London:	Graham	&	Trotman	Limited,	1979),	at	10.	127	J.S.	Mann,	An	Administrator	in	the	Making	(London,	1921),	at	202-203.	128	Batatu,	supra,	ft.	41,	at	77.	The	best	example	where	such	violence	manifested	was	in	the	Muntafiq	region	where	fragmentation	of	the	tribes	was	rife,	while	tribesmen	rejected	the	enforcement	of	tapū	registered	rights	of	 certain	members	of	 the	Saʿdun	 family,	who	backed	 the	Ottomans	and	acquired	wealth	 from	 increased	 rents.	 This	 made	 one	 British	 political	 officer	 describe	 the	 scene	 in	 the	following	manner:	“It	should	be	realized	that	throughout	the	entire	Mutafik	country	there	has	been	a	sort	of	miniature	French	Revolution	taking	place…	It	has	been	nothing	more	or	less	than	a	revolt	of	the	 serf	 population	 against	 the	 landed	 classes…’	 (Iraq,	 Ministry	 of	 Interior	 File	 No.	 48/47.	Administrative	Report	of	Suq	al-Shiyukh	and	District	for	year,	1916-17),	as	quoted	in	Atiyah,	supra,	ft.67,	at	244. 129	Atiyah,	ibid,	at	29.	This	sharecropping	system	meant	that	the	cultivator	or	fellah	did	not	work	for	a	fixed	wage,	but	rather	for	a	share	of	the	crop.	An	absentee	landlord	generally	relied	on	his	sirkal	(sub-shaikh)	to	manage	the	land.	
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In other words, they recognized that granting such documents without an effective system to 
enforce tax payments would only lead to their loss of control. Hence, although the process 
described above was interrupted and reversed, it was this Ottoman intervention into the 
customary legal practices of the tribes of Iraq that initiated the changes in the socio-economic 
relations of the tribes, creating the advent of the first ‘wave of large landlordism’, and setting the 
stage for the impending British colonial intervention to further accelerate such transformation, 
eventually further entrenching these exploitative capitalist relations in law.130  
 
When the British arrived, the state of land tenure was entirely confusing, contradictory 
and unsettled. The preceding system and its interruption produced a situation whereby only 20 
percent of all the land was tapū registered, while the rest of the 80 percent remained as mīrī 
(state-owned) land.131 There were many competing claims (between tapū holders and customary 
lazma holders for example). However, the mandatory administration did not attempt to settle 
these claims. There was therefore no general policy dealing with land tenure during this transitory 
period.132 The British initially approached the tribes based on the region in question, as their 
concern was merely political and military expediency. Nevertheless, from the outset they realized 
that supporting one shaikh against his rivals was an efficient way to control the tribes. The 
selected shaikh would receive financial inducements, favorable land leases and tax breaks as long 
as he supported the British presence and maintained order in his tribe.133 As A.T. Wilson recounts 
in his memoirs, ‘[t]he Shaikhs… were for the most part reasonable men, of substantial means, 
with many of the instincts of wealthy country gentlemen. They were in most cases directly 
dependent on the Civil Administration for the positions they held; realizing that their positions 
entailed corresponding obligations; they co-operated actively with the political officers in 
suppressing offences against public order.”134 This method of expedient administrative control, 
eventually emerged as, ‘a deliberate scheme of government,’ and the tribal policy was clarified 
further in the favor of bolstering the power of collaborative shaikhs. 135  These shaikhs 
consequently became government agents, with the principal role of maintaining order and 
collecting revenue from their designated tribesmen. This led to the further alienation of the shaikh 
																																																																				130	Haim	Gerber.	The	Social	Origins	of	the	Modern	Middle	East,	(London:	Mansell	Publishing,	1987),	at	75.	131	Warriner,	ft.	49,	at	145.	132	Ibid.	133	Wilson,	supra,	ft.88,	at	77.	134	Ibid,	at	95.	135	Atiyah,	supra,	ft.	67,	at	234.
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from his tribe as his power was now derived not from the respect of his tribespeople but from the 
British.136 
 
 As mentioned earlier, the British therefore reversed the Ottoman policy of 
detribalization, strengthening what they saw as decaying tribal institutions. I have already 
discussed this policy earlier in the context of the TCCDR, and its political and juridical 
implications. Together with these tribal legal and political instruments, the British relied on the 
shaikh to extract surplus from agriculture. In the mean time, the intention was to uphold the status 
quo so as not to create ‘new’ rights in land where none existed. For this reason, the British 
administration temporarily continued to apply (its interpretation of) the Ottoman Land Code and 
briefly revived the Tapū department.137 In the Muntafiq region, for example, there were attempts 
to settle title, but this only strengthened the landowners even further. Tapū sanads although 
considered as defective legal documents were at certain instances provisionally considered as the 
‘standard,’ and the British Political Officers were left as final arbiters on the merits of each 
document until further considerations of the land question were made by the administration.138 
However, this temporary arrangement which ‘accepted the legal rights of the landlord against the 
traditional tribal right to a separate Dīra…perpetuated the injustices done by the Turkish regime 
to the tribes,’ for the real question was not the legal interpretation of the sanad, but rather the 
complete subjection of the tribes to landlords and the state.139 In this way, the (shaikhly) tapū 
landholders claimed and at times were successful at receiving settlement of title from the 
mandatory administration during this transitory period, for they readily used the state to further 
oust the traditional prescriptive rights of the tribesmen.140  Finally, with rampant absentee 
landlordism came the widespread use of mechanical pumps as a novel method of irrigation, 
which although in theory increased the crop areas, in fact merely enhanced the ability of pump 
owners (who were mostly wealthy capitalist townspeople) to claim ownership of large tracts of 
land, bringing about a another type of landholder into the fold.141 The government further 																																																																				136	Ibid,	at	235.	137	Sluglett,	supra,	ft.	87,	at	168.	See	E.B.	Howell.	“The	Qanun	Al	Aradhi”	(1922)	in	Journal	of	The	Royal	
Central	 Asian	 Society,	 9:1,	 21-39.	 Howell	 suggests	 that	 fraud	 in	 tapu	 sanads	 was	 ‘glaringly	apparent….nevertheless,	these	preposterous	documents,	unless	fraud	is	proved…which	is	practically	impossible…are	treasured	by	all	the	most	influential	men	in	the	country,	and	generally	regarded	as	being	unassailable	in	law’	(at	32).			138	Atiyah,		supra,	ft.	67,	at	245.	139	Ibid,	at	246.	140	Doreen	Warriner,	Land	Reform	and	Development	 in	the	Middle	East:	A	study	of	Egypt,	Syria	and	Iraq,	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press),	at	145.	141	Mahdi,	 supra,	 ft.	 58,	 at	 99.	 Sassoon,	 Joseph.	Economic	Policy	 in	 Iraq	1932-1950,	 (London:	 Frank	Cass,	1987),	at	143.	
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ingrained these relations when it passed a law in 1926, which gave partial tax exemptions to these 
pump owners.142 These developments during the mandatory period consequently continued the 
processes of the dispossession of the cultivator-peasant. 
 
It was not until 1932 that a legal framework for land settlement was established after 
Ernest Dowson was commissioned by the Iraqi government to write a report and make 
recommendations on land tenure.143 Dowson began his report demonstrating that a settlement of 
rights to land ‘presupposes and requires some stable basis of land law or at least of legalized 
custom on which such rights can be founded’ and none existed in Iraq.144 It was for this reason 
that a proper and clear land survey was required that was not based on ‘mere academic 
discussion,’ but practical policy and ‘local knowledge of the land’145 Although Dowson saw the 
conditions of land tenure in Iraq as being ‘in various stages of divorce from innumerable 
primitive practices, but still rarely wedded to law,’ and although he admitted that it was ‘very 
difficult’ to focus ‘the whole kaleidoscope panorama into one generally intelligible picture,’ he 
insisted that it was necessary to proceed with some form of a generalized plan of diagnosis.146 
Dowson therefore made it clear that the state should make direct connections with the cultivators 
rather than rely on individual landholders as intermediaries. This he argued was what the 
Ottoman Tapū system was intended to do in the first place – ‘promote a body of industrious 
peasant proprietors and taxpayers’.147 He argued that it would be ‘dangerous to public peace and 
contentment’ if land were disposed of in an unrestricted manner. The cultivators and small 
landholders must gain some form of economic stability and experience lest reform merely turns 
into an ‘incitement to the piling up for unproductive debt’.148 In this way, ‘the enormous 
territories of mīrī land now existing’ which constituted the main capital of the nation should not 
be handed over to individuals unless ‘accompanied by equivalent advantages to the public 
purse’.149  
 
Dowson’s final recommendations included the following: first, a complete survey of the 
land must be done, as it is necessary for any settlement. Second, all departments relating to land 																																																																				142	Great	Britain,	Special	Report	on	the	Progress	of	Iraq	1920-1930,	at	209.	143	Ernest	Dowson.	An	Inquiry	into	Land	Tenure	and	Related	Questions:	Proposals	for	the	Initiation	of	
Reform,	(London:	Garden	City	Press,	1931).	144Ibid,	at	6.	145Ibid.	146Ibid,	at	10-11.	147Ibid,	at	61-69.	148Ibid.	149Ibid,	at	68.	
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tenure must be combined and coordinate their efforts. Third, settlement of title should be made on 
the basis of beneficial occupational use. Settlement should be preceded by ‘impartial’ local 
investigations undertaken by officers selected from the community itself. Finally, the state should 
retain its rights of ownership and so land should not be registered in freehold ownership, but 
rather ten-year leasehold tenancies.150 
 
Despite the rational basis of his report, Dowson’s most important recommendations were 
completely ignored. The new land tenure system, which was supposedly introduced on the basis 
of his report, was in reality undermined by Henry Dobbs, the High Commissioner at the time, 
who obviously had considerable influence on the Iraqi government. Dobbs, who was also the 
architect of Iraq’s tribal policy, disagreed with the report’s main recommendations.151 Dobbs’ 
objection, which was not published in the official report, emphasized that the position of the tribal 
shaikhs should be reinforced by allowing them more access to land.152 Dobb’s goal was clearly to 
empower a certain class of large landowners that would act as a bastion for the newly emerging 
British semi-colonial order. Dowson, on the other hand, strongly disagreed with Dobbs, stating 
that, ‘I do not myself think either simplification, or public peace or economic advance are to be 
realized by a deliberate policy of establishing a series of large holders as intermediaries in dealing 
with the mass small holders.’153 It was ultimately Dobbs’ approach that prevailed, for it was the 
most politically expedient one after all.  
 
The two most important pieces of legislation that were subsequently passed were the 
1932 Land Settlement Law, which gave the government the power to settle land title disputes, and 
the Law of Granting Land on Lazma Tenure, which established a new category of landholding – 
mīrī-lazma. This ‘Lazma law’ specified that lazma tenure could be granted to any person who has 
enjoyed the usufruct of land if he could prove that the land has been cultivated for over a period 
of fifteen years preceding the date of settlement.154 As mentioned earlier, customary lazma was a 
traditional form of customary prescriptive right. The new Lazma law effectively created a rigid 
positivist ‘customary’ law that was recognized by the state, and that conferred absolute ownership 
(mūlk), similar to tapū.155 The purpose of passing such a law was to recognize a certain 																																																																				150Ibid,	at	76.	151	Ibid.	152	TNA.	Dowson	to	Humphrys,	15	Jan.	1932.	FO	371/16049,	as	quoted	in	Joseph	Sassoon,	Economic	
Policy	in	Iraq	1932-1950,	(London:	Frank	Cass,	1987),	at	161.	153	Ibid.	154	Warriner,	Land	Reform	and	Development	in	the	Middle	East,	supra,	ft.	140,	at	148.	155	Ibid,	at	147.	
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customary law and tribal practice, and to supposedly ‘preserve tribal solidarity’.156 It therefore 
seemed to be drafted as a compromise, suggesting that certain tribal rights needed to be 
acknowledged in law. In practice, however, its effects were the complete opposite, as what ended 
up happening was precisely what Dowson predicted in his report when he warned against merely 
‘the passing of bills into law’ without ensuring that they were workable on the ground.157  
 
The Lazma Law and its strict interpretation eventually allowed for the newly emergent 
stratum of pump-owners to acquire ownership of lands in which they installed pumps, at the 
expense of the prescriptive rights of tribesmen.158 This occurred according to some because of the 
bias and incompetence of those presiding over settlement courts, which often accepted proof of 
only one year of cultivation, instead of the expressly requisite fifteen.159 The president of the 
Department of Settlements, Hasan Ali, for instance, highlighted that ‘with inexperienced land 
settlement officers, and with the doubtful integrity of the administration, influential people and 
shaykhs were able to get such grants by presenting even more tenuous evidence as proof of 
prescriptive claims.’160 Although this was true, it was in fact the very nature of the Lazma Law 
that ensured that customary rights would be overridden as it was based on notions of property 
relations that were completely foreign to tribal customary law. As mentioned earlier, the 
traditional customary lazma was not only incompatible with such property relations, but did not 
recognize land as a commodity. It was the insertion of such foreign notions of property into this 
traditional prescriptive right and its rendering into a positivist form that ensured its use by the 
pump-owners and capitalist townsmen for their benefit. The law conferred title on whoever was 
able to make the land in question productive (in the context of capitalist relations) rather than as a 
mere tribal right per se. It is this fact (and not mere corruption and incompetence that was, as 
Warriner states, ‘not surprising’ considering the political circumstances), which ultimately 
explains the fact that proof of only one year of productive crop cultivation was sufficient 																																																																				156	Ibid,	at	148.	157	Dowson,	supra,	ft.	143,	at	57-58.	158 	A	 very	 narrow	 interpretation	 of	 the	 definition	 of	 ‘usufruct’	 was	 accepted	 by	 members	 of	settlement	courts.	As	Khayyat	shows,	members	took	advantage	of	the	vague	definition	of	usufruct	in	the	legislation	to	favor	a	narrow	meaning	of		‘administrative	usufruct’	rather	than	‘actual	usufruct’	of	land.	It	was	such	an	interpretation	of	the	law	that	allowed	pump-owners	to	gain	title,	although	very	rarely	 did	 actual	 cultivators	 bring	 their	 claims	 to	 court,	 as	most	 claims	 tended	 to	 be	 between	 two	pump	 owners	 or	 shaikhs	 claiming	 an	 ‘administrative’	 right	 to	 usufruct	 land.	 Khayyat,	 Jaʿfar	 “al-Tatawur	 al-tārīkhi	 li-hiyazat	 al-ardh	 wa	 ʿlaqāt	 al-mūlkīya	 fi	 al-rīf	 al-ʿIraqi”	 [The	 historical	development	of	landholding	and	ownership	relations	in	rural	Iraq],	Al-Iqtisadi	(Baghdad,	1970),	Vol.	11,	No.	2,	at	98.	 159	Ibid.	160	Hasan	Muhammad	Ali.	Land	Reclamation	and	Settlement	in	Iraq	(Baghdad:	The	Baghdad	Printing	Press,	1955),	at	63-65.	
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evidence for the settlement courts to recognize title (entirely free of charge), while tribesmen 
whose ancestors lived on their traditional land for hundreds of years were denied any form of 
ownership or legal rights. In the end, as we will see, the law imposed only obligations on the 
fellah, stripping away all his rights.  
 
A certain understanding of individual property rights relating to land and the importance 
it attaches to the function of surplus production was reflected in the parliamentary debates on the 
Lazma Law. The main concern was the definition of ‘lazma-holder’. After one member objected 
to the possibility that this law would override certain customary rights in his region (such as the 
ancient right of naqsha161), the member from Hila, Salman al-Barrak, responded by warning 
against making any peasant (fellah) a lazma-holder. He claimed that, ‘if we made each fellah a 
lazma-holder, we might as well wish peace upon the land [i.e. wish it farewell]… and if all Iraqis 
become lazma-holders…then the land would become a desert. For as long as there is nothing 
driving the fellah, then he would not cultivate [a thing]...’162 It was clear from the latter debates 
that the fellah was interpreted as being precluded from the definition of a lazma-holder in law 
from the very beginning. The law was ultimately passed unanimously in both houses, and this 
explains the manner in which the commodification of land was primarily contemplated as the 
only way to make land more productive – the application of capital on land was considered a 
necessary precondition to acquire its ownership. 
 
 The legal framework to settle land was therefore in actuality meant to make permanent a 
specific understanding of property relations – a ‘rule of property’ as Ranajit Guha called it163– 
that was not only compatible with but also made to serve the capitalist system in toto. As one 
African legal scholar suggests land tenure reform in a colonial context plays a unique role as ‘the 
implication of tenure reform is that it represented a form of progressive transfer from one 
normative order to another’.164  In our case, a ‘semi-feudal’ capitalist order displaced a tribal 
customary one. The law played a significant role in this process, which amounted to a transfer of 
																																																																				161	Naqsha	 (a	word	deriving	 from	an	expression	denoting	a	 camping	ground)	was	an	ancient	 tribal	prescriptive	 right	 attached	 to	 individual	 plots	 of	 land	 that	 were	 originally	 acquired	 by	 means	 of	personal	toil	or	to	those	who	have	‘broken	the	land	and	developed	it’.	Jwaideh,	supra,	at	338.	162	As	quoted	in	al-Jawāhirī,	Imād	Ahmad.	Tārīkh	Mushkīlat	al-Arādi	fī	al-‘Iraq	wa	Dirāsa	fī	Tatawurāt	
al-‘Āma	[The	history	of	land	problems	in	Iraq	c.	1914-1932],	(Baghdad),	at	274.		163	Ranajit	Guha.	A	Rule	of	Property	 for	Bengal:	An	Essay	on	the	Idea	of	Permanent	Settlement,	 (New	Delhi:	Orient	Longman,	1982).		164	H.W.O	Okoth-Ogendo.	“The	Imposition	of	Property	Law	in	Kenya,”	in	Sandra	Burman	and	Barbara	Harrell-Bond	(eds).	The	Imposition	of	Law	(New	York:	Academic	Press,	1979),	at	155.	
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property rights, ironically and once again with the use of ‘customary law’.165 A specific legal 
form was evoked ensuring the permanent dispossession of the tribesmen and peasant from his 
traditional land. The British, however, did not consider that this framework was greatly upsetting 
to the status quo, for as one commentator maintained, criticisms of the settlement committees 
were ‘commonly exaggerated’ as its members ‘created no rights, they [merely] recorded what 
rights they found to exist’.166 The reality of such meandering in law nonetheless could not be any 
different. The new system of land settlement brought about the destruction of an already 
disintegrating tribal order, permanently displacing it with a modern capitalist ‘semi-feudalism’ 
that endured for another two and half decades until the revolution broke.   
 
It is worth quoting Warriner who similarly refused to hold the British responsible for 
what occurred in Iraq. She wrote (in the distressing year of 1948): ‘land tenure is mainly a 
controversial subject because it has been linked with British administration, and its abuses 
attributed to British mistakes. The difficulty has been that the British influence was only advisory, 
and the Government did not control an administration efficient enough to carry out 
recommendations of expert advisors…’167 I have already shown how the government did not 
follow the most important recommendations of the so-called experts, but what is more interesting 
is the assertion that the British advisory system did not in fact have any influence on realizing the 
intended policies on the ground. The record does not support such a claim. In fact, British 
advisors to the Ministry of Justice were giving legal advice on how to evict peasants from their 
lands, as the TCCDR did not contain a provision to allow for such an outright action, and an 
eviction was only legal under a TCCDR administrative order.168  
 
In one instance, a British advisor argued that it was possible to take a defendant to civil 
court in such a situation if the provisions of the TCCDR were inadequate to ensure the peasant’s 
eviction from the land! Not only does this contradict the supposed existence of a ‘duality’ in law 
and jurisdiction (supporting my previous argument above), but it also illustrates that the intention 
behind the law and its subsequent interpretation was clearly to support the landowners against the 
peasant. This advisor wrote a letter to the ministry of interior where he detailed such legal 
maneuvering: ‘If B wanted to evict G, he had to first make a [TCCDR] application on the basis 																																																																				165	Jwaideh,	supra,	ft.	115,	at	350.	166	Stephen	 Longrigg.	 Iraq	 1900	 to	 1950:	 A	 Political,	 Social	 and	 Economic	 History,	 (Oxford:	 Oxford	University	Press,	1953),	at	251.		167	Warriner,	Land	and	Poverty,	supra,	ft.	140,	at	117.		168	al-Jawahiri,	supra,	ft.	162,	at	263.	
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that the latter has no right [referring to the new lazma law] to reside on the land…and request his 
eviction. If G did not have a deed to support his presence [on the land], an order would be issued 
against him. However, if he produced a contract to support his presence, then B would have to 
request [in civil court] for the annulment of the contract [under civil law] presenting his reasons 
and evidence, and once the contract is annulled, G would be considered as trespassing on the 
land’.169 As al-Jawāhirī exclaims, a reader would probably be astonished by such instruction, as it 
plainly shows that British advisors were ‘conspiring’ with their Iraqi counterparts against ‘the 
poor peasant’ living in his ‘miserable hut’ to evict him from his land, in his own country.170   
 
 Before moving on, one must mention the one piece of legislation that ‘promised genuine 
serfdom for the peasant,’171 and which introduced a trend of further concentration of landlordism 
during the ‘independence’ era of Iraq – namely, the Law Governing the Rights and Duties of 
Cultivators No. 28 of 1933.172 This law rigidly defined the labour relations between cultivators 
and the lazma-owners of the farms (whether pump-owners or sheikhs). The fellah had an 
obligation under severe penalty of law to follow the demands of the farm-owner relating to the 
methods of cultivation (relating to the choice of crops, seeds, waters supply and harvesting) 
(Article 3 and 18). Whatever advances given to the fellah would be considered ‘agricultural debt,’ 
which would incur high interests and penalties if not paid on time (Article 10). If a fellah failed to 
pay his debt (which was impossible to repay in the first place) he would be prevented from 
leaving the farm, and could have his crops and hut confiscated and possibly destroyed by the 
farm-owner. Moreover, an indebted fellah was prevented from working elsewhere (Article 15). 
The fellah was held negligent under the law for ‘virtually every disaster’ that might befall the 
crop – something that cannot be controlled in the unpredictable Iraqi environment.173  
 
In this way, the fellah was consequently turned from a tenant-at-will with some freedom 
of action to a bonded serf tied to the land.174 One former British official admitted that ‘one is 
obliged to regard the fellah’s rights as theoretical only,’175  and that ‘the fellah under the 																																																																				169	Advisor	to	the	Ministry	of	Interior	to	the	Ministry	of	Justice,	No.	C/1634,	Baghdad,	1	June,	1931,	as	quoted	in	Ibid,	my	translation.	170	Ibid.	171	Batatu,	supra,	ft.	41,	at	133.	172	Law	Governing	 the	Rights	and	Duties	of	Cultivators	No.	28	of	1933,	 Iraq	 Government	 Gazette	 no.	31(30	July	1933),	pp.	315-323.		173	Sassoon,	supra,	ft.	141,	at	169.	174	Warriner,	Land	Reform,	supra,	ft.	49,	at	137.	175	The	meaning	of	a	phrase	such	as	 ‘theoretical	right’	might	seem	confusing	and	contradictory,	but	it’s	worth	mentioning	 that	 this	 type	of	 analysis	was	prevalent	 in	 colonial	discourse	 regarding	 land	
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provisions of the present law, is doomed to perpetual indebtedness…[and is] in reality, reduced to 
the status of a slave’.176  The law was drafted to the benefit of the large landholders, who with 
their political positions and seats in parliament ensured its passage into law, despite the 
opposition of a few members to it for its clear injustice towards the peasant.177 It was this law 
(and its revisions) in combination with the TCCDR detailed earlier- that ensured that the tribal 
fellah, now living in extreme poverty, in perpetual debt and enduring serf-like conditions would 
eventually decide to leave the land and migrate to the urban cities in search for a better life.178 It 
would furthermore contribute to his extreme affliction of a disease-ridden state, conditions which 
Michael Critchley, a professor of public health and social medicine at the Royal College of 
Medicine in Baghdad, described in a lecture in March 1954 in the following manner: ‘It is not 
exaggerating to state that the average agricultural worker (fellah) is a living pathological 
specimen as he is probably the victim of ankylostomiasis, ascariasis, malaria, biharzia, trachoma, 
bejel, and possibly of tuberculosis also.’179 It should by now be quite clear that this ‘pathological 
specimen’ was not only the product of the foreign capitalist forces that swept the country, but also 
the embodiment of its unequal relations through the very mechanisms of the law. 
 
VI. How law underdeveloped Iraq: the necessity of law in the history of  semi-colonialism 
 
The history of land tenure and customary law that I have described above is plainly a 
narrative about legal transformation as much as it is about political, social and economic changes 
in the context of colonialism in Iraq. Nevertheless, historians of Iraq have never really taken the 
law seriously. The role of (colonial and semi-colonial) law in the transformation and the 
imposition of underdevelopment or what has been referred to as ‘semi-feudalism’ of Iraq is of 
vital importance to grasp the manner in which it happened, and yet most explanations tend to 
privilege a purely economic or political narrative, whether it is reliance on modernization theory, 
dependency theory or its critique of ‘Political Marxism’ a la Robert Brenner. Let us take one 																																																																																																																																																																																																									tenure.	Meek	points	this	out	when	he	wrote:	‘…the	words	‘in	theory’	or	‘theoretically’	have	frequently	been	 employed	 to	 square	 the	 presuppositions	 with	 facts.	 Time	 and	 again	 there	 appear	 such	contradictions…’	 See	 C.K.	 Meek,	 Land	 Law	 and	 Custom	 in	 the	 Colonies,	 (London:	 Frank	 Cass	 &	 Co,	1968),	at	12.	176	TNA.	 ‘Note	 on	 law	 by	Webster,	 former	 inspector-general	 of	 agriculture’	 in	 FO	 624/1428/7	 (22	Dec.	1933),	as	quoted	by	Sassoon,	supra,	ft.	137,	169.		177	See	al-Jawahiri,	supra,	ft.	161,	at	350.	178	See	 Why	 Labour	 Leaves	 the	 Land:	 A	 Comparative	 Study	 of	 the	 Movement	 of	 Labour	 Out	 of	
Agriculture,	(Geneva:	International	Labour	Office,	1960),	at	160.	179	Critchley,	 A.	Michael.	 “The	Health	 of	 the	 Industrial	Worker	 in	 Iraq,”	British	 Journal	of	 industrial	
Medicine	12.1	(January	1955):	73-75.	
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example from the classic Marxist work of Hanna Batatu, who seems to view the law as of mere 
secondary importance to social and economic ‘forces’ in understanding the transformations that 
occurred in Iraq. In referring to the 1932 land policy and the land settlement law, he wrote the 
following, ‘This policy amounted to a legal recognition of a process that had been taking place 
for a good many decades in Iraq’s countryside: the usurpation by the shaikhs and aghas of the 
communal tribal domain, their disposition of weaker neighbors, and their encroachments on 
virgin state land.’ 180  Considering Law No. 28 of 1933 he wrote, ‘…fortunately for [the 
peasant]…it has never been the custom in Iraq to enforce laws wholeheartedly, and anyhow legal 
enactments could not in the long run have checked a movement that social reality itself 
impelled’.181 First, it is clear that Batatu’s definition of law is narrowly defined as a ‘legal 
enactment’ of certain political and economic processes occurring in social reality that could only 
be considered effective if properly enforced. Furthermore, law is treated as merely auxiliary to 
such historical transformation. In other words, his definition is confined to an instrumental and 
functionalist understanding of law.182 But what is more interesting for our purposes is his 
suggestion that what happened in rural Iraq could have happened without the law. This is an 
astonishing assertion considering the prevalence of law in the overall historical narrative that I’ve 
described above.  
 
Batatu seems to believe that law should be considered as being separate from the social 
and political processes of transformation in history. However, law is so much more complex and 
nuanced than he suggests, for as E.P. Thompson emphasized in his study of the Black Act of 
eighteenth century England, ‘law was deeply imbricated within the very basis of productive 
relations, which would have been inoperable without this law’.183 In the same way, I would argue 
that the entire transformative process in Iraq described above and the imposition of a semi-feudal 
system of large landlordism (especially in the South and referred to as the ‘iqta system) could not 
have occurred and would have been ‘inoperable’ without the law. Moreover, the law was a part of 
the processes of transformation from the very beginning, whether it was during the Ottoman 
period or afterwards when the British arrived. In this sense, the law is more than merely an 
instrument of class (or state) power or mere ideology (which of course it is), but returning to 
Thompson, ‘class relations were expressed, not in any way one likes, but through the forms of 																																																																				180	Batatu,	supra,	ft.	41,	at	110.	181	Ibid,	at	133,	my	emphasis.		182	See	Robert	W	Gordon.	“Critical	Legal	Histories”,		(1984)	Stanford	Law	Review,	36:57.		183	E.P.	Thompson.	Whigs	and	Hunters:	The	Origin	of	the	Black	Act	(London:	Penguin	Books,	1975),	at	261.	
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law; and the law…[therefore] has its own characteristics, its own independent history and logic of 
evolution.’184  
 
The role of law in analyzing Iraqi history therefore must not be dealt with as ancillary to 
other ‘forces’, for the fact that law is a part of the superstructure does not preclude its significance 
in relation to the economic base. The law might not be determining per se, but it is surely 
structurally and ideologically pertinent to the transformation in question, especially when it 
comes to the colonies and I would argue even more so in the semi-colonies, like Iraq. As Peter 
Fitzpatrick has argued, ‘law and state have a role that is more structurally central and structurally 
enduring in the third world,’ that is, in the colonial and semi-colonial context.185 This is because 
it is the law that ensures that the traditional mode of production is preserved and kept somewhat 
intact within a capitalist system, which if left to its own devices would completely destroy it. In 
other words, since these two modes – the traditional and capitalist – cannot be integrated 
‘naturally,’ they must be integrated into ‘an operative combination’ by law and the policies of the 
state.186  
 
The Iraqi economist Mohammed Oboosy has argued that the underdevelopment of Iraq 
emerged from the ‘primitive and semi-primitive methods of production,’ which in turn caused the 
economic structure to become overly ‘inflexible,’ further afflicting the economy with scarcities, 
‘bottlenecks’, and ‘retarding’ any development plans.187 If one were to extend our analysis into 
this economistic argument, it becomes clear that a study of the law would certainly explain how 
this structural inflexibility was initiated, extended and maintained in Iraq on the ground. An 
extensive analysis of law in these circumstances of underdevelopment must be taken more 
seriously and given its proper due if one intends to get a complete understanding of the 
transformative nature of colonialism and imperialism in the semi-colonial Middle East. 
 
 		
																																																																				184	Ibid,	at	262.	185	Peter	Fitzpatrick.	Law	and	State	in	Papua	New	Guinea,	(London:	Academic	Press,	1980),	at	36.	186	Ibid.	187	Mohammed	Jawad	Oboosy.	“A	Study	in	the	Theory	of	Economic	Underdevelopment	With	Special	Reference	to	Iraq,”	Middle	East	Economic	Papers,	15:2	(Beirut:	American	University	of	Beirut,	1958)	at	136,	148.	
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VII. Conclusion  
 
This chapter was generally an attempt to put the law at the center of the early history of 
socio-economic and political transformation of Iraq. The British imported certain colonial 
administrative and legal techniques from the North-Western Frontiers to secure their imperial 
interests and produce a semi-colonial Iraqi state. In so doing, they constructed an unstable 
positivist duality in Iraqi state law, which divided the country into two legal jurisdictions, one for 
the townsman and another for the tribesman. This in turn brought about the invention of a unique 
and modern tribal and customary law. Moreover, this duality, alongside a British land tenure 
policy, which institutionalized capitalist relations of production, contributed to some enormous 
changes in the countryside, structuring deep inequality in Iraqi society. First, it created a specific 
class of shaikhs who would become dependent on British patronage for their power, while their 
tribesmen were transformed into bonded serfs. Second, it ensured that land would be concentrated 
into the hands of a handful of landowners, contributing to the making of a highly exploitative 
(semi-feudal) capitalist system of production, and eventually forcing many of these miserable 
peasants to migrate into the slums of the urban cities and become wage earners. It is therefore 
quite clear from the narrative above that without the British uses of the law and certain legal 
techniques and instruments, most of these structural changes would not have emerged in the way 
that they did.     
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Chapter 2: A Brief History of the 1936 Labour Law & The Formative Years of the 
Early Iraqi Working-Class Movement 
 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
 
I will now shift the historical narrative from rural Iraq to the city of Baghdad to give a 
sense of the formative years of the Iraqi working class and its early movement. The main task of 
this chapter is to contextualize and historicize the labour law of 1936, and to argue that it was 
partly passed as a concession to the working class due to their pressures and initiation of strike 
action. I will then examine the provisions of the labour law and explore its limits. Although this 
piece of labour legislation was meant to pacify the movement and was drafted in such a manner 
that heavily constricted workers’ collective action, its provisions would eventually be 
appropriated into the discourses of both the early and the later labour movements. It was 
continuously used as a reference point and integrated into workers’ demands until the end of the 
monarchy.   
 
The labour law was appropriated as a rhetorical tool by the working class’ (counter-
hegemonic) movement to legitimize their demands. It had a specific ideological function in 
relation to the movement that was ‘educative’, which contributed to the expansion of their class-
consciousness. In other words, the labour law did exactly the opposite of what it was intended to 
do in that rather than pacify or appease the workers, it actually expanded and broadened their 
class-consciousness. Although the early labour movement believed that legal reform was possible 
and looked to the incipient Iraqi state to provide the necessary reforms to address their concerns, 
there was within the next decade a radical shift towards a more revolutionary approach, which put 
emphasis on structural change rather than mere reform. The suppression of the early labour 
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movement would eventually allow for communist ideas to become popular among the majority of 
workers in the next decades. 
       
 
II. The formative years of the Iraqi working class movement 
 
Legality was a contested space in the semi-colonial state. The law was more than just an 
instrument in the hands of the ruling class. Rather, it was continuously contested and occasionally 
appropriated by the workers in their struggle against the state and in their imaginings of a 
democratic future Iraqi polity. In this way, the first comprehensive labour law passed in Iraq in 
1936 cannot be explained in isolation from the previous years of intensified strike activity that 
culminated in a general strike in 1931. The 1931 general strike (the first of its kind in the 
country188) opened the door for the eventual passing of labour legislation in 1936. This is 
significant because it highlights that the formation of the early working class on the ground 
occurred in conjuncture with legal changes that they had a part in shaping. The laws of the Iraqi 
state should not therefore be seen as merely legal enactments passed from the top by legislative 
bodies or the executive, but rather were often shaped in reaction to the actions of those who 
expressed themselves on the streets. I intend to therefore intentionally displace and shift focus 
from the agency of ministers or opposition leaders, towards those workers who were organizing 
in the factories and demonstrating on the streets.  
  
The emergence of the labour movement in Iraq begins with the establishment of the first 
organization that advocated for workers – Jamʿīyat aṣḥāb al-	ṣināʿa (translated as the ‘Artisans’ 
Association’). The Jamʿīyat was officially formed on July 26, 1929, around a month after the 
Law of Associations of 1929 was passed, legalizing the formation of ‘associations’.189  It was one 
of the first organizations that represented and tirelessly advocated for workers’ rights, and in the 
																																																																				188	There	were	strikes	before	1930,	in	particular	in	1922,	1923,	and	1924	at	the	railways	that	called	for	 the	 freedom	 to	 form	 associations	 and	 arguably	 led	 directly	 to	 the	 1929	 law	 of	 associations.	Nonetheless,	these	strikes	were	still	ineffective	in	uniting	workers	and	confined	to	the	workplace.	See	Majid	 Salmān	Hussein.	 “al-Haraka	 al-ʿumāliya	 fi	 al-ʿIraq:	 dirāsa	 fi	 itijāhāt	 al-sīyāsīya,”	 [The	 Labour	Movement	in	Iraq:	A	study	in	its	political	trends,”	Basra	University,	Iraq	Scientific	Journal,	Issue	19,	January	2015,	at	388.	189	Kamāl	Muzhir	Ahmed,	al-Ṭabaqa	al-ʿumāliya	al-ʿIraqiyya:	al-takkawwn	wa	bidāyāt	al- ḥaraka	[The	Iraqi	Working	 Class:	 Its	 formation	 and	 the	 beginnings	 of	 its	movement],	 (Baghdad,	 Dar	 al-Rashid,	1981),	at	123.		Ahmed’s	book	is	one	of	the	few	works	that	details	the	early	formation	of	the	working-class	movements	using	primary	sources	and	interviews.	He	explicitly	critiques	the	historiography	(in	particular	al-Hasani)	for	ignoring	the	early	history	and	formation	of	the	Iraqi	working	class.			 
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short period of its existence became one of the most respected labour organizations in the 
country. At this point in Iraqi history, trade unions in the common meaning of the term did not yet 
exist. The Jamʿīyat was more of a hybrid between a trade union and a guild.190 There was 
certainly a more radical element of workers within its ranks, represented by the majority of its 
membership, the railway workers. This was what gave the Jamʿīyat certain characteristics of a 
trade union. 191  This also differentiated it from its counterpart organizations, such as the 
Shopkeepers’ Association and the Barbers’ Association, which were closer to professional 
associations or craft guilds. Still, as Iraq was largely an agricultural country and industrialization 
was slow at the time, one could not really say that there was a fully industrialized or 
‘proletariatized’ working class as of yet. The workers did not differentiate their interests from the 
artisans and small business owners. The Jamʿīyat was therefore in reality an alliance between the 
petty bourgeoisie (artisans, small business owners) and the industrialized workers (railway and oil 
workers, and factory workers, such as the tobacco workers).  
 
 The Ministry of Interior was reluctant to accept the Jamʿīyat’ s application for a license, 
but it eventually accepted the application, and the organization was legally instituted. Elections 
were subsequently held and the founder of the organization, Mohammad Sālih al-Qazzāz was 
elected as its first president.192 al-Qazzāz, a mechanic and a descendent of a silk tradesman, is 
regarded as Iraq’s first labour leader.193  He came from a comfortable middle class background, 
which allowed him to gain a broad education and eventually worked several government jobs.  
He joined the ‘Artisans’ Office’ in 1917, and for several years took night classes at the School of 
Commerce in Baghdad. 194  al-Qazzāz was considered fairly educated for someone of his 
generation - fluent in several languages, including English, Turkish and Urdu. Despite this 
background, he identified himself as a ‘worker.’195 He was nonetheless clearly closer to the 
artisans of the petty bourgeoisie. Politically, he was a liberal (rather than a Marxist), and a 																																																																				190	Ahmed	argues	that	the	organization	had	a	workers’	platform	rather	than	an	artisan	character.	Ibid,	at	 144.	 The	 fact	 is	 that	 the	 leadership	 was	 composed	 of	 artisans	 (petty	 bourgeoisie),	 while	 the	majority	of	the	members	were	workers.		In	that	sense,	these	associations	should	not	be	regarded	as	worker-led	per	se,	even	though	their	platform	is	certainly	genuinely	worker-oriented.	See	Sbāhī,	Azīz.	
ʿUqūd	 Min	 Tārīkh	 al-ḥizb	 al-Shīwʿi	 al-ʿIraqi,	 al-Juzu’	 al-Awal	 [Decades	 from	 the	 History	 of	 the	Communist	Party	of	Iraq,	volume	1],	(Damascus:	Manshourāt	al-Thaqāfa	al-Jadīda,	2002),	at	76.	 191	Ahmed,	supra,	ft.	189,	at	144.	192	Ibid,	at	140.		193	Batatu,	The	Old	 Social	 Classes,	 supra,	 ft.	 41,	 at	 296;	 Farouk-Sluglett,	 Marion,	 and	 Sluglett,	 Peter,	'Labor	 and	 National	 Liberation.,	 the	 Trade	 Union	 Movement	 in	 Iraq,	 1920-1958',	 Arab	 Studies	
Quarterly,	5,	2,	1983,	at	147.	194	Ahmed,	supra,	ft.	185,	at	133.	195	Interviews	conducted	by	Ahmed,	ibid,	at	133.	
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nationalist.196  He took the plight of the workers as his own and fought for them like no other 
leader in Baghdad at the time. For this reason, the workers respected him and considered him one 
of their own – their representative in the political and international arena.      
 
 The formal goals of this novel organization were detailed in its internal documents, 
which explicitly avoided any indication of political aims and used language that implied the 
cultivation of education and reform.197  The main reason for this vague language was its 
attentiveness to the necessities of getting certified by the authorities, which were reluctant to give 
out licenses due to fears that any form of politicization, especially of an organization with such a 
wide base, would be a threat to the state. In any case, the Jamʿīyat was indeed a reformist 
organization merely seeking economic and legislative reforms.198 al-Qazzāz insisted on this 
narrow goal stating  that this organization was founded to ‘defend the rights of workers and 
kafihīn (‘toilers’) who were unable to voice their demands, and to fulfill their interests’ within the 
confines of the law.199 There was therefore no attempt at this point to connect the problem of 
labour to the capitalist and semi-colonial structures of the Iraqi state, and the	 workers	consciously	 avoided	 turning	 their	 labour	 struggle	 into	 a	 political	 one.	 This	 reformist	approach,	 as	 will	 be	 shown	 later,	 was	 starkly	 different	 from	 the	 later	 revolutionary	(communist-influenced)	 years	where	 the	workers	 regarded	 their	 struggle	 as	principally	 a	political	one.	It was assumed that once the state gained its independence that it would be able to 
advance legislative reforms that would solve the problems faced by the working class.  
 
The influence of the early Marxists and socialists should not be overlooked, as they were 
naturally allied with the Jamʿīyat at the time. In fact, Marxist-influenced intellectuals, such as 
Mahmoud Ahmed al-Sayed, Hussein al-Rahāl and Abdullah Jadou’ had a strong impact on 
workers at the time, and enthusiastically supported al-Qazzāz and his organization.200 Most of 
these educated intellectuals gave weekly public lectures on workers’ rights, and other pertinent 
topics. They also edited and wrote for the working class press.201 Despite its financial difficulties, 
the Jamʿīyat organized massive social and illiteracy programs, developing an entire system of 
support for the poor and laboring masses.202 Physicians opened a free medical clinic for the poor, 																																																																				196	Ibid,	at	134.	197	The	Internal	Rules	of	Jamʿīyat aṣḥāb al-	ṣināʿa.	See	Appendix	1,	Ahmed,	ibid,	at	241.	198	Ahmed,	supra,	ft.	189,	at	142.		199	Ibid.	200	Sbāhi,	supra,	ft.	190,	at	119	201	Ahmed,	supra,	ft.	189,	at	145	202	Ibid.	
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and lawyers took workers as their clients pro bono.203 The emergent Iraqi state was unable to 
provide these basic services for the majority of laboring and working classes, who were in a 
desperate condition. It was no wonder that the membership of the Jamʿīyat grew rapidly, and 
within one year of its founding, it boasted a membership of 3,000 workers.204 Branches surfaced 
all over the country – in Basra, Nasiriya, Hila and other cities.205  
 
  The role of the early working class press206 was an important space in developing 
workers’ class-consciousness. While the government press constantly attacked the working class 
and its leaders, the working class press allowed the workers a space to communicate amongst 
themselves, as well as to articulate their grievances, expressing their plight. Moreover, it was 
within its pages that novel and modern ideas were disseminated to the workers. The inaugural 
issue of a newspaper entitled al-ʿĀmil (‘the Worker’) addressed the workers in the following 
manner:  
 
O Iraqi Worker: This is your newspaper that carries your honorable name in its breast.  And it is 
your literary weapon, which you have the right to treasure in your sustained struggle to claim your trampled 
rights and defend your cause, which is a part of the workers’ cause in the Arab World. It is your crying 
voice that will be heard throughout the world, so that they know that you are alive and aware of your 
injustices; aware of the loss of your rights; aware of the responsibility towards yourself and towards your 
brothers […] Propose what you think would be useful to the worker, from your opinions and ideas – and 
say with it - always and forever: this is our motto…WORKERS OF THE WORLD UNITE!207 
 
Here, one could certainly notice the influence of Marxist and socialist ideas as the more radical 
intellectuals wrote or edited most of the working class press. It was the first time that the phrase, 
‘workers of the world unite’ appeared in Iraq, but soon it recurred elsewhere.208  This was a clear 
turning point for the working class as it showed that the a movement was emerging that was 
ready to organize this class to better its conditions.209  The leftist novelist and intellectual, 
Mohammed Ahmed al-Sayyed wrote an article for the same issue of al-ʿAmil, where he ends by 																																																																				203 	Ibid.	 al-Qazzaz	 stated	 that	 there	 wasn’t	 a	 workers’	 conference	 or	 meeting	 that	 was	 not	significantly	attended	by	lawyers.		See	Ahmed,	Ibid,	at	235.	204	See	al-ʿAlim	al-ʿArabi	July	5,	1930,	as	referred	to	in	Ahmed,	ibid,	at	145,	136. 205	Ahmed,	supra,	ft.	185,	at	145.	206	These	were	newspapers	written	for	and	by	workers,	such	as	al-ʿAmil	(‘The	Worker’).			207	Ibid,	at	160.	My	translation	–	the	last	sentence	was	printed	in	the	middle	of	the	page	in	large	font.	
See	al-ʿAmil,	Baghdad,	Issue	1,	July	8,	1930.	 208	Other	newspapers	that	used	this	phrase	at	that	time	include,	Nida’	al-‘Umāl	 (The	Worker’s	Call’)	(1930);	Majalat	al-Shabāb	 (The	Magazine	of	 the	Youth),	and	finally	al-Ahālī	 (1932).	See	al-Kadhimī,	Naseer	Said;	Musāhama	fi	Kitabat	Tarīkh	al-Haraka	al-ʿAmālīya	fi	al-ʿIraq	hata	1958	 (‘An	attempt	 in	writing	 the	 history	 of	 the	 workers’	 movement	 in	 Iraq	 until	 1958’),	 (Damascus:	 Centre	 for	 the	Research	of	Socialist	studies	in	the	Arab	World,	1991),	at	65. 209	Ibid,	at	66.	
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claiming that the only way the worker could receive all his rights is if all the associations and 
unions united under an umbrella organization ‘to strive for the introduction of special legislation 
for the protection of their rights.’210 The working class press, therefore, cultivated and spread 
these ideas of unity and organization to pressure the state for the passing of labour legislation. 
 
III. The Railway Strike of 1930: the workers’ ‘school of struggle’ 
 
It was the massive general strike in 1931 against the Municipal Fees Law, which 
increased taxes by threefold, which may be regarded as the moment that the question of labour 
was irrevocably forced into the national and political sphere. This general strike, which quickly 
turned into a national one, attracted around 8,000 workers and artisans, and 3,000 oil workers.211  
It was however the preceding railway strike of 1930 which created the active momentum for the 
massive general strike. The years between 1929 and 1933 were very difficult years in Iraq and in 
the world. The Great Depression led to a crisis in Iraq, especially since its economy was 
completely dependent on the capitalist market and Britain.  The Iraqi government laid off public 
sector workers from ministries, and passed a law to reduce the salaries of pensioners.212 However, 
the wages of British workers were untouched, and only a few foreign workers were let go.213 To 
raise revenue, the government began increasing taxes.  This had a very detrimental impact on 
workers, farmers, artisans and small business owners. Foreign companies, such as the IPC, 
however, were relieved from these tax obligations.214 In fact, the government even lowered the 
IPC’s tariffs.215  The tax increases were the main vehicle for social mobilization in the cities as 
every part of the Iraqi commoner’s life was affected.  However, the seeds of urban working class 
discontent were actually sown several months earlier in the railway strike of 1930.   
 
The Iraq Railways, which were still under British ‘executive control,’216 laid off a vast 
number of workers on the pretext of the need for restructuring.217  This was followed by 
																																																																				210	Ibid.		211	Phebe	Marr.	The	Modern	History	of	Iraq	(Westview	Press:	Oxford,	1985),	at	53.		212	Muhathir	Majlis	al-Nuwāb	 (1930),	 (The	Debates	of	 the	Council	 of	Ministers:	 the	meetings	of	 the	year	1930),	at	266-272,	354.	213	Ahmed,	supra,	ft.	189,	at	174.	214	Ibid,	at	176.	215	Ibid,	at	177.	216	Batatu,	supra,	ft.	41,	at	269.		The	railways	became	national	property	in	1936.	It	was	partly	British-owned	(half	of	its	capital	of	over	£	4,000,000	in	gold	was	assigned	to	Britain	in	6	percent	preferred	stock,	while	Iraq	only	had	RS.45.85	lakhs	of	preferred	stock,	the	rest	of	her	share	being	in	deferred	
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significantly lowering workers’ hours, which, in turn, meant the lowering of wages.218 The 
Jamʿīyat began organizing against these measures, and used the working class press to publicize 
their grievances.219 Another matter in dispute was the unequal manner in which the Directorate 
treated British workers compared to Iraqi workers – for example, a British worker’s salary 
amounted to that of 150 Iraqi workers.220  
 
This dire situation led the Jamʿīyat to call for a strike, which commenced on December 
30, 1930. Around a thousand railway workers assembled in the courtyard of the station in west 
Baghdad.221 Management eventually made promises to meet their demands and the workers 
returned to work.222  This event was one of the first strikes of its kind – in terms of size, 
organization and results.223  It soon became clear that the promises made were empty ones. 
Management was not genuine about meeting any of the workers’ demands and continued to lower 
workers’ hours. A second strike was called, which attracted more workers, who gained the 
sympathy of the Baghdadi public. 224  The opposition and nationalist newspapers strongly 
supported the strike and this broadened their support by the Iraqi public, a pattern that would 
remerge in future labour strikes.225  The Iraqi government was clearly threatened by the widening 
support of the strike, and eventually requested the Directorate to look into the workers’ 
demands.226 This pressure compelled management into accepting and signing an agreement, 
which ensured the layoff of all non-expert foreign workers and the payment of all workers’ wages 
‘without exception’.227 The working class and nationalist press presented this resolution as a 
																																																																																																																																																																																																									stock.	See	Ernest	Main.	Iraq:	From	Mandate	to	Independence,	(London:	George	Allen	&	Unwin,	1935),	at	111.	217	Ahmed,	supra,	ft.	189,	at	184.	In	fact,	the	number	of	workers	was	gradually	reduced	from	8,129	in	1926	to	4,000	in	1931.		218	al-Humeid,	Shahab	Ahmed.	al-Thawra	al-Sāmita:	Idrāb	Baghdad	1931	(The	Silent	Revolution:	The	Baghdad	Strike	of	1931),	(Baghdad,	n.p.),	at	30.	219	Ibid.	220	Ahmed,	supra,	ft.	189,	at	183.	221	Ibid,	at	185.	222	Ibid.	223	See	Sassoon,	supra,	ft.	141,	at	185.	224	Ahmed,	supra,	ft.	185,	at	189.	225	Ibid,	at	192.	226	Ibid,	at	193.	227	Iraq	National	Archives,	Files	of	the	Monarchy,	file	number:	D/14,	as	referred	to	in	Ahmed,	ibid,	at	194	(My	translation).		
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victory for the workers228, and this further strengthened the Jamʿīyat’s reputation, attracting more 
workers into its ranks.229  
 
This episode was an important victory for the workers, as they grew bolder and confident 
in their ability to collectively organize and to bring some changes into their labour conditions and 
their lives. Despite the fact that management eventually breached the agreement with the 
complicity of the government barely two weeks after it was signed, it would still be inaccurate to 
treat this strike as a failure or as being ‘ineffective.’230 The reality was the opposite as the Iraqi 
workers learned important lessons from these experiences, in particular the effectiveness of their 
unity and the weapon of the strike. It was no coincidence therefore that less than a month after the 
strike, a petition signed by over a thousand workers was submitted to the government asked for 
‘the rapid provision of a labour law to protect the rights of workers.’231  
 
The Iraqi communist historian, Azīz Sbāhī describes these successive railway strikes as 
being analogous to madrasa nidhālīya or ‘a school of struggle’ that had a significant impact on 
the development of Iraqi working class consciousness.232 Strikes have a very significant impact 
on the development of class consciousness, as it is through collective action that workers grasp 
the power of their own agency and their ability to change their conditions. Workers broaden their 
consciousness, recognizing the role of the state and specifically the law in maintaining their 
oppressive conditions. They experience their own empowerment through collectively organizing 
to bring change into their lives, and they begin to identify with their fellow workers as a class 
based on their shared experiences. V.I. Lenin described the transformational character of strikes 
in the following manner: “a strike…opens the eyes of the workers to the nature, not only of the 
capitalists, but of the government and the laws as well…The workers begin to understand that 
laws are made in the interests of the rich alone; that government officials protect those interests; 
that the working people are gagged and not allowed to make their own needs; that the working 
																																																																				228	The	headline	of	Al-Istiqlāl,	April	6,	1931	read:	“The	workers	return	to	work	after	they	succeed	in	their	demands.”		229	Ahmed,	supra,	ft.	189,	at	195.	230	Marr,	supra,	ft.	212,	at	52.	231	Al-‘Iraq,	January	21,	1931	as	referred	to	in	Ahmed,	ibid,	at	187.		232	Sbāhi.	 ʿUqūd,	 supra,	 ft.	 191,	 at	 118.	 This	 is	 probably	 borrowed	 from	 Lenin	who	 used	 the	 term,	‘school	of	war’	to	describe	strikes.		
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class must win for itself the right to strike, the right to publish workers’ newspapers, the right to 
participate in a national assembly that enacts laws and supervise their fulfillment”.233  
 
The railway strike of 1930 was the beginning of a prolonged process whereby the 
workers’ eyes opened to the (direct) causes of their miserable conditions, especially discerning 
the role of the state and the law in sustaining these conditions. It also proved the workers’ ability 
to organize collectively to bring about pressure for change. It was the first time that the Iraqi 
working class acted in a unified and organized way even though it was still in its early stages. 
Although it was surely this illuminating experience that led the workers to actively demand the 
government to pass a labour law to protect workers’ right, it was in fact the massive 1931 General 
Strike that further kindled their capacity to connect their immediate labor conditions to the Iraqi 
state and its laws.    
 
IV. The General Strike of 1931: the entry of the working class into the political arena 
 
 The intensity of the railway strike had a significant impact on the next episode of the 
early history of the Iraqi working class – the 1931 General Strike against the Municipal Fees 
Law. This event transformed the apparent setbacks of the railway strike into more concrete results 
cementing them further into the broader context of the early nationalist struggle. The general 
strike lasted for fourteen days bringing Baghdad to a complete halt. It was described by British 
officials as ‘a frenzy’ and ‘a fanfare of riffraff,’234 while the Iraqi historian and chronicler Abdul 
Razzāq al-Hasani captured the feelings of the Iraqi plebian when he called it ‘the silent revolution 
of the people.’235 As mentioned earlier, the government hastily passed a law in June 1931 
increasing municipal taxes by threefold. Debate in Parliament was overridden by PM Nuri al-
Saīd, and the law was ultimately passed after its third reading.236 The law itself was bordering on 
the absurd as it affected everyone from the laboring masses. Not one craft, industry or profession 
was spared. A revised scale of around 119 different taxes was levied on all aspects of everyday 
																																																																				233	V.I.	 Lenin,	 “On	 Strikes,”	 in	 Collected	 Works,	 Volume	 5	 (Moscow:	 Progressive	 Publishers,	 1960	[1899]),	310-19,	my	emphasis.		234	al-Humaid,	supra,	ft.	219,	at	14	235	Abdul	Razzaq	al-Hasanī.	Tarikh	al-Wizarat	al-Iraqiya	(the	history	of	the	Iraqi	Cabinets),	Vol.	3,	at	152.	236	Ahmed,	supra,	ft.	189,	at	204.	
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life.237 All workers had to pay a percentage from their income. The taxes were so high that it was 
impossible to expect any worker to pay them and still have enough for his daily needs.238   
 
The Jamʿīyat began to organize against this law, and after a petition led nowhere, a 
general strike was called on June 30, 1931.239 The Baghdadi public responded enthusiastically to 
this call and workers stopped working – all the coffee shops, artisan workshops, and pharmacies 
shut. Public transportation came to a complete halt. There was a deafening silence in the 
ordinarily busy streets of Baghdad.240 The government baffled by this unprecedented course of 
events responded with threats reaffirming the individual’s liberty in operating his business, while 
cautioning that it would not allow anyone to ‘threaten the freedoms of others’ with their 
actions.241 The government deployed the police (some on horseback) to the streets of Baghdad to 
intimidate people to get back to work.242 The main demands of the strikers were not merely the 
annulment of the current law, but the reduction of the taxes in the previous law, coupled with the 
workers’ demand for dealing with the issue of unemployment and the release of all those who had 
been imprisoned for striking.243   
 
The leaders of the strike, including al-Qazzāz, Mohammed Makī al-Ashtārī244, Abdullah 
al-Badrī245 and others were all arrested for incitement under the Baghdadi Penal Code.246 Yet the 
authorities began negotiations with them in prison, where al-Qazāzz insisted that the annulment 
of the law was a precondition for ending the strike.247 The government made a promise that it 
would eventually revoke parts of the law, which the strike leadership ultimately endorsed. 
Nevertheless, the strikers, weary of empty promises, refused to end the strike that rapidly spread 
to other cities, including Basra and Nasiriya.248  It was at that moment that the strike was 
transformed into a much broader ‘national movement,’ that called for the fall of the government 
																																																																				237	Ibid,	at	203.	238	Ibid.	239	Ibid,	at	205.	240	Al-Humaid,	supra,	ft.	219,	at	47.	241	The	statement	could	be	found	in	Sadā	al-ʿAhd,	July	6,	1931,	referred	to	in	Ahmed,	supra,	ft.189,	at	207. 242	Ibid,	at	207,	and	al-Humaid,	supra,	ft.	219,	at	49.	243	See	al-ʿAlim	al-ʿArabī,	July	9,	1931	as	referred	to	in	al-Humaid,	ibid,	at	67. 244	The	leader	of	the	Barbers’	Association.	245	The	leader	of	the	Printers	Union.	246	See	al-Humaid,	ibid,	at	146	for	the	complete	list	of	those	arrested.	247	Ahmed,	supra,	ft.	189,	at	208.	248	Ibid,	at	209.	
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and the end of social injustice.249 The British High Commissioner described the anger on the 
street in a memo to London: ‘Republican cries have been openly raised in the streets … there has 
been no sign of loyalty to King or support for the Government.’250 The government turned to 
repressive tactics to quell dissent and violence ensued, especially in Basra.251 A Royal Decree 
amended Article 83 of the Baghdadi Penal Code making it a criminal offence for a gathering of 
five or more people in public.252 Police armed with machine guns guarded ‘sensitive’ areas in the 
city, and the military was put on emergency alert.253   
 
As King Faisal and Prime Minister Nurī al-Saīd were both abroad in Europe during the 
strike, the viceroy warned that if they did not return immediately, the general strike would most 
likely turn into ‘a great revolution.’254  So, Nurī decided to return to Baghdad, released the strike 
leaders from prison, and began to negotiate with them directly. The government ultimately agreed 
to rescind taxes on nineteen different groups of workers but refused to resign.255 Moreover, a 
statement was made in a government newspaper that directly addressed the workers, claiming that 
the government plans to “[m]onitor the conditions of labour…for the acheivement of the workers' 
well-being, and monitor the implementation of the provisions of laws relating to the organization 
of work.”256 The reality however was that Nurī blamed the strike on a ‘handful’ of ringleaders 
and ‘secret associations’, an obvious reference to the Jamʿīyat and other trade union 
associations.257 The 1931 General Strike was the first attempt by the Iraqi working class to 
directly confront the state using the economic weapon of strike action with the attempt to reform 
state policies and shape the law. The workers brought their specific labour concerns into the 
national and political arena. This explains why the parliamentary opposition felt that they had to 
rally behind them if they were to gain any credibility. 
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The narrative above refutes the analysis in the historiography that disregards the role of 
the workers in leading the strike, preferring the explanation that it was the parliamentary 
opposition that sustained the strike. Workers were generally presented as being led, influenced or 
organized by oppositional parties and interests. There has been no attempt to focus on the 
workers’ own independent role in organizing against the state. A good example is Peter Sluglett’s 
claim that the opposition joined the strike, because it was the only way that the cabinet could be 
ousted at the time, as there were no ‘legal’ mechanisms to do so in Parliament.258 Sluglett seems 
to suggest that it was in reality the party leaders who ultimately ‘took charge’ of and organized 
the strike, coordinating its spread into other cities, rather than the workers themselves. Even 
Hanna Batatu inexplicably remarks that the opposition party, al-Ikha’ al-Watanī ‘led’ the 14-day 
General Strike.259  
 
This type of analysis reduces workers’ struggle to political maneuvering between 
oppositional parties and the cabinet, and neglects Iraqi workers’ agency. The reality was the 
complete opposite – it was the workers and their leaders who planned, organized, executed and 
ended the 1931 strike. It was the workers and their leaders who were put on trial and imprisoned 
– not the leaders of the opposition. Although some MPs resigned after the strike broke, they did 
so for strategic purposes. Politicians took advantage of the situation. This was evident in the 
manner by which they politicized the strike in advocating for the necessity of overthrowing the 
cabinet rather than dealing with the specific underlying issues that concerned the workers.260 Abū 
al-Timman, on the other hand, could be considered as an exception; especially seeing that al-
Qazzāz himself continuously consulted him during the strike.261 However, his party did not have 
a leadership role as is generally assumed, for it lacked the necessary popular base needed to make 
a long-term contribution to the working-class struggle.262 																																																																				258	Sluglett,	Britain	in	Iraq,	supra,	ft.	87,	at	149.	259	Batatu,	supra,	ft.	41,	at	200.		He	also	states	that	Abū	al-Timman’s	al-Hizb	al-Watanī	al-ʿIraqī	had	an	‘initiatory	 role’	 in	 founding	 the	 Jamʿīyat,	 and	 that	 it	 had	 an	 ‘active	 guidance’	 role	 in	 the	 14-day	general	strike	of	1931.	Even	though	this	has	some	truth,	the	focus	always	seems	to	be	steered	away	from	the	workers	themselves.		See	Batatu,	ibid,	at	295.	260	One	 merely	 needs	 to	 recall	 that	 al-Hashimi	 and	 al-Gilani	 were	 involved	 in	 drafting	 the	 first	municipal	 fees	 law	of	1926,	 and	 that	 they	did	not	oppose	 the	hiring	of	 foreign	workers	when	 they	were	 in	power.	 In	 fact,	 al-Gilani	made	a	 statement	 in	1935	when	he	was	a	member	of	 cabinet	 that	‘there	is	no	workers’	problem	in	this	country,	because	the	majority	[of	people]…are	farmers.’	Ahmed,	
supra,	ft.	189,	at	229.	261	Ahmed,	ibid,	at	227,	231.	262This	party	was	so	inextricably	tied	to	Abu	al-Timan’s	person	(he	was	its	major	financier)	that	when	he	turned	his	back	on	it	in	1933,	it	perished.	Batatu,	supra,	ft.	41,	at	200.	
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In that sense, even if the workers and the opposition were coordinating at times, it would 
be far from the truth to argue that the opposition led rather than guided certain aspects of the 
strike. The opposition did make an attempt after the strike to co-opt the labour movement. This 
occurred when the leaders of the Ikha’ party approached al-Qazzāz with the suggestion that he re-
open a permanent association under their auspices. al-Qazzāz refused the offer realizing that this 
new association ‘would have put the labor movement under the control of the opposition 
leaders’.263This was one reason why this general strike did not accelerate further into a 
revolutionary moment, for the so-called ‘nationalist movement’ was still under the clout of the 
(bourgeois) oppositional parties.264 The fact was that the Jamʿīyat did not have a wide or 
comprehensive political program nor did it see itself as a political organization, but merely as a 
labour union with a narrow economic and social reformist agenda.265  
 
The slow demise of the Jamʿīyat began when the government instigated its campaign to 
shut it down soon after the strike ended by bribing some of their members, who in turn accused 
al-Qazzāz of rigging the elections of its administrative committee.266 Based on this fabricated 
accusation, the government ordered the Jamʿīyat shut down.267  al-Qazzāz was arrested on 
allegations of rigging the elections of the Jamʿīyat.268 At this point, there was an attempt to co-opt 
the working-class movement by manufacturing a complicit leadership and an alternative 
organization – Jamʿīyat ʿUmmal al-Mīkanīk (Mechanic Workers’ Association). However, this 
tactic eventually failed as most workers refused to join this organization and instead called for the 
release of al-Qazzāz and the reopening of their union.269 After al-Qazzāz was released from 
prison, he succeeded in reclaiming this organization from its government-sponsored leadership by 
overwhelmingly winning the elections in 1932; after which he decided to merge it with the (now 
illegal) Jamʿīyat, forming the Itihād al-ʿUmmal fi al-ʿIraq (the ‘Iraq Labour Union).270  This new 
trade union continued the same work that the Jamʿīyat was known for271, and in particular 																																																																				263	Marr,	supra,	ft.	212,	at	53.	264	See	Editorial,	‘Mūsāhama	fī	Kitabat	Tarīkh	al-Haraka	al-Niqābīya	fī	al-‘Iraq’	[An	Attempt	at	writing	the	history	of	the	labour	movement	in	Iraq],	in	Thaqāfa	al-Jadīda,	Issue	39,	August	1972,	at	17.		265	Ibid.	266	Ahmed,	supra,	ft.	189,	at	214.	267	Muhadhir	Majlis	al-Nuwāb	of	1931,	at	44.		268	Marr,	supra,	ft.	208,	at	53;	Ahmed,	supra,	ft.189,	at	215.	269	Ahmed,	ibid,	at	221.	270	Sassoon,	supra,	ft.	141,	at	256.	271	TNA.	‘Extracts	from	Iraq	Police	Abstract	of	intelligence	No.	6	dated	the	11th	of	Febuary,	1933’.		FO	622/1/155.	 	 In	one	union	meeting,	 al-Qazzaz	described	 the	utter	 contempt	 that	 some	government	officials	 had	 of	 workers,	 whom	 he	 said	 regarded	 them	 as	 ‘inferior	 beings’.	 He	 said	 that	 ‘these	
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continued to call for the provision of special legislation for the protection of workers’ rights.272 
The Iraq Labour Union was permanently shut down by the government in 1935, and the labour 
movement remained underground, disorganized and fragmented until its revitalization by the 
communists in the 1940s and the 1950s.273 
 
V. The appropriation of legality by the working class: the Labour Law of 1936 & its 
significance 
 
The first piece of labour legislation in Iraq – Labour Law No.72 of 1936 —was passed by 
the al-Hashimi cabinet.274  The argument I will furnish here is that this law was significantly a 
product of working-class pressure from below. It should not therefore be analyzed in isolation 
from the strikes of 1930 and 1931 described above. Moreover, despite its unenforceability by the 
state, this law should be considered as a (partial) victory for the working class. It was the 
culmination of the 1930 and 1931 strikes described above that eventually pressured the Iraqi state 
to make these concessions. Although the main intention was clearly to slow down the momentum 
of the movement by (formally) capitulating to some of their demands, the effect was the complete 
opposite as this law ended up enhancing the workers’ understanding of their rights, educating 
them to appropriate the language of legality into their struggle. As will be shown throughout this 
study, it was in fact this consistent appropriation and reinvention of legality, which made this law 
quite significant in Iraqi working-class history.     
 
Even though the labour law was quite basic in its provisions and contents (it consisted of 
6 parts and 39 sections), it was a close reflection of what the workers had been calling for in the 
																																																																																																																																																																																																									officials…should	 be	 made	 to	 understand	 their	 mistake…[and]	 made	 to	 realize	 that	 present	 day	conditions	in	no	way	resemble	those	of	the	past’.		272	Sbāhī,	supra,	ft.	191,	at	121.	273	The	exception	was	the	spontaneous	mass	political	strike	initiated	by	cigarette	and	oil	workers	in	response	 to	 Baqr	 al-Sidqi’s	 military	 regime	 in	 March	 1937.	 Archibald	 Clark	 Kerr	 wrote	 on	 the	significance	of	 these	 series	of	 strikes	 in	March	of	1937	 in	 the	 following	manner:	 ‘there	has	been	a	greater	number	of	strikes	 in	the	 last	six	months	than	probably	 in	the	whole	history	of	 the	country’	and	that		‘In	general,	it	would	appear	that	there	is	some	growth	of	feeling…that	labour	is	entitled	to	fairer	treatment	than	it	has	received	in	the	past’.	TNA.	A.	C.	Kerr,	British	Embassy,	Bagdad	to	A.	Eden,	London,	March	23,	1937.		FO624/343	(1937).	This	illustrates	the	accelerated	growth	of	awareness	of	the	 Iraqi	 working-class	 in	 the	 significance	 of	 collective	 strike	 action	 as	 an	 effective	 weapon	 in	improving	its	immediate	conditions.		274	Labour	Law	No.	72,	Iraq	Government	Gazette,	No.	20,	May	17,1936,	at	278.		
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past.275  It stipulated that ‘in every industrial undertaking, such special precautions as are 
reasonable to secure the safety of the worker shall be taken.’276 It made a provision for medical 
treatment for injured workers. It made a provision for a rest period of one hour, and ‘a rest period 
of at least 24 consecutive hours after each six days of work’. There was a provision for ‘ordinary 
leave’ with full pay of ten days a year, as well as, sick leave with pay for 15 days for each year. It 
explicitly forbade child labour.277 Moreover, it empowered the Ministry of Interior to set up a 
conciliation/arbitration body for the purpose of settling disputes between employers and workers. 
Finally, Article 23 (the core provision of this law) provided that workers had a right to form trade 
unions, ‘in order to care for their special interests, to spread the spirit of co-operation…between 
them, to effect improvements by educational, cultural, social and moral means to develop the 
industries in Iraq.’ Articles 24, 25 and 26 presented the procedures required to form and certify a 
trade union, and the holding of elections of the administrative committee of a trade union.278  
 
Although it represented a turning point in Iraq’s labour history, the law was practically 
ineffective as the increasingly authoritarian government of al-Hashimi did not enforce or 
implement any of its provisions, especially Article 23 above concerning the recognition of the 
right to form trade unions. 279  The social democratic National Democratic Party, which 
temporarily came to power in the fall of 1936 were adamant on the application of the provisions 
of the law, and furthermore passed some important amendments to improve it, the most important 
of which was limiting daily working hours to eight.280 Unfortunately, with the failure of their 
reform program, the labour law would remain in the books without being consistently applied.  
 
However, even if the government endeavored to apply its provisions, the reality was that 
combined with the laws regulating strikes, it would have been nearly impossible to enforce its 																																																																				275	Mansūr,	 Shāb	 Tūmā.	 Al-Wajīz	 fī	 Qānūn	 al-ʿAmal:	 Dirāsa	 Muqārana,	 al-Juzu’	 al-Awal	 [A	 brief	comparative	study	of	the	labour	law,	volume	one],	(Baghdad:	Sharīka	al-Tiba‘		wa	al-Nashir	al-Ahlīya,	1965),	at	30. 276	Labour	Law	No.	72,	supra,	Chapter	2,	Article	2.		277	See	 TNA.	 CO	 730/168/1.	 (1931)	 ‘Outline	 of	 a	 Law	 Limiting	 Hours	 of	Work	 and	 Regulating	 the	Employment	 of	 Women	 and	 Children’.	 This	 regulation	 was	 the	 first	 to	 be	 passed	 before	 the	consideration	 of	 drafting	 of	 a	 comprehensive	 labour	 law.	 It	 is	 interesting	 how	 such	 ‘civilizational	discourse’	 surrounding	 the	 protection	 of	women	 and	 children	was	 considered	 the	most	 important	aspect	of	an	‘enlightened’	labour	law	and	policy	at	the	time,	and	which	was	satisfactory	for	the	PMC	in	Geneva.				278	Ibid,	Chapter	4,	Articles	23-31.	279	Sassoon,	supra,	ft.	141,	at	257.	280	See	 TNA.	 Clark	 to	 FO,	 23	Mar,	 1937.	 FO	 371/20795,	 E	 2417/14/93.	 A	 further	 amendment	 that	year	stipulated	that	workers	were	entitled	to	annual	 leave	and	sick	leave	with	full	pay.	See	Scott	to	FO,	26	Oct.	1937.	FO	371/27096,	E6573/14/93.	
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provisions. The Iraqi state learned its lesson after the General Strike of 1931 and quickly 
introduced legislation the next year that made it practically impossible to undertake collective 
strike action legally.281 So, for example, a strike that was in any way seen as unconnected to a 
specific labour dispute or somehow politically motivated would be considered illegal. Moreover, 
the Minister of interior had to be given notice of a strike; in other words, spontaneous action was 
illegal. Picketing or spreading information that encouraged other workers to initiate sympathy 
strikes was also criminalized.282 
 
As one British official admitted, trade unions or associations referred to in the law would 
be ‘subject to very close official supervision, and [so] it is unlikely that they will be allowed to 
attain any great political importance,’ and that ‘most of the…provisions are merely permissive. 
The decision whether or not these provisions are to be put into force will rest with the Minister of 
Interior.’283 Therefore, while the law granted the workers the right to organize, it also gave the 
Minister of Interior wide powers to arbitrarily cancel the licenses of unions. It was, in other 
words, the executive and not the judiciary that was the final arbiter on the interpretation of the 
law, and especially on workers’ grievances against the cancellation of these licenses.284 In that 
sense, there was very little room to maneuver within the law when it came and that was certainly 
one reason why the Labour Law was ineffective as it was already stripped of any teeth.285 It is no 
wonder therefore that Joseph Sassoon would write that the 1936 Labour Law did not have ‘any 
significant effect on the development of trade unionism…’286 
 
 My contention, however, is that a closer analysis of this law would suggest a very 
different conclusion: that despite its unenforceability, it had a unique significance and 
consequence for the labour movement, which was positive for the over-all counter-hegemonic 																																																																				281	See	 Article	 4	 of	 the	 ‘Law	 Relating	 to	 Maintaining	 Security	 during	 Strikes	 Number	 70	 of	 1932’	published	in	the	Iraqi	Gazette	#115,	June	30,	1932.	This	law	was	annulled	in	1959.		See	al-Saīd,	Sādiq	Mahdī.	Munāzaʿāt	al-ʿAmal	al-Jamāʿya	wa	Hismaha	[Collective	Labour	Conflicts	and	their	Resolution],	(Baghdad:	Mutaba‘a	al-Ma‘arif,	1961),	at	28. 282	Ibid.	The	penalties	for	breaching	this	law	were	either	six	months	imprisonment	or	the	payment	of	a	fine	of	no	more	than	20	liras.	283	TNA.	FO	624/7/623	(1936):	 ‘Labour	Law	407/IT36.	Sgd	C.H.	Bateman,	British	Embassy,	Bagdad,	to	Anthony	Eden,	Foreign	Office,	London;	April	25,	1936.			284	See	Fu’ad	Hanna	Tellew.	“Labour	Unions	 in	Iraq.”	(Unpublished	Master’s	dissertation,	University	of	Southern	California,	Los	Angeles,	1954),	at	238-239.	285	It	 should	 be	 noted	 that	 the	 definition	 of	 ‘worker’	 in	 the	 law	was	 significantly	 narrow	 as	 it	was	defined	in	a	manner	that	excludes	government	workers,	who	were	in	turn	prohibited	from	striking	for	 any	 reason.	 See	 Article	 109	 of	 the	 Baghdadi	 Criminal	 Code	 (the	 penalty	 was	 two	 years	imprisonment	or	a	fine	or	both).			286	Sassoon,	supra,	ft.	137,	at	257.	
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struggle. Firstly, it should be noted that this law was primarily drafted so as to be presented as 
evidence of the Iraqi government’s ‘enlightened’ labour policy, with the purpose of convincing 
the PMC that Iraq was ready for independence or in the words of Albert Thomas, Director-
General of the International Labour Organization (ILO), its ‘eagerness to co-operate fully with 
other nations of the world in the sphere of social progress’.287 An ILO representative was tasked 
to advice the Iraqi government and the newly formed parliamentary labour committee288 on the 
specific ratification process and adherence to certain international conventions, especially relating 
to the employment of women and children in factories.289 Moreover, an Iraqi delegation was sent 
to the ILO in Geneva to undertake enquiries concerning labour legislation. Based on this visit and 
proposals given by Mr. Thomas, a draft law was submitted to Parliament. Even before the law 
was passed, the Council of Ministers informed the High Commissioner F. Humphrys that the 
PMC should be informed that the recommendations were accepted in principle and would be 
applied to the new labour legislation. This ‘civilizational’ approach towards labour issues was 
common elsewhere in the Third World as the ILO spread its conception of ‘industrial life’ and 
‘social justice’ to other parts of the world.290 In that sense, the labour law did play a role in the 
juridical construction or at least in the justification of Iraqi ‘semi-peripheral sovereignty’, which 
will be detailed in Chapter 3.  
 
Yet, the argument in this chapter is that there was another (unintended) ideological 
feature to this law. The labour movement would put emphasis on the core principles of this law to 																																																																				287	TNA.	Albert	Thomas,	ILO,	Geneva	to	Nuri	As	Saīd,	PM	of	Iraq,	Baghdad.	14th	July,	1931.	[9552].	CO	730/168/1.	 Iraq:	 Labour	 Conditions	 (1931).	 See	 ‘Abdul	 Qadir	 Rashid,	 Secretary	 to	 the	 Council	 of	Ministers	 to	 The	 Legal	 Secretary	 to	 H.E.	 the	 High	 Commissioner	 for	 Iraq,	 Baghdad,	 3rd	 November,	1931.	288 	This	 committee	 included	 a	 British	 lawyer,	 H.I.	 Lloyd,	 who	 was	 recommended	 due	 to	 his	international	legal	experience	with	the	Mosul	Frontier	dispute;	ibid.		289	Ibid.	 In	March	1933,	 the	ILO	sent	a	delegate,	C.W.H.	Weaver	to	 Iraq	to	give	an	account	of	 labour	conditions	in	the	country.	He	wrote	a	report	entitled,	“Impressions	of	a	Visit	to	India,	Iraq,	Persia,	and	Turkey”,	International	Labour	Review,	Vol.XXVIII,	No.4,	October	1933.	After	visiting	some	factories,	he	made	the	following	conclusion:	“[t]he	fragmentary	impressions	of	conditions	of	labour	in	Iraq	that	I	was	able	to	gather	during	a	four	days’	stay	in	Baghdad	were	sufficient	to	show	the	need	for	a	small	labour	department	and	for	simple	labour	legislation	even	in	a	country	at	an	early	stage	of	industrial	development…It	 is	 hoped…that	 the	 Government	will	 succeed	 in	 carrying	 out	 its	 labour	 legislation	programme	 as	 early	 as	 possible,	 both	 for	 the	 correction	 of	 existing	 defects	 and	 as	 a	 means	 of	preventing	abuses	as	industry	further	develops”	(at	487).		What	was	peculiar	about	this	visit	was	that	Weaver	did	not	meet	anyone	from	the	labour	movement	even	though	he	admitted	that	he	was	aware	of	 their	 presence:	 “…I	 was	 unfortunately	 unable	 to	 get	 into	 contact	 with	 the	 leaders	 of	 these	organizations.	The	Association	of	Mechanical	Laborers	of	Baghdad	[which	at	 this	point	was	headed	by	 al-Qazzaz]	 is	 particularly	 active,	 and	 would	 appear	 to	 have	 a	 definite	 organization	 and	programme.”(p.484-485).	Also,	see	Sassoon,	supra,	ft.	141,	at	257.	290	See	Guy	Fiti	Sinclair.	To	Reform	the	World:	International	Organizations	and	the	Making	of	Modern	
States,	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2017),	at	82.	
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its fullest, using it as a rhetorical tool in every one of its lists of demands. If one would consider 
that the labour law was itself a product of direct pressure exerted by the workers (from below) on 
the state, it would make sense why they would later appropriate its language, for they interpreted 
it as their law or at least one which spoke to their aspirations. The workers were quite consistent, 
as shown in the above accounts of the 1930 railway strike and the subsequent 1931 general strike 
in their demand for a piece of legislation that adequately protected their rights. Moreover, by 
March 1931, a few months before the general strike, al-Qazzaz submitted a proposal for a draft 
labour law to the government with the hope of lobbying for exactly what was needed by the 
working class. There were clear parallels in this draft and the labour law that was eventually 
passed.291 Consequently, it is not difficult to make a direct connection with what the workers and 
their unions called for on the ground and the piece of legislation that was passed in 1936.  
 
Finally, the fact was that al-Qazzāz was in direct contact with the ILO as well as several 
international labour organizations in Europe.292 He clearly had confidence in the principles of 
international law and its institutions and believed that the ILO would pressure the Iraq 
government to change its labour policy. 293  He did not consider how these international 
institutions in fact contributed to the making of the semi-colonial Iraqi state, and in turn to the 
very conditions that Iraqi workers were suffering from. This was something that the successor 
communist-led labour movement would understand well. In any case, the young Iraqi labour 
movement made its presence felt on the international stage, and it was this relentless pressure put 
on the Iraqi state (domestically and internationally) that ensured that the basic labour law of 1936 
would finally be passed four years after independence.  
 
The Labour Law of 1936 could therefore be understood as a victory (albeit a partial one) 
for the Iraqi working class, even if the workers would spend the next twenty years fighting for its 
enforcement and application. It should be interpreted as a forced concession won by the workers 
from the semi-colonial state. It surely affirmed the success of the working-class movement in 
Iraq. The workers continued to assert their own interpretation of the law (beginning with the call 
																																																																				291	‘A	draft	project	of	an	Iraqi	labour	law	submitted	by	Mohammed	Sālih	al-Qazzāz,	the	president	of	
Jamiʿyat	Ashāb	al-Sanāʿa,	 to	 the	Prime	Minister	and	ministers	of	 interior,	 justice,	and	economy	and	public	works,	dated	31/3/1931,’	See	Ahmed,	supra,	Appendix	3,	at	268	for	the	full	text. 292	TNA.	FO	622/1/155.	Labour	Organizations	in	Iraq	(1933);	Extract	from	Sawt	al	Iraq,	7th	Feb	1933.	293	Al-Qazzāz	for	instance	sent	the	internal	regulation	and	constitution	to	the	ILO	asking	the	Director	for	his	views	and	whether	it	should	be	amended	to	comply	with	international	standards.	Local	Press	Extracts,	6th	February,	1933,	‘The	International	Labour	office,	Geneva,	makes	Enquiries	about	Labour	in	Iraq’,	Sawt	al	ʿIraq.	FO	622/1/155. 
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for its revision and enforcement) every time they went out on strike. It was through these illegal 
strikes and acts of civil disobedience that they ended up gradually bringing changes to the law.294 
The labour law’s gradual development as shaped by the pressure of workers throughout the years 
is evident by the eventual enactment of Law #36 of 1942, which permitted workers to organize 
legally, and Law #18 of 1954, which developed a detailed arbitration scheme to settle worker-
management disputes, as well as, raised the minimum wage.  
 
How then could this labour law (or law in general) be explained as useful to a counter-
hegemonic struggle in a semi-colonial context? This is an interesting question, which will be 
revisited throughout this work. It is useful here to refer to Antonio Gramsci’s conception of law 
in the context of his famous concept of hegemony. Gramsci contended that the ruling class does 
not solely use violence to assert its control, but mostly uses ideology to develop a hegemonic 
culture that is propagated until it becomes ‘common sense’ to all classes in society.295  Hegemony 
is how the working class identify their own interests with those of the ruling class. The law then 
is one instrument that the ruling-class uses to materialize its hegemony.  
 
The law, for Gramsci, works coercively and consensually within the state apparatus.  This 
has been referred to as the ‘double face of the law.’296  On the one hand, the law secures the 
economic interests of the ruling class by force.  On the other hand, it has an ideological function 
whereby it disciplines the subaltern classes in every level of social and private life solidifying 
their conformity.  Gramsci approaches law by referring to it as the ‘juridical problem,’ which is 
“[…] the problem of assimilating the entire grouping to its most advanced fraction; it is a problem 
of education of the masses, of their ‘adaptation’ in accordance with the requirements of the goal 
to be achieved.  This is precisely the function of law in the State and in society; through ‘law’ the 
State renders the ruling group ‘homogeneous’ and tends to create a social conformism which is 
useful to the ruling group’s line of development.”297   
 
The main function of law for Gramsci is therefore its ‘educative’298 function– the law 
disciplines and persuades all classes in society into believing that the current governing 																																																																				294	See	Chapter	4,	5	and	7.	295 	See	 Antonio	 Gramsci.	 Selections	 from	 the	 Prison	 Notebooks,	 Hoare,	 Q	 (ed.),	 (New	 York:	International	Publishers,	1971),	at	325.	296	Benney,	M.	“Gramsci	on	law,	morality,	and	power,”	International	Journal	of	Sociology	of	Law,	1983,	11(2),	at	205.		297	Gramsci,	supra,	ft.	295,	at	195.	298	Ibid,	at	247.	
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establishment has a cohesive unity that renders it effective and efficient.  Furthermore, the 
educative function of law could be understood when the subaltern classes are constantly being 
told what is legal and what is illegal.  This, in turn, establishes the ruling class’ views and values 
in society, crystalizing them as “common sense.”  As Duncan Kennedy explains, ‘[t]he idea of the 
legal and the illegal is something which, if you can manipulate it skillfully, you can use to 
exercise great power over people who believe it.’299  This hegemonic power, then, generates 
among the subaltern classes a particular conception of the right way to live, authorizing ‘a 
particular form of life.’ 300   The hegemonic function of the law, hence, allows for the 
naturalization, rationalization and universalization of the dominant ideology of the ruling class.301 
 
One could extend Gramsci’s analysis of law to what has been detailed above in the 
context of the labour law’s appropriation by the Iraqi counter-hegemonic movement. In other 
words, the ‘educative’ function of the law could go both ways and the labour movement was 
aware of this as its organic intellectuals302 (a lot of whom were lawyers themselves) would use 
the labour law as a way to educate the workers on their rights. As will be shown throughout this 
work, the law would be utilized in such a fashion throughout the monarchial period even by the 
more radical communist-led labour movement, who did not cease to take the law seriously 
despite knowing that the real struggle lay outside the confines of the law. In this way, one could 
argue that although the law was always contested, this did not mean that it was a neutral arena of 
class struggle, for it was merely one front whereby the workers exerted their vision of the future. 
As Issa Shivji emphasized in his own study of the Tanzanian working class: 
 
 																																																																				299	Duncan	Kennedy.	“Antonio	Gramsci	and	the	Legal	System,”	American	Legal	Studies	Forum,	(1982),	6(1),	at	36.	300	Buckel,	 S	 and	 Fischer-Lescano,	 A.	 “Gramsci	 Reconsidered:	 Hegemony	 in	 Global	 Law,”	 Leiden	
Journal	of	International	Law,	22,	(2009),	at	447.	301	Litowitz,	Douglas.	‘Gramsci,	Hegemony,	and	the	Law,’	Brigham	Young	University	Law	Review,	2000,	No.	2,	515-551,	at	522.	302	Organic	 intellectuals	 are,	 ‘…directly	 related	 to	 the	 economic	 structure	 of	 their	 society	 simply	because	of	 the	 fact	 that	 “every	social	group	 that	originates	 in	 the	 fulfillment	of	an	essential	 task	of	economic	production”	creates	 its	own	organic	 intellectuals.	Thus,	 the	organic	 intellectual	 “gives	his	class	 homogeneity	 and	 awareness	 of	 its	 own	 function,	 in	 the	 economic	 field	 and	on	 the	 social	 and	political	 levels.”’	 See	 Valeriano	 Ramos,	 “The	 Concepts	 of	 Ideology,	 Hegemony,	 and	 Organic	Intelelctuals	 in	 Gramsci’s	 Marxism”,	 Theoretical	 Review	 No.	 27,	 March-April	 1982,	https://www.marxists.org.					
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It is undoubtedly true that state and law ultimately serve the interests of the ruling dominating 
class. But this comes about in the process of complex social struggles. As a result of these struggles, 
undeniably the law comes to embody certain partial successes and concessions won from the dominated 
classes. But this should not be taken to mean that the law has no class character or that it is a neutral arena 
of class struggle. Neither law nor legality per se is in the interests of the oppressed classes. Rather, it is the 
social struggles of the oppressed classes themselves which lend content to law and legality.303  
 
Hence, despite the fact that law was an ‘instrument of the ruling class’, more so in a colonial or 
semi-colonial context, it remained one (limited) locus of working-class struggle.  This indicates 
that the law was malleable enough to be imagined by the workers in their visions of the future 
that they were struggling for – uniting them to move towards some form of ‘proletarian 
hegemony’.304 Consequently the very passing of the 1936 Labour Law did in fact have some 
impact on forging the working-class struggle ahead.  
 
  The appropriation of legality by the labour movement would reappear in the next decade 
when the communists would quite ingeniously use this (dead) law (while referring to the Iraqi 
constitution) to advance their counter-hegemonic struggle, as they knew the value of law in 
educating the masses. A good example is the secretary-general of the ICP, Yūsuf Salmān Yūsuf’s 
essay entitled ‘The Trade Union is the Motto of the Worker Today,’ published in 1944 in the 
communist paper, al-Qāʿida (‘The Base’), in which he stresses the importance of extending the 
labour movement’s use of the trade union to all sectors of the economy, so as to include all 
workers across sectoral lines.305 Calling for the creation of a unified trade union representing all 
workers in Iraq, he refers to the law as a tool that should be appropriated by the workers in their 
struggle: ‘it is necessary to include in the trade union movement all categories of workers, and for 
the word ‘trade union’ to be the slogan of the workers today…and [while carrying] in their 
pockets the labour law and the charter of one of the unions, so as to explain…[to their comrades] 
the benefits of the union and its necessity in workers' lives ... and it should not leave the worker’s 
mind that their route is not furnished with flowers and basil, as their mission does not end when 
they submit their application nor when they are granted a license to establish a union, but they 
																																																																				303	Issa	G.	 Shivji.	Law,	State,	and	the	Working	Class	in	Tanzania,	 (Portsmouth:	Heinemann,	1986),	 at	241,	emphasis	added.	304	Bryan	Palmer	suggests	that	by	focusing	on	the	 ‘ruptures	and	reformations’	of	the	law,	one	could	examine	 its	 ‘reciprocities	with	resistance’,	 and	 this	explains	how	 it	 is	 remade	by	civil	disobedience	(that	 is,	 from	 without	 rather	 than	 within	 the	 law).	 	 Palmer,	 B.	 “What’s	 Law	 Got	 To	 Do	With	 It	 –	Historical	 Considerations	 on	 Class	 Struggle,	 Boundaries	 of	 Constraint,	 and	 Capitalist	 Authority,”	Osgoode	 Hall	 Law	 Journal,	 41.2/3	 (2003):465-490.	http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj/vol41/iss2/16		305	Yūsuf	 Salmān	 Yūsuf	 a.k.a.	 Fahad.	 Al-Qāʿida,	 Number	 4	 and	 5,	 April	 1944	 in	Mu’alafāt	 al-Rafīq	
Fahad	[‘The	Works	of	Comrade	Fahad’],	(Baghdad:	al-Thaqāfa	al-Jadīda	Press),	at	291-297. 
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have to bring to their union the majority of the workers of their industry… to educate them… [on] 
… the union based on the charter and Labour Law No. 72...”306 Yūsuf believed that the Labour 
Law of 1936 had a role to play in the working-class struggle despite (and especially considering) 
the fact that it was not being enforced by the state, and so he asked that the workers keep the 
labour law ‘in their pockets’ to serve as reminder of their rights. 
 
  Here, the workers’ appropriation of the ideological force of the law in their struggle had 
its advantages, although it also had its limits, for as will be shown later the Iraqi workers’ struggle 
was a not a legal one per se. It was largley waged outside the confines of the law, as it was more a 
structural question of conflicting visons of social orders, which in the end legal reform could not 
address. However, this did not mean that legality was not ideologically pertinent for the workers 
in the assertions of their demands and their overall struggle. Although this continuous reference 
to the law and the use of legality was a powerful arsenal for workers’ struggle, it also had its 
limits especially in a semi-colonial context, and this should not be overlooked. The colonial and 
semi-colonial state did not allow for too much elbowroom where law and legality became an 
arena of class struggle. This was quite different from the Western liberal state, where legality was 
continuously used as ‘a modality for shaping relations between labour and capital’.307 The early 
Western liberal state found it essential to use the law to institutionalize conflict between 
employers and workers, while attempting to avoid violent repression as much as possible.  The 
colonial or semi-colonial state, on the other hand, did not find it necessary to do so, and was 
instead more prone to use violence to suppress workers demands. The workers’ struggle in Iraq 
was therefore mostly waged outside the law out of necessity. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I detailed the history of the formative years of the Iraqi working class in 
Baghdad, while contextualizing the first labour law passed in the country in 1936. I argued that 
despite the fact that this law was not enforced by the state, it was in reality a forced concession 
given to the workers because of their unrelenting strike actions, in particular in 1930 and 1931. I 
then make the contention that the principles embedded in this law were later appropriated by the 
labour movement as it was denoted in nearly every lists of demands, even so by the later 
communist-led movement in the next decade. This fact illustrates that the law and its ideology 																																																																				306	Ibid,	at	294	(my	translation;	emphasis	added).	307	See	Eric	Tucker	and	Judy	Fudge.	Labor	Before	the	Law,	(Oxford:	OUP,	2000).	
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was a useful tool for counter-hegemonic movements in the semi-colonial context, as it had an 
educative function, expanding workers’ class-consciousness by allowing them to understand their 
conditions in the overall semi-colonial capitalist system. In a sense, therefore, this chapter has 
shown that the ideology of the law provides those who are struggling against the entire social 
order with a language to articulate their demands, as well as, the imaginations of their alternative 
futures. 
 
The demise of the Jamʿīyat in 1935 and its reformist social-democratic vision permitted 
more radical and revolutionary ideas, which were merely in the margins previously, to emerge at 
the forefront of Iraqi working-class culture and politics. Communism was to become so 
widespread amongst the working class and Iraqi society that it organically evolved into an 
indigenous movement, while being entrenched into working-class culture and its political 
imagination. Although this is not the place to delve into a detailed history of the Iraqi Communist 
Party and its sophisticated organizational and political underground structures, as will become 
clear later, the party was not only a genuine ‘Iraqi’ party308 that represented all sectors of the 
population, but its popularity would soar as the struggle for national independence intensified. It 
is enough to say that once communism arrived in Iraq, it was difficult for it not to spread the way 
that it did, especially considering the socio-economic transformations described in Chapter 1 
were gradually constituting extreme inequality in Iraqi society. Moreover, it was the manner in 
which the communists explained in everyday layman language the important connections 
between the economic and political character of the working-class struggle that was what made 
their approach persuasive and effective.309 As the chapters on the oil, railway and port workers 
will illustrate, the communists maintained that British imperialism and the social, economic and 
																																																																				308	The	ICP	was	an	indigenous	party	that	was	not	in	any	way	controlled	from	Moscow.		It	is	true	that	its	internal	rules	were	organized	in	Marxist-Leninist	fashion	and	the	famed	secretary-general	Fahad	was	trained	in	the	Comintern’s	University	of	the	Toilers	of	the	East	in	the	1940s.	However,	there	is	no	evidence	either	by	Iraqi,	British	or	US	intelligence	of	any	financial	or	organizational	ties	with	foreign	parties	or	states.	As	Batatu	makes	clear	after	examining	the	documents	used	to	prosecute	communist	leaders,	 ‘…there	 is	 no	 evidence	 that	 [the	 party]	 was	 propped	 up	 by	 the	 Comintern	 in	 any…way’.	Batatu,	supra,	ft.	41,	at	576.	This	did	not	preclude	the	fact	that	certain	factions	of	the	party	looked	to	Moscow	for	guidance.	Of	course,	the	Iraqi	government	and	the	British	tried	their	best	to	make	these	connections	with	the	intention	of	delegitimizing	the	party	and	to	spread	the	idea	that	foreigners	were	behind	the	people’s	uprisings,	such	as	the	Wathba.	309	Communism	in	the	region	would	be	articulated	to	the	masses	in	a	explicit	anti-imperialist	manner	that	 was	 within	 ‘the	 ideology	 of	 national	 liberation’.	 In	 other	 words,	 it	 was	 to	 be	 conceived	 in	 a	specifically	 geopolitical	manner,	 what	 Anne	 Alexander	 referred	 to	 as,	 ‘communism	 as	 geopolitics’.	This	was	not	surprising	considering	the	geo-strategic	nature	of	the	semi-periphery.	Anne	Alexander.	“Communism	 in	 the	 Islamic	 World,”	 in	 Smith,	 S.A.	 (ed.)	 The	 Oxford	 Handbook	 of	 the	 History	 of	
Communism,	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2014),	at	270.			
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political conditions of the working class were intertwined, and that therefore they must be dealt 
with together. 
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Chapter 3: The Making of Semi-peripheral Sovereignty in International law – A 
Doctrine of Independence for the Exploitation of Iraqi Oil 
 
 
Oh dancers to the prospect of a new era 
That contains all the old and ragged things 
      What is the difference between the Mandate 
                            And its genitals on the body of Independence?310  
 
~ Mohammad Salih Bahr al-ʿUlūm 
 
 
The occupation of Iraq, [the imposition of] the mandate on it, the treaty alliance with it, and then its “independence” 
and entrance into the League of Nations; all this was done to secure the flow of the politics of the Black Liquid [i.e. oil] 
to the shores of British influence.311 
 
~ Yūsuf Ibrahīm Yazbak 
 
 
“…Iraq had now become a main centre of world power…[It] holds a key position in modern strategic thinking and 
…her oil is held to be essential for the needs of the Western world…”312  
 
~ Sir John Troutbeck  
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
 
The aim of this chapter is to assess the role of international law in the formation of the 
Iraqi state, specifically the juridical construction of its ‘independence’ in 1932. I will describe the 
Iraqi experience of the Mandate system, and the institutions and mechanisms of the changing 
international legal order during the inter-war period. This analysis will elucidate the relationship 
between international law and imperialism in Iraq, and its impact on the lives of the Iraqi working 
class. It is important to understand exactly how the Mandate functioned in Iraq, and how it 
overlapped with British imperial policy, which reacted to nationalist claims. I will use the Iraqi 
experience as a lens to illuminate certain aspects of the workings of the mandate system in the 
semi-peripheral region of the Middle East.  
 
																																																																				310	Muhammad	 Sālih	 Bahr	 al-ʿUlūm.	 Diwan	 Bahr	 al-ʿUlūm	 (Baghdad:	 Matba‘at	 Dar	 al-Tadāmun,	1968),	 1:59.	 As	 translated	 by	 Kevin	 Jones	 in	 ‘The	 Poetics	 of	 Revolution:	 Cultures,	 Practices	 and	Politics	of	Anti-Colonialism	in	Iraq,	1932-1960’	PhD	Dissertation,	University	of	Michigan,	2013.		 311 	Yūsuf	 Ibrahīm	 Yazbak.	 al-Nift	 Mūstʿbid	 al-Shʿwb	 [Oil,	 the	 Enslaver	 of	 Peoples],	 (Damascus:	Manshourāt	wizārat	al-Thaqāfa,	1990). 312	TNA.	FO	371/110991.	VQ	1015/82.	 John	Troutbeck	(British	Embassy,	Bagdad)	to	Anthony	Eden	(FO,	London)	December	9,	1954.	
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The British used certain instruments from its past colonial experiences reconstructing 
them in the context of the mandate system and the new international legal order emerging at the 
time. Most historians of Iraq have considered the Mandate merely within the context of the 
Mandatory power’s actions – not taking into account the role of international law in enabling 
these actions. This is unfortunate considering the fact that it was the international legal order that 
was emerging during the interwar period that allowed the Mandatories the ability to manoeuver in 
maintaining their imperial control. An analysis of the role of international law in the 
subordination of Iraq to imperialism has therefore been quite lacking. In focusing on the Iraq 
episode, I will detail the history of treaty-making, revealing the manner in which it was utilized in 
relation to the development of international law so as to illustrate the unique Iraqi experience 
within the Mandate system. I will turn to a detailed description of how Iraqi semi-peripheral 
sovereignty was constructed by the Permanent Mandates Commission in Geneva. I will end, with 
a focus on the narrative of oil concessions and agreements that would bring some important 
insights on the characteristics of Iraqi semi-peripheral sovereignty – a sovereignty that turned out 
to be more than a matter of granting Iraq its independence, but rather about controlling access to 
the region as a whole for economic exploitation, especially that of oil.     
  
II. The principles behind the Mandate system under international law and the significance 
of the ‘A’ Mandates 
 
 
The Mandate system of the League of Nations has its origins in the 1919 Paris Peace 
Conference after the end of World War I, which endeavored to establish a lasting peace, and 
settle the ‘colonial question’ in an orderly manner under the rule of law.313 The Allied Powers, 
who at that point occupied all the German colonies in Africa, Asia and Oceana, as well as the 
Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire, eventually came up with the idea of the Mandate system 
as a compromise between the ‘liberal’ internationalists and the ‘imperialists,’ who were still in 
favor of the old practice of annexation, whereby enemy territory was seen as ‘booty’ or ‘legally 																																																																				313	The	 ‘colonial	 question’	 refers	 to	 the	 manner	 by	 which	 European	 powers	 have	 approached	 the	‘question’	 of	 the	 territories	 and	 peoples	 that	 were	 colonized.	 	 So,	 for	 example	 previous	 to	 the	emerging	of	the	international	legal	order	in	the	twentieth	century,	European	states	saw	themselves	as	 ‘civilized	 Christian	 nations’	 with	 the	 ‘right	 to	 discovery’.	 In	 other	 words,	 they	 had	 the	 right	 to	occupy	‘uncivilized’	nations	under	international	law.	The	colonial	question	was	therefore	dealt	with	under	international	law	in	a	certain	manner	that	emphasized	full	and	unqualified	control,	whether	it	was	 through	 occupation,	 subjugation,	 cession,	 and	 prescription	 or	 through	 bilateral	 treaties.	 	 See	Ruth	 Gordon,	 “Saving	 Failed	 States:	 Sometimes	 a	 Neocolonialist	 Notion”,	 12	 American	 	 University	
Journal	of	International	Law	and	Policy	903	(1997),	at	938.	
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disposable property to be acquired by victors as spoils of war.314 These old colonial practices led 
to extreme violent exploitation and plunder despite being justified as beneficial to the native 
peoples.  
 
The South African soldier-statesman General Jan Smuts (who was also a lawyer trained 
in Roman-Dutch law) was the first to propose a ‘practical scheme’ for the creation of a Mandate 
system based on international trusteeship in a pamphlet published in December 1918.315 Smuts 
proposed a system of trusteeship based on Wilson’s Fourteen Points, specifically the principles of 
‘non-annexation’ and ‘self-determination’. He saw the League as the ‘reversionary’ of these 
conquered Empires. The main task of the League was that of ‘nursing’ the ‘destitute’ peoples left 
behind ‘towards economic and political independence’.316  Wilson based his final draft (the 
‘Hirst-Miller draft’) that he submitted to the Conference on Smut’s plan, making several 
adjustments by expanding the mandatory idea.317  
 
Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations reflected these ideas, providing that 
the Mandate system undertook a ‘sacred trust of civilization,’ so as to promote the well being and 
development of these colonies that were ‘inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves 
under the strenuous conditions of the modern world’.318 The main goal was therefore the 
protection of native populations from abuse, pillage and exploitation, which was the consequence 
of ‘the unfettered discretion of sovereign states’.319 It was this ‘gross disregard of the material and 
moral welfare of the natives’ that put the old system of formal colonialism in a moral crisis, 
forcing the Great Powers to re-conceptualize the ‘civilizing mission’ into a new form.320 The 
																																																																				314	Quincy	Wright.	The	League	of	Nations,	(New	York:	Greenwood	Press,	1930),	at	24.	For	the	history	of	acquisition	of	territory	under	international	law	and	its	evolution	See,	Sharon	Korman,	The	Right	of	
Conquest:	The	Acquisition	of	Territory	by	Force	in	International	Law	and	Practice,	(Oxford:	Clarendon	Press,	1988),	at	135.	315	Jan	Smuts.	The	League	of	Nations	–	A	practical	suggestion,	(London:	Hodder	and	Stoughton,	1918).	For	more	on	Smut’s	influence	on	the	League	of	Nations,	See	Mark	Mazower,	No	Enchanted	Palace:	The	
End	 of	 Empire	 and	 the	 Ideological	 Origins	 of	 the	 United	 Nations,	 (Princeton:	 Princeton	 University	Press,	2009).	316	Smuts,	ibid,	at	11.		317	Smuts	 considered	 the	 peoples	 of	 Africa	 and	 Oceana	 as,	 ‘inhabited	 by	 barbarians,	 who	 not	 only	cannot	possibly	govern	themselves,	but	to	whom	it	would	be	impracticable	to	apply	any	idea	of	self-determination	 in	 the	European	sense.’	Wilson,	on	 the	other	hand,	 claimed	 that	 the	mandatory	 idea	should	be	applied	to	all	the	colonized;	ibid.	318	League	of	Nations	Covenant,	Article	22,	para.	1-2.	319	Antony	Anghie,	'The	Heart	of	My	Home:	Colonialism,	Environmental	Damage,	and	the	Nauru	Case',	(1993)	34	Harvard	International	Law	Journal	445–506;	at	494.	320	Norman	Bentwich,	The	Mandates	System	(London:	Longmans	1930),	at	4.	
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secondary goal was the promotion of the ‘well-being and the development’ of the native 
population.321      
 
 To understand the innovative character of the Mandate system and its significance, one 
would need to deconstruct its legal principles and concepts. This would uncover its genealogies 
(underlying its continuities) with past colonial concepts and practices. As Aaron Margalith 
observed, the term ‘mandate’ is misleading and was the cause of ‘many a misconception’.  Some 
regarded it as a ‘new conception of colonial administration and international law’.322 Alfred 
Milner, the British statesmen who participated in the drafting of the Covenant, for instance, 
believed that they were breaking from the past when he said, ‘we are opening a new chapter in 
International Law’.323 Others believed that it was merely old (British) colonial policy and practice 
‘internationalized’ by the Mandate system.324 Both these views if unqualified are doubtless 
inaccurate, for although the Mandate system was truly an innovation, it was not necessarily a 
complete break from past formations either. For it was theoretically created as a compromise after 
all.  
 
Hence, to analyze the legal and political principles of the Mandate is necessary if one is 
to be attentive to the contradictory features that lie at the heart of this idea. The three main 
concepts of the Mandate system: the ‘trust’325, ‘guardianship/tutelage’ and the ‘mandate’ were 
technically borrowed from both European private law and British law.326  Nonetheless, these 
concepts have much longer histories, especially in the colonies.327 Edmund Burke referred to a 
‘sacred trust of civilization’ in his passionate speech in the House of Commons on Fox’s India 																																																																				321B.	 Rajagopal.	 International	 Law	 from	 Below:	 Development,	 Social	 Movements	 and	 Third	 World	
Resistance,	(Cambridge	University	Press,	2007),	at	54.	322	Aaron	Margalith.	The	International	Mandates,	(John	Hopkins	Press,	1930),	at	35.	323	Milner’s	memorandum	of	March	8,	1919,	Milner	papers;	as	quoted	in	William	Roger	Louis.	“Great	Britain	 and	 International	 Trusteeship:	 The	 Mandates	 System”	 in	 Robin	 W.	 Winks	 (ed.)	 The	
Historiography	of	the	British	Empire-Commonwealth:	Trends,	Interpretations	and	Resources,	(Durham:	Duke	University	Press,	1966),	at	300.	324	Campbell	Upthegrove,	Empire	by	Mandate,	(NY:	Bookman,	1954),	at	5.	325	D.	Campbell	Lee	argues	that	‘it	is	not	the	Continental	principle	of	Mandate	that	has	promoted	and	produced	 the	Mandatory	 system,	 but	 the	 English	 idea	 of	 Trust.’	 D.	 Campbell	 Lee,	The	Mandate	 for	
Mesopotamia	and	the	Principle	of	Trusteeship	in	English	Law,	(London:	The	League	of	Nations	Union,	1921),	at	13.			326	Margalith,	 supra,	 ft.	 318,	 at	 41,	 45.	 	 The	 concept	 of	 trusteeship	 was	 borrowed	 from	 English	common	law	and	the	law	of	trusts,	while	the	concept	of	guardianship	[and	mandate]	was	borrowed	from	 the	 civil	 law	 of	 the	 European	 continent.	 Civil	 law	 regimes	 do	 not	 have	 the	 trust,	 which	 is	 a	common	law	conception.				327	For	a	good	historical	overview	of	the	evolution	of	 international	trusteeship,	see	Chowdhuri,	R.N.	
International	Mandates	and	Trusteeship	Systems,	(The	Hague:	Martinus	Nijhoff,	1955),	pp.	13-36.	
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Bill in 1783.328 Similarly, US Supreme Court Chief Justice Marshall referred in his decision to 
the Indian natives as being ‘in the state of pupillage’ and characterized their relation to the US as 
that of ‘a ward to his guardian.’329  
 
The main principles underlying the foundations of Article 22, in particular ‘non-
annexation’, ‘international supervision’, and (economic) ‘non-privilege’, have also been used in 
the past in different colonial contexts.330 Perhaps the best example was the Berlin Conference 
1884-85, which was an attempt to formalize colonial administration, setting down the rules and 
procedures for ‘international administration’ (exercised through sovereign rights) of the Congo, 
under the guise of ‘preservation’ and ‘well-being and improvement’ of native African tribes.331 
The purpose of the arrangement was to minimize inter-state rivalries and allow for free trade. 
However, it ultimately collapsed leading to the violent ‘African scramble’.332 Of course, this 
international institution was in reality created merely to provide the legal cover to legitimize and 
justify European authority over Africa.333  
 
If accordingly the main concepts and principles underlying the Mandate were not new, 
then what was it that made the Mandate system an innovation? It was certainly the profound turn 
to the ‘international institution,’ as a way to supervise the execution of the Mandatory’s 
obligations.334 Although this was attempted at the Berlin Conference, it was ineffective, mostly 
because of the lack of accountability. It was in other words (in theory) the addition of the 
principle of ‘international accountability’ that differentiated it from its predecessors.335 The 
Mandatory state was consequently considered ‘a protector with a conscience,’ which assumed 
obligations towards the native population and the ‘society of nations’.336 It acted according to 
‘definitive principles’ that were publicly laid down in the instrument of the mandate, on behalf of 
																																																																				328	Lindley,	M.F.	The	Acquisition	and	Government	of	Backward	Territory	in	International	Law,	(London:	Longmans,	Green	&	Co,	1926),	at	330.	329	Ibid.	330	Margalith,	supra,	ft.	322,	at	46.	331	Lindsey,	supra,	ft.	328,	at	332.		332	This	 arrangement	 although	 justified	 under	 international	 law	 eventually	 paved	 the	 way	 for	 the	mass	exploitation	and	genocidal	killing	of	millions	of	Africans.	See,	Adam	Hochschild,	King	Leopold’s	
Ghost:	A	Story	of	Greed,	Terror	and	Heroism	in	Colonial	Africa,	(London:	Pan	McMillian,	1998).	333	Siba	 N’zatioula	 Grovogui,	 Sovereigns,	 Quasi-Sovereigns,	 and	 Africans,	 (University	 of	 Minnesota	press,	1996),	at	78,	85.			334	David	Kennedy.	“A	Move	to	Institutions,”	(1987)	8	Cardozo	Law	Review	841-988		335	Duncan	Hall.	Mandates,	Dependencies	and	Trusteeships	(Washington	DC:	Carnegie	Endowment	for	International	Peace,	1948),	at	12.	336	Bentwich,	supra,	ft.	316,	at	5.	
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and in the name of the League (rather than its sovereign right as was the case in the Berlin 
Act).337  
 
The organs of the League were the Permanent Mandates Commission (PMC), the League 
Council and the Permanent Court of International Justice. The PMC, composed of ‘experts’ with 
previous experience in colonial administration was considered the ‘center of mandatory 
supervision’. This body was tasked with supervision through its scrutiny of the annual reports 
submitted by the mandatories, advising both the mandatory states and the Council on their 
international obligations.338 In fact, it is revealing that the majority of the members of the PMC 
were lawyers and jurists, for they saw their function in ‘legalistic terms’ and tended to take a 
‘strictly legal approach,’ at times fusing the law with their administrative functions.339 In that 
sense, the PMC reflected the legal character of the Mandate system, which was entirely based on 
‘legal norms and gave rise to justiciable legal obligations on the part of the mandatory’.340  
 
Our narrative of the Iraqi mandate will remain focused on the PMC. This is to make the 
point that the new institutions of the Mandate were based on international law and cannot be 
explained otherwise as some scholars have done. Susan	Pedersen	 in	 her	 recent	 book	 on	 the	history	of	the	Mandate	system,	for	instance,	completely	disregards	the	role	of	international	law	 in	 the	mandate	 system	 and	 its	 legal	 character,	 including	 in	 her	 chapter	 on	 Iraq.	 She	refers	 to	 ‘international	 law’	 no	 more	 than	 a	 dozen	 times	 in	 her	 book,	 and	 merely	 in	passing.341 However, the reality was that PMC were constantly struggling with international law, 
for they were aware that they were making international law in their sessions. In that sense, it is 
impossible to understand Iraq’s emergence as an independent sovereign state without assessing 
the changing dynamics within international law and its order. The story of modern Iraq is 
accordingly a story of international law.      
 
 The Mandate system was classified based on the stages of development of each territory 
compared to the European ‘standard’: the ‘A’ Mandates were designated as the territories of the 
former Arab provinces of the Turkish Empire, which were said to have ‘reached a stage of 
development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized, 																																																																				337	Ibid.	See	Wright,	supra,	ft.	314,	at	23.	338	Wright,	ibid,	at	137-138.	339	Anghie,	Imperialism,	supra,	ft.	21,	at	151.	340	Ibid	at	153.	341	Susan	Pederson,	The	Guardians:	The	League	of	Nations	and	the	Crisis	of	Empire,	(Oxford	university	Press,	2015).	
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subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by the Mandatory until such time 
as they are able to stand alone’.342 The ‘B’ Mandates were designated as the territories of Central 
Africa, which were considered as requiring a number of years (perhaps decades) of tutelage under 
their Mandatories, who were in turn given wider powers for the administration of these territories.  
Finally, the ‘C’ Mandates were designated as the ‘primitive’ peoples of the Pacific, who were to 
be governed as part of the mandatory territory, considering their remoteness from the metropole 
and sparseness of their populations.343  
 
Despite the obvious racial dimensions of such a classification, my argument in this 
chapter is that at the heart of such a classification was more a concern for geopolitics and 
economic questions of capital accumulation in the region (especially oil in the case of the Middle 
East).  In other words, the ‘A’ Mandates were classified as such for reasons that were not 
primarily because Arabs were seen as actually being ‘more civilized’ than African peoples. The 
‘A’ Mandates were carved out in the Near East for several reasons, such as to fulfill previous 
promises concerning independence made by the British, but especially for the necessity of 
appearing as though colonial exploitation of the old variety was not continuing there. It was also 
meant to be a laboratory for experimentation with the concept of sovereignty –searching for the 
proper legal ‘ingredients’ needed for the eventual construction of a non-European sovereignty 
that was specifically compatible with the geopolitical designs over the semi-peripheral Middle 
East as a whole and which ensured the continuous flow of capital and oil.  
 
The main characteristics of the ‘A’ Mandates were that the wishes of the peoples as to the 
selection of their Mandatory power would be taken into account, as well as the Mandatory 
power’s supposedly limited role of ‘administrative advice and assistance’ in its tutelage of the 
territories’ ‘provisional’ independence. As will be shown, however, the reality on the ground was 
that the people’s preferences in the region (typified by all out revolts in Syria, Palestine and Iraq 
against the Mandate system itself) were eventually disregarded, while the supposedly loose and 
limited supervisory structures were forcefully imposed on the region, contributing to the 
emergence of a semi-peripheral sovereignty in Iraq.  
 
Many legal scholars have generally avoided any overall analysis of the ‘A’ Mandates, 
which were not only differentiated from the ‘B’ and ‘C’ Mandates, but also as between each 																																																																				342Covenant	of	the	League	of	Nations,	28	April	1919,	13	(1919)	AJIL	Sup.	128.	343	Margalith,	supra,	ft.	321,	at	29.	
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other. The ‘A’ Mandates were generally regarded as ‘special cases’ that should be studied 
separately. Margalith, for example, emphasized that, ‘although there are some important features 
that are common to all these territories, there are many others, not less important, which are 
peculiar to each area and which give to it a unique character; so that in order to understand clearly 
the political situation in the Near Eastern mandates each territory will have to be separately dealt 
with’. 344 Nevertheless, the ‘A’ Mandates were in fact all connected and should be so considered, 
especially if one is to grasp the political, social and economic background of the region. Although 
I am merely concerned with the case of Iraq here rather than making a comparative analysis, I 
approach my analysis contextually in the context of the region, as this is the only way to 
comprehend the significance of the ‘A’ mandates, while identifying their distinct characteristics 
as they relate to international law. 
 
III. The concept of the ‘semi-periphery’ & its significance to international law   
 
What is meant by the ‘semi-periphery’ in this study? The concept of the ‘semi-periphery’ 
emerged from historical sociology and was famously coined by world-systems theorist, Immanuel 
Wallerstein.345 It is used here as an analytic tool to refer to those states that were free from 
traditional and formal colonialism, but still subject to informal imperial control. The concept 
already contains a certain elasticity that may explain why it is difficult to define, but it essentially 
denotes an ‘intermediate’ status of economically and politically weak states that nevertheless had 
a limited amount of agency and therefore mediated between centres of economic power, 
production and distribution, and underdeveloped zones that supplied raw materials.346  This 
intermediate role contains a unique historical specificity that must not be overlooked by 
international legal scholars. Wallerstein himself emphasizes that semi-peripheral states have 
‘special political properties’.347 This entails that its juridical and legal properties are likewise 
unique. What this study seeks to do is to contribute to the emerging literature in international 
legal scholarship that finds this concept very useful in describing the dynamism and uniqueness 
																																																																				344	Ibid,	at	125.	345	See	Immanuel	Wallerstein.	‘Semi-Peripheral	Countries	and	the	Cotemporary	World	Crises’	(1976)	3	Theory	&	Society,	at	461.					346	See	Giovanni	Arrighi.	Semiperipheral	Development:	the	politics	of	Southern	Europe	in	the	Twentieth	
Century,	(London:	Sage,	1985).				347	Immanuel	Wallerstein,	World-Systems	Analysis:	An	Introduction,	(Durham:	Duke	University	Press,	2004),	at	29.	
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of such ‘intermediate’ role in international law.348 The semi-periphery could be found in notions 
of the ‘semi-civilized’ in international law for instance, and this suggests that the concept of the 
semi-periphery has a juridical as much as an economic dimension and function. It is this notion of 
the ‘semi-civilized’ that is reflected in the ‘A’ Mandate designation in relation to the ‘B’ and ‘C’ 
Mandates. As Umut Özsu argues, taking the semi-periphery seriously, ‘…simply forces us to 
confront the reality that the international legal system is inseparable from a global capitalist order 
with a largely Euro-American infrastructure…’ 349  It is also inseparable from questions of 
geopolitics.  The ‘semi-periphery’ is, in other words, the perfect analytic tool to elucidate the 
economic dimensions of certain juridical formations and this is the main task at hand.   
 
There has been an unfortunate and ‘remarkable’350 lack of focus on the semi-periphery in 
international legal scholarship, in particular those scholars of the TWAIL variety. TWAIL 
scholars, who have been at the forefront of exposing how colonialism and imperialism are 
constitutive of, and at the very foundation of the history and discipline of international law, have 
approached international law based on a strict dichotomy between the periphery and the core.351 
They have as a consequence overlooked the role of the semi-periphery in the development of 
international law. Moreover, they have not made clear distinctions between the periphery and 
semi-periphery in relation to international law, in particular the Mandate system. As Duncan Hall 
correctly warns, to theorize the Mandatory system in the wrong historical and political context 
could lead to numerous errors, one of which is ‘obscuring’ the relationship between the mandate 
systems to other species of imperial governance.352 Moreover, to assume that the ‘A’ Mandates 
were ‘special cases’ that should be distinguished from the overall system ‘minimizes the great 
importance of the Near East Mandates’. The ‘A’ Mandates should not be considered exceptional 
‘special cases’, but rather ‘the main range itself,’ while ‘the African mandates were the lesser 
																																																																				348	See	 Richard	 S.	 Horowitz.	 ‘International	 Law	 and	 State	 Transformation	 in	 China,	 Siam,	 and	 the	Ottoman	 Empire	 during	 the	 Nineteenth	 Century’	 (2004)	 15	 J	 World	 Hist	 445;	 Liliana	 Obregon.	‘Completing	 Civilization:	 Creole	 Consciousness	 and	 International	 Law	 in	 Nineteenth-Century	 Latin	America’	 in	 Anne	 Orford	 (ed.),	 International	 Law	 and	 Others	 (Cambridge:	 CUP,	 2006);	 Turan	Kayaoglu,	 Legal	 Imperialism:	 Sovereignty	 and	 Extraterritoriality	 in	 Japan,	 the	 Ottoman	 Empire	 and	
China,	(Cambridge:	CUP,	2015).		349	Umut	 Ozsu.	 “From	 the	 ‘semi-civilized	 state’	 to	 the	 emerging	market’:	 remarks	 on	 international	legal	 history	 of	 the	 semi-periphery,”	 in	 Ugo	Mattei	 and	 John	 Haskell	 (eds.)	Research	Handbook	on	
Political	Economy	and	Law	(Cheltenham:	Edward	Elgar,	2015),	pp.	246-259;	at	258.	350	Ibid,	at	246.	351	For	a	good	overview	of	the	literature,	See	James	Gathii.	“TWAIL:	A	Brief	History	of	its	Origins,	its	Decentralized	Network,	and	a	tentative	Bibliography,”	3(1)	Trade	Law	and	Development,	(2011):	26.		352	Hall,	supra,	ft.	335,	at	12.
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ridges branching off from it’.353 It is in this way that the semi-peripheral region of the Middle 
East could be considered as a (legal) laboratory, especially with regards to the concept of 
sovereignty.  
 
Tony Anghie argues that it was the ‘displacement and reconfiguration’ of the location of 
sovereignty by international lawyers that allowed for the construction of a novel form of 
sovereignty situated within the international institution of the mandate and its processes.354 That 
is, the characterization of the mandatory territory as possessing ‘latent sovereignty’ gave the 
Mandatory power the space and legitimacy to penetrate the interior of the territory in question, 
considerably transforming its character and society.355 Anghie however did not consider how his 
analysis, which works well for the periphery (the ‘B’ and ‘C’ Mandates), would work for the 
semi-periphery (the ‘A’ Mandate), where sovereignty was conditional and expressly provisional, 
rather than (temporarily or permanently) postponed.  
 
In this case then the question (from an international law perspective) becomes – why was 
there a need to have a situation where sovereignty appears to be provisional in the first place? 
How would the Mandatory power actually have ‘complete access’ to the territory if sovereignty 
were not fully suspended as in the periphery? The answer I think lies in the necessity for legal 
experimentation with this provisional sovereignty for the future geopolitical control of this oil-
rich strategic region. That is, the aim of this experiment was to construct a sovereignty that 
appeared whole in international law, while the territory remained under the economic influence 
of the European powers. It was consequently an attempt to push the concept of sovereignty to its 
limits in international law, while preserving and serving the (economic and geopolitical) crux of 
imperialism. 
 
 I want to therefore suggest that this experimentation in Iraq (at the behest of the 
international institution) with the use of certain legal technologies (such as plebiscites, treaties, 
organic laws, and minority protection regimes) and certain legal reasoning and logic developed in 
Geneva, were essential for the manufacturing of a non-European sovereignty that was unique to 
the semi-peripheral Middle East – a semi-peripheral sovereignty that although allowed the newly 
‘independent’ state to join the international society of nations, ensured that its sovereignty 
																																																																				353	Ibid.	354	Anghie,	Heart,	supra,	ft.	319,	at	494-495;	Quincy,	supra,	ft.	314,	at	500-08.	355	Anghie,	Imperialism,	supra,	ft.	21,	at	149.	
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remained both constrained and economically valuable at the same time. It is in this way that what 
emerged when Iraq became independent was not only a model for other states in the region, 
reflecting the manner in which imperialism remained embedded within the emergent international 
legal order, but it also contributed to the imperialist control of the entire region. 
         
IV. Iraq as ‘model mandate’: the instrument of the treaty and its uses in international law 
 
The British decision to invade and occupy Mesopotamia was primarily made to secure 
the route to India during the Great War. It was during this short period of British military 
occupation that a civil and legal administrative system based on the Indian Raj was established.356 
A debate ensued between British officials in London and India; the latter hoping to annex it as a 
part of the Raj’s sphere of influence.357 Only following the devastating consequences of the 1920 
Revolution, which was the categorical rejection by the native population of the imposition of the 
mandate (seen as a veiled form of colonization), did the British consider installing an Iraqi self-
government. Following the defeat of the revolution through aerial bombardment of tribes and 
villages (with poison gas), the British turned to the idea of creating an outwardly national self-
governed polity with institutions that would allow them to remain under ultimate control. The 
Hejazi Emir Feisal was chosen at the 1921 Cairo Conference as the new King of the incipient 
state.358 The British ensured his ascent to the throne, legitimating it through a sham referendum.  
 
Although it was the principal aim of the British to find a way to adhere to the emerging 
international order (represented by Wilson’s Fourteen Points and institutionalized in Article 22 of 
the Covenant of the League of Nations), while establishing its hegemonic position under the new 
Mandatory regime, I would like to shift the focus from the Mandatory state’s actions to the role of 
the international legal order itself.  Historians of Iraq tend to describe Britain’s approach of 
‘indirect rule’ through introducing the treaty as the main reason for the supposed ‘success’ of the 
Mandate in Iraq. The British approach, described as a ‘masterstroke’ has generally been credited 
with the direction the Iraqi narrative took.359 It was, in other words, their pragmatic outlook, and 
the manner in which they brought their past experiences from other parts of the Empire that 
																																																																				356	See	Ireland,	supra,	ft.	66.	357	Sluglett,	supra,	ft.	83,	at	4.		358	See	Aaron	Klieman.	Foundations	of	British	Policy	in	the	Arab	World:	The	Cairo	Conference	of	1921,	(London:	John	Hopkins	Press,	1970).	359	William	Stivers.	Supremacy	and	Oil:	Iraq,	Turkey	and	the	Anglo-American	World	Order,	1918-1930	(Ithaca:	Cornell	University	Press,	1982),	at	78.		
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determined the course of events.360 Of course, such an argument is problematic in that it assumes 
Iraqis were not a part of this narrative. This is untrue, considering that Britain was in fact reacting 
to Iraqi nationalist claims in the first place.  
 
What is more interesting for our purposes is the role of the international legal order and 
international law in this narrative, in particular the different interpretations of international law 
respecting non-European sovereignty. It is unfortunate that this part of the narrative has usually 
been neglected.361 
 
Barely a year after the 1921 Cairo Conference, the British decided to utilize the 
instrument that they were most familiar with in colonial contexts – the instrument of the treaty, so 
as to express their mandatory relationship.362 Iraqi nationalists, who the British viewed as 
increasingly ‘dangerous’ and ‘irrational’, were vehemently opposed to any form of Mandatory 
relationship, demanded nothing less than complete independence.	The first Anglo-Iraqi Treaty 
was eventually signed in 1922.363 The treaty was written in the contractual language of mutuality 
and reciprocity, skillfully reproducing the Mandatory relationship in a more ‘acceptable’ form, 
while deliberately avoiding any use of the term. The cornerstone of ‘indirect control’ in the 
Treaty was the requirement that the Iraqi government appoint British advisors at every 
governmental post. Ministers were required to consult with a British advisor on all courses of 
action before coming to any decision. The High Commissioner himself was the advisor to the 
King. This parallel British advisory system was generally considered as the backbone of the Iraqi 
state. Supplementary agreements ensured that key military, foreign relations, judicial and 
financial posts were held in British hands.  
 
 Although the whole point of the arrangement was to avoid the appearance of a Mandatory 
relationship, the Council of the League of Nations only approved the treaty, in September 1924 
after it was confirmed as embodying the Mandate in ‘form and substance.’364  The treaty 
maintained British dominance of the new Iraqi state and its institutions, limiting the state’s 																																																																				360	See	 Toby	 Dodge,	 Inventing	 Iraq:	 The	 Failure	 of	 Nation	 and	 a	 History	 Denied,	 (NY:	 Columbia	University	Press,	2003),	at	1-41.	361	See	Pederson,	supra,	ft.	341.		362	The	Mandate	text	pertaining	to	Iraq	was	never	officially	ratified.			363	Anglo-Iraq	Treaty	of	Alliance,	1922,	Cmd	2370	364	See	Quincy	Wright,	“The	Government	of	Iraq,”	(1926),	20(4)	The	American	Political	Science	Review,	743,	at	765.	Wright	regarded	Article	22	of	the	League	of	Nations	Covenant,	the	League	Mandate	and	the	Treaty	with	 the	Organic	Law,	as	 forming	part	of	 the	constitutional	documents	of	 Iraq;	 supra,	 at	747.	
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constitutional structures. It was consequently intertwined with the 1925 Iraqi Constitution or 
Organic Law, enshrining wide executive powers and constricting parliamentary sovereignty, so as 
to allow the King and Cabinet (through the influence of the High Commissioner) to uphold the 
provisions of the treaty.365 For instance, Article 26(3) gave the King the power to override 
constitutional procedures by dissolving parliament and issuing ordinances that had ‘the force of 
law’ for the fulfillment of ‘treaty obligations’.366  Moreover, any measure pertaining to the treaty 
did not require the approval of parliament. Finally, the King had an absolute veto over all laws 
and ministerial orders.367   The Constitution, therefore, ensured that the entire relationship 
between the Iraqi state and Britain remained outside the constitutional order, wholly governed by 
the treaty, which was at that point emanating from international law and its order.368 This 
arrangement allowed the British wide room to influence the King and pressure him not to deviate 
from the treaty, and in turn British imperial policy. 
 
To trace the evolution of treaty-making by the British in the context of international law 
would be useful so as to grasp the way this instrument functioned in the case of Iraq, and the 
nature of the emerging international legal order at the time. The British brought past colonial 
practices from their long experiences in colonial administration, in particular India and Egypt, to 
the Iraqi plane. The American international lawyer, Quincy Wright made such an observation, 
suggesting that the British tradition of colonial administration, which allows for the subordination 
of form to substance was developed in India and Egypt and imported to the case of Iraq: ‘If 
British administrators can make the government run the way they want,’ he wrote, ‘they are 
willing to dispense with the appearance of power’.369 
 
The instrument of the treaty was used in the nineteenth century to create ‘native states’ or 
Indian princely states that were defined by a unique ‘quasi-sovereignty’ that was differentiated 
from international law.  As Lauren Benton has shown, Foreign Office officials at the time were 
elaborating this treaty law (as well as other colonial legal instruments) as being a separate type of 
‘imperial law’ that should be distinguished from international law.370 Several international legal 
																																																																				365	See	Hooper,	C.A.	The	Constitutional	Law	of	Iraq,	(Baghdad:	McKenzie	&	McKenzie,	1928).		366	Anglo-Iraq	Treaty	of	1930,	(Baghdad,	June	30,	1930).	367	Ibid,	Articles	62	and	63.	368	Brown,	Nathan.	“Constitutionalism,	Authoritarianism,	and	Imperialism	in	Iraq,”	Drake	Law	Review,	Vol.	53	(2005):	936.		369	Wright,	supra,	ft.	360,	at	748.		370	Lauren	 Benton.	 “From	 International	 Law	 to	 Imperial	 Constitutions:	 The	 Problem	 of	 Quasi-Sovereignty,	1870-1900”,	Law	and	History	Review,	Vol.	26,	issue	3,		pp.595-619	(2008)	at	599.	
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scholars, in particular C.H Alexandrowicz, have shown that during the nineteenth century, a 
universalizing positivist international legal order emerged replacing the previous more pluralist 
order, which was based on natural law.371  This positivist order was based on the exclusion of all 
‘uncivilized’ nations from the ambit of international law, which was defined as exclusively 
western and ‘civilized’. The ‘universal’ was hence ‘located in Europe,’ while ‘there was a shared 
willingness to apply [western] standards of political and legal practice universally as well as a 
readiness to deny admission to the international community to these states that fail to meet these 
required standards’.372  This shift to positivism led treaties that were signed with non-European 
states to be interpreted to the latter’s detriment, as positivists ignored the circumstances in which 
these treaties were signed.373 Consequently, ‘the history of violence and military conquest which 
led to the formation of these treaties plays no part in the positivist’s approach to the treaty’.374 
Therefore, in the case of the Indian princely states, the instrument of the treaty was utilized to 
exclude these states from the ambit of (civilized Western) international law and the society of 
nations.  
 
It also led to the construction of the notion of ‘divisible sovereignty,’ which asserted that 
sovereignty could be held in degrees with full sovereignty reserved for the imperial power.375 In 
this way, these Indian princely states were given a certain degree of internal sovereignty and even 
considered as independent, although they lacked international personality and were excluded 
from the society of nations. Furthermore, Britain had the right to intervene and disregard their 
obligations under the treaty whenever they saw fit. This was a very similar arrangement to the 
Persian Gulf States, which also had signed treaties with the British government. These treaties 
similarly gave the Shaikhdoms internal autonomy, in return for the surrendering of their external 
sovereignty and the maintenance of British ‘paramountcy’ in the Gulf.376 The Gulf treaties were 
likewise differentiated from the ambit of international law. The tracing of the evolution of these 																																																																				371	C.H.	Alexandrowicz,	An	Introduction	to	the	History	of	the	Law	of	Nations	in	the	East	Indies	(Oxford:	Calrendon	Press,	1967).	372	Gerry	 Simpson.	 Great	 Powers	 and	 Outlaw	 States:	 Unequal	 Sovereigns	 in	 the	 International	 Legal	
Order,	(Cambridge	University	press,	2004),	at	246-247.		Simpson	argues	that,	‘ultimately,	these	late-Victorian	 practices…can	 be	 viewed	 as	 precursors	 to	 the	 current	 liberal	 anti-pluralist	movement	 in	international	law’.		373	Anghie,	supra,	ft.	21,	at	71.	374	Ibid,	at	73.	375	Benton,	supra,	ft.	366,	at	603,	601.		Benton	suggests	that	the	manner	that	the	princely	states	were	governed	tended	to	be	overlooked,	because	they	were	quickly	and	clearly	made	subordinate	to	the	British.	 	See	Mantena.	Alibis	of	Empire,	 supra,	 for	 the	 ideological	 origins	 of	 the	British	 approach	 of	‘indirect	rule’	through	the	lens	of	its	most	well	known	legal	scholar	at	the	time,	Henry	Maine.	376	See	 al-Baharna,	 Hussein,	 The	 Legal	 Status	 of	 the	 Arabian	 Gulf	 States,	 (Manchester:	 Manchester	University	Press,	1968),	at	84-90.	
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instruments within other colonial contexts emphasizes that ‘the politics of sovereignty within 
empires generated new legal practices,’ that I would argue did not entirely disappear after the 
emergence of the new post-war international legal order, as the very concept of sovereignty (as it 
relates to non-Europeans) was shaped by these practices.377 
 
While the instrument of the treaty was utilized to exclude the non-European from 
international law and its order in the nineteenth century, in the case of Iraq, the treaty was brought 
in to do the opposite: to express the Mandatory relationship that would eventually create Iraq as a 
‘sovereign state,’ and lead to its eventual membership in international society. My argument, 
however, is that the legal experiment that ensued in Iraq brought about novel legal practices (or 
refined old instruments, such as the treaty itself) ensuring that Iraq’s inclusion into international 
society would still be an exclusion. This exclusion, however, would now occur within the ambit 
of international law rather than without it. It is therefore ironic that the treaty was brought in so as 
to avoid using the Mandate directly but to do so indirectly (i.e. to exclude to include), and yet the 
inclusion of Iraq into the society of nations as will be shown below was constrained by a new 
treaty and by the imperialism embedded within international law (i.e. to include to exclude, so as 
to include to exclude again). 
 
 The 1922 Anglo-Iraq Treaty brought about some confusion as to the British proposal that 
the Mandatory relationship was to be expressed in treaty form rather than the mandate itself. This 
was because it created the ambiguous position, whereby the British had ‘a mandate for Iraq vis-à-
vis the League, and not one vis-à-vis Iraq’.378  This was reflected in Lord Palmer’s speech before 
the Council where he said that ‘Iraq has advanced too far along the path laid down in Article 22 
of the Covenant for the particular form of control contemplated in that article to be any longer 
appropriate…[t]he treaty and connected documents place the British government in a position 
vis-à-vis Iraq to discharge their obligations toward the League…’379 The Council, as mentioned 
earlier, approved the treaty as reflecting the mandatory relationship in substance rather than in 
form.380 The decision of the Council stipulated that the purpose of the treaty was ‘to ensure the 
complete observance and execution in Iraq of the principles which the acceptance of the Mandate 
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was intended to secure.’381 Although the mandate was not ratified, it remained the operative 
document, defining the obligations of the British government towards the League and its 
Covenant.382 The PMC, which also had some doubts, eventually came to the same conclusion that 
a Mandate existed in Iraq despite this unusual arrangement.383  Similarly, although certain 
international lawyers had some misgivings maintaining that it was possible to argue that a 
Mandate did not exist in Iraq,384 most scholars were eventually convinced that not only was there 
a mandate in Iraq, but that ‘the form of the documents seem to comply more accurately with the 
terms of Article 22…than is the case with any other class A mandate’.385  Lindley, for instance, 
maintained that Iraq was a ‘sovereign state’ that was subject to treaty conditions and advice from 
British advisers and experts.386  
 
The treaty provided that an Organic Law (a constitution) and an Electoral Law would be 
passed by a Constituent Assembly. Iraq was to maintain its indivisible sovereignty as a 
constitutional monarchy with a representative government.387 The instrument of the treaty was 
therefore used in this instance to distance Iraq from the mandate, while at the same time 
constructing a limited sovereignty in form, which would give Britain some control and indirect 
influence in the same manner that it did in India and Egypt. The difference here was that the 
sovereignty given was not divisible, but rather indivisible with constraints imposed by the treaty.  
 
The instrument of the treaty remained a subjugating one even with the presence of 
(formal) indivisible sovereignty that allowed the ‘high contracting’ parties to come to a 
‘contractual agreement’. However, my argument goes further to claim that subjugation and semi-
colonialism was not only maintained by the instrument of the treaty, but also by the newly 																																																																				381	Ibid.	 Bentwich	 claims	 that	 the	 instrument	 is	 purposely	 referred	 to	 as	 a	 decision	 rather	 than	 a	mandate	with	intention	of	avoiding	the	hated	word.	See	Bentwich,	supra,	ft.	320,	at	57.	382	O.J.,	V,	at	1217	383	P.M.C.,	Min,	VII,	10-14,	123.	384	The	other	 viewpoint	 that	 appears	 to	 have	been	prevalent	 at	 the	 time	was	 that	 the	 Iraqi	 people	were	themselves	unaware	of	the	fact	that	their	territory	was	mandated,	and	even	if	they	were,	they	misunderstood	the	legal	significance	of	the	‘mandate’	and	confused	it	with	actual	‘sovereign’	control	(either	because	the	legal	niceties	of	the	mandate	were	mistranslated	or	unable	to	be	translated	into	the	Arabic	language).	The	catch-22	logic	of	this	is	evident:	Iraqis	were	either	ignorant	of	the	facts	or	unable	 to	 grasp	 the	 facts	 due	 to	 their	 inferior	 culture.	 Moreover,	 this	 notion	 that	 Iraqis	 were	somehow	 ‘tricked’	 into	 the	mandatory	 relationship	 is	 not	 only	 a	 reflection	 of	 the	 racist	 orientalist	idea	that	assumes	that	Iraqis	were	unable	to	ascertain	their	own	conditions	in	a	critical	manner,	but	also	completely	disregards	the	role	of	violence	(whether	the	crushing	the	1920	revolt	that	rejected	the	mandate	or	the	use	of	martial	law)	in	the	imposition	of	the	mandatory	relationship.						385	Margalith,	supra,	ft.	322,	at	125;	Wright,	supra,	ft.	310,	at	60.	386	Lindley,	supra,	ft.	328,	at	257.	387	Treaty	with	H.M.	King	Faisal,	10	October	1922,	Cmd	1757,	1922.	
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emerging international legal order itself, which was receptive to this old instrument of colonial 
administration. I am therefore proposing that the Iraqi arrangement should not be merely 
understood as a pragmatic reaction to a mere coincidence of events. It was no coincidence that the 
1922 Anglo-Iraq Treaty was sanctioned by the Council as an international instrument that 
embodied the principles of the Covenant, in turn becoming a part of international law rather than 
differentiated from it as a form of imperial law as in the case of the nineteenth century. Hence, 
whether Iraq was granted independence in 1932 or several years later, did not make any 
difference, for the international legal order in place at the time only allowed for a specific 
(narrow) sovereignty to emerge, and this is what tends to be misapprehended by many scholars of 
Iraq and the Mandate system. I will return to this point when discussing the manner in which Iraq 
became independent or ‘emancipated’ from the mandate, and the unique semi-peripheral 
sovereignty that arose thereafter.     
 
I want to end this section by focusing on one particular episode whose significance I 
believe tends to be overlooked by historians, but it elucidates the nature of the treaty and 
international law. This episode occurred when the treaty was stalled in the Constituent Assembly 
(the body that was tasked to pass the Iraqi constitution -or Organic law- and ratify at treaty in the 
same time). While the treaty was signed in October 1922, it was only ratified in June 1924. The 
circumstances of ratification were tense as opposition to the treaty was building not only on the 
streets, but also amongst nationalist political parties. When the King, who was trying to appeal to 
public opinion refused British advice to arrest the leaders of the anti-treaty movement, the High 
Commissioner, Percy Cox, took matters in his own hands when the King fortuitously fell ill with 
appendicitis to swiftly declare martial law, arrest nationalists and dissenters, closing down anti-
treaty newspapers and banning political parties and trade unions.388  
 
The Assembly ended up ratifying the Treaty (by a narrow majority of 13 votes) after it 
was forced to form quorum, as it was given the ultimatum to either accept the treaty or allow for 
the possibility of reverting to the Mandate, ‘in its original form’.389 The final wording of the 
resolution that was passed unmistakably implied the reluctance that was predominant: ‘This 
Assembly considers that many of the articles of the Treaty and Agreements are so severe that Iraq 
would be unable to discharge the responsibilities of the alliance desired by the people of Iraq.  
																																																																				388	For	 a	 detailed	 account	 of	 this	 episode	 See,	 Alī	 al-Wardī.	 Lamahāt	 min	 Tarīkh	 al-‘Iraq,	 volume	6:171-208.	389	Main,	supra,	ft.	216,	at	85.	
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But it relies upon and trusts the honour of the British government…and is confident that it will 
not agree to burden Iraq nor to prejudice the aspirations of the people. It is only this confidence 
and trust on the part of Iraq which has induced the Assembly to accept the statements which have 
been received from His Excellency the High Commissioner on behalf of the British Government, 
to the effect that the British Government, after the ratification of the Treaty, will amend with all 
possible speed the Financial Agreement…’390  
 
It was therefore through martial law that the instrument of the treaty and the Mandate was 
eventually ratified, and the legal structures that would govern the Iraqi state were legitimized. 
This fact tends to be overlooked as a mere tactic by the British to enforce the treaty, but there was 
surely more to it than that. As Chapter 6 will show, this episode reveals that semi-peripheral 
sovereignty could only be maintained through the violence of emergency law. In other words, 
these were in fact two sides of the same coin.	The imposition of the Anglo-Iraq Treaty through 
martial law illustrates that ‘civilizing’ violence remained at the heart of the new international 
legal order and the mandate system.391 In that sense, martial law would reappear throughout the 
period in question, in fact peaking after Iraqi independence in the 1940s and 1950s. This could be 
explained by the fact that martial law (and the laws of emergency) were already by now a regular 
feature of the institutions of the new Iraqi state, but also at the heart of the treaty relationship 
itself, and in turn, the mechanisms of the international institution of the Mandate and its order.  
 
																																																																				390	Report	 by	 His	 Britannic	 Majesty’s	 Government	 on	 the	 Administration	 of	 Iraq	 for	 the	 period	 April	
1923-December	1924	at	22.	391	What	is	most	interesting	was	the	fact	that	the	report	submitted	by	the	British	government	to	the	PMC	in	Geneva	did	not	mention	the	use	of	martial	law	to	force	the	Assembly	to	ratify	the	treaty.		The	report	mentioned	that	‘…the	most	disturbing	feature	was	the	agitation	got	up	by	the	extremist	party	in	 Baghdad,	 led	 by	 a	 group	 of	 lawyers,	 against	 the	 ratification	 of	 the	 Treaty.	 They	 stopped	 short	neither	at	the	grossest	misrepresentation,	nor	at	the	most	flagrant	intimidation	to	obtain	their	end…’	The	report	continuously	referred	to	an	atmosphere	gripped	by	fear	of	‘agitators’	and	‘coffee-loiterers’	who	 were	 ‘terrorizing	 deputies’	 and	 preventing	 them	 from	 ratifying	 the	 treaty.	 This	 apparently	justified	 the	 police	 to	 clear	 the	 streets	 and	 restore	 order.	 Moreover,	 the	 report	 suggests	 that	 this	‘anonymous	 intimidation…had	 produced	 an	 atmosphere	 of	 panic	 in	 which	 all	 argument	 suffered	distortion.’	 In	 that	sense,	 the	report	made	 it	appear	 that	any	argument	or	debate	on	this	 issue	was	distorted	by	intimidation	that	was	‘anonymous’.	See	Report	by	His	Britannic	Majesty’s	Government	on	
the	Administration	of	Iraq	for	the	period	April	1923-December	1924,	at	21,	22			
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V. The manufacturing of Iraqi independence & the obfuscation of the economic dimensions 
of semi-peripheral sovereignty 
 
 
I will end this chapter with a detailed analysis of how Iraq was construed as having 
reached independence through the processes of the Mandate system and under international law. 
This will allow for an analysis of the sovereignty that emerged, identifying its unique features in 
the context of the semi-periphery. To reiterate, my argument is that the semi-peripheral 
sovereignty that emerged when Iraq was proclaimed as an independent state was instrumental in 
creating the structures that perpetuated its subordination, including more broadly the control of 
the semi-peripheral Middle East and its integration into the markets of the world capitalist 
economy. It is for this reason that Iraq was considered a ‘model’ mandate for other states in the 
region, and this explains its significance as the proudest achievement of the Mandate system and 
the League.  
 
The ‘A’ Mandates were drawn up so as to bring about an interconnected economic block 
in the Middle East whereby the Great (mandatory) Powers would have continual economic 
influence, specifically through access to oil resources. The fundamental purpose of this 
arrangement and the ensuing doctrine of semi-peripheral sovereignty was to ensure that an 
‘independent’ Iraqi state was voluntarily – through the juridical forms of the ‘equality’ and 
‘reciprocity’ embedded in contracts and concessions – providing access to its oil deposits for the 
world economy. Granting Iraq a form of sovereignty, justified under international law, would 
make this possible as long as the oil concessions and agreements were resolved separately (as 
was the case) in the interests of both the Mandatory power as well as the other Great Powers.  
 
To substantiate this assertion, I will examine the PMC deliberations on both, the question 
of the admission of Iraq into the society of nations, as well as those relating to oil concessions and 
agreements in the region. The PMC reports reveal some interesting and contradictory views on 
the meaning of independence in the context of the Mandate system and international law. It will 
be evident that a closer look at the PMC discussions suggests that questions relating to the 
economic implications of independence were vital. By focusing on the economic dimensions of 
these discussions, it will be more apparent how the question of political sovereignty related to the 
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wider economic principle of ‘open door’, while the question of oil concessions was intentionally 
separated from the overall analysis. Although the economic dimensions of the Mandate system 
tended to remain in the background of the PMC discussions dealing with Iraq’s political 
sovereignty, my argument is that they were the most important and should be considered as its 
most significant characteristic. I will end this section by turning to the controversial discussions 
relating to the oil pipeline agreements that were meant to connect Iraq, Palestine and Syria with 
the purpose of getting Iraqi oil to the Mediterranean and ultimately to the world. This will 
illuminate the significance of Iraq’s sovereignty to the region as a whole.  It is therefore my 
intention to reveal the crucial connections between the oil concessions and pipeline agreements, 
to the question of the sovereignty of Iraq in the broad context of the semi-colonial Middle East.     
 
 On September 1929, Britain agreed to support Iraq’s entry to the League of Nations and 
in turn its formal independence by 1932.392  There was hence the need for a new treaty detailing 
the arrangements of the relations between the two states after formal independence. The ‘Anglo-
Iraqi Treaty of Alliance’ was ratified in 1930 only after the most trusted and unscrupulous of the 
King’s court, Nurī al-Saīd headed the cabinet and used his infamous firm tactics to stifle any 
parliamentary opposition. The treaty’s contents maintained a ‘close’ alliance between the two 
states, providing that the British were bound to assist Iraqi forces when necessary. Although Iraq 
would finally attain control of its own military, it was obligated to receive training and equipment 
from Britain, and in return the Royal Air Force (RAF) would maintain two military bases rent-
free by the government, while preserving its privileges and immunities.393  
 
Iraqi sovereignty, according to the treaty, was therefore clearly conditional and riddled 
with constraints – especially the British right to move troops over Iraqi soil, and the continued 
employment of some British judges.394 As for the matter of British ‘advisors’ and ‘experts’, the 
treaty stipulated that this arrangement would remain intact. The economic dimensions of the 1930 
treaty were intentionally vague and couched in military terms, so as not to excite any suspicion 
that the British were using their mandatory position for the purpose of capitalist exploitation. 395 
A separate financial annex attached to the Treaty ensured that the major national and strategic 
assets in the country, in particular, the Port of Basra and the railways ultimately remained under 																																																																				392	See	 Pederson,	 Susan.	 “Getting	 Out	 of	 Iraq	 –	 in	 1932:	 The	 League	 of	 Nations	 and	 the	 Road	 to	Normative	Statehood,”	American	Historical	Review,	(2010):	975-1000.	393	Treaty	of	Alliance	between	United	Kingdom	and	Iraq,	PP	1929-1930,	Cmd.	3627.	394	Ibid	395	Sassoon,	supra,	ft.	141,	at	15	
	 95	
British administrative control despite partial transfer of legal ownership.396 In that way, the 
Treaty was not merely the basis for ‘serving Britain’s political and military interests in Iraq,’ but 
also provided ‘the means for protecting and widening British economic interests there’.397 
 
 The PMC	398 was convening its sixteenth session in Geneva when it received word from 
the British representative of its intention to recommend Iraq for admission to the League of 
Nations.399 At the afternoon meeting, the chairman swiftly invited the PMC to determine the 
procedure that would need to be followed in the case of the emancipation of Iraq from the 
Mandate, as well as the independence of the ‘A’ mandate states in general. He stated that 
members would need to consider whether Iraq had reached the ‘degree of maturity’ that was 
acceptable for their independence.400 This would also include agreeing on the required guarantees 
to protect the interests of members of the League.401  The PMC eventually decided that it would 
‘welcome entry of Iraq to the League if and when certain conditions were fulfilled, in particular 
that it becomes apparent that Iraq was able to stand alone, and that effective guarantees be 
secured for the observance of all treaty obligations in Iraq for the benefit of racial and religious 
minorities and of the members of the League of Nations’.402 In the mean time, the PMC would 
take the opportunity to question the accredited representative regarding Iraq’s ability to govern 
itself. Upon receiving this observation from the commission, the Council adopted a resolution on 
January 13, 1930, which requested the PMC to submit any suggestions that might assist it in 
coming to a conclusion.403  
 
 By the eighteenth session in June 1930, the PMC appointed a subcommittee (including 
members Van Rees, Rappard, Palacious, and Count de Penha Garcia) to study the general 
conditions that would need to be fulfilled rather than merely deal with the case of Iraq.404 Count 
																																																																				396	Main,	supra,	ft.	216,	at	110.	397	Sassoon,	supra,	ft.	141,	at	16.	398	The	PMC	only	met	twice	a	year	to	review	the	reports	of	mandatory	powers	and	any	petitions.	 It	was	generally	kept	under	somewhat	of	a	‘tight	leash’	by	the	Council	as	it	did	not	have	wide	powers	of	conducting	 fact-finding	missions	 or	 to	 hear	 petitioners	 in	 person,	 but	 they	were	 still	 influential	 in	that	they	were	composed	of	‘experts’	who	assessed	and	scrutinized	the	annual	reports	of	Mandatory	powers.	Their	importance	to	this	analysis	is	the	fact	that	they	were	jurists,	who	were	concerned	with	international	law.	399	Pederson,	“Getting	Out	of	Iraq,”	supra,	ft.	392,	at	982.		400	P.M.C.	Minutes,	16th	session,	November	6-26,	1929,	at	17-20.	401	Ibid.	402	Ibid,	at	203.	403	League	of	Nations,	Official	Journal,	1930,	at	77.	404	P.M.C.,	Minutes,	18th	session,	at	43.	
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de Penha Garcia was appointed as rapporteur.405 He subsequently submitted his preliminary 
report, where he decided that questions pertaining to general principles of law should be dealt 
with first (i.e. the general conditions of admission) and not the particular case of Iraq.406 He went 
on to claim that ‘there is one primary and incontestable principle – that a mandate must terminate 
when certain conditions are fulfilled’.407 It was the ‘maintenance of peace’, he said, that was the 
primary factor in the development and termination of the Mandate.408 Moreover, he made it clear 
that this was connected to the preservation of the ‘continuing rights’ of the Mandatory powers: 
‘…all States members of the League…were guaranteed by the mandatory power the peaceful 
enjoyment of a number of rights. Consequently, when a Mandate comes to an end this position 
must be adapted to the new state of affairs’.409  
 
Finally, termination of the Mandate would depend on the welfare of the native 
population, as well as, the consent of the Mandatory power, which retained a ‘moral 
responsibility’ for the consequences of the termination.410 The Count then moved to list the 
factors that needed to be considered to determine the extent of ‘maturity of the country 
judged…from a technical [and] juridical standpoint’.411 These were as follows: conditions of 
internal and external security, the social and moral conditions of the population, the spirit of 
existing legislation, economic and financial conditions, obligations arising out of agreements with 
the mandatory, obligations assumed towards members of the League, guarantees for freedom of 
conscience and religion, guarantees for the protections of minorities, guarantees for an adequate 
judicial system, guarantees for safeguarding the moral and material interests developed under the 
mandate regime, and lastly the adoption of the principle of economic equality to the new situation 
created by the termination of the mandate.412 
 
The preliminary report above demonstrates how the PMC were in fact making 
international law by formulating the conditions of sovereignty through the Mandate process that 
would later be applied to the case of Iraq. It was considered a purely legal question, which was 
distinct from the political and economic questions. It was in other words, a positivist analysis that 																																																																				405	P.M.C.,	Minutes,	19th	session,	153-156.	406	Ibid.	407	Ibid,	at	155.	408	Ibid.	409	Ibid.	410	Ibid.	411	Ibid,	at	156.	412	Ibid.	
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emphasized neutrality and legality. The fact was, of course, that such a separation in international 
law was in reality an impossibility, for these principles and standards were being formulated and 
‘set’ in the words of the Count himself by [and one should add in the interests of], ‘the rich and 
powerful States’. 413   It is consequently by focusing on the economic dimensions of the 
discussions that the true nature of this novel semi-peripheral sovereignty becomes clear. It is no 
surprise that the principle of open door or economic equality was considered by the Count to be 
the very basis of the mandate system.414 It was also clear that the mandatory power, including the 
members of the League, expected the continuation of certain economic rights, and it was on this 
specific question of ‘economic equality’ that disagreements arose as it was obviously 
contradictory and so challenging to resolve an obligatory open door with independence.   
 
 By the twentieth session, which was held in June 1931, there were three separate 
memoranda on the points in question written by Van Rees, Lord Lugard, and Count Garcia. These 
memoranda raised some interesting issues regarding the different interpretations of independence 
under the Mandate system. Van Rees attempted to make the argument that the readiness of a 
people for independence, ‘is a question of fact and not of principle, and the answer could be 
found only in local conditions as a whole, connected with political and administrative 
organizations and their working with the economic and social development of the territory.’415 
Moreover, when the mandate of the territory in question lapses, an entirely new state comes into 
being. For this reason, Van Rees emphasized that, ‘you cannot say that the mandate is abrogated 
and at the same time use the mandate as the legal basis for the establishment of conditions which 
must be fulfilled by the emancipated territory’.416 Although special conditions should be imposed 
on the new state, these conditions must have their basis on ‘considerations foreign to the 
mandate’. If these conditions, ‘which the civilized world have the right to make on the new state’, 
are not accepted, then the territory in question would not be worthy to take its place among the 
society of nations.417 Van Rees then turned to the principle of economic equality and admitted 
that to re-establish this obligation would ‘gravely impair the sovereignty of the territories 
declared independent.’418 So, there must be a way to square this circle as it were and as will be 
clear this was done by emphasizing the notion of ‘reciprocity’419 after independence – i.e. that the 																																																																				413	Ibid,	at	206.	414	Ibid.	415	P.M.C.	Minutes,	20th	session,	pp.195-201.	416	Ibid,	at	198.	417	Ibid.	418	Ibid,	at	200.	419	Ibid,	at	185.	Thanks	to	the	legal	form	of	the	treaty	that	was	possible.		
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newly ‘independent’ state would be able to negotiate freely on the basis of reciprocity with the 
former Mandatory powers on issues relating to the economic sphere and this would suffice. The 
reality was that this resolution did not take into account that the international legal order served 
the interests of the powerful imperial states and real ‘reciprocity’ was not possible in such a 
situation.  
 
 The British member, Lord Lugard’s memorandum dealt with the meaning of the term 
‘standing alone’.420 He argued for a liberal interpretation of the words ‘to stand alone,’ and 
expected a slow transition, whereby a state may need to stand alone, ‘with the aid of a prop, or 
buttress to lean on’.421 Lugard ended with a summary of what was essential for the internal and 
external conditions of withdrawal of the mandate. Regarding the former question of internal 
conditions, the Council must be satisfied that the new state could maintain internal order and 
efficient government; the welfare and just treatment of racial, linguistic and religious minorities 
must be assured; the new State must be able and willing to fulfill the obligations it undertakes; 
that it has functioned for a certain time with success, and that there is an adequate prospect of 
economic and financial stability.422 As for the question of external conditions, Lugard listed the 
following: that the state must accept ‘the general principles of international law’; where the 
redisposition of the capitulations are stipulated in the mandate, it would also have to accept the 
obligations therein; religious freedom and justice must be assured to foreigners, and finally 
treaties made by the mandatory on behalf of the territory must remain in force unless denounced 
by the new state.423  
 
Lugard believed that these conditions were necessary and justified, because 
‘emancipation from a mandate is something more than independence, as is shown by the fact that 
Iraq, though subject to the mandate regime, is already independent.’424 As for the principle of 
economic equality, Lugard did not find it as an essential part of the mandate system.425  This was 
not surprising considering that Britain already had their economic interests secure in Iraq – there 
was no need to insist on this point as the other members. 	The notion that ‘emancipation’ from the 
mandate process was ‘more than independence’ reveals a lot on the characteristics of the 
emergent semi-peripheral sovereignty, for concrete sovereignty on its own was unacceptable. 																																																																				420	Ibid,	at	201.	421	Ibid,	at	201-203.	422	Ibid.	423	Ibid,	at	202.	424	Ibid.	425	Ibid.		
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What was required was sovereignty that was incorporated into the international legal order on the 
terms of the imperial powers.  
 
Finally, turning to Count Garcia’s memorandum, it was reiterated that withdrawal from 
the mandate should not affect the maintenance of peace. With regards to the question of the 
conditions, he argued that to require an emancipated territory to give equality of economic 
opportunity to members of the League would be unreasonable, but that this privilege may be 
granted voluntarily upon condition of reciprocity by the new state.426 
 
The members subsequently discussed these three memoranda in the twentieth session. 
Orts believed that with the combination of these three reports, one would be able to draft a reply 
to the Council. The PMC ultimately agreed that that the list of obligations to be imposed by the 
mandated territory at the time of its emancipation from a mandate, as well as, the criteria by 
which independence would be granted should both be dealt with by the Council. Orts reminded 
the members that the commission’s job was a legal one – that of laying down the legal principles 
for emancipation from the mandate, and it was not its place to take political action, which was for 
the Council to do.427  
 
A topic that was discussed at length was the question of economic equality and its 
perpetuation as a guarantee. One argument that was made by Orts was the impossibility of 
imposing this principle on a truly independent state, as it would amount to an impairment of 
sovereignty.428 The chairman’s response was that this principal should be safeguarded as its 
existence amounted to, ‘an acquisition on the part of the League…in that its application could not 
but contribute…to the maintenance of world peace’.429 Merlin added that the principle was 
necessary precisely to protect the mandated territory from a situation where the ex-mandatory 
power would take advantage of its position and dominate the new state economically or to set a 
‘price for its emancipation’.430  The principle of the open door was therefore, according to this 
argument, a protection from the potential of future exploitation from the ex-mandatory power. It 
was eventually agreed by members that economic equality was to be extended through the ‘most-
favored-nation-treatment’ to members of the League, which should be granted on condition of 																																																																				426	P.M.C.	Minutes,	20th	Session,	at	205-210.	427	Ibid,	at	153.	428	Ibid,	at	156.		429	Ibid.	430	Ibid.	
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reciprocity for a transitional period.431  In other words, it was not to be an obligation, but rather 
voluntarily given by the new state. This assumed that the principle of ‘reciprocity’ in international 
law was by itself enough to protect the new state from the economic domination of the powerful 
ex-mandatory, which was far from reality in Iraq, where Britain dominated nearly every aspect of 
its economy. 
 
The PMC concluded its findings to the Council by listing the conditions needed to be 
fulfilled before a mandated territory could be released from a mandated regime.432 The Council 
approved the PMC’s report on September 4, 1931. It was only then that the question regarding 
Iraq’s case was refereed to the PMC in its twenty-first session to advise whether it has been 
fulfilled based on the general principles previously laid down.  
 
The PMC ultimately but reluctantly came to the conclusion that Iraq satisfied the general 
conditions above. In assessing the de facto conditions they examined The Special Report…on the 
Progress of Iraq, 1920-1931, which was submitted by the British and painted an auspicious 
picture of the progress of the Iraqi state and its institutions. The report claimed that Iraq had, ‘all 
the working machinery of a civilized government.’433 Britain asserted that it has appropriately 
fulfilled its Mandatory obligations. The High Commissioner at the time, Henry Dobbs argued that 
Article 22 of the Covenant, which required that a Mandate could only be terminated when a state 
was able to ‘stand alone without the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by the 
Mandatory,’ should be interpreted narrowly; Iraq was able to ‘stand alone’ administratively – not 
militarily or economically, but that was sufficient.434  
 
By June 1931, the PMC, skeptical throughout its deliberations, while noting that certain 
provisions of the treaty were ‘somewhat unusual’, nonetheless unanimously agreed to admit Iraq 
after a declaration confirming Britain’s continuing ‘moral responsibility’ to the implications of 
																																																																				431	Ibid,	at	185.	432 	Ibid,	 at	 157-160.	 This	 list	 included:	 a	 settled	 government	 and	 administration	 capable	 of	maintaining	 a	 regular	 operation	of	 essential	 government	 services;	 the	 capability	 of	maintaining	 its	territorial	integrity;	maintenance	of	public	peace;	the	availability	of	adequate	financial	resources;	and	the	possession	of	laws	and	a	judicial	system	which	affords	justice	for	all.	433	Colonial	Office.	Special	Report,	11.	434	TNA.	CO	730/119/10DO	no.	SO	448,	Secret	Draft,	from	Sir	Henry	Dobbs,	Baghdad,	to	the	Secretary	of	State	for	the	Colonies,	London,	24	February	1927,	part	1,	1927	Iraq,	no.40299,	Admission	of	Iraq	to	the	League	of	Nations	and	Revision	of	the	Anglo-Iraqi	Treaty,	1927,	173.	
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Iraq’s independence was made.435 On October 1932, Iraq became the first (and ultimately only) 
mandated state to gain formal independence through the processes of the Mandatory system.   
 
The PMC’s deliberations above reveal an attempt to construct within international law a 
specific form of sovereignty that would ensure the imperial powers’ geopolitical and economic 
dominance of Iraq and accordingly the semi-peripheral Middle East as a whole. One could notice 
that although questions pertaining to economics were considered as paramount concerns that 
should be taken into account, they were purposely set aside as either secondary or technical in 
nature. Yet, it is my argument that if one were to focus on the underlying economic aspects of 
these deliberations that the purpose of the mandate system, in particular, the ‘A’ mandates of the 
Middle East would be clear. As one commentator observed, although the ‘A’ Mandates were 
clearly made to be transitory, they were likely to leave behind ‘a permanent economic monument 
in the shape of a new overland route across the desert from Europe to India to Persia’.436 The 
Mandate system as it relates to the semi-periphery was hence approached in a specifically 
geopolitical and spatial manner that was (ironically) quite similar to the economic framework that 
defined the Sykes-Picot agreement.   
 
An examination of the oil concessions and pipeline agreements thus illuminates the 
specificity of the form of sovereignty that emerged in Iraq. The ‘A’ mandate system linked the 
three mandated areas economically by an oil pipeline from the Mosul oilfields to the ports of 
Haifa in Palestine and Tripoli of Syria. Moreover, the British government surveyed the route for a 
railway from Haifa to Baghdad, ‘that would pass by what is today British mandated territory, and 
thus bring the peoples of Iraq and Palestine into one trade orbit’.437 Bentwich considered these 
vital economic links to be such a defining characteristic of the ‘A’ Mandates that he believed that 
they would eventually bring about the political integration of the Arab states.438 Before moving 
forward with this analysis, the economic principles of the Mandate system must be identified and 
described.    
 
																																																																				435	PMC,	Minutes,	20th	session,	at	134.		See	Emerson,	Rupert.	“Iraq:	The	End	of	the	Mandate”.		436	Arnold	Toynbee,	Survey	of	International	Affairs,	 (London:	Royal	 Institute	of	 International	Affairs,	1930),	at	174.	437	Norman	Bentwich.	 “The	Termination	of	 the	A	Mandates’,	 (Max-Planck	 Institut	 für	ausländisches	öffentliches	 Recht	 und	 Völkerrecht,	 1933),	http://www.zaoerv.de/03_1933/3_1933_1_a_176_191.pdf,	at	191.	438	Ibid.	
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VI. The principle of economic equality, the ‘open door’ or the freedom of capitalist 
accumulation under international law 
 
The principle of economic equality, which is also known more generally as the principle 
of the ‘open door’, was one of the most important economic principles of the Mandate system. It 
ensured that the mandatory territory was (legally) open to world markets, essentially allowing its 
natural resources to be exploited by the members of the League. It was this principle, along with 
rapprochement439, and rationalization440 that made up the economic principles underlying the 
League.441 The idea behind this principle was that, ‘the Mandatory must be discouraged from 
deriving exclusive economic and other advantages from the performance of its task’.442 This 
(theoretically) removed the ‘international friction’ that would naturally arise from the 
‘monopolization of commerce and resources’ by any one power.443 The reputable Polish-British 
international lawyer and jurist, Hersch Lauterpacht considered that based on the travaux 
preparatoire preceding the drafting of the Covenant of the League of Nations, the principle of 
economic equality was ‘admittedly modeled after the pattern of the Berlin Treaty of 1885 relating 
to the Congo and the treaty of St Germain of 1919 which revised it’.444 However, the difference 
between this principle and its earlier uses at the end of the nineteenth century was that it 
prohibited any ‘position of unilateral advantage’ for Western powers, because ‘permanent 
inequality of the Mandated Territory in the field of international trade must…be rejected 
as…contrary to the intention of the framers of the Mandate.’ ‘The regime of the Mandate,’ 
Lauterpacht continues, ‘was not conceived as a system of economic exploitation of the Mandated 
Territories by all the Members of the League as distinguished from exploitation by the Mandatory 
only.’445  
 
																																																																				439	The	 principle	 that	 political	 and	 economic	 cooperation	 was	 necessary	 for	 the	 maintenance	 of	peace.	440	The	theory	 that	 it	was	necessary	 to	control	economic	conditions	of	production,	distribution	and	consumption.	441Michael	 Fakhri.	 Sugar	 and	 the	 Making	 of	 International	 Law	 (Cambridge:	 Cambridge	 university	Press,	2014),	at	74.	442	Hersch	Lauterpacht,	International	Law:	Being	the	Collected	Papers	of	Hersch	Lauterpacht,	Volume	
3,	The	Law	of	Peace,	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	1977),	at	89-90.	443	Ibid.	444	Ibid.	445	Lauterpacht,	supra,	at	90.	Bentwich,	 the	British	attorney-general	of	Palestine	describes	the	open	door	 principle	 as	 ‘…the	 complete	 antithesis	 to	 the	 Colonial	 system	 of	 the	 eighteenth	 century,	 by	which	the	governing	territory	alone	was	allowed	to	make	profit	out	of	the	Colony,	and	that	country	framed	a	policy	designed	to	enrich	itself	as	much	as	possible.	The	maxim	of	the	new	order	is:	 ‘Seek	equality	and	avoid	greed’.	Bentwich,	supra,	at	108.	
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The principle of economic equality (and the open door) was therefore interpreted under 
international law as not amounting to exploitation in any way, but the reality as the case of Iraq 
exemplifies, was that economic exploitation continued unabated. The only difference was that it 
was now justified under the new post-war international legal order, and operated under the mantle 
of development and the cloak of a new and justified form of sovereignty.       
 
The ‘open door’ emphasized that the preservation of free trade and investment was 
necessary for the (semi-peripheral) sovereignty that would emerge after a mandate had run its 
course. Even the ‘maintenance of peace’, which as we saw was referred to throughout the PMC 
deliberations, actually meant the maintenance of peace for the very purpose of free trade with the 
members states of the League.446 Hence, in theory, the open door’s purpose was to avoid the 
possibility of war by permitting the Great Powers a share in the access to resources of the newly 
acquired territories rather than the maintenance of the old approach of ‘economic fortification’ 
around one’s territories – a policy known as the ‘sphere of influence’. In addition, the open door 
was generally justified on the basis that the free market through competition would ultimately be 
beneficial for the development of native society (driving up wages) and its economy. The open 
door policy was therefore maintained to be favorable for all parties involved. 
 
 New research on the economic functions of the League generally lacks analysis of the 
link between the political and juridical aspects of the Mandate system and exactly how it was 
connected to its underlying economic features (particularly in the semi-periphery), and how it 
furthered capitalism.447 The fact was that a specific form of political order and a corresponding 
legal ideology/doctrine was essential for the principle of the open door to work in the semi-
periphery. It is for this reason that the US government was satisfied with Britain’s ultimate 
control over Iraq, for as long as the semi-peripheral sovereignty that emerged would ensure, ‘the 
kind of political order receptive to capitalism and foreign investment,’ preserving ‘the proper 
climate for business activity,’ the US government would not oppose British designs over Iraq or 
the region.448  
 
																																																																				446	Fakhri,	supra,	ft.	441,	at	74.	447	See	 Patricia	Clavin,	Securing	the	World	Economy:	The	Reinvention	of	the	League	of	Nations,	1920-
1946	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2015).	448	Stivers,	supra,	ft.	462,	at	74.	The	PMC	held	that	property	and	contract	rights	were	to	be	maintained	beyond	the	mandate.	The	Council	followed	suit	by	ruling	that	successor	states	must	honor	economic	agreements	made	by	their	previous	imperial	overlords.	Pederson,	supra,	ft.	341,	at	235.			
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Semi-peripheral sovereignty therefore could not be understood without an examination of 
the economic principles that were meant to be reconciled with it, and effectively maintained in 
the region. Benjamin Gerig, an American member of the League Secretariat and a proponent of 
free trade, wrote one of the most important studies on the principle of ‘open door’ in 1930 in 
which he highlighted the significance of this link when he concluded his book by stating that ‘the 
Mandate system is undoubtedly the most effective instrument yet devised to make the Open Door 
effective’.449 It is exactly this link between the economic principle of the open door to the semi-
peripheral sovereignty that emerged in the case of Iraq that should be studied, as the 
subordination of the mandated territory of the semi-periphery to the world economy was meant to 
remain intact and sustained in another form after the termination of the mandate. 
 
VII. The independence of oil pipelines: semi-peripheral sovereignty in relation to oil 
concessions in the Middle East 
 
 
 
To understand this link further, I will explore the discussions regarding the IPC oil 
concessions in Iraq and the (1931) pipeline agreements with Palestine and Syria, to explore how 
they overlapped with Iraqi semi-peripheral sovereignty. This analysis will illuminate the unique 
characteristics of semi-peripheral sovereignty. It will also reveal its effects on the emergent 
spatial configuration and in turn on the workers in Iraq, which will be dealt with in Chapters 4 
and 5. 
 
Oil was always at the backdrop of Iraq’s modern history, although it has sometimes been 
deliberately overlooked. One notices this in the PMC deliberations– oil concessions in the case of 
Iraq were merely discussed in the context of economic equality and even then, only dealt with in 
detail in relation to the mandated territories that were affected by the construction of a new 
pipeline that was intended to allow access of Iraqi oil to the Mediterranean.450  It will be clear 
how although the ‘semi-peripheral sovereignty’ discussed above was intended to make the open 
door policy function on the ground, the question of oil was ultimately distinguished from it by 
certain legal reasoning. Instead, the open door policy that was meant to (in theory) protect the 
interests of the Iraqi government by allowing competitive tenders from various prospects on the 																																																																				449	Benjamin	Gerig.	The	Open	Door	and	the	Mandate	System:	A	Study	of	Economic	Equality	before	and	
since	the	establishment	of	the	Mandates	System,	(London:	George	Allen	&	Unwin,	1930),	at	199.	450	PMC	Minutes,	20th	session,	at	144-9,168-77.	
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market, and prevent monopolization, was in reality evaded through the use of an innovative 
instrument of the oil consortium. This instrument allowed the (legal) principle of open door to be 
satisfied (at least as far as the PMC were concerned) partially and only in theory, while 
effectively circumventing it in practice. Hence, in the end, the open door policy was differentiated 
by the PMC in every legal question that arose on the ‘A’ Mandates, whether in Iraq or the region. 
My intention in this part of my argument is to emphasize that only by bringing this oil narrative 
closer to the question of ‘semi-peripheral sovereignty’ could one would grasp its unique features. 
 
 The ‘A’ Mandates were not confirmed nor allocated (as the ‘B’ and ‘C’ mandates) until 
Anglo-French negotiations over Mesopotamian oil (mostly concentrated in the province of Mosul 
and described by a German technician as ‘a veritable lake of petroleum of almost inexhaustible 
supply’451) were resolved and formalized in the San Remo Conference in Italy in April 1920. The 
complementary oil agreement secured a 25 percent share of the oil output for the French 
government, but made it clear that ‘the petroleum company shall be under permanent British 
control’.452 The British justified taking control of the oil fields in Mosul by reference to the 
London-based Turkish Petroleum Company’s (TPC) unratified pre-war concession agreement 
with the Ottoman government of 1914, which secured the British Anglo-Persian Company (later 
to be renamed BP) 50 percent of the share of the concession, while promising the ‘native 
government’ up to a 20 percent share.453 Despite denials that the British were attempting to 
devise a monopoly, US protests over their exclusion from the agreement, alleging a violation of 
the open door principle were eventually conceded, leading to a revised agreement in 1923. The 
US-owned Standard Oil Company was consequently promised a 25 percent share of its monopoly 
concession in the exploitation of oil in Iraq.454  
 
																																																																				451 	See	 Edward	 Mead	 Earle,	 Turkey,	 the	 Great	 Powers,	 and	 the	 Baghdad	 Railway:	 a	 Study	 in	
Imperialism,	 (New	York,	Macmillan,	1923),	at	15;	as	quoted	 in	Timothy	Mitchel.	Carbon	Democracy:	
Political	Power	in	the	Age	of	Oil,	(London:	Verso,	2011),	at	48.	452	See	 the	 full	 text	of	 the	 agreement	 in	 J.C.	Hurewitz,	Diplomacy	in	the	Near	and	Middle	East,	 (New	York:	Van	Nostrad,	1958)	at	75-77.	Anglo-Persian	Oil	was	to	hold	half	of	the	share	in	the	ownership	of	the	company,	while	Shell	controlled	the	other	half.	See,	Mitchell,	supra,	ft.	451,	at	95.		453	See	 Marian	 Kent,	 Oil	 and	 Empire:	 British	 Policy	 and	 Mesopotamian	 Oil,	 1900-1920,	 (London:	Macmillan,	 1976);	 and	 Mejcher,	 Helmut.	 Imperial	 Quest	 for	 Oil,	 Iraq	 1910-1928,	 (London:	 Ithaca,	1976).	454 	Gerig,	 supra,	 ft.	 449,	 at	 137-144.	 The	 TPC	 was	 eventually	 jointly	 owned	 in	 the	 following	composition:	 the	 Anglo-Persian	 Oil	 Company	 (23.75	 percent),	 Royal	 Dutch	 Shell	 (23.75	 percent),	Compagnie	Francaise	des	Petroles	(23.75	percent),	and	a	US-based	consortium	made	up	of	Standard	Oil	of	New	Jersey	and	Mobil	(23.75	percent	each)	and	Gulbenkian	(5	percent).	Hence,	British	shares	were	predominant	in	this	arrangement.		
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Following this understanding, the Turkish Petroleum Company (later renamed the Iraq 
Petroleum Company [IPC] in 1929) began direct negotiations with the Iraqi government. 
Although the Iraqi government with the help of the British negotiated certain terms that would 
prevent the TPC from intentionally delaying production for the purpose of inflating oil prices on 
the market (such as a timeline for the construction of a pipeline and a minimum level of 
production), the most important demand which would have ensured the implementation of these 
terms – an actual share of ownership, did not materialize. The oil companies refused to budge on 
this issue, and the Iraqi government finally capitulated, signing the concession in March 1925. 
The oil companies were therefore successful in establishing an exclusive TPC [IPC] concession, 
which included exclusive rights of exploration in all of Iraq (with the exception of the province of 
Basra), while fully removing Iraqi part-ownership.  
 
These negotiations occurred while the question of Mosul was still looming.455 The 
territorial dispute over Mosul, the province in which the bulk of these oil fields were located, was 
yet to be determined. The League of Nations Commission of Inquiry that was appointed and sent 
to investigate the validity of Turkish claims over the province eventually recommended that 
Mosul remain attached to the state of Iraq.456 Although the commission chose not to mention the 
recent extensive and exclusive concession in their report, there was a clear correlation between 
the two affairs,457 especially if one were to consider that the British inferred to the Iraqi 
government that resolving the oil negotiations swiftly would safeguard Mosul, and would in turn 
open the door for British support for Iraqi independence at the League of Nations.458 Moreover, 
the commission made an argument that Mosul must remain a part of Iraq from ‘the purely 
economic’ point of view, as it cannot be separated from ‘its natural hinterland’. 459  The 
Commissioner’s interpretation of ‘purely economic point of view’ was in fact the view of the 
multinational corporations and foreign investors, especially the oil companies, who ensured 																																																																				455	See	 Sara	 Shields,	 ‘Mosul	 Questions:	 Economy,	 Identity	 and	 Annexation,’	 in	 Reeva	 Simon	 and	Eleanor	 Tejirian,	 eds,	 The	 Creation	 of	 Iraq,	 1914-1921,	 (NY:	 Columbia	 University	 of	 Press,	 2004);	Quincy	Wright,	‘The	Mosul	Dispute,’	American	Journal	of	International	Law	20:3,	July	1926:	453-64.	456 	See	 League	 of	 Nations,	 Question	 of	 the	 Frontier	 between	 Turkey	 and	 Iraq,	 1925	 (Wirsen	Commission	Report).		457	Even	as	early	as	the	Lausanne	conference	the	question	of	Mosul	could	not	be	disconnected	from	oil.	 Sluglett	 claims	 that,	 ‘oil	 and	 the	 frontier	award	were	so	 inextricably	mixed	 that	 it	 is	difficult	 to	discuss	one	except	in	terms	of	the	other…’	supra,	ft.	87,	at	71.	458	Mitchel,	supra,	ft.	451,	at	97.	459	Question	 of	 the	 Frontier	 between	 Turkey	 and	 Iraq.	 Report	 submitted	 to	 the	 Council	 by	 the	
Commission	instituted	by	 the	Council	Resolution	 of	September	30'',	1924.	Geneva:	League	of	Nations,	1925	 (Document	 C.400.	 M.147,	 vii),	 as	 referred	 to	 in,	 Mai	 Taha.	 Nation	 and	 Class	 Subjectivity	 in	
International	Law	and	 its	 Institutions	 in	 the	Middle	East,	1919-1939	 (SJD	Dissertation,	 University	 of	Toronto,	2015),	at	127.	
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access to the most valuable natural resource of the province.460 The British subsequently (as per 
the Mosul determination) amended the Anglo-Iraq Treaty to extend the mandate to a further 
twenty-five years, while including a provision that immediately terminated the mandate once Iraq 
advances to the stage of political development that qualified it for membership at the League. The 
oil concession could therefore not be understood in isolation from the semi-peripheral sovereignty 
that emerged in Iraq and vice versa. 
 
The arrangement between the oil companies and the Great Powers that was made to 
ensure that economic equality (at least in theory) was to be satisfied was in reality more of a 
compromise. It has for this reason been described as a ‘slowly opening door’ rather than an actual 
‘open door’461 It has similarly been argued that the open door principle was effectively ‘diluted’ 
in this particular case, because of the fact that in reality, American companies were not permitted 
to bid freely for concessionary right; instead one exclusive American group, and this group alone 
was absorbed by a monopoly.462 This explains why some members of the PMC made the 
observation that the Iraq government appeared to have agreed to a policy of monopolization after 
all.463 In that sense, what emerged was a special arrangement, which Gerig called a ‘practical 
open door’ in the form of a consortium: ‘a new experiment in international co-operation’.464 This 
new mechanism should be analyzed in relation to ‘semi-peripheral sovereignty,’ as it was a part 
of the overall legal arrangement that was intended to be a model for the manner in which the 
natural resources of the ‘A’ Mandates (in particular Iraqi oil) were to be exploited within the 
ambits of the new international legal order.  The usefulness of this mechanism in legal reasoning 
would remerge in PMC deliberations in Geneva. 
 
The complex arrangement described above remained controvertial, and Geneva was 
turned into an international ‘arena for publically contesting’ the strategic interests of the great 
powers, especially oil claims.465  These disputes generally occurred within the confines of the 
open door principle, and the PMC was called upon to consider petitions that alleged that this 
sacred principle was violated.466 It was clear that the principle of the open door needed to be 																																																																				460Ibid.	461	Gerig,	supra,	ft.	449,	at	149.	462	William	 Stivers,	 “International	 Politics	 and	 Iraqi	 Oil,	 1918-1928:	 A	 Study	 in	 Anglo-American	Diplomacy”,	Business	History	Review,	Winter,	1981,	55:,	pp.517-532;	’	at	533.	463	16	PMCM,	at	41-44.	464	Gerig,	supra,	ft.	449,	at	184.	465	Pederson,	The	Guardians,	supra,	ft.	341,	at	272.	466	Ibid.	
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addressed and eventually reconciled with this new reality through legal reasoning by the PMC. In 
1927, Kastl who was the committee member assigned by the PMC to write a report on whether 
the 1925 IPC concession was compatible with the principle of open door (already enshrined in 
Article 11 of the 1922 Anglo-Iraq Treaty), concluded that there was no violation. However, he 
made sure to voice his apprehension to the fact that Iraq’s interests would have been better served 
if there was open competition, stating that ‘there is no doubt that the extension of the Concession 
implies a very great advantage for the Company.’467  
 
The interesting legal reasoning for our purposes was first put forward by Van Rees, who 
pointed out that the Iraq Treaty was silent on the point of ‘industrial concessions’ and it could 
therefore be inferred that the Iraq government was ‘free to act on its own discretion’ with regards 
to the extension of the concession by thirty-five years.468 The point was that there was no 
violation of the open door, because oil concessions were an exception. Orts’ responded with a 
hint of irony that the Iraqi ‘…people would learn with surprise that the clause [in the Treaty] 
referring to economic equality did not apply to Iraq’s principle industry’.469 It was this sort of 
legal reasoning that distinguished oil concessions, which would reappear in later PMC 
deliberations, in particular those regarding the pipeline agreements with the mandatory 
administrations of the other ‘A’ Mandates – Palestine and Syria. 
 
 After the IPC began drilling, the company discovered a vast oilfield stretching to the 
North of Kirkuk, and decided to use this as an excuse to delay production for further 
reconnaissance. It was a longstanding strategy of oil companies to delay and sabotage production 
for the purpose of increasing global oil prices, and this was tactfully used against the Iraqi 
government, who were demanding the immediate construction of a pipeline to begin production 
as per the agreement. The Iraqi government, however, was crippled with a high deficit, and so 
had no alternative after prolonged and intense negotiations but to agree to sign a revised 
concession in 1925 in exchange for a modest cash advance in 1931. The agreement was later 
described by the US State Department’s oil expert as ‘one of the worst oil deals that has ever been 
signed’.	470 The revised concession eliminated all taxation of the company’s profits, removed the 
minimum production obligation, and the company’s relinquishment of undeveloped plots. It also 
																																																																				467	PMC,	14,	at	214;	See	at	247-249	for	the	full	report.	468	Ibid,	at	38.	469	Ibid.	470	Mitchel,	supra,	ft.	451,	at	47,	102.	
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extensively expanded the area of the concession from 192 square miles to 32,000 square miles.471 
The subjugating structures within this concession would extend to the entire region through the 
conventions signed by the other ‘A’ Mandate states (Palestine, Syria and Lebanon).   
 
The construction of a pair of (bifurcated) oil pipelines were planned to transport Iraqi oil 
to the Mediterranean – one branching south to Haifa (Palestine) and the other north to Tripoli 
(Syria). These were not only the biggest pipelines in the world at the time, but they were to 
increase global oil production fourfold (from 20,000 to 80,000 barrels a day) despite only 
representing a fraction of Iraq’s oil production capacity.472 To make this a reality, two identical 
pipeline agreements (or conventions) were signed between the IPC and the Palestine and Syrian 
mandatory administrations.  
 
The PMC never actually discussed the revised 1931 IPC concession in Iraq, nor was the 
issue of whether this concession violated any of the Mandatory provisions of the Anglo-Iraq 
Treaty ever raised. There was no need to raise any issue as long as the initial 1925 concession 
was established not to have violated the open door principle. Besides, Iraq was close to attaining 
‘independence’, and it was ironically this gained ‘sovereignty’ that was to ensure that these 
crucial issues were resolved in international law. It is for this reason that one would need to 
follow the PMC deliberations elsewhere to get some clues as to the nature of the semi-peripheral 
sovereignty that was attained by Iraq. It is within these discussions regarding the pipeline 
agreements between the IPC and the two other mandated territories in the region that one would 
find some insights on the role of semi-peripheral sovereignty on the entire region. 
 
During the twentieth session, the PMC had lengthy discussions on the pipeline 
agreements between the IPC and the mandate administrations of Palestine and Syria.  Although 
the PMC eventually decided not to denounce the British and the IPC, it was clear that several 
members were highly critical of these agreements.  The two ‘closely related’ but ‘quite distinct’ 
issues in these discussions were whether the question of economic equality was violated by the 
(pipeline) concessions, and whether the interests of the territories in question suffered by the 
concessions in violation of the mandates.473 The agreements appeared to provide the company 
with considerable benefits at the expense of the native populations of the mandatory territories: 
																																																																				471	Ibid.	472	Ibid.	473	See	PMC,	20,	168-176,	at	168.	
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the company paid no import tax on oil used for its own works or on construction material used for 
its operations, the oil in transit was not subject to export tax, the lands required for the pipe-line 
was rent-free, and the company was not liable to taxation by the mandatory administration.474  
 
The questions that arose could be understood in the context of certain provisions in the 
Palestine mandate. Article 18 of the mandate, which reproduced the principle of economic 
equality, prohibited any discrimination, in matters concerning taxation in favor of the nationals of 
any state members of the League (or its companies). Advantages that were precisely those 
granted to the IPC. Article 18 also made it clear that the Mandatory administration, ‘may impose 
such taxes and custom duties as it may consider necessary, and take such steps as it may think 
best to promote the development of the natural resources of the country and to safeguard the 
interests of the population.’475 The question for the PMC was whether the pipeline agreement (the 
Convention of 1931) violated Article 18 of the Palestine Mandate.  
 
The arguments that arose were interesting.  The members, who believed that the 
concession did not violate the provision in the mandate, generally emphasized how the pipeline 
concessions would greatly benefit from the development of the mandated territories in question. 
The British Lord Lugard was the member who argued vigorously to emphasize this point. He 
claimed that the privileges and exemptions were ‘small in comparison with the benefits,’ that 
arose from the concession, such as the influx of capital, employment of labour, and the increase 
of shipping in its ports.476 Merlin similarly claimed that the concession would in fact directly lead 
to, ‘changing completely the economic aspect of Iraq, Palestine and Syria…[especially through] 
the establishment of oil ports,’ where ‘many vessels would put in at those ports, and as a result, 
money would be spent there, and a commercial port would certainly develop….’ and these were 
very important factors from the stand point of the development of these territories.477 Besides, 
Lugard stated, the committee already questioned the representatives of the mandatory powers of 
Palestine and Syria earlier, who were clear that the agreements would greatly benefit the 
territories.478  
																																																																				474	Ibid,	at	169.	475	Ibid,	at	144-45.	476	Ibid,	at	169.	477	Ibid,	at	172.	478	Ibid.	 Lugard	 claimed	 that	 he	 found	 their	 statements	 ‘honest	 and	 truthful’.	 This	was	 usually	 the	manner	 in	which	 the	PMC	deliberations	were	conducted,	especially	when	members	questioned	 the	representatives	 of	 mandatory	 powers.	 The	 members	 would	 seldom	 question	 the	 representative’s	statements	even	 if	 they	were	exaggerated	or	 false.	 It	 is	 for	 that	reason	that	 the	PMC	never	actually	
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Van Rees made an alternative argument agreeing that the concession should be exempted 
from both the application of the provision of the mandate and economic equality. He argued that 
this concession had a ‘special character’, which covered a vast program of works that should be 
recognized as ‘being of public utility’.479 In other words, although it was a private company that 
bore the expense of these works, the nature of the works remained of public utility! Van Rees 
actually went so far as to make the claim that it ‘was not engaging in commerce, but was dealing 
with Governmental affairs’.480 The principle of economic equality therefore, did not apply in this 
case as it was a case of ‘essential public works’, and the concession did not therefore infringe on 
the mandate.481  
 
These arguments above were (slightly) rejected by the other members of the PMC, who 
were openly critical of the pipeline agreements (in particular Orts, Ruppel, Rappard and de Penha 
Garcia). Orts responded to Van Rees that admitting an exception such as the one proposed would 
eventually lead to ‘a class of privileged concessionaires exempt from ordinary law,’ opening up 
further disregard of the principles of the mandate.482 Moreover, it appeared that the territory was 
actually paying the whole cost of the scheme in the form of exemptions from taxation and custom 
duties, and that this was ‘the unpleasant feature of the scheme’.483 Ruppel rejected Van Rees’ 
reasoning, emphasizing that the concession was in reality ‘exclusively private in character’ and it 
was not intended for public use as the use of the pipeline was reserved for the company.484  
 
Rappard was the member who was the most critical, appearing to almost denounce the 
mandatory power and the company when she said: ‘Here was a British company exploiting for its 
own advantage the natural resources of Iraq. The company had found it advantageous to bring its 
pipeline through Palestine. But…the concession given it by the mandatory Power…granted it 
exemption from all the rules of common law… therefore it seemed that… [the mandatory Power] 
had subordinated the interests of the country under its mandate to the interests of a company of its 																																																																																																																																																																																																									denounced	a	mandatory	power.	A	good	example	occurs	 in	 the	case	above	when	Rappard,	who	was	overly	 critical	 of	 the	 pipeline	 agreement,	 had	 to	 later	 emphasize	 that,	 ‘if	 in	 the	 course	 of	 the	discussion,	he	had	himself	used	vigorous	language	in	putting	his	points,	he	had	never	meant	to	accuse	the	Mandatory	power,’	ibid,	at	170.	479	Ibid,	at	145.	480	Ibid,	at	146.	481	Ibid.	482	Ibid.	483	Ibid,	at	147.	484	Ibid.	
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own nationality.’485 Although Rappard stressed that the company actually had a ‘British legal 
personality,’ Lugard insisted that the company was a consortium composed of four nations, and 
that Britain had no advantage in this arrangement.486 Here, one notices how the novel legal 
mechanism of the consortium was used (especially in legal reasoning) for the very purpose of 
avoiding any allegation that economic equality was being violated.  
 
The PMC’s deliberations regarding these oil concessions (or conventions) concluded with 
the members unable to reach an agreement on the issues, and it was decided that it was not 
necessary to formulate observations to the Council, which would require a vote. The PMC’s deep 
division could not possibly allow for an unprecedented denunciation of a mandatory power, 
although one could easily interpret this calculated move as a partial denunciation by 
implication.487 The statement submitted to the Council affirmed that the provisions of the 
mandate ‘did not constitute an obstacle’ to the granting of the advantages conferred by the 
concessions for the construction of a pipeline in Palestine and Syria and the Lebanon, but the 
PMC made sure to mention the disagreements on the issue by stating that, ‘during its 
discussion…doubts were expressed by certain of its members as to whether some of the clauses 
of the agreements in question kept the necessary balance between the advantages and privileges 
granted to the concessionary company and the advantages that would accrue to the two 
territories’.488  
 
Therefore, the fact that the pipeline agreements were a ‘natural corollary’ to the Iraqi 
concession illustrate that the subjugating structures within this concession extended to the entire 
region. The legal reasoning made a distinction between the principle of economic equality and oil 
concessions in that the latter were allowed to violate the principle of open door – they were made 
to be exceptions to the ‘A’ mandates in question. This is why these discussions are revealing, as 
they illustrate quite clearly the actual function of Iraqi semi-peripheral sovereignty in its 
intersection with the oil concessions. As Lugard admitted, ‘[t]he oil came from Iraq. Surely that 
country was entitled to obtain access to the sea by the shortest route.’  He went on to refer to ‘the 
principle underlying the Navigation Act of Vienna of 1815 and the Berlin Act of 1885’.489 As 
Bonné, explains ‘the antecedents of the Pipe-line Concession are inseparable from the actual 																																																																				485	Ibid,	at	147,	emphasis	added.	486	Ibid,	at	148,	171.	487	As	Fritz	Grobba	of	the	German	Foreign	Ministry	mentioned	if	the	two	divided	sides	voted,	the	PMC	would	have	narrowly	condemned	the	British	Government.	See	Pederson,	supra,	ft.	341,	at	274		488	PMC,	20TH	session,	supra,	at	230.	489	Ibid,	at	170.	
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[Iraqi] concession for the exploitation of oil…[as]…without the assurance of unhindered 
transport, the possession of oil wells is useless…’490 It is apparent that the legal reasoning and the 
principles of international law in these discussions were advanced to ensure that the flow of Iraq’s 
oil was to gain access to the shortest route to the sea. Here my argument comes full circle: as the 
pipeline agreements cannot be explained without reference to the Iraqi oil concession, so the 
concession cannot be explained without Iraqi semi-peripheral (political) sovereignty.   
 
Semi-peripheral sovereignty turned out to be more than just about the granting of 
independence to Iraq, but about the economic exploitation and geopolitical control of the region 
as a whole, especially through the access, extraction, production and transportation of oil to the 
world economy. The importance of oil to the world market was so vital that it was allotted 
exceptional status to the principles of international law of the time, as even the sacred open door 
principle of the mandate system was contradictorily circumvented by the mandatory powers, the 
oil companies and by the PMC in Geneva through complex legal mechanisms and sophisticated 
reasoning as was shown above.  
 
VIII. Conclusion 
 
The main point of this chapter is to illustrate the role of international law in the juridical 
formation of an ‘independent’ Iraqi state in the Middle East in the context of the Mandate system.  
My argument is that the ‘A’ mandates were designated in the semi-peripheral Middle East with 
imperial considerations in mind that were exclusive to the semi-periphery (such as geopolitics 
and access to oil). The purpose of the juridical construction of semi-peripheral sovereignty must 
consequently be directly linked to the economic principles of the Mandate system, in particular 
the open door policy. I have also shown how the oil concessions that were negotiated in Iraq were 
intrinsically connected to the question of Iraqi independence, and the semi-peripheral sovereignty 
that emerged. It was only after the question of oil was settled that Britain sought Iraq’s 
independence in the League of Nations. The PMC in Geneva, who as jurists were knowingly 
making international law in their sessions, eventually confirmed the viability of this semi-
peripheral sovereignty and welded its doctrines in the context of the international legal order. My 
main argument was not only that Iraqi semi-peripheral sovereignty was required for the Great 
Powers to gain access to Iraqi oil, but further to (economically) control the region as a whole. By 																																																																				490	Alfred	 Bonné.	 “The	 Concession	 for	 the	 Mosul-Haifa	 Pipe	 Line,”	 The	 Annals	 of	 the	 American	
Academy	of	Political	and	Social	Science,	Vol.	164,	Nov.	1932,	116-126;	at	116.		
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analyzing in detail the contentious discussions relating to the pipeline agreements between the 
IPC and the other ‘A’ Mandate states, the role of semi-peripheral sovereignty in the entire region 
becomes clear.  
 
The tracing of these legal mechanisms and instruments reveal that international law was 
continually present in the history of the Mandate system in the Middle East, and one could not 
ignore its significance. The shifting international law necessitated the juridical construction of a 
semi-peripheral sovereignty within international legal doctrine to be granted to Iraq. This was the 
only way that Iraqi oil was to be legally extracted and transported to the Mediterranean and to the 
world. An entire legal edifice (whether mechanisms, technologies, structures or instruments) 
followed this narrative – I have discussed several in detail, such as the treaty and the consortium. 
It is ironic how Iraqi sovereignty, especially through the oil concession (and the 1930 Anglo-Iraq 
Treaty) actually further subjugated the other mandated territories in the region, notwithstanding 
the fact that these administrations looked to Iraq’s independence as a hopeful development. Iraq 
would be governed by the semi-peripheral sovereignty that it gained in 1932 and its 
corresponding Treaty for another two and a half decades until the revolution broke.        
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Chapter 4: The Oil Workers’ Struggle Against the Legal Spatiality of Imperialism 
in the Iraqi Oil Frontier 
 
 
Why are the people hungry unable to get sustenance 
And the children of the toiler perish from starvation? 
Oil pipelines, the property of the people, and they pass through 
All its profits into the pockets of thieves.491 
 
~ Zāhid Mohammad 
 
The natural resources [of this country] have become a curse upon it through which the colonizer gains strength, [while] 
the suffering of the people surges.492  
 
~ ʿAbdul Fatāh Ibrahīm  
 
  
 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
The previous chapter revealed the manner in which the oil concession and pipeline 
agreements were intrinsically linked to the juridical construction of semi-peripheral sovereignty 
and the making of ‘independence’ in Iraq. My purpose in this chapter is to analyze the 
implications of this concessionary agreement and the emergent semi-peripheral sovereignty on 
the socio-economic conditions of the working class, in particular by examining the micro-history 
of the oil fields in the provincial city of Kirkuk. This will be done by examining why the oil 
workers of the Iraqi Petroleum Company (IPC) in Kirkuk and the surrounding areas, organized 
against the legal structures of imperialism that were imposed upon them, and how their actions at 
specific points in space and time forced the company, the British and the Iraqi government to 
reassess their labour arrangements. I will then move to detail and analyze the Gawurbaghi strike 																																																																				491	As	quoted	by	Iraqi	communist	and	legal	scholar,	‘Abdul	Hussein	al-Sha‘bān;	in	Tawfīq	al-Tamīmī,	
ḥiwār	 mʿa	 al-Akadīmi	 wa	 al-Mufakir	 Dr.	 ʿAbdul	 Hussein	 al-Shaʿbān’	 [A	 conversation	 with	 the	academic	 and	 thinker	 Dr.	 ʿAbdul	 Hussein	 al-Shaʿbān];	 al-Nour	 Foundation	 for	 Culture	 and	Media,	(30/3/2012).	al-Sha‘bān	recalled	when	he	went	to	a	mass	demonstration	against	the	Israeli-British-French	attack	on	Egypt	in	1956,	as	a	young	boy,	he	joined	the	crowds	in	reciting	these	verses	from	Zahid	Mohammad’s	poetry.	Mohammed	was	a	popular	poet,	who	was	a	port	worker	and	active	in	the	labour	movement.		http://www.alnoor.se/article.asp?id=148176 492ʿAbdul	Fatāh	Ibrahīm.	ʿAla	Ṭarīq	al-Hind	[On	the	route	to	India],	first	published	in	1935,	(Dīmashq:	Manshūrāt	Wizarat	al-Thaqāfa,	1991),	at	238.			
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of 1946 that was violently suppressed. I will critique the ‘official’ company narrative of the strike 
and use the archive against itself to expose the limits of this narrative. The company’s ultimate 
response, which was to shift its ideological approach to one of social development, will then be 
examined, in particular its attempt to impose a specific ideology and alternative institution of 
trade unionism.  Finally, I will argue that law played a significant role in the production of the 
space of the Iraqi oil frontier; concluding with an examination of the legendary K3 pumping-
station strike of 1948 to further advance my analysis.      
 
II. Urban migration & the labour question in post-war Iraq 
 
 Although Iraq’s population was mostly rural, by the end of the 1940s the urban 
populations of the cities grew at a rapid pace – increasing from only 25% in 1930 to 37% in 
1947.493 Of course, one of the main reasons for this ‘mass exodus’ was what was described in 
Chapter 1: the intolerable conditions of the agricultural worker (fellāh), who took every 
opportunity to flee from his serf-like conditions, seeking a better life in the cities. No longer tied 
to the land, he became a wage earner.  However, when he reached the city, he found that 
conditions were not so much better. Most rural migrant workers became the bulk of unskilled 
work force, taking on precarious work, inhabiting and squatting in small mud huts (or sarifas) at 
the outskirts of the cities. Living at near starvation levels, when unable to find work, they 
sometimes had no recourse but to turn to theft. 
 
One significant factor that contributed to the fast changing labour conditions of 
underemployment in the 1940s arose directly from the winding up of the war effort that employed 
a bulk of the Iraqi working class. The Middle East Supply Centre494 commissioned a British 
academic (Peers) to write a report to study the question of labour and advise on solutions 
regarding the anticipated mass layoff of local workers that were to be discharged from the service 
																																																																				493	Sassoon,	supra,	 ft.	141,	at	3.	For	detailed	statistics	on	this	rural-city	migration	see,	M.	Salman	al-Hasan.	Tattawur		al-Iqtisādi	for	al-Iraq,	at	71.	 	According	to	Hasan,	 this	migration	began	as	early	as	1918	and	1920,	when	the	police	and	military	institutions	were	formed	as	the	majority	of	these	had	their	origins	in	the	rural	areas.	494	The	Middle	East	Supply	Centre	was	an	agency	set	up	 in	Cairo	 in	1941	during	World	War	 II	as	a	clearing-house	for	all	matters	of	civilian	supply	and	transport	in	the	region.	Its	goal	was	to	regulate	and	 control	 shipping	 and	 commerce	 among	 the	 countries	 in	 the	 region	 to	 aid	 the	war	 effort.	 	 See	Martin	W.	Wilmington.	The	Middle	East	Supply	Centre	(NY:	SUNY,	1971).		
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of the British Army by the end of the war.495  Peers made several proposals that entailed that 
‘surplus labour’ could be reabsorbed into certain sectors, in particular the ‘modal points of 
movements, [communications] and trade’ (the railways, the port of Basra and road 
transportation).496 Other than the apparent development of irrigation and agriculture schemes, the 
expansion of public works (with the help of British ‘technical experts’) would allow for the re-
employment of those discharged, although he admitted that certain unskilled workers (especially 
what he referred to as ‘black-coated laborers’) would be difficult to absorb in the peacetime 
economy.497 The increased output of oil, a valuable ‘exportable commodity’ was regarded as 
promising outlet that would help in this regard.498   
 
Despite having a somewhat positive outlook on the prospects of labour in post-war Iraq, 
Peers was cognizant of some of the difficulties that would arise. ‘It is wrong to assume,’ he wrote 
‘that the entire body of unskilled laborers recruited for the war effort will easily and automatically 
return to their villages, to be reabsorbed into agricultural pursuits…’499 It was clear that there was 
now ‘an uprooted class’ emerging that would not return to agricultural pursuits, especially 
considering that there was absolutely no security for the small cultivator and the fellah. After 
Peers’ initial report, the labour committees that were formed during the war with the purpose of 
framing labor policy in the country, had to finally address this issue of a transition.500 
 
This chapter will study the role of IPC in the city of Kirkuk by examining what Joseph 
Sassoon referred to as the ‘triangular relationship’ between the Iraqi government, the IPC and the 
																																																																				495	TNA.	FO	921/302.	 ‘Labour,	Middle	East:	Report	on	 Iraq	by	Professor	Peers’	 (1944).	This	 report	was	considered	as	the	 ‘first	of	 its	kind’	as	 it	directly	dealt	with	the	question	of	 labour,	emphasizing	the	urgency	of	dealing	with	it	before	the	war	comes	to	an	end.			496	Ibid,	at	11.	497	Ibid.	498	Ibid,	at	17.	499	Ibid.	500	See	 TNA.	 FO	 921/300.	 Director	 of	 Pioneers	 and	 Labour	 to	 Peers,	 829/PL.	 26	May,	 1944.	 There	were	 at	 least	 three	 labour	 committees	 and	 sub-committees	 in	 Iraq	 at	 the	 time.	 These	 committees	were	 generally	 composed	 of	 representatives	 of	 the	 R.A.F,	 R.O.C.,	 I.P.C.,	 and	 the	 Iraqi	 government	amongst	others.		Their	function	was	to	monitor	and	fix	wage	scales	and	ensure	that	labour	provisions	were	adequately	met.	The	question	of	 ‘civilian	labour	discharge’	was	eventually	brought	up	on	June	of	 1945	 and	 a	 special	 committee	was	 formed	 to	 revise	wages	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 cost	 of	 living,	 and	more	importantly	to	discuss	the	transition	to	peacetime	with	the	establishment	of	labour	exchanges	‘to	 the	 social	 advance	 and	 re-employment	 of	 workers	 discharged	 by	 the	 army’.	 Although	 the	responsibility	was	left	for	the	Iraqi	government,	the	British	were	prepared	to	advise	on	the	matter.	See	FO	371/45304.	E4789/216/93.	22	June,	1945.	‘Disposal	of	Civilian	Labour	discharged	in	Iraq	by	British	forces’.					
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British.501 The labour movement (in particular the oil workers) influenced and exposed this 
‘triangular’ relationship and I will bring their narrative to the fore. I will begin by describing the 
economic and political influence of the IPC in the city of Kirkuk by focusing on how the legal 
structures imposed by the concession in conjuncture with the 1930 Anglo-Iraqi Treaty allowed it 
to wield its power on the local economy of the city and on Iraq as a whole. The semi-peripheral 
sovereignty gained by Iraq described earlier brought about a somewhat ambiguous legal or 
jurisdictional space that allowed for such (rather fragmentary) hegemonic control to emerge, 
while contriving at least the appearance of an arm's length relationship between the three actors. 
So, despite the fact that the company and the British government kept in regular contact, 
coordinated and exchanged intelligence, British officials emphasized that the IPC was ‘quite 
separate from His Majesty’s Government’.502 The fact was that their relationship was more 
harmonious, as the IPC were willing to assist the British government in their political and 
imperial aims in the country and vice versa.503 One of the arguments in this chapter is that the 
ability to claim that there was a separation between the interests of the British and the IPC was 
partly made possible because of the juridical instruments at the intersection of the concession and 
the 1930 treaty, and this juridical component of this history is something that needs to be taken 
more seriously in the current scholarship.   
 
III. Everyday life in an oil company & the miserable conditions of the Iraqi oil worker  
 
 
The economic power welded by the IPC (with the support of the British Embassy) 
arguably made it somewhat function like a de facto ‘state within a state’ or at least allowed it to at 
times function in a governing capacity, particularly in its impact on the every day lives of 
Kirkukis and Iraqis. Consequently, its labour policies made a considerable impact on the city of 
Kirkuk, affecting the labour policy of the country as a whole. As described in Chapter 3, the 1931 
agreement was favorable to the IPC as it eliminated the Iraqi government’s power to tax the 
company’s profits and removed the minimum-drilling obligation. By expanding the concession 
area from 50,000 hectares to 8 million hectares, the IPC (which was technically a British firm) 																																																																				501	Sassoon,	supra,	ft.	137,	at	252.	502	TNA.	 Comments	 by	 Beckett	 (Treasury),	 29	 May	 1942.	 	 T	 160/1157/17859,	 as	 referred	 to	 by	Sassoon,	supra,	ft.	141,	at	251.			503	One	 British	 official	 in	 London	 made	 it	 quite	 clear	 in	 his	 minutes	 that	 there	 should	 be	 closer	coordination	 between	 the	 British	 government	 and	 the	 oil	 companies	 in	 the	 region,	 because	 ‘His	Majesty’s	 Government	 and	 the	 oil	 companies	 are	 all	 in	 it	 together	 and…the	more	mutually	 helpful	they	can	be	to	each	other	the	better’.	TNA.	Minute	by	E.A.	Berthoud,	18th	May	1948,	FO/371/68479,	E6413/620/93/G.	
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would eventually gain a monopoly over the entire topographical area of the oil fields and in turn 
oil production in Iraq (initially excluding Basra).504  
 
Although oil was not yet directly vital to the development of the country (which would 
only occur after 1950 with the renegotiation of the oil agreement to increase royalties to the Iraqi 
government), it still significantly contributed to the finances of the government and its budget.505 
The fact was that the Iraqi government regularly turned to the IPC for direct loans, which were 
never given unconditionally.506 Furthermore, as will be seen throughout this narrative, the central 
government in Baghdad seldom interfered with the IPC’s operations in the city of Kirkuk and the 
weak municipal government in many ways preferred to protect the company’s private interests 
(even violently if need be) as opposed to that of its constituents. One company report described 
the IPC’s power in freely welding political influence, stating that; ‘in Iraq…we are fortunate in 
having more freedom of action, with our operations not subject to the dictates of restrictive 
legislation…’507 
 
From the moment that oil volcanically erupted out of the drill at Baba Gurgur in June 
1927 (which was to become the coronary artery of the Kirkuk oil fields and the Kirkuk-Haifa-
Tripoli pipeline), Iraq was transformed from a potential prize to, ‘one of the most valuable 
concessionary areas in the world’.508 Considering the significance of oil for British strategic, 
economic and military interests, it was no surprise that the British government would choose to 
eagerly put their administrative and diplomatic resources at the service of the company, especially 
when it came to controlling labour unrest that certainly took its inspiration from broader concerns 
of anti-imperialism, communism and nationalism.509 The IPC, therefore, had characteristics of 
																																																																				504	By	1938,	 it	would	acquire	the	only	other	competitor	 in	the	country,	the	British	Oil	Development	Syndicate	 (BOD),	which	 had	 an	 Italian	majority	 shareholding	 interest.	 A	 subsidiary	 of	 the	 IPC,	 the	Basrah	 Petroleum	 Company,	 would	 acquire	 the	 BOD’s	 75-year	 concession,	 and	 so	 the	 IPC	 would	finally	 succeed	 in	 establishing	 its	 monopoly	 over	 Iraqi	 territory	 (except	 the	 small	 district	 of	Khanaqin).	 See	 Zuhayr	 Mikdashi.	 A	 Financial	 Analysis	 of	 Middle	 Eastern	 Oil	 Concessions:	 1901-65.	(London:	Frederick	Praeger,	1966),	at	73.		505	For	details	 on	 these	negotiations	 and	 the	 agreement	 see	Penrose	&	Penrose.	 Iraq:	 International	
Relations	and	National	Development,	(London:	Ernest	Benn,	1978).			506	Sassoon,	supra,	ft.	141,	at	249.	507	‘Comments	on:	Report	on	Employees	Housing	Programme,’	23	June	1952.	BP	135818.		508	J.H.	 Bamberg.	The	History	 of	 the	British	 Petroleum	Company:	 Volume	2,	 The	Anglo-Iranian	Years,	
1928-1954,	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	1994),	at	157.		It	should	be	noted	that	this	work	is	the	‘official’	history	commissioned	by	the	company.	509	TNA.	FO	371/61673.	 	E	3045/1492/IG.	 ‘Strategic	Importance	of	Kirkuk	oilfields’	(9	April,	1947);	The	Chiefs	of	Staff	still	did	not	consider	the	Kirkuk	fields	in	Iraq	as	more	strategically	 important	as	
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both, an (political) imperial and (private) corporation as it operated inside a newly ‘independent’ 
state (that is, within ‘sovereign’ territory that belonged to Iraq).  This situation elucidates, as 
James Ferguson has suggested how ‘new forms of disorder and order’ accompanied such 
‘selectively territorialized’ mineral-extraction enclaves (such as the oil company), which allowed 
capital to flow and ‘hop’ freely in-between wide geographic spaces.510 For this reason, Nelida 
Fuccaro argues that, as an oil city with a turbulent history, Kirkuk should be located, ‘at the 
intersection of the complex corporate, imperial, national and international politics that marked the 
development of oil production in the Middle East after the First World War.’511 It was at this 
intersection, where contradictory tensions were located, did urban violence and industrial unrest 
manifest. 
 
The IPC’s arrival at Kirkuk considerably altered its urban landscape and demographic 
characteristics, as it attracted diverse rural-urban migration of those seeking work from rural areas 
and surrounding cities.512 These rapid changes would result in an increase of Kirkuk’s urban 
population from around 25,000 in the 1920s to 68,000 in 1947, nearly half of which were to be 
employed by the company.513 Within the next two decades, Kirkuk was developed not merely as 
a modern ‘oil city,’ but as a focal pipeline town or terminus where from Iraq’s ‘Third River’ 
emanates.514  
 
The IPC would go on to build a network of pipelines across the desert to reach the ports 
of the Mediterranean in Palestine and Syria. Twelve mini-company towns were eventually 
erected along a parallel network of 12-inch pipelines functioning as pumping-stations.515 Four of 
these stations were in Iraq: K1 was the first station built adjacently to the Kirkuk fields; K2 was 																																																																																																																																																																																																									the	fields	in	Abadan,	Iran	since	they	were	only	‘partially	owned’	and	anyway	they	were	confident	that	the	Iraqi	government	could	suppress	any	disturbances.				510	James	 Ferguson.	 “Seeing	 Like	 an	Oil	 Company:	 Space,	 Security,	 and	Global	 Capital	 in	Neoliberal	Africa,”	(2005)	American	Anthropologist,	Vol	7,	Issue,	pp.	377-382.		511	Nelida	 Fuccaro.	 “Reading	 Oil	 as	 Urban	 Violence:	 Kirkuk	 and	 its	 Oil	 Conurbation,	 1927-58,”	 in	Freitag,	 Fuccaro,	 Ghrawi	 &	 Lafi,	 Eds.	Urban	Violence	 in	 the	Middle	East:	 Changing	Cityscapes	 in	 the	
Transition	from	Empire	into	Nation	State,	(New	York:	Berghahn,	2015),	pp.222-242;	at	223.		512	For	a	detailed	discussion	on	the	effects	of	 the	 IPC	on	Kirkuk’s	urban	 landscape	see,	Arbella	Bet-Shlimon.	(2012).	Kirkuk,	1918-1968:	Oil	and	the	Politics	of	Identity	in	an	Iraqi	City,	Ph.D.	dissertation,	Cambridge,	MA:	Harvard	University,	148-158.			513	Ibid,	at	161.	514	Fuccaro,	 supra,	 ft.	 511,	 at	 225.	 The	propaganda	 film	 entitled	 ‘the	Third	River’	 presented	 the	 oil	company	as	producing	the	river	of	wealth	that	would	flow	into	the	world	transforming	everything	it	touches.	Accessed	at	BP	Archive,	July	2016.	See	Mona	Damluji.	“The	Image	World	of	Middle	Eastern	Oil,”	Hannah	Appel,	Arthur	Mason	&	Michael	Watts	(eds.),	in	Subterranean	Estates:	Life	Worlds	of	Oil	
and	Gas,	(Ithaca:	Cornell	University	Press,	2015),	pp.147-164.	515	S.	Longrigg.	Oil	in	the	Middle	East:	Its	Discovery	and	Development,	(London:	1969)	at	179.	
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25 miles away; K3 was located in the small town of Haditha in the Upper Euphrates and was the 
point of bifurcation (i.e. where the pipeline diverges in two directions, one going towards Tripoli 
and the other Haifa), and finally T1 was located not far from the Syrian border.516 One British 
exploration geologist at the time described the complex infrastructure that complemented the oil 
pipelines: ‘There was a whole infrastructure to support the [pipe] lines: twelve pumping stations; 
100 wells and 320 kilometers of water pipelines in the desert, serviced by twelve smaller 
pumping stations to provide drinkable water; terminals with eight underwater lines to moving 
berths 1.5 kilometers from the shore; a network of telegraph, telephone and wireless connections 
to support operations; an air transport system; four main rail heals workshops, offices and a 
labour force…’517  These interconnected towns would be central for the IPC’s propaganda 
discourse in Iraq and the region as they were presented with their new residential buildings, 
facilities, schools and supermarkets, as being a part of the larger effort of development and 
modernity of the ‘new’ Iraq and Middle East.518  
 
However, concealed beneath the surface, reality could not be any different, as the 
majority of daily wage earners (who although lived relatively better than those living in the urban 
slums of Baghdad, Kirkuk and Basra), were subject to intense exploitation and arrogant racism. 
Desmond Stewart and John Haylock, two British schoolteachers described the K3 pumping 
station as an ‘oil cage’, denoted by ‘a military abbreviation,’ it was more ‘a nightmare settlement 
from science fiction’ as it was based on a system of extreme class exploitation:  
 
Nearly three thousand people live on the station, and they are rigidly segregated into castes. 
British employees and a few Iraqis compromise the first class; school teachers are included with the clerks 
in the second; labourers are, of course, in the third…The cool, thickening [British] officials give the Iraqis 
the impression that they regard themselves as superior beings, angels of technology with messages and 
orders, to be delivered in office hours... In K3 [they conclude] even in politeness the class system prevails. 
The “first class” do not salute the “third class,” the “second class” can only go into the first-class club by 
invitation.519  
 
																																																																				516	Fuccaro,	supra,	 ft.	511,	at	225.	See	 Iraq	Petroleum	Co.	An	Account	of	the	Construction	in	the	years	
1932	to	1934	of	the	Pipe-line	of	the	Iraq	Petroleum	Company,	limited,	from	its	oilfield	in	the	vicinity	of	
Kirkuk,	 Iraq	 to	 the	 Mediterranean	 ports	 of	 Haifa	 (Palestine)	 and	 Tripoli	 (Lebanon),	 (London,	 St,	Clements	press,	1934).			517Michael	Quentin	Morton.	 In	the	Heart	of	the	Desert:	The	Story	of	an	Exploration	Geologist	and	the	
Search	for	Oil	in	the	Middle	East,	(Aylesford:	Green	Mountain	Press,	2007),	at	11.		518	Henry	 Longhurst	 describes	 the	 private	 company	 jets	 (named	 the	 IPC’s	 ‘Doves’)	 as	 ‘flying	 like	clockwork	 between	 headquarters,	 the	 oilfields	 and	 the	 pumping	 stations’.	 Henry	 Longhurst.	
Adventure	in	Oil:	The	Story	of	British	Petroleum	(London:	Sidgwick	and	Jackson,	1959),	at	204.		519	Desmond	Stewart	 and	 John	Haylock,	New	Babylon:	A	Portrait	of	 Iraq	 (London:	Collins,	 1956),	 at	181-190.		
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This ‘caste-like system’ was a characteristic of colonial relations, which remained sharply 
rampant, openly visible and in may ways unbroken within these oil enclaves.  
 	
 
 
 Although the Company controlled the supply of labour within the fields, a bulk of local 
workers were daily wage earners, who were directly hired from Bedouin contractors.520 An 
exploitative system of tribal ‘racketeering,’ was in place and it expanded due to the lack of trade 
unions at the time; it often put the worker in debt, forcing him to borrow money from local 
moneylenders to pay the high employment fees.521 The IPC did not contest this system of labour 
recruitment, but was rather complicit in its perpetuation by regularly using it to hire a significant 
number of its daily wage earners, at least until the early 1950s. It was this system of labour 
recruitment that was heavily relied on in the construction of the pipelines described above and it 
continued thereafter.522 Tribal sheikhs sold the labour of their tribesmen on a daily basis to avoid 
the provisions of the labour law, which did not protect daily workers. Yet, the company was 
always careful to emphasize that their workers were paid a higher wage than any other industrial 
establishment, and that they were given subsidies and benefits, such as a rent allowance.523   
 
IPC workers were hired on the basis of a hierarchal grade system – that is, there were at 
least five grades of workers with different wage scales.  For instance, the company hired ‘coolies’ 
and ‘unskilled labour’ as daily wage earners, as opposed to skilled laborers who would have 
receive a higher monthly wage. A labour sub-committee report indicated that the lowest daily 
wage paid in October 1946 was 310 fils524 (or 260 without rent allowance) and the minimum 
living cost index for a small family (or the ‘labourer’s basket’) in June 1946 was 379 fils.525 As 
the labour advisor of the British Middle East Office in Cairo, M.T. Audsley reported two months 
after the 1946 Kirkuk strike, despite the fact that the oil companies paid higher wages compared 																																																																				520	TNA.	LAB	13/674.	‘Notes	on	Labour	Expert’s	visit	to	K3	&	K2,’	on	11th	to	15th	Jan,	1952,	by	Labour	Advisor	of	Iraqi	Government.	521	Ibid.		522	See	Iraq	Petroleum	Co.	An	Account	of	the	Construction,	supra.	523	TNA.	 FO	 371/68482.	 ‘Report	 on	 visit	 to	 Iraq	 from	 8th	 June	 to	 10th	 July	 by	 M.T.	 Audsley’	 (1	November,	1948).	524	The	Iraqi	dinar	was	on	par	with	the	British	pound	and	so	1	fils	was	equivalent	to	50	shillings	(the	British	currency	in	the	Empire	at	the	time).	525	TNA.	 Sir	 H.	 Stonehewer-Bird	 (Bagdad)	 to	 FO,	 29/10/1946.	 FO	 371/52456.	 E1094/3860/93.	‘Labour	Conditions	in	Iraq’.		See	‘Labourer’s	Basket	–	man,	wife	and	2	children	as	revised	by	Central	Labour	Sub-committee	ref.	Minutes	of	Meeting	of	Dec.	22,	1942,	Part	1(b)’.		
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to other large employers, because of growing inflation, no wage was able to keep pace with the 
rising cost of living index.526 Hence, he argued that any increase in wages would only lead to an 
increase in rents and foodstuff and this would not have a favorable impact on the community and 
so he recommended increased amenities rather than cash wages as a more appropriate response.527 
By comparison the average wage of semi-skilled labour in other large undertaking (such as the Railways) 
was 230 fils. This wage wrote Audsley meant that ‘vast numbers of workers are very nearly half 
starved’.528 This was in July of 1948 when the cost of living increased by six times due to inflation.  This 
was only a few months before the Wathba uprising.    
 
 The labour conditions in the oil fields were ominously harsher than the company and 
most British officials would admit. It was not merely the question of the differences of wages 
between the ‘grades’ of workers and the visibly large gap between the wages of officials and 
skilled workers (mostly British) and non-skilled or semi-skilled workers (mostly Iraqi), but there 
were other concerns, which would in time transform the oil fields into the center of labour strike 
action and anti-imperial struggle.  
 
As already mentioned, the company operated in a socially segregated manner, not merely 
in the remoteness of the workers’ quarters from the fortified company camp, where higher paid 
British company officials and their families resided, but in everyday company life.529 One British 
Embassy councilor noted, ‘I found that there was almost completely no intercourse between the 
IPC and the local inhabitants…and [not even] Iraqi officials ever seemed to be invited to the 
[company] camp’.530  Warning of the repercussions, the councilor advised the company to 
collaborate with the British Institute (a cultural organization) to invite Iraqis to such things as a 
cinema showing, as even if they ‘do not understand a word of the film’ it would foster a good 
relationship.531  
 
A perceptive British Embassy official (F. Wells) touring the IPC stations for the first time 
wrote an astoundingly candid account of what he encountered:  																																																																				526	TNA.	 FO	 371/68482.	 ‘Report	 on	 visit	 to	 Iraq	 from	 8th	 June	 to	 10th	 July	 by	 M.T.	 Audsley’	 (1	November,	1948).	See	p.9	for	details	of	wage	scales.		527	TNA.	Stonehewer	to	FO,	25	Oct	1946,	‘Labour	Conditions	in	Iraq’,	E10773/3860/93.	528	Ibid.		529	This	 was	 the	 case	 with	 other	 oil	 fields.	 Robert	 Vitalis	 has	 brilliantly	 exposed	 how	 ARAMCO	established	a	Jim	Crow	system	-imported	from	the	Southern	US-	within	the	Dhahran	oil	camps	in	the	1930s.	 See	 Robert	 Vitalis.	 America’s	 Kingdom:	Mythmaking	 on	 the	 Saudi	 Frontier,	 (London:	 Verso,	2009).			530	TNA.	FO	624/105.	‘Oil:	IPC	Labour	Welfare’,	25	October,	1946.			531	Ibid.		
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Sometime ago a British businessman…said to me, “Iraq is just like a British Dominion”.  I was 
reminded of this remark during the tour which I just made of the IPC Pipe line stations…These foreign 
concessionary installations are directed by a handful of Europeans, mostly British, and the distinction 
between management and labour rather shocked me…It is difficult to make precise criticisms of the 
workers’ conditions…they are well fed and are for the most part housed in Nissan huts, which are certainly 
far superior to the mud hovels of their villages…But the relation between management and labour is 
outwardly that of “sahibs” and “niggers” and this aspect is accentuated by the luxury in which the 
management and British staff live, and their remoteness. There is no unofficial social contact between 
British and Iraqis; in fact I gathered that such contact is discouraged…In brief, my impression was what 
our Russian friends would call capitalism at its worst, and foreign capitalism at that. It is rather a shock to 
anyone who sees it for the first time...532    
 
Here, one could clearly see how the ‘higher wage rate’ that the company often referred to served 
more as propaganda tool to fend off criticisms as calculation of a wage could not in itself explain 
the shockingly humiliating conditions of the Iraqi workers in these camps and the indignity they 
felt.533 The company was generally oblivious to these conditions before the eruption of the strike 
in 1946.534  
 
The extraordinary social tensions of semi-colonial ‘foreign capitalism’ and imperialism 
described above were reflected in the manner in which workers were being discharged, usually 
without notice. One company response to press criticisms that workers were being unjustly 
discharged was scribbled on the side of a British report in the following way: ‘the statement that 
“anybody who dares to disobey is discharged immediately” is of course…correct. You could 
hardly expect to run any undertaking…on any other basis, could you?’535 Despite the fact that 
Iraq became an ‘independent’ state nearly two decades before the above report was written, 
colonial relations remained fully intact, especially in the concessionary enclaves of the semi-
colonial and imperial spaces of oil production. This was certainly due to the juridical intersection 
between the private oil concession and the semi-peripheral sovereignty given to Iraq.  As we will 
see, these racialized colonial relations and the indignity that they produced would guarantee the 
detonating of the massive strike to come. 
 
 																																																																				532	TNA.	FO	624/130,	Minutes	by	F.	Wells,	7	April,	1948.			533	One	veteran	Iraqi	communist	who	worked	at	the	IPC	in	his	youth	describes	in	his	memoirs	how	every	Iraqi	(whether	a	worker	or	staff	member)	was	expected	to	respond	with	the	phrase	 ‘Yes,	sir’	when	 addressed	 by	 a	British	 company	 official.	 	 Obviously,	 Iraqi	workers	 considered	 this	 insulting.		Tomā	 Tomās,	 “Awrāk	 Tomā	 Tomās”	 (1)	 (The	 Papers	 of	 Toma	 Tomas	 -1-),	 al-Nnās,	 10/15/2006,	(http://al-nnas.com/THEKRIAT/15jsf1.htm).	534	Arbella	Bet-Shlimon.	 “The	Politics	and	Ideology	of	Urban	Development	 in	 Iraq’s	Oil	City:	Kirkuk,	1946-58,”	Comparative	Studies	of	South	Asia,	Africa	and	the	Middle	East,	Vol.33,	No.1,	2013,	at	29.	535	TNA.	FO/624/176.	‘Oil:	IPC	Labour’,	10	Aug,	1949.	
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IV. The Gāwūrbāghī strike & the limits of Iraqi law in penetrating imperial spatiality  
 
Communist parties around the world were generally given some freedom to operate 
during the Second World War536, and the ICP took advantage of this by organizing workers into 
trade unions. This had an effect of opening up some freedoms in Iraqi society, and it was around 
that time that an amendment to the labour law was passed that made further improvements in 
compensation, overtime and vacation terms.537 It was also around that time that the al-Pachachi 
government legalized several trade unions – between 1944 and 1945, sixteen trade unions were 
licensed. Of these sixteen, communists led twelve, while the others were led by those affiliated 
with the left, such as the social democrats.538   
 
One of the first unions licensed in 1944 was the Railway Union. It was this union that would 
organize the 15-day Schālchīyyah strike in 1945, which was a precursor of the Kirkuk oil strike of 
1946.539 This strike would produce a cadre of labour organizers and worker-communists that 
would later lead the workers in the Kirkuk oil fields. One of these leaders was a young 
communist by the name of Hannā Ilyās Kohārī (Abū Tilʿat),540 an ex-member of the Supervisory 
Committee of the suppressed Railway Union, who was discharged from the railways after the 
suppression of the strike, and eventually found his way into the employ of the IPC.541  
 
The Iraqi Communist Party was a vast complex organic network that was organized in 
branch, district and local committees. The smallest unit in the network was the cell (al-khaliyyah) 
that was made up of two and five members who worked in a common place. It was the center of 
organizing action – the main point of contact with the masses.542  Workers, peasants, and students 
were organized in local factory, rural and school committees. It was this type of organizational 
structure that made the party quite effective. The main characteristic of communist organizing 
amongst the working class at the time was that of penetration – with the intention of organically 																																																																				536	This	was	due	to	the	fact	that	the	Soviet	Union	was	a	major	ally	in	the	fight	against	Fascism.	537	Law	No.36	of	1942.		538	Sbāhī,	supra,	ft.	191,	at	255. 539	The	Schālchīyyah railway	strike	will	be	detailed	in	Chapter	5.	540	See	Hirmuz	Kohārī,	“Tahiya	Ijlal	wa	Kībār	li	shūhadā’	al-Tabaqa	al-‘āmīla”	[A	homage	to	the	great	martyrs	 of	 the	 working-class],	 in	 al-Hīwār	 al-Mutamadin,	 5/3/2006	(http://m.ahewar.org/s.asp?aid=63746&r=0).	 	 After	 the	 Kirkuk	 strike,	 Hanna	 Kohārī,	 a	 Christian	Chaldean,	 spent	his	days	 in	prison	until	 the	1958	revolution,	but	would	 later	be	 imprisoned	again,	tortured	and	killed	by	the	Ba‘athists	during	the	bloody	month	known	as	‘Black	February’	of	1963.		His	comrade	dedicated	a	 long	poem	 to	him,	where	a	 reference	 is	made	of	 Ilyās’	 ‘journey	of	 struggle	 in	Kirkuk:	‘the	battle	of	the	garden’‘	[i.e.	the	Gawurbaghi	garden].	541	Batatu,	supra,	ft.	41,	at	622.		542	Johan	Franzen,	Red	Star	Over	Iraq:	Iraqi	Communism	before	Saddam	(London:	Hust	&	Co),	at	40.	
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making communism a part of the ‘flesh and blood’ of the labouring masses.543 The party planned 
to target the ‘colossal enterprises’ fully or partially managed and/or owned by the British – the 
railways, the Port of Basra and the oil refineries. Although, the aim was to convert these 
economic hubs of imperialism into ‘Communist fortresses,’ it was rather the ability of a handful 
of communists to guide and influence workers to articulate their demands that eventually made 
their strikes effective.544    
 
Returning to the central narrative in Kirkuk, learning of the successes of their fellow 
workers’ strike in the IPC terminus in Haifa (Palestine),545 the oil workers of Kirkuk (especially 
the daily workers) began sending a series of petitions. One pamphlet, which was circulated 
among IPC workers in January 1946, described their miserable conditions in detail, stating that 
‘our standard of living…have become so low that it cannot be considered fit for any free and 
civilized man in the age of the Atomic Bomb’. 546  It goes on to claim that, ‘[t]his 
Concessionaire… [and the] imperialistic foreigners seek nothing but to augment their own profits, 
and we, the human-beings, are left…as a cheap commodity, subjected to those imperialists who 
cannot sympathize with us, simply because they have come to rob us of everything – our 
wealth… independence… [and] freedom’.547 The workers go on to criticize their extremely low 
wages, lack of food, shelter, transportation, and their severe working conditions; ending their 
appeal with a call for collective organized action: ‘organize yourselves rank and file’ through the 
formation of a union.548 The moment that the IPC received this petition, the fields’ manager, Mr. 
Wheatley, contacted the head of the Kirkuk police, giving him permission to set up a base of 
operations from within the oil fields and the company camp.549 
 
																																																																				543	Batatu,	supra,	ft.	41,	at	605.		544	Ibid.	545	See	 Zachary	 Lockman,	 Comrades	 and	Enemies:	 Arab	 and	 Jewish	Workers	 in	 Palestine,	 1906-1948	(Berkley:	University	of	California	Press,	1996),	232-34,	327-32.	546	BPA.	 ‘The	Miserable	 State	 of	 the	 Iraq	 Petroleum	 Company’s	Workmen	 at	 Kirkuk,’	 translated	 in	English	and	enclosed	in	‘Iraq	During	the	Year	1946,’	File	162461,	BP.		547	Ibid.	548	Ibid.	549	Iraq	National	Archives.	‘Report	by	the	administrative	investigator	Saīd	al-Qazāz’	in	a	file	entitled,	‘Workers’	 strike	 of	 the	 IPC’	 17/Kirkuk/6;	 as	 refereed	 to	 in,	 Ja‘far	 Abbās	 Ḥumaidī.	 al-Tatwurāt	 al-
Syasīsya	fī	al-‘Iraq,	1941-1953	 [‘the	political	developments	 in	 Iraq,	1941-1953’]	 (al-Najaf:	Matb‘a	al-Ni‘man,	1976),	 at	431.	This	 is	 consistent	with	British	 records	 that	 suggest	 that	 the	 fields’	manager	was	in	constant	contact	with	the	police	and	asked	for	‘special	police	protection’	of	the	IPC	during	the	strike.	 See	 TNA	 FO	 371/52456.	 Wheatley,	 Kirkuk	 to	 Stock,	 London,	 dated	 July	 30,	 1946	 in	E7581/3860/93.	‘Strike	of	Iraq	Petroleum	Company	at	Kirkuk’,	1	August	1946,	at	2.						
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The IPC flatly rejected the workers’ demands. Instead, they permitted the formation of a 
toothless ‘workmen committee’, after expelling several so-called ‘agitators’ and ‘trouble-
makers’.550 Even though Hanna Ilyās was still elected to the committee, he considered it ‘an 
imperialist device aimed at crippling the struggle of the workers and their basic rights.’551 The 
workers then decided to meet at a local coffeehouse on June 13 and agreed on the following list 
of demands rather than participate in the company committee: the recognition of their legal right 
to form an independent trade union; the increase of their cost of living allowance from 80 to 250 
fils; an end to arbitrary dismissal of workers; the arrangement of transportation to and from work, 
the granting of a war bonus (equivalent to that of the IPC workers in Haifa), and the introduction 
of sickness, disability and old-age insurance.552 The mutasarif (governor), who acted as a 
mediator between the company and the workers, subsequently made a statement ensuring his 
sympathy with the workers, and promising that he would convince the company to fulfill their 
reasonable demands within the provisions of the labour law.553  
 
The workers then decided to give the authorities a two-week window until July 3 to fulfill 
their demands before calling a strike. On July 1, the company agreed to a mere 50 to 100 fils 
increase of the high-cost-of-living allowance, and rejected all other demands.554 The company 
point of view, according to Mr. Wheatley, was that the members of the workmen committee 
‘seemed satisfied’ with this offer and only changed their attitude because of the intimidation 
tactics of ‘political agitators’ who ‘harangued their colleagues’ that they have been ‘swindled’.555 
This account was maintained throughout, and the IPC insisted that they have always been ‘the 
best employers of labour in Iraq’.556  
 
																																																																				550	TNA.	 FO	 371/52456.	 E7581/3860/93.	 ‘Strike	 of	 Iraq	 Petroleum	 Company	 at	 Kirkuk’,	 1	 August	1946.					551	Ibid.	552	TNA.	 FO	 371/52456.	 Telegram	 from	 Baghdad,	 to	 Foreign	 Office,	 London,	 19	 July	 1946,	 I.P.C.	workers’	strike	at	Kirkuk.	Batatu,	supra,	ft.	41,	at	623	553	Iraqi	National	Archives.	 ‘Statement	of	Mutasarrif	of	Kirkuk	 to	 IPC	workers,	No.4810,	dated	 June	19,	1946’	as	referred	to	in	Humaidī,	supra,	ft.	545,	at	422.		The	mutasarif	ensured	the	workers	that	if	their	demands	were	not	eventually	met,	they	may	proceed	to	the	proper	channels	to	appeal	(through	the	Ministry	of	Social	Affairs	and	the	Ministry	of	Interior)	and	that	‘all	doors’	of	the	‘responsible’	state	institutions	were	open	to	them.		554	TNA.	 FO	 371/52456.	 Telegram	 from	 Baghdad,	 to	 Foreign	 Office,	 London,	 19	 July	 1946,	 I.P.C.	workers’	strike	at	Kirkuk.	555	TNA.	FO	371/52456.	Wheatley,	Kirkuk	to	Stock,	London,	dated	July	30,	1946	in	E7581/3860/93.	‘Strike	of	Iraq	Petroleum	Company	at	Kirkuk’,	1	August	1946.					556	Ibid.		
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The next day, a Higher Strikers’ Committee was formed, which constituted four worker-
communists (including Hanna Ilyās), a Committee-in-Reserve of five, and five subordinate 
strikers’ committees of four to six members each, representing a variety of workers, including, 
the workshop, motor and mechanical workers.557  
 
When the two-week window ended, a strike was called on July 3. The response was 
instantaneous. Around 5,000 oil workers responded, ultimately leading up to a massive 
demonstration in the streets of Kirkuk the following day, whereby workers marched with their 
banners that bore their demands, chanting: ‘Long live the working class; long live the oil 
workers’ union’558; ‘we demand the right to organize our trade union!’ and ‘we demand the 
improvement of our labour conditions!’559 Picket lines were formed around the entrances of the 
oil fields.560  The strikers would assemble daily in what became the focal point of the strike in 
Gāwūrbāghī, a large garden in the western outskirts of Kirkuk, not far from the company camp. 
There they would hold meetings, listen to speeches and poetry delivered in all local languages, 
representing the diversity of Kirkuk.561 In one speech, a communist strike leader explained to the 
workers the semi-colonial character of the company: ‘we are all confronting one enemy. It is not 
only the oil workers by themselves who are the victims of the company, for the octopus spreads 
its tentacles into every aspect of our affairs; they stand behind the Iqtāʿīn (feudalists) who exploit 
the fellahīn…and the mutasarrif threatens the workers in defense of the interests of the company 
and the government persecutes the people…so that the company may continue to exploit our 
oil…and so that the boots of [British] soldiers remain defiling our land… You say you hate 
colonialism, but what is colonialism? It is the monopolistic oil company precisely.’562 There was 																																																																				557	Batatu,	supra,	ft.	41,	at	623	558	CP/CENT/INT/17/01,	Workers	of	the	Iraq	Petroleum	Co.	go	on	strike,	Baghdad,	5	Jul.	1946.		559	al-Ṭalibāni,	Makram.	‘Gāwūrbāghī	Malḥama	Buṭūlīya’,	[“Gawurbaghi:	a	heroic	epic	of	the	working	class”]	al-Thaqāfa	al-Jadīda,	Issue	26,	July	1971.		560	TNA.	 FO	 371/52456.	 E7581/3860/93.	 ‘Strike	 of	 Iraq	 Petroleum	 Company	 at	 Kirkuk’,	 1	 August	1946;	Handwritten	notes	on	Baxter’s	meeting	with	Wheatley.							561	The	 speeches	 were	 delivered	 in	 Arabic,	 Kurdish,	 Assyrian,	 Armenian	 and	 Turkish.	 See	 Resan	Hussein,	 ‘Idrāb	 Gāwūrbāghī:	 Mūthīra	 Nidhālīya	 Kabīra’	 [‘The	 Gawurbaghi	 Strike:	 a	 great	 glorious	struggle’],	Tarīk	al-Sha‘ab,	Issue	230,	July	12	2015.			562	Itiḥād	al-Shaʿab,	15	July,	1959	as	quoted	in	Suʿād	Khayrī.	Min	Tārīkh	al-Ḥaraka	al-Watanīya	[From	the	 history	 of	 the	 Nationalist	 Movement],	 (Baghdad,	 1975),	 at	 151.	 It	 should	 be	 noted	 that	 Iraqi	communist	 and	nationalist	 intellectuals	who	were	 active	 in	 organizing	 the	 oil	workers	 at	 the	 time	carried	in	their	pockets	Yūsūf	Ibrahīm	Yazbak’s	seminal	book,	entitled:	al-Nift	Mustaʿbid	al-Sh‘wb	[Oil,	
the	Enslaver	of	Peoples].	Published	 in	1934,	 this	book	was	 the	 first	 to	be	published	 in	Arabic	by	an	Arab	author	on	the	politics	and	imperialism	of	oil	 in	the	region.	Yazbak	was	a	Lebanese	communist	and	 one	 of	 the	 founders	 of	 the	 Syrian-Lebanese	 Communist	 Party.	 His	 aim	 was	 to	 illuminate	 the	‘secret	politics’	of	oil	 to	the	Arab	reader	and	show	how	it	was	connected	to	 imperial	designs	 in	the	region.	He	writes,	“O	poor	Arab,	oil	is	your	property	and	your	devil;	your	lover	and	your	enemy;	your	
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no doubt that the Kirkuki workers were at that moment united in class solidarity like they never 
were before. In the words of the novelist Fadhil al-Azzawi, ‘the strike was a thrilling song 
fest’.563 The entire city was attracted to the garden, opening their doors to workers, while 
coffeehouses refused payment from any striker.564   
 
On July 8, a new mutassarif, Hassan Fahmī, was appointed undoubtedly due to his 
predecessor’s slightly sympathetic approach towards the strikers. On July 10, the British Embassy 
councilor, Mr. Busk, urged the PM of the importance of ‘strengthening the hand of the 
mutassarif’ so that he could more effectively deal with the strike, and was told by the foreign 
minister that ‘new regulations’ were being drawn up to provide mutassarifs with wide executive 
powers ‘to arrest agitators without legal formalities’.565 Busk would later receive personal 
assurances from the PM that ‘any threat to the IPC’ would be dealt with ‘firmly’.566 Meanwhile, 
the new mutassarrif released a statement, in which he was dismissive of the workers’ demands, 
maintaining that the current labour law already provided them with protection and that the IPC 
already made ‘concessions’ that would only be released once the workers returned to work 
immediately. 567  The workers refused to end their strike until all their demands were 
unconditionally met. It was at this point that Fahmī decided that he would no longer tolerate the 
‘illegality’ of the strike. He consequently dusted off an old Ottoman law still in the books 
(No.131 of 1910) that allowed the authorities to use force to disperse a crowd for the ‘protection 
of the public’.568  
 
On the evening of July 12, while the workers were congregating in the Gāwūrbāghī 
garden, the police commander inaudibly ordered them to disperse. The workers, who did not hear 
his request, began chanting for the fulfillment of their demands. The commander then whistled 
and the police, who surrounded the garden from all sides, began to forcefully, disperse the 
crowd.569 The police ended up shooting at the crowd. As many as eighteen workers were killed 																																																																																																																																																																																																									liberator	and	your	enslaver…it	is	your	life	and	your	death,	so	know	“something”	of	its	politics	so	that	you	may	know	what	[state]	you	are	in	and	where	you	have	arrived!”	Yazbak,	at	19.		 563	Fadhil	al-Azzawi.	The	Last	of	the	Angels,	(tr.	William	M.	Hutchins),	(New	York:	Free	Press,	2007),	at	52.	 This	 is	 an	 autobiographical	 novel	 where	 the	 Gāwūrbāghī strike	 and	 its	 aftermath	 are	 vividly	described.		564	Khayrī	,	supra,	ft.	562,	at	150. 565	TNA.	FO	371/52456.	E7931/3860/93.	‘Strike	at	Kirkuk’.	Busk	to	FO,	No.	637.	10	Aug,	1946.			566	Ibid.			567	TNA.	FO	371/52456;	E6576/3860/93.	‘Strike	at	Kirkuk’	July	15,	1946;	Humaidi,	supra,	ft.	549,	at	435-436.			568	Humaidi,	supra,	ft.	545,	at	437.	569	CP/CENT/INT/17/01.‘The	Slaughter	of	Kawer	Baghi’,	31	Oct,	1946.		
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and twenty-seven wounded.570  As news spread of the massacre, there was public outrage 
throughout the land: it became clear that ‘the Iraqi government was prepared to kill Iraqi workers 
to defend the interests of a colonial company!’571 The communists argued that there was ‘a high-
combination of government and company,’ emphasizing the imperialistic character of the 
company and the Iraqi state’s collusion with it.572 This was certainly not a far-fetched conspiracy 
as the records show.573 The Iraqi state was clearly acting on the advice of the British Embassy, 
which in turn were guarding the interests of the company. The workers were no longer dealing 
with a sophisticated abstract analysis given to them by the communist intelligentsia – the bullets 
that rained on them that day was all the proof they needed to grasp the semi-colonial character of 
the Iraqi state, its complicity in maintaining their conditions, and the effects of imperialism on 
their lives.   
  
   As a massive demonstration broke out the next day, where the crowd carrying the dead 
on their shoulders, demanded the resignation of ‘the government of bullets’ and to bring those 
responsible to court,574 the British government in London confirmed in a dispatch of their 
satisfaction with the actions of the local authorities that acted ‘wisely in defense of public 
security,’ and praised the ‘satisfactory attitude’ of the IPC throughout the strike.575 One of the 
workers in the demonstration rose up and said, ‘these dead are the victims of foreign influence 
and imperialistic interference’.576 The oil workers were now clearly consciousness of how 
imperialism and its legal manifestations created a space for such slaughter to occur. The British 
government, on the other hand, accepted the company narrative that the strike was ‘principally 
the work of political agitators,’ and ‘not the spontaneous result of discontent’ among the workers, 
with little to no scrutiny.577 Shortly thereafter, responding to a question in the House of Commons 
on the effects of the ‘stoppages of work’ at the IPC oil fields, the Secretary of State for Foreign 
																																																																				570	Humaidi,	ft.	549,	at	438.		Batatu,	supra,	ft.	41,	at	624.	571	Khayri.	Min	Tarīkh,	supra,	ft.	558,	at	150-152.	572	Batatu,	supra,	ft.	41,	at	624.	573	The	 Minister	 of	 Interior,	 Abdullah	 al-Qassāb,	 also	 resigned	 in	 protest	 against	 the	 unjustified	interference	of	the	British	Embassy	and	the	company	in	the	affairs	of	the	governorate	of	Kirkuk.	See	al-Hasanī,	Tārīkh	al-Wizarat	Vol.	7,	supra,	 ft.	231,	at	116-119.	Al-Hasanī	 reproduces	his	 resignation	letter	in	its	entirety.			574	al-Talibānī,	supra,	ft.	559,	at	7.	575	TNA.	FO	371/52456.	E7051/3860/93.	‘Strike	at	Kirkuk	of	IPC’,	July	19,	1946.	576	CP/CENT/INT/17/01.‘The	Slaughter	of	Kawer	Baghi’,	31	Oct,	1946.	577	Ibid.	
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Affairs, Phillip Noel-Baker, without any mention of its violent suppression, affirmed that the 
strike has come to an end and assured his colleague that the ‘output of oil was not reduced.’578  
 
At a press conference in Baghdad, the PM insisted that it was only due to the efforts of 
the government who negotiated with the company that certain ‘concessions’ were subsequently 
made and that strike action itself did not amount to anything.579 The Gāwūrbāghī massacre 
eventually led to the fall of the ʿUmarī cabinet, while the IPC decided to increase the minimum 
basic day wage from 80 to 140 fils and the total minimum basic day wage from 200 to 310 fils.	580 
However, the company refused to reopen the union. The IPC immediately embarked on long-term 
urban development projects (beginning with a housing scheme for IPC workers) endeavoring to 
shift its policy towards what was termed a ‘sociological’ approach for ideological and propaganda 
purposes.581  
 
The battle rapidly moved from the Gāwūrbāghī gardens to the streets of the large cities 
and finally to the courts, which were transformed into theatres of struggle ‘for the defense of the 
rights of the people.’582  At least 150 lawyers came out in solidarity to the trial of the nearly two-
dozen workers who were detained.583 They were all eventually released by order of the Kirkuk 
Penal Court.584 The new government ordered an investigation of the massacre, and a report was 
eventually released that found that the police were unprovoked, the workers were unarmed and 
that all the vicitms were shot in the back. The report also acknowledged that there was no security 
risk on the public as was alleged by the police, since the gardens were far from the city-center.585 
																																																																				578	TNA	 FO	 371/52456.	 E7581/3860/93.	 ‘Strike	 of	 Iraq	 Petroleum	 Company	 at	 Kirkuk’,	 1	 August	1946.	 	Oil	production	was	not	completely	disrupted	by	the	strike	as	the	company	maintained	some	workers	within	the	fields	who	continued	to	work.	In	another	dispatch,	the	fields	manager	stated	that	production	was	maintained	thanks	to	the	‘superhuman’	efforts	of	British	staff.	579	al-Zamān,	July	19	1946.		580	Sālim	al-Nū‘mān	suggests	that	the	IPC	only	agreed	to	a	slight	wage	increase	to	distant	itself	from	its	involvement	in	the	scandal	of	British	interference	in	crushing	the	strike.	Sālim	al-Nū‘mān,	Al-Hizb	
Al-Shīyu‘i	al-‘Iraqi	bi-qayādat	Fahad	 (‘The	 Iraqi	 Communist	 Party	 under	 the	 Leadership	 of	 Fahad’),	(Syria:	Al-Mada,	2007),	at	195.		581	TNA.	 FO	 371/61673.	 E8010/1792/93.	 ‘Development	 of	 the	 Kirkuk	 Oil	 Fields’	 28	 August,	 1947.		This	 approach	 involved	 ‘engaging	 in	 a	 little	 greater	 activity	 outside	 the	 purely	 technical	 side	 of	procuring	oil’	so	as	to	establish	 ‘very	good	relations	with	the	people	in	the	locality	of	the	oil	 fields’.	
See	also	Bet-Shlimon,	The	Politics	and	Ideology	of	Urban	Development,	supra,	ft.	530.		582	al-Talibanī,	supra,	ft.	561,	at	6.	583	Resan	Hussein,	supra,	ft.	557.		584	Ibid.	585	Al-Hasanī,	supra,	ft.	235,	at	121.	See	Humaidī,	supra,	ft.	545,	at	442	for	the	detailed	findings	of	the	investigation.		
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The Minister of Interior, convinced of these conclusions, requested the resignation of the police 
commander of Kirkuk. However, the PM refused and the commander was merely suspended.586  
 
Workers representing fourteen trade unions subsequently submitted a petition to the PM 
demanding that the IPC and their administration be held accountable in Iraqi court.587 This did 
not happen. Iraqi law and justice were unable to penetrate the semi-colonial legal structures 
(maintained by the 1930 Treaty) that were shielding the company. I will return to this in due 
course, but first I will briefly examine certain aspects of the narrative described above concerning 
the question of political agitation and the ideology of trade unionism. 
         
V. A critique of a company narrative & a semi-colonial ideology of trade unionism 
 
The company’s narrative of the strike, which was accepted by both the British Embassy 
in Baghdad and the Foreign Office in London, was that it was contrived by outside political 
agitators. However, as our narrative above suggests the causes of the strike were evidently based 
on genuine grievances of economic exploitation by the company in an extreme environment of 
semi-colonial subservience. The strike could not have been singlehandedly instigated by external 
political agitators, but it was rather a strike initiated by the workers themselves.  
 
A close reading of British records reveals the contradictions inherent in the company 
narrative. The IPC official, Mr. Wheatley, refused to consider that the company was at any fault, 
preferring the explanation that the arrival of a handful of outside communist ‘political agitators’ 
from Baghdad, supposedly in one swoop (in a mere couple of days) got the workers to strike.588 
This he argued happened thanks to their use of ‘a weapon, which was not customary in England, 
namely, intimidation’.589 Spontaneity was therefore rationalized as actual evidence of political 
agitation and violence rather than illustrating the workers’ own organizational efforts. For this 
reason, Wheatley was convinced that in fact ‘practically the whole of our local staff and labour 
																																																																				586After	the	fall	of	the	monarchy,	al-Qassab	claimed	that	it	was	in	fact	at	the	insistence	of	the	British	Embassy	that	the	police	commander	and	mutasarif	were	not	dismissed.	See	Najat	Kawthar	Oughlo,	
Safahāt	Min	Tarīkh	Kirkuk	minthū	Fajir	al-Tarīkh	ila	1958	[Pages	from	the	history	of	Kirkuk	from	the	dawn	of	history	until	1958],	(London:	Dar	al-Hikma,	2015),	at	454.		587	See	Fa’q	al-Būtī.	Mawsuʿa	al-Sahafīya	al-ʿIraqīa	[The	Encyclopedia	of	Iraqi	Journalism],	Baghdad:	al-Mada,	2010),	at	270-271	for	a	copy	of	the	petition. 588	TNA.	H.	N.	Wheatley	to	K.	Stock,	30	July	1946.	FO	371/52456.	E7455/3860/93.					589	Ibid.		
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did not wish to strike’.590 In addition, he went so far as to claim that the ‘undoubted support’ of 
the Russian delegation in Baghdad was at play.591  More interestingly, he rationalized the 
solidarity between the workers that emerged during the strike as a result of ‘Arab resentment’ 
over Palestine. The ‘question of Palestine,’ he said, ‘was a very serious matter for the company,’ 
as it was the one issue that united all workers (Arabs, Kurds and Assyrians) and the agitators used 
it to manipulate the workers to strike.592  
 
The complete dissection of the economic grievances from the political aspects of the 
strike was a reoccurring feature of the dispatches to London. Company statements were recycled 
uncritically throughout: the IPC workers described as being the best-paid workers in the country, 
and the company referred to as the most ‘enlightened’ employer in Iraq. These claims, and in 
particular that of definite political agitation, were so overstated in the dispatches that some British 
officials in London could not help but question this narrative. Even the Secretary of State, Ernest 
Bevin, for instance, a former trade unionist, was shocked to learn that the strike was not analyzed 
as an industrial dispute in any way. Asking for more information on whether the workers were in 
fact treated fairly by the company, he emphasized that ‘men do not strike for political reasons 
unless they have also real [economic] grievances’.593 The responses to these criticisms tended to 
be that even if economic grievances existed, they were surely exploited by political agitators.   
 
The other line of reasoning in the company narrative that was generally accepted by 
London was that political agitation was clear because the workers were given a ‘substantial 
increase in their cost of living allowances’ (which was not an actual wage increase)594 only two 
days before the strike was initiated.595 The workers’ rejection of this offer was seen as being 
completely irrational. As is evident from the counter-narrative, the IPC workers did not merely 
strike for a wage increase or quantifiable benefits, but were insistently concerned with regaining 
their dignity, which was a matter of principle.596 This was clear from their most significant 
																																																																				590	Ibid.	591	Ibid.		592	Ibid.		593	TNA.	Minutes	by	Howe,	22	 July	1946.	E7015/3860/93.	FO	371/52456.	 ‘Strike	at	Kirkuk	of	 IPC’,	July	19,	1946.		594	Around	two	shillings	or	one	dinar.		595	TNA.	Minutes	by	Howe,	22	 July	1946.	E7015/3860/93.	FO	371/52456.	 ‘Strike	at	Kirkuk	of	 IPC’,	July	19,	1946.		596	Davis,	Eric;	“History	for	the	Many	or	History	for	the	Few?	The	Historiography	of	the	Iraqi	Working	Class,”	in	Workers	and	Working	Classes	in	the	Middle	East,	Lockman,	Z.	(ed.),	(New	York:	SUNY	Press,	1994),	at	292.	
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demand, which was their continuous assertion that the company adhere to the law, in particular 
the labour law. This for them could only materialize if they were allowed to form their own 
independent trade union. Finally, the ending of the common practice of discharging workers at 
will (in a manner that circumvented the labour law) was another significant demand. This 
practice, which occurred in the context of a marked racist environment was a very sensitive issue 
for the workers indeed.597 
 
Wheatley’s conception of Iraqi workers was not merely one that was dehumanizing in 
that it took away from the workers’ agency, but it was also based on the orientalist and racist idea 
that Iraqi workers were unable to think for themselves as to what was good for them, and that 
they were easily manipulated en mass by a few political saboteurs. There tended to be two 
explanations given for such an analysis throughout the British records. First, the Iraqi is often 
described as being governed by a certain irrational and emotional temper that makes him prone to 
external agitation. This is best reflected by one British official’s statement that ‘the Iraqi is like a 
gypsy dancing girl who when she hears the voice of the drum must dance. In other words, Iraq is 
a fertile field for agitation’.598 Any sober organizational and strategic planning on the part of Iraqi 
workers was therefore completely discounted as an explanation for effective strike action. Even 
the ‘leftist’ and communist pamphlets that were in circulation at the time were seen as impossible 
to have been ‘drawn up by an Iraqi mind’.599  
 
Second, this denial of Iraqi agency was generally conveyed in parallel with reference to a 
vague subversive (external) invisible hand that continuously overshadowed Iraqi agency. There 
was no way that Iraqi workers were acting on their own and for their own specific interests. This 
could not possibly have been a sound explanation for analyzing the Middle East, the land of 
endless mystery and subversive intrigue. This denial of agency reverberates in what Priya Satia 
has argued in her description of the underpinnings of British thought in Arabia: ‘[a]ll Middle 
Eastern avowals of nationalism [or anti-imperialism] were degraded and delegitimized by 
absorption into a grand conspiracy of indeterminate authorship’.600 This conspiracy theory was 
indeterminate as there could not be ‘a single mastermind’ behind them, because ‘Orientals did not 
																																																																				597	See	pp.126-128	above.	598	TNA.	 C.S.J.	 Berkeley,	 Office	 of	 the	 Political	 Adviser,	 Nasiriyah	 to	 British	 Embassy,	 Baghdad.	FO/624/72.	Communism:	323/5/45.	(14	Sep,	1945).	599	TNA.	Minutes	by	Walker,	British	Embassy	Bagdad,	120/11/84,	8	Jan	1947.		FO/624/116.	600	Priya	Satia.	Spies	in	Arabia:	The	Great	War	and	the	Cultural	Foundations	of	Britain’s	Covert	Empire	
in	the	Middle	East,	(Oxford:	OUP,	2008),	at	226.	
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posses individual minds as such,’ but rather ‘a collective existence, made possible by the magic 
information network’ of spies and subterfuge.601   
 
By way of contrast, as one veteran Iraqi communist who experienced the event pointed 
out, what made this strike unique was precisely the workers’ participation in the administration of 
their own strike action.602 It was only natural that the communists would guide the workers in 
matters of strategy and tactics, but it was the workers’ own agency of organization that steered 
the strike and theirs alone.   
 
 
 The IPC as well as the British learned some vital lessons from the events of the 
Gāwūrbāghī strike and as mentioned earlier the company immediately began to undertake a shift 
in their policy to what one British diplomat referred to a ‘sociological’ approach towards their 
workers and the city as a whole; that is, one that would put more emphasis on social and urban 
development, in particular housing schemes and educational projects for their workers. As 
significant was the appointment by the British Embassy in Baghdad of a labour attaché, and by 
Iraqi government of a full-time labour advisor.603  The escalation of labour troubles and strikes in 
the coming years would lead the IPC to eventually appoint a Chief Labour Officer,604 as well as, 
Information Officers a few years later with the task of keeping in contact with the Baghdadi 
press, so as to directly respond to criticisms of the company in the press.605 These defensive 
measures had some significant ideological motivations, including countering the influence of 
communism, but especially urgent was the demonstration that Britain (with its commercial and 
industrial enterprise) was ‘the world’s pioneer in the promotion of social justice’.606  
 
The IPC’s ‘sociological’ effort was meant to bring about some changes in workers’ 
conditions providing them with transportation, hospitals, maternity and infant welfare centers, 
cinemas and above all housing.607 The housing scheme in particular was meant be a ‘tangible 																																																																				601	Ibid,	at	223-224.	602	al-Nūʿmān,	supra,	ft.	580,	at	194. 603	TNA.	Busk	(Bagdad)	to	Baxter	(London),	17	August	1946.	E7015/3860/93.	FO	371/52456.	604	6635	605	TNA.	FO/624/176.	Oil:	IPC	Labour.	606	TNA.	Douglas	Busk,	Baghdad	to	Ernest	Bevin,	13,	August	1946.	LAB	13/193.	607	TNA.	 FO/624/105.	 Oil:	 Iraq	 Petroleum	 Company	 Labour	 Welfare,	 Nov	 20,	 1946.	 One	 British	official	was	quite	blunt	about	the	significance	of	social	development	for	propaganda	when	he	wrote,	‘Propaganda	through	medical	work	is	extremely	effective	and	every	possible	effort	should	be	made	to	increase	medical	staff’.	
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manifestation’ of the IPC’s ‘goodwill’. 608  By 1950, according to a British report, 246 
‘bungalows’ were built on the new Arrapha Estate for Iraqi staff, and within five years that figure 
rose to over 450 houses.609 The Company would develop a home-ownership scheme for the very 
purpose of furthering this ideology and so as to appear to be contributing to Kirkuk’s economy 
and development.610 The hope was that such an approach would prevent more labour strikes from 
happening, allowing the company to appear favorably to the public. The supply of electricity to 
the municipality, for instance, led one pro-British Iraqi newspaper to praise Kirkuk, describing it 
as the ‘the city of black-gold’ where ‘the company [IPC] supplies electricity from which all is 
benefiting’.611  
 
The company would later refer to this tailored approach in a confidential and exhaustive 
report, commissioned and released in 1955 (partly as a result of the nationalization ‘crisis’ in 
neighboring Iran) as the ‘integration approach’, which was aimed at integrating the company 
(including its subsidiaries the B.P.C. and the M.P.C.) into the Iraqi economy, on the one hand, 
and making the company ‘more acceptable to the Iraqi way of life’ and community on the 
other.612  The overall goal of the approach was to ‘secure the position’ of the company, ‘beyond 
disturbance in any event’ and to prevent nationalization at all costs.613  In terms of the non-
economic aspect of the approach, the point was to break out of the ‘physical and mental 
compounds, the imperium in imperio which they [i.e. company officials] tended in the past to 
inhabit’.614  This approach was therefore a pre-emptive measure that came out of the experience 
of the Gāwūrbāghī strike. I will not get into all the details of this important report, but rather 																																																																				608	TNA.	 FO	 371/52456.	 E12108/3860/93.	 ‘Iraq	 Petroleum	 Company’s	 Housing	 Scheme’,	 Dec	 10,	1946.	609	TNA.	W.J.	Hull,	‘Visit	to	IPC,	Kirkuk	Fields,	15-18	August	1950,’	August	1950,	LAB	13/672;		‘Guide	to	Kirkuk,’	c.	1955,	File	119015,	BP.	This	was	refereed	to	as	the	‘Creole	Housing	Policy’	as	it	was	tried	and	tested	in	Venezuela	in	1949,	a	few	years	before	Kirkuk.	The	IPC’s	Managing	Director,	H.S.	Gibson	admitted	 that	 it	 failed	 its	 objectives	 in	 the	 end	 as	 it	 further	 segregated	 communities	 and	 allowed	workers	 to	 develop	 ‘class	 consciousness’:	 ‘the	 construction	 and	 upkeep	 of	 permanent	 company	quarters	 is	not	 only	 costly	but	 fails	 to	 satisfy	 any	objective…[especially	 as]	 it	 has	 the	 advantage	of	setting	up	a	class-conscious	section	within	a	community	which	must	always	be	avoided’.	H.S.	Gibson	to	Hoard	Page,	London,	10	July	1952.	BP	135818.	610	BPA.	‘Notes	on	IPC	Group	Meeting	on	9th	November	1950,’	File	60550,	BP.		611	BPA.	Al-Shaʿb,	3	August	1950	enclosed	and	translated	in	HH.	Wheatley	to	Sir	John	Cunningham,	29	August	1950,	File	135819,	BP. 612	BPA.	 John	 Murray.	 Policy	 and	 Practice	 of	 the	 Iraq	 Petroleum	 Company,	 Limited	 and	 Associated	
Companies	in	their	Economic	and	Other	Relations,	(in	Two	Volumes),	London,	31/12/1955,	File	4656	BP,	at	 i.	This	report	was	commissioned	after	 industrial	strikes	continued	to	escalate	between	1948	and	 1954.	 The	 aim	 was	 to	 develop	 an	 approach	 that	 would	 ‘prevent	 nationalization	 and	expropriation	of	the	IPC’	by	eliminating	‘the	climate	of	opinion	which	is	favorable	to	nationalization’.				613	Ibid,	at	3,	emphasis	in	original.	614	Ibid,	at	ii.	
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focus on the section that deals with the company’s treatment of workers,615 in particular the 
question of trade unions. Despite taking a similar view with regards to the role of communist 
political agitation as mentioned above this time with regards to the Basra Strike of 1953, the 
author stressed that ‘a foreign company…cannot afford to treat its Iraqi personnel worse than its 
foreign ones’.616 Consequently, the company, he emphasizes, must treat its workers ‘so obviously 
good’ that people ‘merely laugh’ at any ‘propaganda’ that claims otherwise.617 One of the 
primary efforts focused on was the development of ‘joint consultation’ committees as a substitute 
for independent trade unions and its relation to the law.  
 
 After the suppression of the Gāwūrbāghī strike and the trade union that organized it, the 
IPC reintroduced the ‘joint consultation’ worker committees, which were considered as adequate 
substitutes for independent trade unions. Despite the fact that the British Embassy encouraged the 
formation of ‘genuine trade unions’ amongst the oil workers of Kirkuk, this really meant unions 
(and committees), which were pro-British and anti-communist.	618 This was therefore, a part of a 
broad top-down ideology of trade unionism that was aimed at the Iraqi labour movement.  
 
In fact, the British government was constantly concerned with establishing new devices 
to co-opt the labour movement in Iraq. ‘We should endeavor,’ a Foreign Office official in London 
wrote, ‘to put into control of labour unions in Kirkuk…labour leaders who are known to have 
anti-communist views.’619 Another official reiterated this position by arguing that ‘medical rather 
than surgical measures’ must be used to treat communism, and this could only be done by 
‘jockeying’ into control of the labour unions in Kirkuk ‘a non-communist labour leader’.620 
Similarly, the 1955 company report suggested that government unions should be encouraged, as 
they would form at once, ‘a safety valve and a point of contact’.621 Referring to the assessment of 
the IPC’s Personnel Adviser, the author illustrates the manner in which government-sponsored 
rather than independent trade unions would function:  
 
It is possible that they [i.e. government unions] may not be effective for some time; but, in the 
words of the Personnel Adviser, “it is the Communist-inspired ad hoc ‘union’ that is to be feared at this 																																																																				615	Ibid.	616	Ibid.	at	Chapter	XII,	at	4.	617	Ibid.	618	TNA.	Bagdad	to	FO,	12	July	1946,	FO	371/52459.		619	Ibid.	620	TNA.	 Minutes	 by	 RMA	 Honkey.	 FO	 371/52459.	 E6246/5857/93.	 ‘Communism	 in	 Iraq’,	 4	 July	1946.		621	BPA.	John	Murray,	supra,	ft.	612,	at	11.	
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stage and not a Government-organized union. The latter frequently provides a harmless outlet for the 
aspirations of potential trouble-makers who become so preoccupied by the internal organization and 
politics of the union that they forget the purpose for which it was formed”. This is a useful, if slightly 
Machiavellian, point.622 
 
The government-sponsored unions would therefore function in the same way as the company’s 
joint consultative committees – to insulate and depoliticize the workers and ultimately pacify any 
form of genuine struggle against the company. A Machiavellian technique if ever there was one.    
 
  The IPC established an administrative machinery to deal with disputes in the form of 
joint consultative committees (as well as general welfare committees) as a way for workers and 
management to communicate on issues of mutual interest. These committees were ultimately 
unsuccessful, as all the ‘best workmen’ considered them as having been discredited by the recent 
strike, especially seeing that those who led the former committees were opposed to the strike.623 
It did not help that dialogue in these committees was heavily restricted by management, who did 
not allow any discussion on matters covered by the labour law or which concerned wage rates.624 
This was the same criticism made by the author of the 1955 company report, who argued that 
these committees were supposed to address questions of production, but this was rarely done.625 
Instead, the committees’ merely acted in an ‘advisory’ capacity and became a forum where 
workers could make suggestions on efficiency, welfare and educational issues.626 The company 
acted like a ‘benevolent paternalist’ in the settlement of disputes.627 There was therefore more 
than a general lack of interest in joining these committees, for most workers did not want to be 
seen as ‘stooges’ of the company.628   
 
 In any case, the ideology of trade unionism that emerged at the IPC after the strike was 
clearly advanced to undermine the workers’ ability to run their own unions. It was therefore not 
out of genuine concern for the workers that they were put into place, but rather to control and 
‘keep tabs’ on them.629  Furthermore, the new IPC fields’ manager, Mr. Mainland, who was hired 
after the strike, was described by a British Embassy councilor, as ‘a nervous individual’ who was 																																																																				622	Ibid.	623	TNA.	FO	624/105,	supra,	ft.	607.	624	Albert	 Badre	&	 Simon	 Siksek.	Manpower	and	Oil	 in	 the	Arab	World,	 (Westport:	 Hyperion	 Press,	1960),	at	183.		625	BPA.	Murray,	supra,	ft.	612,	Chapter	XII,	at	13.	626	See	 TNA.	LAB	13/1634.	Hull,	 ‘Iraq	Labour	Memorandum	No.	4’	August,	 1950;	 for	details	on	 the	workings	of	these	committees;	Albert	Badre	&		Simon	Siksek,		supra,	ft.	624,	at	184.					627	Albert	Badre	&	Simon	Siksek,	supra,	ft.	624.		628	Ibid,	at	187.			629	TNA.	FO	624/105.	‘Oil:	IPC	Labour	Welfare’,	25	October,	1946.			
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‘preoccupied by the dangers of subversive elements’ and was determined to cleanse the company 
of political agitators.630 After visiting the oil fields, the councilor explained the ideological basis 
of this new developmental policy, referring to it as ‘Calpurnian,’ that is, one that would ensure 
that the company was ‘above suspicion’.631 This he wrote could only be done if they endeavored 
to achieve ‘occidental [labour] standards’ in Iraq.632 In other words, if the company would at least 
appear to be treating their workers on the basis of (‘civilized’) ‘western standards,’ they would be 
beyond reproach and no one would be able to criticize them for not following the (‘uncivilized’) 
labour law of the state.  Even in the midst of the strike, the British Ambassador, Stonehewer-Bird, 
suggested that the company did not have to ‘stick strictly’ to the Iraqi labour law as long as it 
treated its workers by what it regarded as Western or British standards.633  
 
Here, one could see that this so-called new policy as it was applied to trade unionism was 
merely meant to reinforce the company by putting it in an ‘invulnerable’ position634, as it allowed 
it to once more avoid the labour law whenever it pleased by reference to its ‘enlightened’ 
occidental standards. These colonial double standards were precisely what the workers were 
opposed to when they decided to strike. In many ways, this strategy was effective as the newly 
appointed labour attaché, A.T. Audsley, visiting the IPC a couple of years later would cme to the 
conclusion (again) that the company provided ‘more favorable conditions than the labour law’.635  
 
As an alternative to this narrative, a ‘law and space’ approach provides a more coherent 
explanation for why it was that Iraqi law was ultimately unable to penetrate into the 
concessionary space of the company by holding it accountable for what happened at Gāwūrbāghī.  
               
VI. Law & Space in the Iraqi Oil Frontier: the pipelines of law in a desert space 
 
Returning to the overarching argument of Chapter 3: the semi-peripheral sovereignty 
granted to Iraq under international law which was discussed in a previous chapter, functioned in 
tandem with the (1931) oil concessionary agreement, contributing to the specifically tense social 
conditions in Kirkuk. In fact, I went further to suggest that semi-peripheral sovereignty was 
																																																																				630	Ibid.	631	Ibid.	632	Ibid.	633	TNA.	E7015/3860/93.	FO	371/52456.	Stonehewer-Bird	to	Sargent,	9	July	1946	634	TNA.	FO	624/105,	supra.	635	FO	371/68458.	E12918/77/93.	M.T.	Audsely,	Report	on	Visit	to	Iraq	from	June	8th	to	10th,	1948.	
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constructed for that very purpose – that is, to allow the oil company to function with a certain 
amount of operational freedom. Hence, the already expanded powers that the company received 
from the concessionary agreement were further bolstered by the weak sovereignty of the Iraqi 
state. This surely had a hegemonic influence on the social and economic dynamics of Kirkuk and 
Iraq as a whole. Vast material socio-economic transformations occurred in the city, which in turn 
had an impact on the laboring classes as I have already described in detail above. Furthermore, it 
was precisely because the company was somewhat shielded by an assemblage of these legal 
structures that it was able to completely evade any liability for the murder of workers by their 
local henchmen at Gāwūrbāghī.  
 
Here, the law played a significant role in the social production of the space of the oil city 
of Kirkuk. This space as a part of the Iraqi oil frontier and its international dimensions could not 
have operated without the unique legal infrastructure put into place and the streamlining of all its 
parts in tandem. Hence, following from those scholars who have highlighted the constitutive 
connection between law and space, the analysis becomes clearer; it explains why the tensions 
described earlier manifested in such a way culminating into violence.636 It also explains the 
spatiality of law and how it shielded the company, contributing to its power and impunity in its 
operations.   
 
In fact, the law of concession is itself a perfect illustration of how law could completely 
alter the geography and space that is its subject.637 A ‘concession’ has been defined as a grant or 
license granted by a state to a private individual or a corporation (‘the concessionaire’) to 
undertake works of public character extending to a considerable period of time, and involving the 
investment of substantial capital and expertise.638 An oil concession is one that is generally 
granted as an exclusive right to ‘search for, obtain, exploit, develop, render suitable for trade, 
carry away export and sell petroleum’.639 Despite having an international character, a concession 																																																																				636	See	Nicholas	Blomley.	Law,	Space	and	the	Geographies	of	Power	 (New	York	and	London:	Guilford	Press,	 1994);	 Tayyab	 Mahmud.	 “Law	 of	 Geography	 and	 the	 Geography	 of	 Law:	 A	 Post-Colonial	Mapping”	 Jurisprudence	 Review,	 vol.	 3.064,	 (2010),	 pp.64-106;	 Andreas	 Philippopoulos-Milhalopoulos.	“Law’s	Spatial	Turn:	Geography,	Justice	and	a	Certain	Fear	of	Space”	Law,	Culture	and	
the	Humanities	(2010),	XX(X)	1-16.		637	As	 Simon	 Siksek	 illustrates,	 the	 operation	 of	 an	 oil	 concession	 in	 particular	 possess	 unique	characteristic	since,	‘it	destroys	the	very	substance	of	the	concession’	attacking	the	very	substance	of	the	mineral	resources	for	which	the	concession	is	granted.	Simon	Siksek.	The	Legal	Framework	for	Oil	
Concessions	in	the	Arab	World	(Beirut:	The	Middle	East	Research	and	Publishing	Centre,	1960),	at	7	638	Simon	G.	Siksek,	ibid,	at	4-5.	639	Henry	 Cattan.	 The	 Evolution	 of	 Oil	 Concessions	 in	 the	Middle	 East	 and	North	 Africa,	 (New	 York:	Oceana	Press,	1976),	at	2.		
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contract is recognized as being governed by the municipal law of the local jurisdiction and not 
international law.640 However, in this case, whereby a foreign company was granted wide powers 
in a concessionary agreement by a weak state (which was itself dependent on the company for its 
finances), it is clear how the law of the state cannot truly be enforced on the company.  
 
In any case, concessionary agreements had a very specific function, as they were 
instruments initially used by the oil industry to effectively generate ‘transfers of sovereign powers 
over vast tracts of land’ to foreign companies for long periods of time, for payment of a fixed 
royalty calculated by the quantity of oil produced.641 As Sonarajah states, only an arsenal ‘web of 
power’ exerted by the home state alongside ‘a concentrated dominance exerted within the 
international system by the dominant powers’ could ultimately maintain these concessionary 
agreements.642 The concession therefore contributed rather violently to the production of this (oil) 
space. It is in this context that the IPC caused certain social tensions within its space, for 
unregulated by the state; it was instead ruled by what could be referred to as the international law 
of primitive accumulation.643  
 
To clarify further, Kirkuk, as a part of the oil frontier where oil extraction occurred at a 
‘specific, focal point of its location,’ constituted a uniquely situated space in the international 
machinery of imperialist oil production in the region and the world capitalist economy.644 It was 
this specificity that made it both the center of imperialist capitalist exploitation, as well as, the 
very beating heart of anti-imperialist struggle in Iraq. The oil frontier is, as Michael J. Watts has 
shown, already a unique space in that not only does it function on its ‘own temporalities and 
spatialities’ of global capitalism,645 but also operates within ‘an astonishing spatial patchwork, a 
quilt of multiple, overlapping, and intersecting spaces of territorial concessions, blocs, pipelines, 
risers, rigs, flow stations, export terminals… [It is, in other words] a cartographer’s dream-space: 
a landscape of lines, axes, hubs, spokes, nodes, points, blocks and flows.’646 The IPC in the oil 																																																																				640	This	was	firmly	established	in	the	Anglo-Iranian	Oil	Co.	(Jurisdiction)	Case	(1952).	641	M.	Sonarajah.	The	International	Law	of	Foreign	Investment:	Second	Edition.	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2004),	at	40.	642	Ibid.	643	Mark	 Neocleous.	 “International	 Law	 as	 Primitive	 Accumulation;	 Or,	 the	 Secret	 of	 Systemic	Colonization”	European	Journal	of	International	Law,	(2012)	Vol.	23,	no.4,	941-962.		644	Thad	Dunning	&	Leslie	Wirpsa.	“Oil	and	the	Political	Economy	of	Conflict	in	Colombia	and	Beyond:	A	Linkage	Approach”	Geopolitics,	Vol.	9,	No.	1	(Spring	2004),	pp.81-108;	at	82	645	Michael	J.	Watts.	“Securing	Oil:	Frontiers,	Risk,	and	Spaces	of	Accumulated	Insecurity,”	in	Hannah	Appel,	Arthur	Mason	&	Michael	Watts	(eds.),	Subterranean	Estates:	Life	Worlds	of	Oil	and	Gas,	(Ithaca:	Cornell	University	Press,	2015),	pp.211-236;	at	221.	646	Ibid.		
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city of Kirkuk operated on similar lines. Its space was a dynamic and multilayered network, 
which was ultimately connected across pipelines and pumping stations to the ports and cities of 
the Mediterranean. As Iraq’s gateway to the world – the point where the ‘Third River’ of ‘black 
gold’ flows from; it was also where order and disorder manifested; where violence ultimately 
broke, and where the tensions of capitalist modernity were reproduced.  
 
In parallel to and constitutive of this spatial specificity was a legal specificity, which 
made all this a reality in many ways, for before pipelines could be designed and erected, one 
would need to construct the legal space for this to even be a possibility – the ‘primordial straight 
line’ drawn on the map if you would. The law and its structures played a prominent role in 
bringing all this about. For example, semi-peripheral sovereignty allowed for the triangular 
relationship between the company, the British and the Iraqi government to appear to be 
functioning at a certain arms-length, when in fact this was not the case as we have seen in our 
narrative, where their processes were so much closer and at times entirely interconnected – the 
Gāwūrbāghī strike and massacre being a perfect illustration of this. The British government 
frequently evoked Iraqi (semi-peripheral) sovereignty to continuously put the blame on the Iraqi 
government for all its shortcomings in its dealing with the labour question, diverting from their 
own responsibilities. Iraq was an ‘independent’ and ‘sovereign’ state after all, notwithstanding the 
influence the British had through its advisors. 
 
 
 
Only a couple of years after the Gāwūrbāghī strike, after the Wathba uprising in 1948, the 
labour attaché to the British Embassy, M.T. Audsley, released a report whereby he used the same 
inconsistent and contradictory line of reasoning in that, on the one hand, he severely criticized the 
‘feudal reactionary character’ of the Iraqi government in its dealing with the working class, while, 
on the other hand, he recommended the following ‘security’ measures when dealing with any 
labour troubles in the IPC: “If the Government is unwilling or unable to put its house in 
order…we must always have a strong and pro-British Mutasarrif, Commandment of Police, and 
G.O.C. 2nd Division who have instruction to make it clear at all times that the IPC is a vital Iraqi 
interest, and that incitement of our labour ranks is a crime against the state. At the same time, 
care should be taken in the appointment of judges to Kirkuk, and the Ministry of Justice should 
instruct the President of the Courts that no lenient treatment is to be given to cases of incitement 
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of labour to strike.”647 This is a remarkably candid recommendation and in many ways illustrates 
exactly how the complicity of the triangular relationship functioned during the Gawūrbāghī strike 
in 1946. The labour attaché (who acted more like the labour strike ‘fixer’) was therefore merely 
conjuring up an already tried and tested method of labour suppression. 
      
VII. Pressure Points of Oil Imperialism & Capitalism; or how to use space to sabotage law  
 
 
The concluding angle in this narrative invokes another episode in the labour history of 
Iraq that advances my argument about the spatiality of law, namely the massive strike of the oil 
workers at the K3 pumping station in the isolated desert town of Hadītha, which took place 
during the revolutionary period of the Wathba uprising in April of 1948.648 As mentioned earlier, 
the K3 pumping station was one of the most important pipeline stations whereby oil flowed 
through the desert out to Mediterranean ports and to the world – it was the critical point of 
bifurcation.  
 
 Although the idea of a strike there originated with the communist party, it was only after 
organizing a mass meeting of 3,000 workers when a resolution agreed to undertake wildcat strike 
action. Led by a charismatic communist labour organizer by the name of Shanwar Oūda,649 the 
strike began the following day on the 23rd of April. Almost immediately, a series of ad hoc 
committees emerged: a strike committee, which kept out of view was considered the ‘living brain 
of the strike’; a negotiating committee, which although a façade of the strike committee was also 
its ‘chief lever;’ an organizers’ committee tasked to select orators and poets; and a strike’s 
prefects led by the chief of the guard.650 The prefects were tasked to oversee meetings and 
gatherings by preserving order and discipline. Station patrollers took shifts to enforce the strike. 
A picket guard controlled those who entered or exited the station, ensuring that, except with the 
written permission of the strike committee, ‘not even a pint of gasoline’ would leave the station. 																																																																				647	TNA.	 FO	 371/68482.	 ‘Report	 on	 visit	 to	 Iraq	 from	 8th	 June	 to	 10th	 July	 by	 M.T.	 Audsley’	 (1	November,	1948);	Appendix	D,	‘The	Security	Situation	in	Iraq	as	it	Affects	the	Company,’	at	3.		648	The	Wathba	will	be	dealt	with	in	detail	in	a	following	chapter.		649	Oūda	was	a	former	schoolteacher	who	was	dismissed	by	the	authorities	for	spreading	communist	propaganda	in	1946.	He	found	his	way	into	the	employ	of	the	IPC	as	a	mechanic	to	make	ends	meet.	He	 was	 later	 imprisoned,	 tortured	 and	 killed	 by	 the	 Ba‘athists	 during	 the	 1963	 coup.	 See	 Fāyez	Haīdar.	 “Meḥdi	 (Shanwar)	 Oūda	 :	 Qa’id	 ʿUmālī	 Salib	 wa	 Masīra	 Yathkurūḥa	 al-Tārīkh”	 (“Mehdi	(Shanwar)	 Ouda:	 A	 steadfast	 labour	 leader	 and	 a	 March	 remembered	 by	 history”),	 al-Hiwār	 al-
Mutamadin,	2009/6/5,	(http://www.ahewar.org/debat/show.art.asp?aid=174173).			 650	Batatu,	supra,	ft.	41,	at	625.	
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The entire K3 pumping station, which at that point was in full workers’ control, came to a 
complete standstill.651  
 
The main demands of the workers encompassed the following: a wage raise of 25% for 
workers of grades (0-1) and 50% for those of grades (3-5); the enforcement of the labour law; 
providing K3 workers the same amenities as those given to the Kirkuk (K1) workers; adequate 
housing and transportation; making Saturday a half-day; ending the constant overseeing of 
workers during the day by security guards; ending the practice of dismissals at will and fining; 
and dismissals for taking strike actions.652 The company’s response was not only to regard the 
strike a ‘breach of the law,’ but also to make the typical accusation that it was not a genuine 
industrial dispute, but rather ‘a subversive movement’ concocted by the communist party.653  The 
British Vice-Consul in Baghdad seemed rather astonished when he admitted that, ‘the strike was 
from the outset organized with remarkable efficiency. The strikers took over the whole plant and 
picketed the ferry across the river Euphrates near Hadītha and all roads leading to the camp’.654 
The exceptional organizational capacity of the strikers was attributed, as it was earlier, as actual 
evidence of outside political influence rather than stemming from the actions of the workers 
themselves. 
   
Although the company eventually conceded to some minor demands, it rejected the key 
demand of a wage increase. The strike committee refused to back down, and the workers’ spirits 
remained high. By May 5th, a squadron of nearly 30 armored police cars arrived on the scene, 
circling the station and workers’ quarters with machine guns. Shortly thereafter, the celebrated 
poet, Mohammed Mahdī al-Jawāhirī, furiously wrote in a newspaper in Baghdad: ‘Do they want 
to repeat the Gawūrbāghī massacre!’655  The strike committee, who at first unsuccessfully tried to 
‘enlist the sympathy of the [police] rank and file’, then ordered the workers to stay away from the 
police and avoid confrontation at all costs.656 The British Vice-Consul, who considered Oūda a 
communist ‘fanatic’, wrote of his organizational methods, that he maintained firm discipline, 
																																																																				651	TNA.	FO	371/68479.		Telegram	No.	478	from	Mack,	Bagdad	to	FO,	4	May,	1948.	E65768/620/93.	‘Strike	on	the	Iraq	Petroleum	Company’s	Pipeline’	5	May	1948.			652	al-Humeidī,	supra,	ft.	549,	at	563-564.	653	TNA.	F.	Wells	Minute,	14	May	1948.	E7302/620/93.	FO	371/68479.	‘Strike	on	Iraqi	Petroleum	Co	Pipeline’,	21	May	1948.		654	Ibid.	655	Jarīda	al-ʿAsūr,	Issue	14,	9	May	1948,	as	quoted	in	al-Humeidī,	supra,	ft.	549,	at	571. 656	TNA.	F.	Wells	Minute,	14	May	1948.	E7302/620/93.	FO	371/68479.	‘Strike	on	Iraqi	Petroleum	Co	Pipeline’,	21	May	1948.		
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‘repeatedly impressing upon the strikers the necessity for avoiding violence whilst at the same 
time showing that they were effectively under control’.657  
 
A couple of days later, the police cut off food rations, water and electricity from the 
station. Realizing that they could not rely on the local bread offered by the neighboring villagers 
for long and insisting on avoiding what would be a certain violent confrontation with the police, 
the workers held a meeting where they decided to march to Baghdad, 250 kilometers away to 
present the government with a petition comprising of their demands. Therefore the next morning 
on the 12th of May, the workers of K3 began their long journey to Baghdad.  At the head of their 
column they carried a banner that read: ‘We the Oil Workers Have Come to Claim Our Violated 
Rights’.658  
 
By the time the workers crossed twenty-four kilometers to Hurān valley, they were 
exhausted and fatigued from the scorching heat. Taking shelter in the closest village of al-
Baghdadi, many of them lost consciousness. As rumors spread, eight trucks carrying food and 
water arrived for them in solidarity from the people of Hīt. Their brethren drove them back to Hīt 
where they took repose.  The next day on May 13th, the K3 workers left Hīt on foot. Enduring 
their journey, only to be knocked by the desert sun at noon, at which point they were offered 
hospitality from the tribe of the al-Muhamadī, who fired rifles and chanted tribal songs in their 
honor.  When the sunset, they returned to the sandy road, sightlessly trailing in the dead of night. 
In the morning, they realized that they arrived in a place called al-Warrār, one kilometer north of 
Ramadī and 126 km west of Baghdad. Mounting on small handmade boats, the workers began 
traversing the Euphrates to get to Ramadī. When they reached the other side of the river, still 
raising their large banner, they continued to march until they approached a bridge that led to 
Fallūjah. There the police were waiting for them.  It was a trap. The K3 workers were 
apprehended approximately 60 km from their destination. Although some were returned to 
Hadītha, Oūda and the strike leaders were all arrested and charged under martial law.659 
 
This heroic episode of labour struggle, which would later be known as ‘al-Masīra al-
Kubrā’ (The Great March), was to assume legendary significance in the annals of Iraqi and labour 
historiography. I have recounted the entire narrative so as to make several points to illuminate my 
																																																																				657	Ibid.		658	Batatu,	supra,	ft.	41,	at	625.	659	This	narrative	of	al-Masīra	was	based	on	Batatu,	ibid,	at	625-627.	
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argument on legal spatiality.  It was only after the K3 workers decided where in the unique 
imperial map they were situated in to undertake strike action, were they able to very effectively 
interrupt the operations of oil production and hit imperialism where it hurts, while they asserted 
their normative demands, which they regarded as their legal rights. The workers used spatiality as 
a strategy so as to counter the legal spatiality of imperialism itself. It was their grasping of the 
spatial map of the Iraqi oil frontier – the network of oil pipelines and the manner in which they 
were all interconnected in the whole region – that allowed them to assert their interpretation of 
the law. In fact, they were directly challenging the legal structures that were imposed upon them; 
the semi-peripheral sovereignty which was maintained by the Anglo-Iraq Treaty that was months 
earlier challenged in the streets of Baghdad during the Wathba, was the same legal configuration 
that was challenged by them during their strike in an isolated town in the middle of the desert.  
 
This narrative and the workers’ control of the pumping-station is a great example of the 
spatiality of law– that is, how legal structures are spread out in a spatial configuration. Timothy 
Mitchel has implicitly emphasized this link between spatiality and law in the context of the oil 
frontier in the region when he wrote: ‘in building the infrastructure of oil, the petroleum 
companies were also laying out the infrastructure of political protest. The points of vulnerability, 
where movements could organize and apply pressure, now included a series of oil wells, 
pipelines, refineries, railways, docks and shipping lanes across the Middle East. These were the 
interconnected sites at which a series of claims for political freedoms and more egalitarian forms 
of life would be fought.’660 Here, Mitchel was suggesting that organized action on a specific 
‘vulnerable’ point in a spatial arrangement would bring certain pressures to the everyday 
operations of the world capitalist machinery. However, he should have added that this 
‘infrastructure of political protest’ was conceivable because of the existence of a corresponding 
legal infrastructure that was a part of the spatial configuration in question, and so applying 
pressure on these sites had an effect on the law as well. The K3 workers were simultaneously 
rejecting their role in the operations of an exploitative system of capital accumulation, while 
asserting and even constructing their own imaginative legal order. This explains why one worker 
considered that the ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’661 was established at K3 that day, while 
workers would refer to the station as ‘the State of Shanwār Oūda’.662  																																																																				660	Mitchel,	supra,	ft.	451,	at	103.		661	His	statement	was:	 ‘[I]n	a	word,	 the	dictatorship	of	 the	proletariat	was	established	at	K3	on	the	23rd	of	April,	if	the	comparison	is	apt”.		Batatu,	supra,	ft.	41,	at	625		662 	Ara’	 Khājādwr.	 “Maʿan	 al-ʿUmālīya	 Tuhāwir	 Ara’	 Khājādwr”	 [Maʿan	 converses	 with	 Ara’	Khājādor],	al-Hīwār	al-Mutamadin,	6/8/2008,	http://www.ahewar.org.		 
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The strike and the beehive-like organizing capacity of the K3 oil workers in controlling 
the station is a remarkable illustration of how precise organized action that takes into account 
space and spatial configuration affects and eventually transforms law and governance. More so, 
the workers’ very determination to assert their rights after being forced out of their station was 
itself replete with meaning. For unlike the oil pipelines that they operated under the desert sun 
that pumped a lifeless commodity into the machinery of the capitalist world economy, the 
workers were determined to materially impress that their natural rights and living demands 
through their very actions would traverse the space of the vast desert all the way to the seat of 
state power in Baghdad, and explode into a revolutionary mode to shake up the despotic order 
that oppressed them. This of course did not happen. Not yet. Their unwavering movement was 
tragically blocked. Although the strike failed in that none of the workers’ demands were fulfilled, 
this legendary effort in worker organization and agency would reemerge in a radical way after the 
revolution in 1958. 
 
VIII. Conclusion 
  
            This chapter has detailed the socio-economic conditions of the oil workers of Kirkuk, 
examining the micro-history of the IPC oil fields. The main point is to show that the legal 
arrangements described in Chapter 3, had a material effect on the ground by ensuing capitalist 
operations were established in Kirkuk. The concessionary agreement and semi-peripheral 
sovereignty produced a unique space where the company had a wide discretion to operate, in turn, 
creating a certain colonial capitalism. The chapter then moves to uncover the triangular 
relationship between the company, the British Embassy and the Iraqi government in violently 
crushing the Gawūrbāghī oil strike of 1946, which was initiated by the oil workers to resist the 
imperialist constraints imposed on their lives. This strike demonstrates how the imperial and 
capitalist spaces that emerged from international and transnational law insulated Iraqi law and so 
prevented the Iraqi people from pursuing justice against the company for the murder of Iraqi 
workers. The chapter consequently critiques the company narrative of the strike and its responses 
to it. Finally, the famous K3 pumping station strike is detailed to illustrate how spatiality was 
used as a strategy by the oil workers in their anti-imperial struggle and to assert their own 
proletarian legal order.        
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Chapter 5: The Railway & Port Workers’ Struggle Against the Semi-Colonial 
Legality of the Iraqi State 
 
 
 
The Port soars when it hears the call 
Yielding an echoed response 
And the heroes of the trade union how they 
                                                                 Taste humiliation and suffering 
  Guilty when it is said to us that the bearers of  
                       Rights want what was snatched [from them]? 
And just for every freeman to endure [at] 
                The hand of the colonizers in pain and vex 
… 
 
So cry to your ‘ally’ on our behalf: 
We do not want neither a treaty nor a mandate.663 
 
 
~ Badr Shākir al-Sayyāb 
 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
The other advanced sectors of the Iraqi working class at the time were the railway and 
port workers.  The previous chapter dealt with the micro-history of the oil workers and showed 
how they struggled against the ‘triangular’ complicity between the IPC, the Iraqi state and the 
British Embassy. This chapter will expand this analysis, moving from the provincial city of 
Kirkuk and its surroundings into two other sites of labour struggle at the time: the Iraq State 
Railways, concentrated in the workshops of western Baghdad, and the Port of Basra in the South. 
Both the railways and the port were arranged as semi-autonomous entities —administratively and 
functionally separated from the Iraqi state. This was the direct effect of the 1930 Anglo-Iraqi 
Treaty and Iraqi semi-peripheral sovereignty.  After detailing these legal structures, I will turn to 																																																																				663	The	entire	poem	quoted	in	Jasim	al-Matīr,	“Bayna	ʿam	47	wa	Thukrā	74	Afʿāl	Kathīra	Tuthīr	al-Da 
ḥsha,”	[Between	the	year	‘48	and	the	memory	of	‘74	a	lot	of	actions	that	astonish],	Basrah	al-Ahāli,	25/3/2008.	Al-Sayyāb,	who	was	a	port	worker	at	the	time,	recited	this	poem	on	the	day	of	the	1948	port	strike,	the	strikers	carried	him	on	their	shoulders.	The	poem	illustrates	how	the	strikers	tied	their	conditions	to	the	Anglo-Iraq	treaty.	My	translation.		 
	 149	
explore the conditions of the railway and port workers and then analyze their various 
organizational efforts to improve their conditions, while simultaneously challenging the 
repressive semi-colonial legal structures that were imposed on them through collective strike 
action.  I will end with an analysis of the manner in which British experts –especially the labour 
attaché to the British Embassy and the labour advisor to the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour 
– influenced the institutions of the Iraqi state.  I will show how the British expert’s approach 
conceived of trade unionism and the working class in Iraq. The argument in this chapter is that 
while the railway and port workers were structurally challenging the semi-colonial legal order, 
British experts were devising top-down social and labour reforms to ensure the maintenance of 
this order and British hegemony. I will then critically examine the limitations of their analyses in 
their reports to explain their failure in preventing revolution in the end. 
 
II. The Iraq State Railways as imperial arteries of communications 
 
The Iraq railways were envisioned for a specific purpose that has always been at the 
center of imperial considerations. This goes back to the tense conflicts that emerged between 
imperial powers over the strategic ‘Berlin-Baghdad Railway’ that was initially obtained as a 
concession by the German-controlled Anatolian Railway in 1902.664 By the time the First World 
War began in 1914, and the British occupied Iraq a few years later, only a 74-mile section of 
standard-gauge railway between Baghdad and Samārra was under construction.665   It was 
consequently only as a result of the war that the British Army was to extensively build the 
railway system in Iraq.666 As the Director-General of the Iraqi State Railways wrote in one of his 
reports in 1947, ‘the railway [system] is virtually a product of two wars’.667 The British, who 
always regarded the railways as essential to their strategic communication network in the 
																																																																				664	The	 literature	 on	 the	 Baghdad-Berlin	 Railway	 is	 vast.	 	 For	 a	 more	 recent	 study	 see,	 Murat	Ozyuksel.	Berlin-Baghdad	Railway	and	the	Ottoman	Empire:	 Industrialization,	 Imperial	Germany	and	
the	Middle	East,	(I.B.	Taurus,	2016).			665	Naval	 Intelligence	 Division.	 Iraq	 and	 the	 Persian	Gulf	 (B.R.	 524,	 Geographical	 Handbook	 Series,	September	1944),	at	579.		666	Ibid,	at	580-581.	 ,	During	the	war	effort	the	following	lines	were	constructed:	the	Basra-Nasiriya	line;	 the	 Basra-Qurna-Amara	 line;	 the	 Shaikh-Saad-Sinn-Atab	 line;	 the	 Kut-Baghdad	 line;	 the	Baghdad-Baquba-Mansur	line;	the	Baghdad-Fallujah	line;	Baghdad	Hilla	line;	and	Sammara-Baiji	line.	Most	 of	 these	 lines	 would	 be	 dismantled	 after	 the	 war,	 while	 a	 single	 line	 between	 Basra	 and	Baghdad	would	be	deemed	sufficient	for	post-war	purposes.		667	Iraqi	State	Railways.	Report	on	the	Administration	of	the		Railways,	1945-46,	(Baghdad:	September	1st,	1947).	
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region,668 ensured the safeguarding of their interests in what Longrigg and Stoakes considered the 
‘arteries of Iraq’s communication’669 after independence. Hence, it is for this reason that the 
railways were to be explicitly addressed in the 1930 Anglo-Iraq Treaty, fundamentally 
influencing the institutions of an ‘independent’ Iraqi state. 
 
The main lines of the railway system, were divided into two sections, standard gauge 
north of Baghdad to Baijī along the Tigris, and meter gauge from Baghdad to Basra, along the 
Euphrates, and from Baghdad to Jalūla on the Diyāla, where it branched eastwards to Khanaqīn, 
and northward to Kirkūk.670 In 1939, the Baghdad-Baiji was extended through Mosul to Tell 
Kochek on the Syrian frontier, and after 1945 the Kirkūk was extended to Arbīl.671 For the 
purposes of this chapter, the most important part of the entire railway system lay in the 
workshops and stores of Schālchīyyāh in Baghdad (a working-class district situated 2.5 miles 
north-west of Baghdad West station). The headquarters of the Railways were located in the west 
side of the Tigris in Baghdad.672   
 
 
During the first war, between 1914-1918, those employed by the Railway Directorate 
were entirely British and Indian. By 1940, the total staff numbered 8,863 (32 of whom were 
British, 31 Indian, and the rest were Iraqis).673 After the second war, in 1946, according to a 
railway administrative report, the total staff numbered 14,522 (14,461 of whom were Iraqis). The 
majority of Iraqis were employed as labourers (11,211), while the others were for the most part, 
low-grade or junior officials. Only 43 Iraqis were in some sort of middle and ‘senior positions,’ 
compared to 59 British officials served in senior or higher technical and ‘expert’ positions.674 
This composition of employees at the Railways was a reflection of the fact that the institution was 
juridically separated from the Iraqi state and administered in such a manner. These legal 
structures were embedded in the 1930 Anglo-Iraq Treaty and finalized later in a separate 1936 
Railway Agreement that I will discuss in detail below.  This therefore rendered the Railway 																																																																				668 	See	 Morton	 Brown	 Stratton.	 British	 Communications	 in	 the	 Middle	 East	 1885-1939,	 (PhD	Dissertation,	University	of	Pennsylvania,	1943).		669	Stephen	Longrigg	and	Frank	Stoakes.	Iraq	(Ernest	Benn,	London,	1958),	at	133.	670	Naval	Intelligence	Division,	supra,	ft.	661,	at	581;	Longrigg	and	Stoakes,	ibid,	at	133.		671	Ibid,	at	133.		For	a	detailed	description	of	the	railway	lines	see,	Hugh	Hughes.	Middle	East	Railways	(Kenton:	The	Continental	Railway	Circle,	1981),	at	89-90.	672	Naval	Intelligence	Division,	supra,	ft.	665,	at	585.	673	Ibid.	674	Iraqi	State	Railways.	Report	on	the	Administration	of	the		Railways,	1945-46,	(September	1st,	1947),	at	36.	
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Directorate as having a special status under law, for although its ownership was transferred to the 
Iraqi state (in 1936); it was in reality administered under the authority of a British Director-
General, who had semi-autonomous powers under statutory law. It was in that sense that most 
Iraqis considered the Railway Directorate as ‘an alien [semi-colonial] body’.675   
 
 
III. The legal structures that govern the institutions of the Railway Directorate 
 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the 1930 Anglo-Iraq Treaty of Alliance would govern the 
relations between the newly ‘independent’ Iraqi state and Britain.  I have already argued that this 
treaty in fact ensured that Iraqi sovereignty would be constricted as it gave Britain significant 
room to influence the vital functions of the Iraqi state. Furthermore, this treaty gave way for the 
development of a novel form of sovereignty – semi-peripheral sovereignty – under international 
law, as the jurists of the PMC in Geneva considered it quite adequate for the termination of the 
Mandate. In an annex of the treaty, it was stipulated that a ‘close’ alliance between the two states 
would be maintained, especially relating to the military, as two bases were to be maintained rent-
free inside Iraq, while British troops had a (virtually unlimited) right to move troops over Iraqi 
soil. Article 7 of the annexure stated that Iraq would, ‘…afford, when requested to do so by His 
Britannic Majesty (HBM), all possible facilities for the movement of British forces of HBM of all 
arms in transit across ‘Iraq and for the transport and storage of all supplies and equipment that 
may be required by these forces during their passage across Iraq. These facilities shall cover the 
use of roads, railways, waterways, ports and aerodromes of Iraq and HBM’s ships shall have 
general permission to visit the Shatt-al-Arab.’676  
 
A separate financial annexure, which was likewise attached to the treaty, dealt with the 
railways. It was stipulated that the ownership of the railway system would be transferred by 
British government to the Iraq government and registered under its name, while full beneficial 
ownership shall be vested by lease at a nominal rent in a special body or corporation having a 
separate legal personality to be constituted by special Statute of the Iraq Legislature.677 This 
																																																																				675	Batatu,	The	Old	Social	Classes,	supra,	ft.	41,	at	617.	676	The	Anglo-‘Iraq	Treaty	of	1930,	(Baghdad,	June	30,	1930),	Art.	7	of	the	Annexure	to	the	Treaty	of	Alliance.			677	Ibid,	Notes	Exchanged	with	the	Iraq	Prime	Minister	Embodying	the	Separate	Agreement	on	Financial	
Questions	Referred	to	in	the	second	Exchange	of	Notes	Appended	to	the	Anglo-Iraq	Treaty	of	30th	June,	
1930;	Art.	4(a).	
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corporation would be wholly responsible for the administration and management of the railway 
system, subject to limitations imposed by the statute.678 The Board of the corporation would 
consist of five members, two of whom would be appointed by the government of Britain and two 
by the government of Iraq; the fifth who would be the Chairman would be appointed by both 
governments in agreement.679 
 
It took a longer time than anticipated to subsequently negotiate and finalize an agreement 
by which the railway was to be transferred to the Iraqi state. The disagreements were mostly 
regarding the actual amount to be paid for purchase, and the composition of the Board mentioned 
in the treaty, and its statutory powers. E.G. Hogg, the British Advisor to the Ministry of Finance, 
explained the difficulties in negotiations in a Note where he wrote, ‘in the case of the 
Railways…[the] Iraqi [government] feel that operations are conducted inside a wall which they 
cannot see through and can only to a very limited extent look over. They are told that the 
existence of the Board will make all the difference, since they will have their representation on 
the Board, which will be composed of reasonable men…[who] will listen to their views. On this 
they are skeptical…’ considering that they would become ‘a permanent minority’ on the 
Board.680  
 
Eventually, the Railway Agreement was concluded in March 1936. A law was passed to 
create a corporation that would govern the railways.681  It was agreed that the Iraqi state would 
take over ownership of the railways (including its material assets and Reserve fund) for a nominal 
sum of 494,000 British Pounds Sterling.682 The Iraqi Government was to accept all liabilities 
relating to the railways. Furthermore, it was agreed that for twenty years from the date of the 
transfer, the management of the railways would be entrusted to a five-member Board of 
Management appointed by the Iraqi Government, only one of whom would be a British subject. 
However, the agreement made it clear that British subjects would hold all key positions of 
administration, such as General Manager, Inspector-General of Traffic and Chief Engineer. In 
that sense, the Railway Agreement and the Anglo-Iraq Treaty ensured that the railway system 
was to remain under British administrative control, although it was legally owned by the Iraqi 																																																																				678	Ibid,	Art.	4(b).	679	Ibid,	Art.	4(d).	680	TNA.	CO	730/172/4.	Note	by	Mr.	E.G.	Hogg,	C.M.G.,	Advisor	to	the	Ministry	of	Finance,	(Baghdad,	7th	August,	1932).		681	Ibid,	‘Railway	Corporation	Law’	(1932).	682	The	 text	 of	 the	Railway	Agreement	 is	 in	TNA,	 Sir	Archibald	Clark	Kerr	 to	 FO,	 1	April,	 1936,	 FO	371/19998,	E2117/25/93.	
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state.  This was one of the legal instruments that were innovatively used to dismember the 
strategic parts of the country, turning them into semi-colonial enclaves, with the purpose of 
safeguarding British interests.  As I will show later, a similar approach was used when dealing 
with the Port of Basra.  It was no wonder that these spaces would eventually become important 
sites of anti-colonial and anti-imperial struggle.  
 
IV. The first communist ‘experiment’ in strike action at Schālchīyyāh & its significance 
 
I have earlier recounted the role of the railway workers in the formative years of the 
history of the labour movement in the early and mid-1930s in a previous chapter. So, it should be 
kept in mind that the railway workers had a considerably longer history in labour organizing and 
it is for this reason not surprising that the communists would decide to begin their involvement 
with labour in the railways, leading to the 15-day Schālchīyyāh strike that would have a 
significant contribution to the overall history of labour movement in Iraq. The communists’ 
strategic approach was to gradually organize cells in different railway stations throughout the 
country (such as Ma’qīl, Sāmāwah, Diwanīyyah, Baghdad West, Baghdad North, Baghdad East, 
and Kirkūk).683 However, they focused their energies on the Schālchīyyāh workshops, as they 
considered it as the ‘most fundamental point in the entire system’, where they would be able to 
affect the most damage if strike action was called.684 The workers of the Schālchīyyāh workshops 
numbered 1,265 in May 1945 (compromising about 12 percent of all railway workers).685 
 
																																																																				683	Batatu,	supra,	ft.	41,	at	617.	684	Ibid.	685	Ibid.	
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Figure	3:	Map	of	Baghdad	 showing	 the	 railway	workshops	 in	 the	 Schalchiyyah	neighborhood.	
(Naval	Intelligence	Division,	Handbook,	supra,	ft.	665,	at	511).	
 
Most of the railway workers (like their counterparts in the huge industrial enterprises) 
were uneducated, had rural origins, and remained attached to their tribal roots.686 It was therefore 
a difficult task for the urban communist intelligentsia to shake their consciousness as their 
peasant-outlook and tribal affiliations made them less susceptible to notions of class solidarity, 
and appeared to fragment their ability to unite under class or even nationalist lines.687 Yet, despite 
these misgivings, the railway workers were successful in finding a form of unity at pivotal 
moments, under notions of class solidarity. The communists were sensitive to recruit the workers’ 
most respected leaders into their ranks (in particular Alī Shukur and ʿAbd-Tamr) and this 																																																																				686	al-Nūʿmān,	supra,	ft.	576,	at	122. 687	Ibid.		
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eventually made the party quite attractive. In time, the communists succeeded in becoming an 
intrinsic part of the railway workers, providing the workers with the analytic language and 
conceptual tools they needed to understand the world around them.688 
 
The Railway Union received its license from the Ministry of Social Affairs in September 
1944.689  Its first congress was held in Baghdad on November 7, 1944.690 Hāshim Jawād, the 
well-respected Iraqi member of the ILO chaired the elections, which gave it a certain 
legitimacy.691 Sixty-four delegates representing 1,692 members of all railway workers were in 
attendance.692 The assembly elected a supervisory council of twelve (ten of which were members 
of the ICP), and an administrate bureau of seven members (four of which were members of the 
ICP). Alī Shukur, a charismatic and well-respected communist-worker693, was elected as the 
president of the union, and Abbūd Hamza as secretary.694 The union charter emphasized that it 
would seek improvements in wages and working conditions strictly by ‘legal’ means, 
discouraging any confrontation with the state.695 It called for workers’ education (to teach them 
how to read and write), the raising of their technical skills, ‘to cultivate brotherly ties amongst 
themselves in the interest of the working class, their Iraqi homeland, and ‘international 
democracy’’.696 Within a month of its establishment a third of the railways workers (around 
11,000 workers) joined the union.697 In fact, the licensing of this union was such an important 
event that its headquarters was transformed into the epicenter of far-reaching labour organizing 
and solidarity across sectorial lines, bolstering the labour movement as a whole.698      
 
At the congress, the new president of the union, Ali Shukur made a speech in which he 
emphasized that the union’s main role was to advocate for the legal rights of the railway workers 
																																																																				688	Batatu,	supra,	ft.	41,	at	620.	689	TNA.	Thompson	(Bagdad)	to	FO	(London).	15	Sep.	1944	‘Formation	of	Trade	Association	in	Iraq’	E6090/5305/43.	FO	371/40096.		690	TNA.	Thompson	(Bagdad)	to	FO	(London).	18	Aug.	1944	‘Formation	of	trade	associations	in	Iraq’	E6090/5305/5305/93.	 FO	 371/40096.	 	 It	 happened	 to	 be	 the	 27th	 anniversary	 of	 the	 Bolshevik	Revolution.	691	TNA.	Mr.	Thompson	to	Mr.	Bevin,	Oct	8,	1945.	E7496/6265/65.	FO	371/45281.	692	Batatu,	supra,	ft.	41,	at	618.		693Salim	Obeid	al-Nū‘mān,	a	communist	lawyer,	who	frequently	defended	workers	arrested	for	their	trade	union	activities	in	court,	knew	Shukur	well	and	described	him	as	‘charismatic’,	 ‘brave,	and	‘an	example	of	well-mannered	and	kind	personality’.	al-Nū‘mān,	supra,	ft.	52,	at	298,	.		694	TNA.	Mr.	Thompson	to	Mr.	Bevin,	Oct	8,	1945.	E7496/6265/65.	FO	371/45281.			695	Batatu,	supra,	ft.	41,	at	618.	696	Constitution	of	the	Iraqi	Railway	Workers’	Union	(Baghdad,	1944),	Articles	2-7,	Ibid.		697	Ibid.	698	Sbāhī,	supra,	ft.	191,	at	255.	
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and to resolve all their problems.699 He then turned to identify some of the main problems facing 
the workers, mentioning their drastically low wages which were inadequate to live on. He 
recommended that wages should be fixed on a yearly rather than daily basis.700 He also addressed 
the question of hours of work, stating that workers worked overtime to the detriment of their 
health.701 One of the main issues that he tackled related to dismissals-at-will and the manner in 
which management abused their powers, often fining workers in a punitive manner.702  Shukur 
insisted that this needed to be regulated and clearly defined within the law so that it was not 
abused. Finally, although he agreed that open communication channels and full cooperation 
between management and the union was a necessity – even suggesting the formation of a special 
committee to look into workers grievances and educating them on their rights under the labour 
law – he made it clear that an independent trade union must be recognized by management as the 
sole bargaining agent for the railway workers.703  
 
From the very beginning, the attitude of the British Director-General of the Railways, 
Major Smith, was hostile towards the formation and licensing of the union. Rather than 
recognizing its elections as a democratic process, he saw it as being instigated by communist 
agitators who were ‘political opportunists’ rather than genuine railway workers.704 Smith would 
keep a close eye on these developments, privately encouraging workers to ‘squeeze out’ those 
undesirable (elected) leaders from their ranks.705 Even the British Embassy councilor, who agreed 
that the new union was for the most part promoted by ‘political busybodies’, would go on to 
criticize Smith’s uncompromising approach, writing in a dispatch to London: ‘“political 
opportunists” or not, leaders with some education and independence will be necessary if workers 
in this country are to improve upon their miserable status. They are unlikely in my view to make 
																																																																				699	Ṣawt	al-Ahālī,	10	November	1944.	700	Ibid.	701	These	accusations	have	been	documented	elsewhere,	especially	in	the	working-class	press.	Here	is	an	example	 from	the	communist	paper,	al-Qa‘īda	(December,	1943):	 “The	head	of	 the	workshop,	Mr.	Holt…always	forces	the	workers…to	work	overtime,	night	and	day…until	the	hours	turned	into	a	total	of	fourteen	hours	a	day…[this]	made	the	health	of	the	workers	worst…day	after	day…If	a	worker	needed	to	go	 to	 the	hospital,	he	only	had	ten	minutes	 to	do	so,	otherwise	he	would	 lose	half	of	his	wage…”	See	Nasīr	Saīd	al-Khadhamī	[Sbāhī],	Musahama	fī	Kitābat	Tarīkh	al-Haraka	al-‘Amalīya	fī	al-
‘Iraq,	Markaz	Dīrāsāt	al-Ishtrakīya	fī	‘Ālim	al-‘Arabī,	Dīmashq,	1989),	at	150.			702	Ṣawt	al-Ahālī,	10	November	1944.	703	Ibid.		704TNA.	Mr.	Thompson	to	Mr.	Bevin,	Oct	8,	1945.	E7496/6265/65.	FO	371/45281.	705	Ibid.	
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such progress if merely organized into “company unions” which is evidently what Smith would 
like to see’.706  
 
As one would expect from a semi-colonial enterprise, the British Embassy believed that 
the numerous allegations regarding the working conditions of the railway workers made in the 
circulating communist pamphlets were exaggerated, at one point it was claimed that that 
conditions of railway workers were much higher than other industries. Moreover, the 
contravention of the Iraqi labour law by the railway administration, which was one of the main 
allegations made by the workers, was astoundingly admitted, but it was claimed that this 
contravention was done ‘to the advantage of the workers’.707 
 
On April 11, the railway union submitted a petition to the railway administration which 
listed the demands of the Schālchīyyāh workers, which were raises of 50%, 40% and 30% on day 
wages of less than 200 fils,708 between 200-300 fils, and of more than 300 fils, respectively.709 
The question of higher wages was the most important concern for the workers, because if one 
were to calculate the wages of the workers at the time and compare it to the cost of living index, it 
would be obvious that they were utterly inadequate.  The lowest wage for day labourers at the 
railways was 150 fils710, while the ‘labourer’s basket’ for one family to live on in December 1945 
was calculated at approximately 405 fils.711 In other words, wages were less than inadequate to 
live on, especially considering the continuing rise of the cost of living. In fact, even by 1948 
when some increases in wages were applied, while living costs rose to six times before the war, 
the labour attaché to the British Embassy wrote in his report that ‘the purchasing value of these 
																																																																				706	Ibid.	707	TNA.	Note	by	P.	Rex	Marriot,	 ‘Enclosure:	Iraq	Communist	Party’,	Sep.	25,	1945.	E7496/6265/65.	FO	371/45281.	708	The	Iraqi	dinar	was	on	par	with	the	British	pound	and	so	1	fils	was	equivalent	to	50	shillings	(the	British	currency	in	the	Empire	at	the	time).	709	The	petition	and	demands	are	included	in	Ja‘far	‘Abbās	Ḥumaidī.	Al-Taṭwurāt	al-Syāsīsya	fī	al-‘Iraq,	
1941-1953	 [‘the	 political	 developments	 in	 Iraq,	 1941-1953’]	 (al-Najaf:	 Matb‘a	 al-Ni‘man,	 1976),	 at	153.	710	TNA.	Iraqi	State	Railways,	Establishment	General	Order	No.	76:	Schedule	of	Wages	for	Daily	Paid	Railway	Workmen,	1st	May,	1945;	in	‘Labour	Conditions	in	Iraq’	Stonehewer	British	Embassy,	Bagdad	to	FO,	Oct	29,	1946,	E10974/3860/93.	FO	371/52456.	711	TNA.	‘Labourer’s	Basket:	Man,	Wife	and	2	Children	as	revised	by	Central	Labour	Sub-Committee.	Minutes	 of	Meeting	 of	Dec	22,	 1942,	 Part	 1	 (b)’;	 in	 ‘Labour	Conditions	 in	 Iraq’	 Stonehewer	British	Embassy,	Bagdad	to	FO,	Oct	29,	1946,	E10974/3860/93.	FO	371/52456.	
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wages was much below the lowest subsistence level,’ and that therefore a wage of about 230 fils a 
day meant that workers were ‘nearly half-starved’.712  
 
The conditions of the railway workers could also be ascertained from the descriptions of their 
living quarters, which were tiny mud huts surrounding the workshops. A communist lawyer, 
Sālim al-Nūʿmān described one of these huts, where the administrative bureau of the union would 
sometimes meet, in the following manner: ‘the hut…was made up of one room [and] built from 
mud… its space was no more than thirty square feet; [and] a family of five lived in it…[T]hese 
were the conditions of the railway workers’.713 Even when the labour attaché, was given a tour of 
these quarters in 1948, he described them as ‘nauseating’.714 Azīz al-Hājj, one of the foremost 
communist intellectuals who was assigned the task of coordinating union activities with the party, 
described how a railway worker portrayed his conditions in a union meeting as he was weeping: 
Describing ‘the unaffordable rents, dismissals-at-will, high costs and black housing, the police 
chase, the abuse of the British administration … [It is clear the worker concluded that] the 
[British railway] administrator Smith and his kind were the ones running these [Iraqi] 
governments.’715 
 
The Railway Directorate’s response to the union’s demands was an unqualified refusal, 
and Shukur consequently had no choice but to order a national strike four days later.716 The 
response was instantaneous. The Schālchīyyāh workshops came to a complete standstill for ten 
consecutive days. This naturally put a great strain on the entire railway system, as strike action 
spread to other stations in Basra and Mosul.717 On the third day, Major General H.C. Smith cut 
off water supplies to the workers’ mud hut dwellings surroundings the railway workshops.718  
 																																																																				712TNA.	 FO	 371/68482.	 ‘Report	 on	 visit	 to	 Iraq	 from	 8th	 June	 to	 10th	 July	 by	 M.T.	 Audsley’	 (1	November,	1948).		713al-Nūʿmān,	supra,	ft.	580,	at	299.		714	TNA.	FO	371/68482.	‘Report	on	visit	to	Iraq	from	8th	June	to	10th	July	by	M.T.	Audsley’,	supra.	715	al-Hājj,	 Azīz.	 Dāfatir	 al-Shakhis	 al-Ākhir,	 [Notebooks	 of	 the	 Other	 Person]	 (Beirut:	 Mu’sasa	 al-
ʿArabīya	lil-dirāsāt	wa	al-Nashir,	1985),	at	104. 716	al-Nūʿmān	 recounts	 how	 Shukur	 as	 the	 president	 of	 the	 administrative	 bureau	 of	 the	 union	approached	Comrade	Fahad	the	secretary-general	of	the	ICP	to	try	to	convince	him	of	the	necessity	to	call	a	strike	shortly	after	the	congress	ended.	Fahad	cautioned	against	this	as	he	felt	that	it	was	not	the	correct	move	in	terms	of	strategy	and	tactics.	He	argued	that	waiting	for	the	right	moment	was	decisive	 for	 a	 successful	 strike,	 eluding	 to	 the	 fact	 one	must	 take	 into	 account	 the	wider	 political	implications	and	its	effects	on	the	nationalist	movement	as	a	whole.	al-Nūʿmān,	supra,	ft.	580,	at	123-124.	717	Humaīdī,	supra,	ft.	549,	at	154-55.	718	Batatu,	supra,	ft.	41,	at	619.	
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On the 17th, the mutasarif of Baghdad ordered the suppression of the union, arresting the 
members of the administrative bureau. The justification for the revocation of the union’s license 
and its suppression could be found in a letter sent to Parliament from the Minister of Social 
Affairs, which claimed that Iraqi workers were ‘socially and intellectually immature’ to form a 
union, as they were easily prone to manipulation by political agitators, in turn, threatening the 
‘peace of the Monarchy.’719  The Minister urged that the union’s license be revoked, and 
Parliament agreed. During the strike, the Railway Administration formed a spineless ‘Labour 
Committee’ that called for an end of the strike before any demands were met. The workers aware 
of this strategy boycotted it, and mockingly referred to it as ‘Smith’s Committee.’720 General 
Smith, consequently warned the strikers to resume work by the morning of the 21st, or be 
considered, ‘as having left the service of the railway without notice.’721 The workers remained 
firm for the most part. At this point, Smith appealed to the workers: ‘Your interests are our 
interests. Therefore, return to work and have confidence that your Administration…will improve 
your condition as far as is possible.’722 There was no response. On the 24th, Smith threatened to 
import Indian labour.  Five days later, the strike subsided after a promise by the Ministry of 
Social Affairs to increase wages to a certain extent.723 After the 28th, worker disintegration spread 
for fear for their jobs, and the strike eventually ended.724 The railway union was permanently shut 
down and would not reemerge until after the fall of the Monarchy. 
 
 The significance of the 1945 railway strike in the history of the labour movement could 
not be overstated as it was in the words of Sbāhī the first ‘experiment’ in organizational strike 
action in post-war Iraq.725 It was in other words, the beginning of a pattern that would reoccur 
elsewhere, where a union would be democratically formed by the workers, then violently 
suppressed by the government, leading to the emergence of a (hidden) ‘strike committee’ that 
would undertake a more offensive militant strategy of wildcat strike action. This pattern 
continued sporadically until the advent of the revolution. 
																																																																				719	As	quoted	in	Humaidī,	ft.	549,	supra,	at	155.	720	Sbāhī,	supra,	ft.	187,	at	258-259. 721	Batatu,	supra,	ft.	41,	at	620.	722	Ibid.		723	Ibid.		A	committee	was	formed	by	the	Ministry	of	Social	Affairs	to	deal	with	the	question	of	wages,	and	it	was	decided	that	raises	of	30,	25	and	20	percent	would	be	implemented.	In	the	front	page	of	
Ṣawt	al-Ahālī,	the	editors	called	for	the	reopening	of	the	union	and	the	release	of	the	administrative	bureau,	arguing	that	the	fact	that	wages	were	to	be	raised	implies	that	the	workers	were	correct	and	effective	in	striking	to	fulfill	their	demands.	Sawt	al-Ahālī,	April	25,	1945.			 724	Batatu,	supra,	ft.	41.		725	Sbāhī,	supra,	ft.	191,	at	257.	
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As Batatu illustrates the railway strike demonstrated that the communists did not actually 
have unlimited influence or control of the workers. That is true, however Batatu did not fully or 
explicitly acknowledge the independence of the trade union and its administrative bureau from 
the ICP. In other words, his narrative assumes that the party was the prime mover of every aspect 
of the strike, including the union itself, which was not the case. The union was influenced by the 
communists and very closely coordinated with the party, and its president was a communist, but 
he took the workers’ concerns to the party leadership rather than imposed party instructions on 
them.726 The fact was that the leadership of the union was democratically elected for a reason and 
that was that they were trusted to further the workers’ interests while keeping wider political 
questions in mind. Close coordination and guidance does not necessary mean full control 
(although it could surely at times imply strict discipline), and that was never really the policy of 
the party in the first place.   
 
The communists were successful in broadening the workers’ perspective and allowed 
them to practice all-embracing solidarity. In other words, they were able to see the larger picture. 
Hence, the strike actually brought workers from different industries together to defend the very 
idea of trade unionism, which was being attacked by the government and the railway 
administration. Numerous sympathy strikes were initiated by mechanic, carpenter, electrical, 
cigarette and printer workers.727 One petition submitted to the government made it clear that, ‘this 
attack on the railway workers is considered as directed towards all the workers of Iraq’.728 The 
other consequence of the strike was the gradual radicalization of the working class as labour 
issues were now understood in the context of the nationalist movement and its political discourse. 
In other words, the role of the labour movement in the overall nationalist movement was further 
clarified, and workers were able to grasp how ‘workers solidarity’ came hand in hand with 
nationalist ‘popular solidarity’.729 This allowed for the escalation in the popular ‘hatred towards 
British colonialism [and imperialism]’ within and beyond the Iraqi working class.730 So, for 																																																																				726	al-Nūʿmān	writes	on	this	issue	that	Shukur	was	loyal	to	the	communist	party,	and	was	careful	to	follow	party	policy.	However,	he	was	aware	of	his	role	as	the	leader	of	a	large	union	and	as	an	ardent	trade	unionist	many	times	made	his	own	decisions	without	consulting	the	party.	Fahad	trusted	him	and	did	not	interfere	with	any	of	these	decisions,	but	only	asked	him	to	consult	the	party	when	the	issue	in	question	had	broader	political	implications	that	went	beyond	trade	unionism.	Supra,	ft.	52,	at	298,.		727	Ḥumaidī,	supra,	ft.	549,	at	155	728	Ibid,	at	156.	729	al-Nūʿmān,	supra,	ft.	580,	at	126.	730	Ibid.	
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example, the Iraqi Federation of Students organized sympathy strikes in support of the railway 
workers’ struggle, referring to the Railway Directorate in their petition to the government as a 
‘colonial entity’.731 The significance of the formation of this bond between the students and the 
workers would be one of the most important and effective relationships during the Wathba. 
 
More significantly for our purposes, the communists exposed the manner in which Iraqi 
law was being undermined by the semi-colonial legal structures that governed the railways. The 
response of the British railway administration of violent suppression of the union and its 
replacement by what workers would later refer to as the ‘colonial Smith Committees’ 
demonstrated how the Anglo-Iraq treaty and its legal structures had a direct effect on the workers. 
The ICP were central in contributing to the broadening the worker’s consciousness in this regard, 
allowing them to learn from their experiences. This is clear in a communist declaration written by 
Fahad and addressed to the railway workers in February of 1946 that called for the re-initiation of 
strike action, and directly critiqued the neo-colonial legal structures of the railway administration 
and its restrictive influence on Iraqi law: 
 
... Comrades! … We understand why you want your trade unions [rather than the ‘workers 
committees’]…you want them because they represent you and because you struggle under their banner to 
implement the labour laws, and to improve your living…conditions, and to respond to the assault and 
injustices that you are exposed to by the Colonial Smith Administration. And we understand why Smith 
and the Iraqi government want to strip you and strip [all] the workers of Iraq from the trade unions and 
replace them with ‘worker committee[s];’ because they want the labour law to remain – like the Iraqi 
constitution – a dead law, and because they want to exploit the Iraqi worker like an animal without any 
rights to raise his voice or respond against any injustice perpetrated against him…732    
 
       
The struggle therefore moved from one generally concerning a wage increase to one dealing 
specifically with the very existence of trade unionism in Iraq, the recognition of an independent 
railway trade union and (quite explicitly) the implementation of the labour law. The workers were 
aware that through their actions, they were injecting real content into the empty shells of the 
labour legislation that was in the books, and this had an important effect on their nationalist 
resistance against the legal structures governing the Iraqi state.  
 
In that sense, the 1945 strike would in fact later continue under a new form of offensive 
action with the 1946 strike (and later in massive successive 1948 strikes during the Wathba), 
																																																																				731	Ibid,	at	125.	732	Declaration	of	the	Iraqi	Communist	Party	to	the	Railway	Workers,	Feb	28	1946	reproduced	in	full	in	
al-Thaqāfa	al-Jadīda,	issue	132,	1981,	at	77.		
	 162	
which was now not only more political, but brought to further prominence the organizational 
institution of the ‘higher strike committee’. Therefore, as the democratically elected trade unions 
were systematically suppressed by the Iraqi state and their British administrative overlords, the 
higher strike committee which tended to operate underground would emerge as an important 
organizational structure for the labour movement; whereas the tactic that would eventually 
distinguish this change in strategy (as was already detailed with the actions of the K3 oil workers) 
would become offensive wildcat strike action. This happened hand in hand with the development 
of a cadre of worker-communists, who would gain and hone unique organizational experiences in 
the strategies and tactics of strike action, and who would move to coordinate their efforts into 
other industries, in particular the oil fields and the Port of Basra. 
           
 
V. ‘To Balsara’s Haven’733: The struggle of the Port workers of Basra & their victory 
 
One of the most important sites of labour struggle that would emerge on similar lines as 
the railways was the Port of Basra.  The history of the city of Basra (at one point dubbed the 
‘Venice of the East’ due to its narrow canals and waterways) could not be understood without its 
port734, which for centuries, as the only ‘sea-gate’ to the city and ‘the Land of Two Rivers,’735 
was so central to the trade routes of the Indian Ocean and the Gulf, and later on would become 
vital to linking Iraq to the world economy.736  Naturally, most of Iraq’s export and import trade 
passed through this port. Basra, situated on the right bank of the Shatt al-Arab, 70 miles by river 
above Fao, is in fact an agglomeration of three towns: Basra City; Ashar; the modern port of 
Maqil; and several large villages: Jubaila (on the river front); Manawi and Rubat Saghir.737  The 
British first entered the city in 1914 and occupied it thereafter, eventually turning it into ‘an 
																																																																				733	From	Milton’s	Paradise	Regained	734	Mohammed	Khudayyir	 illustrates	this	well	 in	his	book	Basrayatha,	which	 is	an	autobiographical	portrait	 of	 Basra,	 when	 he	writes,	 “Had	 it	 not	 been	 for	 the	 date	 palm,	 there	would	 have	 been	 no	baskets	for	harvesting	dates.	Had	there	been	no	baskets	for	harvesting	dates,	there	would	have	been	no	date	pickers.	Had	there	been	no	date	pickers,	there	would	have	been	no	ships.	Had	there	been	no	ships,	there	would	have	been	no	port.	Had	there	been	no	port,	no	city	would	have	been	built.”	One	of	the	 most	 important	 long	 established	 industries	 in	 the	 city	 was	 the	 date-packing	 industry.		Mohammed	 Khudayyir,	 Basrayatha:	 Portrait	 of	 a	 City,	 William	 Hutchins	 (tr),	 	 (Cairo:	 AUC	 Press,	2007),	at	5.	735	Cecil	 Byford.	 The	 Port	 of	 Basrah	 Iraq,	 (Published	 under	 the	 authority	 of	 the	 Port	 of	 Basrah	Directorate,	London:	Waterlow	&	Sons,	1935).	736	See	 Hala	 Fatah.	The	Politics	of	Regional	Trade,	 supra;	Thabit	 Abdullah.	Merchants,	Mamluks,	 and	
Murder:	The	Political	Economy	of	Trade	in	Eighteenth-Century	Basra,	(NY:	SUNY	Press,	2001).			737	Naval	Intelligence	Division,	supra,	ft.	665,	at	505-506.	
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appanage of British India’.738 Of course, even before their military expedition, by the early 
twentieth century, trade in Basra was already ‘almost entirely in British hands.’739  
 
The British army gradually began constructing the modern port of Basra during the first 
war, using its access as the main supply base for their two military bases in Habbānīyyāh and 
Shū‘aybāh. Once the military effort was over, the port reverted to its commercial function and 
officially opened in 1920 – its new commercial status affirmed in the Port of Basra Proclamation 
1919 (Provisional) – considered as ‘the Port of Basra Code’740- which would eventually be 
incorporated into the constitution or Organic Law in 1924.741  The Basra Port Directorate 
remained under British ownership, although it was placed under the control of the new Iraq 
government and subsequently administered by the Ministry of Finance.742   	
 
 
By the time the Anglo-Iraq Treaty was signed in 1930, the port would be governed by 
very similar legal structures as the railways– that is, as a semi-autonomous institution. The 
financial annexure of the treaty set up an autonomous Port Trust, whereby the property of the port 
would be (legally) transferred to the Iraqi government.743 The Port Trust had its own ‘legal 
personality,’ and this legislation could not be amended without the agreement of the British, as 
long as Iraqi government owed debt with respect of the port.744  The Iraqi government would 
consequently confer ‘full beneficial ownership’ upon the Port Trust.745 
 
 The Iraqi government ultimately paid a nominal sum of 540,875 British pounds 
sterling.746  Hence, by the Second War, the port would become the property of the Iraqi 
government, although it was administered by an independent Port Authority, headed by a British 																																																																				738	Paul	 Rich	 (ed.),	A	Voyage	 in	 the	Gulf:	C.M.	 Cursetjee’s	The	Land	of	 the	Date	 (1918)	 (Cambridge:	Allborough,	1991),	at	157.		739	A.C.	Wratislaw.	A	Consul	in	the	East	(London:	William	Blackwood	and	Sons,	1924),	at	139.		740	Byford,	supra,	ft.	735,	at	36	741	Ibid.	742	The	Ministry	of	Finance	was	created	in	1927	and	directly	attached	to	Parliament.	It	was	separated	from	the	executive	under	 law.	 Its	 functions	were	to	examine	all	accounts	of	 the	state,	 including	the	railways,	the	port	and	industrial	factories,	and	it	was	empowered	to	take	broad	discretionary	action	to	remedy	any	deficiencies.	See	Sassoon,	supra,	ft.	141,	at	51.			743	Anglo-Iraq	Treaty,	Annexure	to	the	Treaty	of	Alliance	744	Ibid.	745	Ibid.	746	Naval	Intelligence	Division,	supra,	ft.	665,	at	508.	
	 164	
Port Director and a Director General of Navigation (including British senior administrative 
staff).747  Furthermore, the finances and budgets of the port, like the railways, were fully 
separated from that of the Iraq government.748 The port was therefore one of the strategic sites 
that was so important for British imperial interests that it had to be (practically) dismembered 
from the governing functions of the Iraqi state, turning it into a semi-colonial enclave governed 
by a separate semi-colonial legality. This was once more the effect of semi-peripheral 
sovereignty, which as discussed earlier, was characterized by a fragmented and constricted 
sovereignty at its core with merely the appearance of a legally conferred sovereignty.  
 
 
The port workers were differentiated into numerous categories according to their 
functions in the port – they were not merely skilled, semiskilled and unskilled, but also marine 
ratings, monthly labourers, day labourers, labourers on contract and labourers on piecework.749 
Furthermore, according to Batatu, the bulk of these workers came from rival tribes –Nassār and 
Bahrakān – which made them even more difficult to unify under class or nationalist lines.750 The 
communists and their allies therefore had a difficult road ahead in ‘loosening the workers from 
their old tribal moorings and fastening them to new proletarian anchors’.751  The national 
campaign for a Port Workers’ Union began in 1944. As will be shown, one of the main 
characteristics that distinguished the struggle of the port workers was the uncompromising 
attempt to unify all the fragmented port workers and to guarantee that the Iraqi labour law was 
applied systematically to all port workers rather than only some. 
 
  In one revealing petition to the authorities during the campaign, which was published in 
the working-class press, the manner in which the Port Administration intentionally avoided the 
application of Iraqi law (namely the 1936 Labour Law) was described in colorful language, and 
the miserable conditions of the port workers compared to the ‘slave-workers of Pharaohs’. It is 
worth quoting in part below:    
 																																																																				747	Ibid.	748	Cecil	Byford,	supra,	ft.	735,	at	24.	749	Batatu,	supra,	ft.	41,	at	621.	750	Ibid.	751	Ibid.	Nāsir	ʿAbbūd,	a	communist	trade	union	leader	described	the	difficulty	of	educating	illiterate	port	 workers.	 He	 would	 personally	 undertake	 one-on-one	 sessions	 with	 workers,	 reading	 and	explaining	 the	 communist	 newspaper,	al-Qa‘ida	 in	 detail.	 	 “Nāṣir	 ʿAbbūd.	Munādil	 Fatha	wa	 Shīū‘i	
Ṣāmid,”	Majala	al-Ghadd,	Basra,	17	July	2011.		 
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Our [port] workers have lived under the shadow of the British directorate that controls the Port, a 
life of misery and despair and slavery […] representing the cruelest form of colonial exploitation, […] a 
life that…does not fit with [the principles of] human rights of our age today… [The port administration] 
have taken away […] our rights […] Yes we have built the pyramids of the Pharaohs of the Port with our 
empty stomachs and our bodies half naked but we will not lose our conscience, as honorable workers and 
as citizens, we rose like other workers [before us] of our dear Iraqi nation to demand for our legal right to 
establish a trade union, we seek to resurrect the labour law [of 1936] from under the layers of accumulated 
neglect throughout the years… [we demand for the establishment of]…[a] trade union that seeks to raise 
our standard of living and improve our conditions of work. However, the foreign directorate of the Port 
has…attempted to intervene - to prevent us from acquiring our right to establish a trade union […] The 
workers of the Port want to […] enforce Iraqi laws [and] their rights. However, the masters of the Port see 
in the extension of the provisions of Iraqi laws into their independent directorate –which they consider as 
their own personal state- a danger that threatens their independent entity […] and the loss of their control 
over this directorate...752 
 
The petition made it clear that one cannot understand the conditions of the port workers without 
grasping the reality of the port as a semi-colonial enclave and the legal structures that govern it in 
the first place. In a way, the workers once again brought a dead Iraqi law in the books to life by 
using it in their petition and connecting it to what they consider as their violated rights. The use of 
the law in such a way could be considered as a strategic arsenal of resistance under their sleeves – 
the appropriation of legality and legal rhetoric to further their cause. In many ways, what they 
were asking for was not radical at all but rather quite moderate. However, for a semi-colonial 
administration and an authoritarian government, this was too much to ask for.   
 
 The Port Workers’ Union ultimately received its license from the Ministry of Social 
Affairs despite several setbacks on 15 August 1945. The first congress was held on 12 October in 
a local coffeehouse, leading to the election of a Council of Thirteen Supervisors (which included 
seven communists), and an Administrative Bureau of eight led by the worker-communist, ‘Abd 
al-Husān al-Jabbār, who was elected as president.753 Around 3,125 workers (60 percent of all port 
workers) subsequently joined the union by April 1946.754 According to a prominent labour 
organizer and port workers’ leader, Nāsir ʿAbbūd,755 despite gaining the legal license, the port 
administration rapidly waged its own repressive campaign against the union, with the goal of 
disrupting its activities at every move, especially with increasing its outright dismissals of any 
worker suspected of organizing for the union.756  A small strip of land in the port was chosen as 																																																																				752	Quoted	in	Zakī	Khayrī	and	Suʿād	Khayrī.	Dirāsāt	fī	Tarīkh	al-Hizb	al-Shīūʿi	al-ʿIraqī,	[Studies	in	the	history	of	the	Iraqi	Communist	Party,	Vol.	1],	(Baghdad:	al-Yūbil	al-Thahabī,	1984),	at	134.	753	Batatu,	supra,	ft.	41,	at	621.	754	Ibid.	755	Nāṣir ʿAbbūd,	“Liqa’	Mʿa	al-Rafīq	Nasir	ʿAbbūd”	[‘An	interview	with	Comrade	Nasir	Abbud’]	in	al-
Thaqāfa	al-Jadīda	(Issue	152,	1984),	at	51.	756	Ibid,	at	52.	
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the official headquarters of the union and a mounted structure erected, while workers were 
assigned to guard its entrances night and day, as meetings and heated debates were held, 
especially regarding the role of trade unionism and the importance of worker solidarity.757 
 
 The union decided to organize its first strike on 21 May 1947 – a higher strike committee 
was formed.758 The Union’s list of demands included the recognition of the union by the port 
administration, the application of the labour law to all port workers regardless of their grade, the 
reinstatement of those dismissed for their trade union activism, and the raising of wages.759 This 
first experiment in strike action failed as police swiftly arrested the strike leaders and two-dozen 
workers.760  
 
According to ʿAbbūd, those arrested were ill-treated by police and then taken to appear in 
front of the courts, which took on a popular significance as their trials were ‘transformed into a 
political demonstration against [police] terrorism and the defense of trade union rights and 
political freedoms’ and especially ‘the right to strike’ which the workers consistently fought for to 
be enshrined into the 1936 Labour Law.761 Several communist and left-leaning lawyers appeared 
in court in defense of those arrested, in particular the prominent communist lawyer, Mohammed 
Hussein Abū al-ʿīs, who with his distinctive oratorical voice denounced the violent tactics used 
against the working class.762 Despite the fact that this first experiment in strike action by the port 
workers was a failure in that none of the workers’ demands were fulfilled and at least sixty-five 
‘agitator-workers’ were expelled from the port,763 ‘Abbūd would consider it as an key moment 
whereby the workers gained experience discipline and solidarity, especially between the working 
class and the Iraqi masses as a whole.764  
 
The determination of the port workers did not falter as they returned to plan new 
strategies and tactics in strike action in their next confrontation soon afterward during the Wathba 
uprising of 1948.  I will return to the details of the Wathba in Chapter 7, but for now what is 
important to note is that a wave of labour strikes, one of which was the K3 oil strike detailed 																																																																				757	Ibid.	758	Ibid,	at	53.	759	Ṣawt	al-Ahālī,	28	May,	1947.	760	ʿAbbūd,	supra,	ft.	755,	at	513		761	Ibid.	762	Ibid.	763	Batatu,	supra,	ft.	41,	at	621.	764	ʿAbbūd,	supra,	ft.	755,	at	513.	
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earlier, intensified and spread like fire throughout the country during the months of April and 
May, including of course throughout Basra.765 An atmosphere of despair was prevalent in Basra 
as the working class and common people struggled with the extreme inflation that characterized 
the year of 1948 – the prices of necessities continued to rise, while there was a shortage of wheat 
and barely.766 This situation was unbearable and its stark effects became more visible when the 
Regent visited the city, and a British official wrote, ‘the common people contrasted the 
magnificence of the HRH’s reception with the terrible quality of bread they were forced to eat.’767 
It was later reported that bread was thrown at his car, while an old lady presented him with a 
piece of black bread, which she told him was ‘a specimen of what the poor had to eat in Basra.’768 
 
The Port Workers’ Union once again drafted a signed petition listing their demands and 
sent it to the port administration and ultimately the Ministry of Social Affairs.769 Their demands 
were similar to what was called for before, emphasizing the application of the labour law to all 
workers. They were explicitly opposed to the piecemeal system of employment (nithām al-qitʿa), 
whereby workers were hired and paid extremely low wages for specific tasks, such as loading and 
unloading cargo.770  The port workers employed by this unfair system were called ʿUmmāl al-
Arṣīfa (‘the workers of the streets’) and were commonly referred to as al-Masālīkh (literally, ‘the 
naked ones’) as an indication of their miserable conditions. One of the union’s main and most 
consistent demands, therefore, was to address the plight of these most vulnerable workers of the 
port and to include them within the protections of the labour law, which was only applied to 
certain grades of workers, if at all.  
 
The port administration refused to negotiate or even discuss the workers’ demands as the 
Electrical Manager called the police to prevent the electrical port workers from entering the 
offices of the administrator.771  The Head of the Dredging Port at Fao was consequently asked 
whether he had a response to the petition and he replied, ‘there is no response and whoever does 
not want to work should leave immediately’.772 It was this attitude of the port administration that 
forced the workers at Fao to come out on strike on April 4, followed by all port workers in Basra 																																																																				765	TNA.	‘Basra	Monthly	Summary’,	18	May,	1948;	E	6381/111/93	FO	371/68459	766	TNA.	‘Basra	Monthly	Summary,	Oct.	1948’;	FO	371/68459.	767	TNA.	‘Basra	Monthly	Report,	1	March	1948’;	E2807/111/93;	FO	371/68459	768	Ibid.	769	Ṣawt	al-Ahālī,	30	February	1948.	770	Batatu,	supra,	ft.	41,	at	443.	These	workers	would	receive	as	little	as	40	to	60	fils.	771Ṣawt	al-Ahālī,	30	February	1948.	772	Ibid.	
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the next day.773 Only a couple days earlier, the dockworkers of the British shipping company 
Gray Mackenzie and Co were on strike, due to their ‘exceptionally low wages’ and the 
company’s evasion of the labour law with regards to sick and annual leave.774 Therefore, for the 
first time in the history of the Port of Basra, all the port workers of every department were on (a 
coordinated) strike and the entire port came to a complete standstill. The workers showed 
ingenuity in their organizational strategy when they used a new tactic, namely that of sabotage as 
they cut electricity from the port generator, which supplied the entire city.775 The city was 
consequently deprived of electricity and water for several hours, forcing the mutasarrif (at times 
in defiance of the Director-General of the Port) to end the strike on the same day with the 
‘complete capitulation to the workers’ demands’.776 The agreement that was reached included an 
all round increase of 50 fils, and the reinstatement of 96 agitators who were dismissed for their 
actions in the previous strike.777  
 
The strike ended with a clear moral and tactical victory not only for the port workers, but 
the labour movement as a whole, and the port authorities were forced to negotiate with the Port 
Workers’ Union and implicitly recognize it as the sole bargaining agent for all port workers.  This 
triumph however did not last for long, as martial law was declared in May, apparently due to the 
termination of the mandate in Palestine and the pending war.778 This ‘new weapon’779 of 
emergency law, as one British official called it, and which I will analyze in detail in Chapter 6, 
was not only used by the Iraqi government to suppress all opposition, but to arrest all labour 
organizers and union leaders.780 By May 2, the Port Workers’ Union was entirely suppressed, 
while the search for communists was intensified to the extent that it was described in one report 
as ‘taken on the characteristics of a medieval witch hunt’.781 Nevertheless, the deep experience 
and knowledge that the port workers gained was ingrained into their consciousness and their 
innovative approaches in strike action would be further developed, tried and tested in the port 
strike of 1952 and later on in the massive General Strike in Basra of 1953. 																																																																				773	TNA.	‘Basra	Monthly	Summary	for	April	1948’,	(18	May,	1948);	E	6381/111/93	FO	371/68459	774	TNA.	 ‘Reported	 Ill-Treatment	 of	 Workers	 by	 Gray,	 Mackenzie	 and	 Co.	 Ltd’,	 18	 May	 1948.	E7015/7015/93.	FO	371/68482.	775	TNA.	‘Basra	Monthly	Summary	for	April	1948’,	(18	May,	1948),	supra.	776	Ibid.	777	Ibid.	778	TNA.	‘Basra	Monthly	Summary	for	May,	1948,’	(14	June	1948),	E8368/111/93,	FO	371/68459.	779	Ibid.	780	The	Military	 Court	 in	Basra	 sentenced	 the	 president	 of	 the	 Port	Union	 and	 two	others	 to	 three	years’	 imprisonment.	 TNA.	M.G.	 Little,	 Basra	 Consulate-General	 to	 J.C.	 Richmond,	 British	 Embassy,	Bagdad,	I	June	1948.	No.	1021,	FO/624/127	(1948).		781TNA.	‘Basra	Monthly	Summary	for	June	1948’	(7	July,	1948),	E9674/111/93,	FO	371/68459.	
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 Before moving on, it would useful to summarize some of the insights that arise from the 
present narrative of the railway and port workers. It is clear that the workers were learning from 
their experiences. While the first strikes in the railways failed, those in the port were eventually 
successful. This illustrates the gradual but certain development of the labour movement as a 
whole. Furthermore, the manner in which the law was appropriated by the workers in their 
demands is a reoccurring theme, but here it happened in a much more cognizant way as semi-
colonial legality, which was seen as a barrier to the application of Iraqi law as a whole (whether 
the Iraqi constitution or the labour law) was specifically confronted.  
 
The port and railway workers (more so than the oil workers) were directly challenging 
the semi-colonial character of the Iraqi state. This is considering the fact that the semi-
autonomous administrations of the railways and port were state-owned institutions that were not 
controlled by the Iraqi state.  Furthermore, the strategic uses of and references to the labour law 
by the workers as the main source of their natural rights, which they saw as having been violated 
by the semi-colonial legal structures of the Anglo-Iraq Treaty and its annexures, demonstrates 
that the workers were not only concerned with the interpretation of law, but with the overthrow of 
a semi-colonial legal order and the establishment of a more just and truly independent one. 
 
 
VI. Seeing like an expert: trade unionism as subversion & reform as counter-revolution 
 
I will end this chapter with an analysis of the role of British labour experts within the 
institutions of the Iraqi state. Despite claiming that they did not have much control or influence, I 
will show that this was not the case and that the failure of the Iraqi government in dealing with 
the labour problems of the country was not merely due to their authoritarianism or incompetence 
as was repeatedly claimed, but rather to the very intervention of these so-called ‘experts’. British 
experts refused to admit that it was their presence and the history of British intervention in any 
way instigated the ‘labour troubles’ that they were examining.  It will be clear that these labour 
experts, who were assigned the tasks of addressing the major labour problems and developing 
recommendations for the Iraqi government, were not in fact genuinely concerned with the plight 
of the workers nor did they have a moderating effect on labour issues, but rather they were 
producing top-bottom social reforms to prevent any revolutionary or structural change to emerge 
from below. In other words, they were in fact concerned with the maintenance of the status quo of 
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British influence in Iraq and that was the reason why their symptomatic recommendations were 
ineffective and instead caused the further radicalization of the working class and the eventual 
eruption of revolution.  
 
It was after the election of the British Labour Party in 1945 that a strategic shift occurred 
in foreign policy concerning the colonies and semi-colonies in the Empire. This new ideological 
shift was influenced by the initiative of the Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, who’s aim was to 
focus on social and economic development with the intention of countering the influence of 
revolution and communism, while maintaining British control in the region.782 As Paul Kingston 
has shown, despite the fact that the problems in Iraq were fundamentally structural, Britain was 
merely interested in ‘promoting socio-economic development without structural reform’.783  
Although there was a long history of British technical assistance in Iraq before the war, more 
emphasis (at least in theory) was now put on serving the plight of the working class, the poor, and 
the peasants. The point was to reframe the relationship between Britain and the region in a way 
that appears reconciliatory to some nationalist demands, while ensuring that it would remain 
within ‘the larger imperial design for the region’.784 In this way, one could argue that there were 
in fact fewer differences between the new Labour government and its predecessor in its principal 
goal of maintaining an imperial starglehold on the region – the only difference was that it would 
now be undertaken under the guise of social development and presented in a favorable light to the 
peoples of the region.      
 
 It was therefore during this period of late British imperialism, which has been described 
as ‘an imperialism of science and knowledge,’ where academic and scientific experts rose to 
positions of ‘unparalleled triumph and authority’.785 It was in this context that British labour 
experts were appointed to deal with ‘labour questions’ of Iraq; questions that the British 
Ambassador considered as ‘the most vital that this country has to face and that on their solution 
will largely depend the future of this country’.786 The main concern of course was regarding the 
																																																																				782 	See	 Paul	 Kingston.	 Britain	 and	 the	 Politics	 of	 Modernization	 in	 the	 Middle	 East,	 1945-1958	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	1996).		783	Ibid,	at	99.	784	Ibid,	at	18.	785	Joseph	Morgan	Hodge.	Triumph	of	the	Expert:	Agrarian	Doctrines	of	Development	and	the	Legacies	
of	British	Colonies,	(Athens:	Ohio	University	Press,	2007),	at	11.	786	NAUK.	 ‘Labour	 Conditions	 in	 Iraq’	 Stonehewer	 British	 Embassy,	 Bagdad	 to	 FO,	 Oct	 29,	 1946,	E10974/3860/93.	FO	371/52456.	
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effects of labour militancy and communist influence on trade unions.787 It was accordingly no 
coincidence that soon after the violent Gāwūrbāghī strike in the oil fields of Kirkūk in 1946 that a 
serious proposal was made for the need of having a British labour advisor in the Ministry of 
Social Affairs of the Iraqi state or as an alternative a permanent labour attaché to the British 
Embassy.788 After some discussion on what would be more effective, it was ultimately settled that 
a labour attaché789 would become a ‘special agent en mission’ rather than permanently attached to 
the Embassy, while the Iraqi government would eventually hire a labour advisor790 who would 
work from within the ministry.791 It was noted that only ‘long and sustained pressure’ on the Iraqi 
government by an ‘Advisor working inside and an Attaché working outside’ that any results in 
implementing reforms would be achieved.792 M.T. Audsley, an official of the Ministry of Labour 
and National Service, who was appointed as labour attaché in the British Middle East Office in 
Cairo in 1945 where he was based, would later act as the labour attaché to the British Embassy in 
Baghdad, frequently travelling there to investigate and write several detailed reports on labour 
issues. It was however only after the Wathba by the end of 1948 and following the severe waves 
of strikes that a labour advisor (W.J. Hull) was retained by the Iraqi government’s Ministry of 
Social Affairs793 – at the time the ministry responsible for all labour issues in the country.794 
 
 Before tackling the question of the role of the British expert in Iraqi state institutions and 
the limitations of expert analysis, it is important to explore the contradictory aspects of the British 																																																																				787	TNA.	Killearn	to	Bevin,	16	Jan	1946.	J340/53/16,	FO	371/53327.	788	TNA.	Busk	(Bagdad)	to	Baxter	(London),	17	August	1946.	E7015/3860/93.	FO	371/52456.	789	The	Labour	Attache	service	developed	as	a	result	of	 the	need	to	tackle	the	 increasingly	relevant	questions	 of	 labour	 in	 Diplomatic	 Missions	 abroad	 starting	 from	 1942.	 Its	 role	 usually	 entailed	maintaining	close	contact	with	the	‘appropriate	government	departments,	associations	of	employers	and	workers,	 and	 institutions	operating	 in	 the	 labour	and	 industrial	 fields’.	 	 Labour	Attaches	were	spread	throughout	the	British	Embassies	in	many	parts	of	the	world.	See	Godfrey	Ince.	The	Ministry	of	
Labour	and	National	Service,	(London:	George	Allen	&	Unwin	Ltd,	1960),	at	57-58.		790	The	role	of	the	labour	advisor	in	the	Ministry	of	Social	Affairs	was	detailed	by	Audsley	in	his	1948	report	ranged	over	the	whole	of	the	living	conditions	of	the	people	and	would	include	wages;	hours	of	work;	national	social	insurance;	control	of	prices	of	essential	commodities	from	the	cost	of	living	angel,	land	settlement	schemes,	housing,	and	the	drafting	of	labour	legislation,	laws	and	regulations.	Audsley	 described	 the	 advisor’s	 overall	 task	 as	 the	 laying	 of	 ‘the	 foundations	 upon	 which	 a	progressive	long-term	development	could	be	executed’	by	providing	ministers	with	‘expert	guidance’	which	they	are	in	dire	need	of.	TNA.	FO	371/68482.	‘Report	on	visit	to	Iraq	from	8th	June	to	10th	July,	1948	by	M.T.	Audsley’.	791	One	 British	 official	 argued	 that	 an	 advisor	 working	 from	 within	 the	 Iraqi	 ministry	 would	 be	ineffective	unless	he	retained	some	executive	powers	as	his	reports	would	be	ignored	and	‘this	could	never	be’,	and	so	he	concluded	only	a	labour	attaché	to	the	Embassy	would	be	a	plausible	option.		792	TNA.	Audsley	to	Waterlow,	‘Report	on	Iraq	Labour	problems’	E12918/77/93.	FO	371/68458.			793	The	Ministry	 of	 Social	 Affairs	was	 created	 in	 1939	 and	was	 responsible	 for	 population	 census,	town	planning	and	village	organization	as	well.	Sassoon,	supra,	ft.	141,	at	51.	794TNA.	FO	371/68482.	‘Report	on	visit	to	Iraq	from	8th	June	to	10th	July	by	M.T.	Audsley’.		
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expert analysis and its conception of trade unionism in Iraq.  If one read the labour reports and 
dispatches written by these experts, it would be quite evident that the Iraqi worker was not only 
conceived in a certain orientalist manner (very similar to what was described in an earlier 
chapter), but that he was essentially erased as an agent from history. That is, for the British 
expert, a socially conscious Iraqi working class did not exist – at least not as an organized labour 
movement, but instead it was merely a group of illiterate workers who were being manipulated by 
subversive outside forces, making it not a genuine representative of the working class.   
 
For that reason, it is quite ironic that the British expert would criticize the Iraqi 
government for being so irrationally repressive of labour in the country or quite incompetent in 
industrial relations, when he similarly saw the labour movement as a purely political subversive 
organization. The British Ambassador, for example, considered Iraqi workers as ‘illiterate 
workers’ who were constantly being exploited by ‘crooked lawyers and politicians’, while he 
referred to the Iraqi government as ‘a reactionary dictatorship to which the name of labour is 
anathema’.795  Even if one did not take into account the fact that the Iraqi state was itself 
functioning through the constricting legal structures of the Anglo-Iraq treaty, the British response 
towards labour organizing activities in Iraq was quite contradictory in terms and as I have shown 
earlier in the context of the railways, port and oil fields, was still repressive and violent. 
 
In one labour report, Hull, the labour advisor to the Iraqi government, wrote, ‘the few 
trade unions here are not representative of the wage earners’,796 and in another that, ‘there is no 
likelihood of any organized or effective labour movement developing in the near future in 
Iraq’.797 These claims were made while he endlessly criticized the Iraqi government for not 
having proper (technical) understanding of the concept of trade unionism. As another British 
official illustrates this incompetence of the Iraqi government who regarded ‘the movement of 
labour as the movement of gangs of low paid workers from one place to another’ without having 
any conception of the organization of labour, and considered all trade unions as ‘hotbeds of 
communism’.798 The fact is, however, that the British administrators in general as I have shown 
above and in previous chapters in a similar manner rejected the legitimacy of the indigenous 
(grassroots) labour movement. In other words, it appears that the expert was merely critical of the 																																																																				795 TNA.	 Stonehewer	 to	 FO,	 25	 Oct	 1946,	 ‘Labour	 Conditions	 in	 Iraq’,	 FO	 371/52456,	E10773/3860/93.	796	TNA.	Hull	to	Guildhaume,	26	June	1951.	EQ	2181/1.	FO	371/91704.	797	TNA.	 ‘Note	 on	 a	meeting	with	Mr.	Hull,	 Labour	Advisor	 to	 the	 Iraq	Government’	 EQ2182/3.	 FO	371/98783	(23	July,	1952).	798	TNA.	M.S.	Rose,	‘Iraq	Labour	Problems’	21	Feb.	1951.	EQ2182/2.	FO	371/98783.	
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Iraqi government because its repression was not done through a certain orderly and bureaucratic 
system of labour organization. What is interesting about this contradictory line of reasoning is 
that Hull as the British ‘expert’ analyzed trade unionism in a similar narrow manner. The only 
difference was that he claimed to be an ‘expert’ who had ‘expert knowledge,’ which was 
supposedly unbiased, and he was developing a national scheme and labour policy with the main 
purpose of maintaining British hegemony in the country.   
 
So, for instance, Hull wrote that there was no freedom of association in Iraq, and that the 
executive of the Iraqi state would never relax its control over trade unionism and ‘the right to 
combine for any purpose’.  He then referred to a conversation he had with someone he referred to 
as an ‘astute’ Iraqi banker, who explained to him that this was necessary because no political 
parties in Iraq have any real popular support and so ‘a street riot or strike could unseat a 
government’.799 Hull continued by arguing, approvingly of such analysis, that trade unionism in 
Iraq derives ‘from a conviction of immense power that could be exercised by anyone with only a 
few thousand well-organized workers behind him.’800 Hull here seems to be perpetuating (in a 
quite tautological manner) the same analysis of trade unionism, of which he was criticizing the 
Iraqi government’s incompetence for. His analysis maintained that all trade unionism in Iraq 
(whether it was anti-British or nationalist) had its basis on ‘purely political’ foundations and so 
was illegitimate and subversive. Furthermore, Hull’s conception of Iraqi workers was one that 
completely negated rational organized action and in an orientalist way emphasized Arab 
emotional temper; he described ‘the general state of the Iraqi worker as one of apathy’, from 
which ‘he could suddenly be stirred into outbursts of uncontrollable violence’.801 
 
 In that sense, trade unionism in Iraq (and the region) was not considered akin to trade 
unionism elsewhere in the world (particularly in the West), and for this reason could not be 
analyzed as such, but rather could only be understood through the lens of an ‘expert’ with unique 
‘expert knowledge’ of the local conditions, whatever this maybe. This same line of reasoning was 
made by Audsley, the labour attaché, when he wrote, ‘the present “industrial relations” bear no 
comparison with the pattern described in books. The Middle East is being shaken to its depth by 
the surge of political fanaticism, the fast growing “workers’ demands” and the grinding never-
																																																																				799TNA.	Hull	to	Guildhaume,	26	June	1951.	EQ	2181/1.	FO	371/91704.	800	Ibid.	801	TNA.	 ‘Note	 on	 a	meeting	with	Mr.	Hull,	 Labour	Advisor	 to	 the	 Iraq	Government’	 EQ2182/3.	 FO	371/98783	(23	July,	1952).	
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ceasing wheels of communism’.802 The quotation marks in this sentence alone reveal more than 
anything the manner in which the British expert viewed trade unionism and the working class in 
Iraq and the Middle East in general. 
 
 The claim that was always maintained was that British experts or advisors in the Iraqi 
government did not in fact have any significant influence, but were merely there on a limited 
advisory role – that is, to use their ‘expertise’ to advise the minister on any given course of action. 
This arrangement was of course quite convenient in that the Iraqi government would always be 
blamed if problems persisted. However, if one were to read the records closely, it becomes clear 
that these experts actually had much more influence than was admitted. So, for example, Hull, the 
labour advisor to the Ministry of Social Affairs, demonstrates such deference towards his views 
in one episode, whereby he urged the Minister not to interfere with the elections of the tobacco 
and carpenter workers, claiming that these unions were harmless.803 The Minister responded with 
an Arab proverb – ‘the man who has once been bitten by a snake will start [sic] in fear at the sight 
of a piece of rope’. To this Hull replied, ‘there was here not even a piece of string’. The Minister 
then conceded that, Hull was the ‘expert’ and he knew better, so he would have to ‘reverse his 
view’.804   
 
Reflecting on this episode, Hull wrote the following: ‘I dislike being called an expert but 
the title is the very essence of the position of a British official here. It implies if I am not mistaken 
an authority whose views may be overridden by other authorities but until they are must be 
listened to with respect even if not too much is done about them. These people are impatient of 
“advisors” – one must never call oneself that.’805 Hull’s observation reveals the manner in which 
British experts prefer not only to do their work out of view, but also to insist that they do not have 
any discretionary powers whatsoever. That is, the expert denies and underplays his influence and 
role within the ministry and the functions of the Iraqi state, although this was in fact exactly one 
of the effects of semi-colonialism and the Anglo-Iraq Treaty. 
 
I will end this chapter by making a few points on why it was that the recommendations 
and reforms of both, the labour advisor and attaché, and their attempt at developing an overall 
national labour policy was a complete failure in the end.  It was not primarily as it was 																																																																				802	TNA.	Audsley	(Cairo)	to	Morgan	(Ministry	of	Labour,	London),	18	May,	1948.	LAB	13/674.	803	TNA.	Hull	to	Guildhaume,	18	July	1950.	EQ	2181/1,	FO	371/98783	(3	Sep,	1950).	804	Ibid.	805	Ibid.	
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consistently claimed because of the incompetence of the reactionary and ‘feudal character’ of the 
Iraqi government and state, but it was rather due to the fact that these reforms were useless as 
long as the conditions of semi-colonialism existed. That is, as long as the constraining legal 
structures of the Anglo-Iraq Treaty were maintained.  
 
The main aim of the overall workings of the advisor and attaché was to counter 
revolutionary change (and communism) and maintain British hegemony. It was in other words 
devised as ‘reform from above to forestall revolution from below’. 806  Therefore, the 
recommendations for social reform which included: the drafting of and application of labour 
legislation, the establishing of minimum wages to alleviate the high cost of living, planning 
agricultural developments, and the development of what was referred to as ‘a constitutional Trade 
Union movement,’ were all means to ensure that British semi-colonial control would not be 
faltered.807 It was in other words merely a safeguard against any changes in the legal structures of 
the treaty and the semi-colonial legal order. Audsley made this very clear when he wrote that 
Iraqi workers should not be encouraged as they have been by the Russians, ‘to rebel against their 
government’, but rather to pursue their interests in a ‘democratic manner’: 
 
The Russians have no scruples in this respect, as elsewhere. They are anti-Government, anti-
British, anti-evolution, anti-democratic; their methods of encouraging revolution are well-known…[W]e 
are…anti-Communist. We do not preach revolution; the Russians do… We want to see orderly progressive 
social betterment of the people, the removal of injustice, better living conditions, freedom to create 
democratic workers’ organizations – even if the pace is slow; the Russians do not. Somehow or other we 
must convince the Iraq Government…that it is in their hands to pave the way towards bringing order out 
the present social chaos…and that they must give encouragement to and secure the co-operation of, 
workers’ leaders and other who are hostile to revolutionary methods.808 
  
 Here, Audsley does not mince words when he emphasizes the real aim of these labour and social 
reforms, and the role of British experts in dealing with the question of labour in Iraq.  Even Hull, 
the labour advisor, viewed his initiative of developing a new Directorate-General of Labour as 
not merely being as ‘an essential service for a modern state’, but specifically because it ‘could do 
more than any other to prevent the growth of communism’.809 In that sense despite the fact that 
the British viewed themselves as having a ‘moderating influence’ on a ‘reactionary’ government, 
they were in fact doing the complete opposite in further radicalizing the working class.810 This is 
																																																																				806	See	Rachel	Anne	Alexander.	‘Leadership	in	the	National	Movements	of	Egypt	and	Iraq	1945-1963’,	(Unpublished	PhD	Dissertation,	University	of	Exeter,	2007),	at	151.	807TNA.	FO	371/68482.	‘Report	on	visit	to	Iraq	from	8th	June	to	10th	July	by	M.T.	Audsley’.			808	Ibid.	809TNA.	Hull	to	Guildhaume,	18	July	1950.	EQ	2181/1,	FO	371/98783	(3	Sep,	1950).	810	Alexander,	supra,	ft.	806,	at	152.	
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probably because Iraqi workers (in the oil fields, railways and port) rather than being illiterates 
with no agency were quite conscious of what was being done to their movement. 
 
 Furthermore, legal reform, especially in the context of semi-colonialism, could never 
bring about real structural change. This was due to the controlling influence of the legal structures 
of the Anglo-Iraq treaty (and the effects of semi-peripheral sovereignty), which retarded the 
effectiveness of Iraqi law in the first place. However, this was also due to the political question of 
semi-colonialism, which concerns the entire order and is not merely one that concerns legality. It 
was this fact that was completely ignored in any of the analyses of British experts. As Fahad has 
written on such a narrow analytic lens: some (British experts) would soon ‘rise to the moon and 
some would sink into the depths of the earth’ before admitting that ‘the main cause of 
unemployment in this country is in front of their eyes’: the foreign monopolistic companies that 
control the economy.811 Audsley and Hull likewise refused to admit what was in front of their 
eyes, which was British semi-colonial intervention, which they were a part of. It was no wonder 
that Audsley did not interview a single trade union leader for his investigative reports, supposedly 
for fear that his motives would appear suspicious to the government.812 While even when he was 
approached by a trade union leader, who conveyed to him the exact concerns of the majority of 
the working class, he completely disregarded his statement as too ‘sweeping’: 
 
I remember an Iraq Trade Union official saying to me…that the workers blamed us for everything 
that happened in their country; that the Treaty of Alliance which replaced the Mandate in 1932 had not 
lessened our interfering influence and that we had something to do with everything major event in Iraq 
since then; that if the country had remained backward, if its general standard of life was terribly low and if 
the social conditions were appalling the most accepted reason among large sections of the public was that 
British policy wanted it to be so…These were sweeping statements and I doubt whether the antagonism 
towards us is as general as they imply but they are certainly the ammunition used by the vocal extremists 
and political agitators to further their subversive and destructive ends.813 
 
Audsley’s refusal to admit that British semi-colonial intervention in Iraq was a major cause of the 
conditions of the Iraqi working class is more than disingenuous, for it was the arrival of British 
colonialism and capitalism that permanently destabilized the rural areas and the socio-economic 
structures of Iraqi society, establishing underdevelopment, as I have shown in a previous chapter. 
Of course, Audsley’s view was also informed by his conception of the Iraqi worker as having a 
‘fanatical temperament’ and who was incapable of consciously and deliberately organizing action 
against the semi-colonial conditions that oppress him. My narrative of the railway and port 																																																																				811	Yūsūf,	supra,	ft.	305,	at	186.	812	TNA.	FO	371/68482.	‘Report	on	visit	to	Iraq	from	8th	June	to	10th	July	by	M.T.	Audsley’,	at	19	813	Ibid.	
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workers above exposes the absurdity of such analysis. It was therefore the limitations of the 
expert’s analysis and lens (as well as its specific ideological purpose), which prevented any of the 
social and labour reforms (no matter how genuine they may appear) from being effective and 
failed to prevent the outburst of revolution from below.     
 
VII. Conclusion 
 
This chapter detailed the struggle of the railway and port workers to improve their 
conditions and to challenge the legal structures of semi-colonialism that governed their 
workplaces. These workers were directly challenging the semi-colonial character of the Iraqi state 
and its semi-autonomous enclaves of the railways and port. This was different from their 
counterparts  at the oil fields who’s struggle had more of a regional and international dimension 
in resisting (oil and corporate) imperialism within the specificity of the oil city in the region, 
which had more of the characteristics of a colonial rather than a semi-colonial enclave.  I have 
shown how the railway and port workers slowly but inventively developed their organizational 
tactics and strategies in strike action from their first attempt at the railway workshops to their 
(pivotal but momentary) victory at the port. The port and railway workers were attempting to 
bring structural and normative change into their lives through their actions from below and they 
often did this by strategically using and referring to the law as (only) one of their arsenals, hand 
in hand, with strike action and sabotage. This was of course the complete opposite of how British 
experts used the law in their development of labour and social reforms to supposedly remedy the 
ailments of the working class – theirs was an imposed top-bottom and bureaucratic development 
for the mere purpose of preventing any structural change. The expert’s approach was merely a 
strategy for maintaining British hegemony and the semi-colonial structures in Iraq, which the 
workers completely rejected as they considered British intervention as being the main cause of 
their miserable conditions.     
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Chapter 6: The ‘Magical Weapon’ of Permanent Emergency – A Technique in the 
Semi-Colonial Governance of Iraq  
 
 
The tradition of the oppressed teaches us that the ‘emergency situation’ in which we live is not the exception 
but the rule.814  
 
~ Walter Benjamin 
 
 
[Y]our part of the world is likely to make big strides forward…not without struggle perhaps, but nevertheless 
in the direction of progress toward a fuller and more secure life, and such [draconian] laws will…become things of the 
past to be studied by research students into obscure subjects.815 
 
 ~ Denis Pritt 
 
 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
 
As the previous chapters have shown, it was through the use of emergency law that 
labour strikes were suppressed. In this chapter, I will argue that the uses of the emergency 
doctrine was a technique of semi-colonial governance in Iraq. This chapter is therefore an 
exploration of the interconnection between law and violence in the context of the uses of criminal 
law and martial law by the semi-colonial Iraqi state.  In other words, I will analyze the manner in 
which the Iraqi state used a combination of criminal law, martial law and the doctrine of 
emergency to suppress opposition to the social order and to maintain its hegemony. The argument 
that will be made here is that the semi-colonial Iraqi state used tried-and-tested British colonial 
techniques of governance by constitutionalizing the Crown’s ability to proclaim emergencies to 
quell any disorder that it considered as a threat to its order. By delving into the historical origins 
of the doctrine of emergency, it would be clear that it was in fact a technique of governance rather 
than a temporary response to isolated crises. Martial law was a standard mechanism used to 																																																																				814	Walter	 Benjamin.	 ‘Theses	 on	 the	 Philosophy	 of	 History,’	 in	 Hannah	 Arendt	 (ed.),	 Illuminations:	
Essays	and	Reflections,	(New	York:	Schocken,	1969),	at	253.			815	TNA.	Letter	from	D.	Pritt	to	K.	Kazanji	[i.e.	Qazanchi],	dated	20	March	1946,	enclosed	in	D.	Pritt	to	McNeal,	18th	July	1947,	E6508/771/93,	FO	371/61664.		
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protect British interests in the colonies, and it was similarly and regularly used by the semi-
colonial Iraqi state.  I will elucidate how this mechanism was ingrained into the institutions of the 
Iraqi state and its constitution with the legal advice of British experts. It will be clear that Iraq 
was ungovernable (as an ‘independent’ ‘parliamentary democracy’) without these legal 
techniques, as revolutionary change was inevitable. It was in a way these colonial (legal) 
techniques that helped suspend the advent of the revolution until 1958.    
 
Before turning to the debates surrounding emergency law and briefly focusing on the 
Intifāda of 1952 (an attempt to renew the Wathba)816 where the military was called into the 
streets for the first time in the history of the country to quell demonstrations, I will begin with a 
brief examination of how the criminal law was used to pacify all forms of dissent under the guise 
of fighting communism. These laws were in turn essential in a state of emergency. This is clear 
when analyzing the amendment to the Baghdad Penal Code of 1938, and its application in the 
first trial of the Secretary-General of the ICP, Yūsuf Salmān Yūsuf (Fahad). The military courts 
relied on the 1938 amendment to imprison thousands, while eventually sentencing ICP leaders to 
the death penalty.   
 
II. The uses of the criminal law by the Iraqi state & the criminalization of progressive 
thought and action 
 
 
 Even before the institutionalization of emergency with the controversial amendment of 
the Iraqi Constitution in 1943, which I will analyze in the second part of this chapter, the Iraqi 
government was continuously developing new ways of drafting legislation against what it saw as 
the spread of communism and leftist ideology in the country.  This would eventually lead to the 
passing of an amendment to the Baghdad Penal Code, which would be considered as the harshest 
piece of legislation against communism – defined in the broadest possible way – in the entire 
Middle East – this was the Law Supplemental to the Baghdad Penal Code No. 51 of 1938.817 I 
will analyze this law below, but for now it would be enough to note that it made it a crime to 
believe in the ‘doctrines of communism, anarchy and the like, which aim at the change of the 
system of government,’ (which was interpreted broadly enough to include anything that called for 																																																																				816	I	 fast	 forward	 to	 the	 Intifada	 of	 1952	 merely	 because	 it	 was	 the	 first	 time	 that	 emergency	legislation	was	 invoked	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 controversial	 constitutional	 amendment	 as	 opposed	 to	during	the	Wathba	when	martial	law	was	already	declared	on	the	basis	of	the	Palestine	War,	which	was	in	turn	used	as	an	excuse	to	crush	the	movement	as	will	be	shown	in	the	final	chapter.				817	Iraq	Government	Gazette,	No.	30,	Baghdad,	24th	July,	1938,	at	475	
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social reform) and the dissemination of these ideas. This was in essence the criminalization of 
thought and it would be consistently used against the opposition and the nationalist movement 
throughout the history of the monarchy. 
 
 As early as April 1936, the Iraqi government passed a law that amended the Baghdad 
Penal Code in a manner that made it more effective in prosecuting those who possessed, printed 
or intended to publish through ‘the medium of communist propaganda [and] endeavor[ed] to 
create hostility to the established system of government’. 818  Although the definition of 
‘communist propaganda’ was already broad, the Minister of Interior approached the British 
Ambassador, Archibald Clark Kerr, the next year for advice on the ‘form and scope’ of drafting 
‘special legislation’ that would be even harsher, and would essentially ‘make it a crime to be a 
Communist’.819  Despite admitting that the Iraqi government were ‘exaggerating the dangers of 
the spread of modern political ideas in this country’ by seeking to draft such legislation, Kerr 
contacted the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, and asked him to send copies of laws 
passed in India, which he considered to have been successful in dealing with communism.820  By 
September 1937, Ordinance No. 44 for the Prevention of Harmful Propaganda was passed. This 
ordinance increased the powers of the government in dealing with ‘communism’ further by 
enlarging the scope of the term ‘harmful propaganda’ to the following: (1) ‘Any publication 
effected in bad faith…of a nature calculated to arouse: (a) Feelings of hatred or aversion for the 
state, or (b) Feelings of aversion or hostility among various classes of the inhabitants.  (2) Any 
publication effected in bad faith… citing fabricated reports or misinterpreting any true report, 
with the object of disturbing public security or good foreign relations.821  This definition of 
‘harmful propaganda’  included ‘meetings’ intended on ‘exciting the public against the state or 
arousing feelings of aversion or hostility among the various classes of the inhabitants’.822         																																																																				818	TNA.	FO	624/7.	Sgd	Archibald	Clark	Kerr,	Bagdad	to	FO,	London,	29	April,	1936.	A	copy	of	the	law	[Law	Amending	the	Bagdad	Penal	Code	No.	45	of	1936]	was	enclosed	and	had	similar	wording	to	what	would	be	drafted	later	in	1938.		The	law	stated	that	the	following	paragraph	shall	be	added	to	Section	89	of	the	Code:	“Whoever	is	found	in	possession	of	written	or	printed	or	any	other	matter	intended	for	 publication,	 of	which	 the	 contents	 come	within	 the	 scope	of	 the	previous	 sub-sections,	 shall,	 if	found	to	have	come	to	posses	the	same	with	ill	intent	and	with	intent	to	give	publications	thereto,	be	punished	with	the	penalty	provided	for	each	offence	itself’.	819	TNA.	FO	624/9/516.	Sgd	Archibald	Clark	Kerr	,	Minute	Sheet,	19,	November,	1937.	820	TNA.	FO	624/9/516.	Archibald	Clark	Kerr,	British	Embassy,	Bagdad	to	Sir	Herbert	Metcalfe,	India;	Nov	23,	1937.	821	TNA.	FO	624/9/576,	Oswald	Scott,	British	Embassy,	Bagdad	to	FO.	18,	December,	1937.	Enclosed:	
Ordinance	for	the	Prevention	of	Harmful	Propaganda	No.	44	of	1937.		This	law	was	eventually	repealed.		822	Ibid.		It	is	interesting	that	the	term	‘class’	is	used,	which	is	of	course	a	reference	to	the	poor	workers	and	peasants.			
	 181	
 
 In July 1938, Law Supplemental to the Baghdad Penal Code No. 51 was passed and as 
mentioned above made it a crime not only to disseminate ‘communistic’ ideas, but to ‘express 
approval’ of these ideas!  Article 1 (1) read:  ‘Whoever expresses approval of or disseminates by 
any of the means of publication mentioned in Article 78 of this Law, any doctrines of 
communism, anarchy or the like, which aim at the change of the system of government and the 
fundamental principles and status of human society that are guaranteed by the Organic Law, shall 
be punished with penal servitude or with imprisonment not exceeding seven years or with fine or 
both.’823 Article 1(2) increased the sentence to penal servitude for life or imprisonment for fifteen 
years if the ‘expression of approval or dissemination of the doctrines’ was carried out with 
violence.  Article 1(3) stated that if the latter occurred before more than one member of the 
military forces or police, the death penalty would be applied.  Article 5(a) extended these 
penalties to anyone ‘who becomes a member of an association the aim or object of which is to 
approve or to disseminate’ these doctrines.824  
 
Law No. 51 would be used throughout the period of the monarchy to suppress not only 
communism, but also all forms of opposition. It would be particularly useful for the military 
courts that were operational when martial law was proclaimed.  It is interesting to note that even 
the British advisor to the C.I.D. (Criminal Investigation Department) criticized the law for being 
drafted in a manner that would undoubtedly bring about hostile comment from the Soviets, who 
the advisor said would ‘rightly protest that this law is a Nazi law’.825  He pointed out that the 
Baghdad Penal Code was already sufficiently worded to deal with communism and that the 
‘institutions of prosecutions against alleged “communists” for their actions as such, and not as 
ordinary disturbances of public peace stirring up and propaganding [sic] in a manner intended to 
cause hatred and contempt against other sections of the people and against the Government 
charged under the appropriate sections of the Baghdad Penal Code, would undoubtedly call forth 
hostile comment, if not actual diplomatic protest…’826 The Baghdad Penal Code, he wrote, was 
‘strong enough – if applied properly and impartially.’827  This advice was not taken seriously and 
instead Law 51 or what would later be dubbed in British reports as: ‘Grobba’s law Against 
																																																																				823	Ibid.	824	Ibid.	825	TNA.	FO	624/101.	CID	TO	A.H.	Ditchburn,	Advisor	to	Ministry	of	Interior,	30	June	1946.			826	Ibid.	827	Ibid.	
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Bolshevik Communists,’828 would be used extensively, especially during the Wathba as a legal 
and violent measure to suppress the entire Iraqi nationalist movement.  
 
In fact, by March 1948 (before the proclamation of martial law), Najīb al-Rāwī, the 
Minister of Justice, was described in a dispatch by the British Ambassador, Henry Mack, as 
‘refreshingly active and vigorous’ in his pursuance of numerous communists, who were 
continuously being sentenced under this law in the courts. al-Rāwī directly consulted British 
Judge and legal advisor to the ministry, Sir John Prichard in putting together a list of suspected 
communists who should be arrested, while suppressing the opposition press, and ensured that 
suspected communists were removed from ‘positions important to the security of the state’.829  
Furthermore, what was more interesting for our purposes was that other countries in the region 
were coordinating to do the same thing. al-Rāwī was in close contact with the Minister of Justice 
in Egypt, who was looking to pass similar legislation against ‘communism’ there.830 The head of 
the C.I.D. in Egypt visited Baghdad to discuss such measures counterpart there to exchange lists 
of suspected communists. He ended up taking with him copies of the Iraqi laws (specifically Law 
51). al-Rāwī made similar arrangements with his counterparts in Syria and Lebanon supplying 
them with Iraqi laws with the purpose of developing ‘a common Arab League policy against 
communism’.831 Mack expressed ‘great pleasure’ at this development.832 The diffusion of these 
draconian laws suggests that they were of great benefit in maintaining the semi-colonial orders to 
the benefit of imperial powers in the region.833     
 
 It was on the basis of Law 51 or Grobba’s Law that Yūsuf Salmān Yūsuf aka Fahad, the 
Secretary-General of the ICP, along with his close comrade and Politburo member, Zakī Basīm, 
were prosecuted after their capture on January 18, 1947.834 They were accused of reliance on 																																																																				828	Ibid.	A	reference	to	the	former	(Nazi)	German	Ambassador	in	Iraq,	Fritz	Grobba,	who	supported	the	Rashid	Ali	Coup	of	1941	against	the	British-sponsored	regime.		829	TNA.	Minute	by	Henry	Mack,	16	March	1948;	FO/624/127.	830	Ibid.	831	Ibid.	832	Ibid.	833	The	reworking	and	redrafting	of	draconian	legislation	in	such	a	manner	did	not	end	here.	By	1954,	a	 list	 of	 ordinances	 and	 amendments	 were	 passed	 that	 were	 even	 more	 draconian.	 One	 was	
Ordinance	No.	17	of	1954	Supplemental	to	the	Iraqi	Nationality	Law,	which	basically	stripped	citizens	of	 their	 Iraqi	 citizenship	 if	 they	 were	 convicted	 under	 the	 1938	 law	 above.	 	 This	 rendered	communists	or	anyone	who	opposed	the	regime	as	stateless.	The	legal	advisor	to	the	British	Embassy	found	this	law	completely	‘indefensible’	and	contrary	to	the	‘general	principals	of	international	law’.	This	practice,	which	began	during	the	Wathba,	was	later	to	be	institutionalized	in	law.	See	Minutes		in	‘Communists	in	Iraq,’	Oct	14,	1954,	VQ	1015/77/G,	FO	371/110991.	834	Batatu,	supra,	ft.	41,at	537.	
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‘foreign sources of income’; contacts with a ‘foreign state’ (i.e. the Soviet Union); incitement to 
armed insurrection; and the most serious: the propagation of communism among members of the 
armed forces.835 All these accusations were flatly denied by Fahad, who eloquently addressed the 
judge on each of them, stating that the party was independent in its finances and organization, and 
was not intent on overthrowing the monarchy, but rather merely struggling for the people’s 
natural rights and the democratic order as defined by the Iraqi constitution.836 It was quite 
revealing that he referred to the constitution, especially to argue that Law 51 was 
unconstitutional.837 He considered the Iraqi Communist Party – at least for the time being – as in 
effect struggling for the protection of the provisions of the Iraqi constitution against the regime’s 
‘terroristic’ policies and the ‘imperialist’ 1930 Anglo-Iraq Treaty, which undermined it.838 This 
sort of reasoning would be reiterated in nationalist discourse (including by opposition MPs in 
Parliament) in the context of martial law and emergency legislation as will be shown later. Fahad 
had already referred to Law 51 in his writings, calling it a ‘reactionary fascist law’, that was a 
‘weapon in the hands of the Iraqi regime and its police’ not merely to suppress the communist 
movement, but also to suppress the labour movement and the nationalist movement in its 
entirety.839 He repeated this point to his interrogator the day he was arrested. When asked 
whether he knew that propagation of communism is liable to punishment under the penal code, he 
responded: ‘The relevant article 89a of the Code…is out of accord with the Iraqi Constitution, 
which has conceded the freedom of belief of every Iraqi citizen.’840  																																																																				835	Ibid,	at	539.	836	Ibid,	at	540.	837	One	 should	keep	 in	mind	 that	 this	was	done	 in	 a	 rhetorical	manner	and	was	 strategic.	 In	other	words,	Fahad,	as	a	communist	and	adherent	of	historical	materialism,	did	not	actually	believe	in	the	ideal	of	the	rule	of	law	as	a	source	of	revolutionary	change.	However,	it	was	obvious	that	to	struggle	for	this	ideal	had	its	strategic	benefits	considering	the	semi-colonial	conditions	of	Iraq,	where	the	law	was	flaunted	and	democracy	was	a	farce.		838	A	 public	memorandum	written	 by	 the	 ICP	 and	 addressed	 to	 the	 international	 community	with	reference	 to	 the	UNO	Charter	 [and	 international	 law],	 emphasized	 that	 ‘the	 demands	 of	 our	 Party	expressed	 by	 our	 National	 Charter,	 are	 …	 for	 achieving	 liberties,	 for	 the	 exercise	 of	 the	 rights	recognized	by	 the	 Iraqi	 constitution,	 for	 the	demand	of	making	 the	 independence	of	our	 country	a	reality	not	a	word	of	the	mouth.	This	signifies	that	our	Communist	Party	does	not	intend	to	change	the	state	system	and	the	 fundamental	principles	and	constulates	 [sic]	of	 the	social	constitution.	On	the	contrary,	it	intends	to	stabilize	the	representative,	democratic	state	system	and	fights	to	stabilize	the	 fundamental	 constulates	 [sic]	 recognized	 in	 our	 constitution,	 such	 as	 Iraq	 as	 an	 independent	state.	 At	 no	 time,	 [did]	 we	 make	 an	 appeal	 or	 carried	 out	 a	 slogan	 involving	 the	 change	 of	 state	system.	All	our	slogans	and	official	 statements	 involve	 the	call	 to	 fight	 imperialism,	 to	stabilize	 the	democratic	state	system	and	to	accomplish	our	independence	and	national	sovereignty.	We	did	not	call	for	an	armed	revolution	as	the	government	accuses	us;	for	no	responsible	body	in	our	party	has	ever	 issued	 an	 appeal	 for	 the	 masses	 arousing	 them	 to	 armed	 revolution”.	 	 TNA.	 Translation	 of	memorandum	by	ICP	dated	5	June	1947,	enclosed	in	FO/624/116.			839	Yūsuf.	Kitābāt,	supra,	ft.	305,	at	434-435.	840	As	quoted	in	Batatu,	supra,	ft.	41,	at	538	
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A public memorandum written by the ICP described the trial proceedings as ‘nothing… 
[more]…than a comedy of which the acts were set by the C.I.D.’841 This was not an exaggeration. 
The trial proceedings became increasingly farcical when resembling a Kafkaesque subplot, Kāmil 
Qazānchī (who would later lead the Coordination Committee of the Wathba movement) at the 
time, chief defense counsel, was arrested in the middle of the trial and charged under the very 
same law (Law 51) after he made an impassionate plea on behalf of his communist clients! This 
of course demonstrates how broadly drafted this piece legislation was and how it was used by the 
police and prosecution. Qazānchī was accused of being a communist agent financed by the Soviet 
Legation.842 This led the other nine attorneys to resign, and the defendants were left ‘deprived of 
the sacred right of defense’.843 Consequently, the police and prosecution in ‘an exposed manner, 
was itself conducting the court proceeding, in directing questions and in answering them 
sometimes, instead of the accused’.844  
 
The Higher Criminal Court ultimately found Fahad and Basīm guilty, sentencing them to 
the death penalty. The ICP memorandum suggested that the verdict was decided in unison with 
the government without taking any of the evidence into consideration, abandoning both Iraqi law 
and the principles of international law. It was only due to an unexpected regional and 
international outcry that the sentences were eventually commuted to penal servitude for life and 
fifteen years respectively. One of these appeals came from the British socialist lawyer and MP, 
Denis Pritt, who in an intense exchange in the House of Commons, questioned the Secretary of 
State for Foreign Affairs, Christopher Mayhew, on the trials: ‘Is the hon. Gentleman aware 																																																																				841	TNA.	Translation	of	memorandum	by	ICP	dated	5	June	1947,	enclosed	in	FO/624/116.			842	British	Embassy,	Bagdad	to	FO,	London;	4	June	1947,	E5041/77193,	FO	371/61664.	See	al-Zamān	newspaper,	September	2,	9	and	10,	1947	for	details	of	the	court	proceedings.	Qazānchī’s	office	was	raided	and	papers	were	confiscated	that	were	used	as	evidence	against	him.	The	chief	evidence	relied	on	were	letters	of	correspondence	with	Labour	MP,	Denis	Pritt,	regarding	the	translation	of	his	books	into	 Arabic.	 The	 prosecution	 considered	 Pritt	 a	 ‘Communist	 [British]	 MP’.	 Pritt	 consequently	 sent	impassionate	pleas	to	the	FO	asking	them	to	intervene	into	Qazānchī’s	case.	See,	D.	Pritt	to	McNeal,	18th	 July	1947,	E6508/771/93,	FO	371/61664.	(The	letter	used	by	the	prosecution	is	also	enclosed	therein).	 The	 appeals	 court	 eventually	 acquitted	 Qazānchī,	 and	 this	 was	 probably	 due	 to	 Pritt’s	appeals	to	the	British	Foreign	Office.	Iraqi	lawyers	and	the	nationalist	movement	never	forgot	Pritt’s	contribution	to	their	struggle.	Ironically,	after	the	Revolution,	Pritt	(this,	‘Communist	MP’)	would	be	greeted	 from	 the	 airplane	 by	 a	 large	 group	 of	 lawyers	 and	 half	 the	 Cabinet	 as	 he	 recounts	 in	 his	memoirs:	 ‘As	I	entered	the	[airport]	building	itself,	 I	heard	an	Iraqi	bystander	say	something	which	made	people	smile.	I	asked	what	he	had	said,	and	was	told	that	it	was:	“What	Englishman	could	there	possibly	be	who	deserves	such	a	welcome	here?”	The	Autobiography	of	D.N.	Pritt,	(London:	Lawrence	&	Wishart,	1965),	at	135.	843	TNA.	Translation	of	memorandum	by	ICP	dated	5	June	1947,	enclosed	in	FO/624/116			844	Ibid.	
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that…. [t]hese [Iraqi] gentlemen have, in fact, been sentenced to death for writing pamphlets, in 
support of trade unionism?845 Will he, therefore, get our representatives in Iraq to have an 
unofficial word with that country? It is controlled by our Army [after all].’ To which Mayhew’s 
response was to evoke Iraqi (semi-peripheral) sovereignty to argue that there was no ground for 
intervention, while completely denying that the British Army controlled Iraq through the Anglo-
Iraq Treaty!846   
 
It was only after martial law was declared during the Wathba did the regime have another 
chance to retry and ultimately execute the ICP leaders. I will return to this episode in the final 
chapter on the Wathba.  The point for now is that an intricate web of draconian criminal 
legislation was developed to complement the violent uses of the doctrine of emergency so as to 
maintain the regime’s semi-colonial hegemony.      
 
 
III. The Magical Weapon of Emergency as a Technique of Governance  
  
The question in the remaining part of this chapter will revolve around the doctrine of 
emergency and its uses in the context of the semi-colonial Iraqi state.  In other words, why was it 
that up to the 1958 revolution the Iraqi state was dominated by continuous states of emergency 
and proclamations of martial law? There were a total of sixteen proclamations of martial law in 
the 37 years of the existence of the Iraqi Hashemite monarchy (between 25 October 1925 until the 
eve of the revolution on 13 July 1958).847 From the seventeen years between the second 
occupation of Iraq in 1941 up to the fall of the monarchy in 1958, nearly nine of these years were 
																																																																				845	Of	 course,	 what	 Pritt	 meant	 was	 that	 they	 were	 sentenced	 to	 death	 merely	 for	 their	 political	beliefs	 –	 i.e.	 for	 being	 communists.	 Although	 as	we	 have	 seen	 Fahad	 did	 in	 fact	 help	 in	 drafting	 a	significant	number	of	pamphlets	for	the	railway	and	port	unions	amongst	others.			846	TNA.	 E	 5831/771/93;	 FO	 371/61664.	 ‘Parliamentary	 Question’,	 30	 June	 1947.	 	 The	 British	government	continued	to	claim	that	 there	was	no	 ‘locus	operandi’	 to	 intervene	 into	 the	affairs	of	a	sovereign	 country.	 Here	 it	 is	 quite	 obvious	 how	 the	 discourse	 of	 semi-peripheral	 sovereignty	operated	as	it	allowed	the	British	imperial	power	to	assert	Iraqi	sovereignty	rights,	while	furthering	their	imperial	interests.		Ironically,	a	handwritten	minute	from	the	FO	in	London	emphasized	that,	‘if	we	 intervene	 [on	 the	 sentences	 passed]	 it	 would	 give	 the	 impression	 that	 we	 run	 Iraq’,	 and	 ‘we	should	not	 get	 into	a	 rebook	 to	 the	application	of	 the	 laws	of	 Iraq	 forbidding	 the	dissemination	of	communist	 doctrine’.	 TNA.	 E6509/771/93;	 18	 July	 1947.	 ‘Sentences	 on	 the	 Iraqi	 Communists’	 FO	371/61664.	847	Haydar	ʿAbdul	Hādī,	Dirāsāt	fī	Qānūn	al-Huqūq	al-Insān	[Studies	in	Human	Rights	Law],	(ʿAmman:	Dār	al-Hamad,	2009),	at	191.	 
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dominated by a state of emergency of some form or another.848 The question therefore is whether 
this pattern reveals something of how a semi-colonial state that was considered ‘independent’ 
under international law still heavily relied on the colonial doctrine of emergency to govern its 
population and maintain its social order.   
 
The answer, as will be shown, is that there was a clear pattern, which suggests that it was 
partly due to such (legal) technique that the Iraqi regime lasted a decade after the Wathba until it 
was finally overthrown. Furthermore, it was with the uses of martial law that the criminal 
legislation detailed above was used more effectively and systematically in the military courts.  A 
good example of the effects of martial law could be found in a monthly report from the Basra 
Consulate-General, which in an astounded tone referred to martial law as a ‘new magical 
weapon’ of the government. Referring to the declaration of martial law in May of 1948, the report 
stated that ‘the situation cleared almost magically’ and that ‘power was now once more in the 
hands of government and there were few delusions as to how it would use its new weapon’.849 It 
also stated that ‘British popularity soared’ right after the imposition of martial law.850 How and 
why was this the effect of martial law?    
 
My aim in this chapter is to explore this ‘magical weapon of governance’ with the hope 
of grasping just how it operated and how it affected the organizing efforts of the nationalist 
movement and the labour movement. I will begin with a brief historical contextual recounting of 
the doctrine of emergency in Britain and its colonies so as to trace its origins.  I will then move to 
detail the Intifāda of 1952, which was an uprising that led to the call of military forces into the 
streets of Baghdad to maintain order.  This will lead to an analysis of the legal history of the 
doctrine of emergency, specifically focusing on the constitutional amendment of 1943, which 
gave the Crown the authority to proclaim a state of emergency whenever the monarchy was 
threatened by a ‘crisis’. After tracing the legal history of emergency and the manner it was 
institutionalized in the governing and constitutional structures of the Iraqi state, I will look at 
some of the debates inside and outside of parliament revolving around this question, especially 
focusing on the work of the social democrat, opposition MP and legal scholar, Hussein Jamīl. 
 
 																																																																				848	ʿAqīl	al-Nāsirī.	Al-Jaīsh	wa	al-Sulta	fi	al-ʿIraq	al-Malakī,	1921-1958	[The	Military	and	Government	in	Monarchial	Iraq],	(Damascus:	Dār	al-Hassād	li	al-Nashir	wa	al-Tibā‘a	wa	al-Tawzī’,	2000)	at	154. 849	TNA.	‘Basra	Monthly	Summary’,	Oct	1948,	FO	371/68459.	850	Ibid.	
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A. The origins & uses of martial law: tracing the history of the doctrine of emergency 
 
 
If one were to trace the evolutionary and historical development of martial law from 
England to the colonies, it would become clear how the doctrine of emergency was used 
specifically as a ‘technique of governance and instrument of control, rather than a purely reactive 
and temporary response to an isolated crisis’.851 Moreover, as John Reynolds and others have 
argued it was not just in the colonies that the doctrine of emergency was diffused, but it was also 
distilled into the normative framework of international human rights law, with the derogatory 
provisions therein.852 In this sense, in this study, it should be understood broadly in relation to the 
semi-peripheral sovereignty granted to Iraq through international law and the mandate system.853  
 
The origins of martial law in England could be traced to the medieval conception of 
‘military law,’ which was a system of regulations developed to maintain order and discipline of 
the armed forces. From the fourteenth century onwards, the ‘justice of martial law’ was to be 
applied not only to soldiers and sailors in wartime, but later extended to civilians, in particular 
rebels, traitors, and rioters among others.854 It was unclear what was the exact scope of these 
powers under martial law, but it was considered as a ‘summary form of criminal justice’ that was 
separate from the ordinary courts.855  
 
There were competing theories as to the foundations and parameters of martial law 
amongst English legal scholars. One theory emphasized that martial law operated within the 
parameters of the rule of law.  A.V. Dicey famously asserted that martial law was, ‘unknown to 
the law of England,’ which illustrates, ‘unmistakable proof of the permanent supremacy of the 
law under our constitution’.856 Dicey meant that under English law authority would never fully 
pass to the military and so martial law remained within the purview of the rule of law.  It was in 
this sense derived from the common law, ‘right of the Crown and its servants to repel force by 																																																																				851	John	Reynolds.	 “The	 Long	 Shadow	of	 Colonialism:	 The	Origins	 of	 the	Doctrine	 of	 Emergency	 in	International	 Human	 Rights	 Law,”	 (2010).	 Comparative	 Research	 in	 Law	 &	 Political	 Economy.	Research	Paper	No.	19/2010,	at	4.	http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/clpe/86.		852	See	John	Reynolds.	Empire,	Emergency	and	International	Law,	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2017).	853	Ibid,	at	5.	Let	us	not	 forget	 that	 the	ratification	of	 the	Anglo-Iraq	Treaty	 in	parliament	was	 itself	imposed	through	martial	law.	See	Chapter	3.		854	J.V.	 Capua,	 ‘The	 Early	 History	 of	 Martial	 Law	 in	 England	 from	 the	 Fourteenth	 Century	 to	 the	Petition	of	Right,’	36:1	Cambridge	Law	Journal	(1977),	at	152,	153.	855	Ibid.	856	A.V.	Dicey,	Introduction	to	the	Study	of	the	Law	of	the	Constitution,	(8th	ed.	1915),	at	289.	
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force in the case of invasion, insurrection, riot, or generally of any violent resistance of law’.857  
This had its basis on the common law defense of necessity. In other words, as long as the force 
used to suppress a riot was ‘necessary,’ it was considered to be lawful.858 An alternative theory 
suggested that martial law did suspend ordinary law for military rule, but it was only temporary 
and hence still operated within the constraints of the law.859 In other words, the suspension of 
ordinary law was similarly done out of ‘necessity,’ and was constrained by the constitution. A 
third view stated that martial law was not law, but rather as Lord Wellington’s famous 1851 
formulation, in relation to the use of martial law in Ceylon, the ‘will of the General who 
commands the army’.860 Here, emergency law is considered as being outside the purview of the 
law, merely limited by the General’s practical judgment on the field.  
 
 It was not until the mid-sixteenth century that martial law in Britain was extended from 
instances of war and rebellion to an offensive measure of governance used in peacetime. It was 
during this time that martial law was used as a weapon of class and political repression against, 
‘general undesirables with no apparent means of support’.861 During the ‘Pilgrimage of Grace’ in 
1537, for instance, Henry VIII instructed his commanding lieutenants to, ‘continue to proceed by 
martial law until the country was in such terror as to insure obedience’.862 This use of martial law, 
which was first widely used in Ireland, continued in England in certain variations until it was 
outlawed by parliament after the passing of the Petition of Right in 1628.863  
 
Although the Petition of Right led to the disuse of martial law in Britain, this was not the 
case abroad where its colonial uses proliferated becoming, ‘an essential part of the security 
apparatus of many colonies in the empire’.864 Martial law was turned into a mechanism of control 
																																																																				857	Ibid,	at	284.	858	Dicey’s	theory,	which	is	championed	by	contemporary	scholars	like	David	Dyzenhaus,	should	not	be	understood	outside	its	historical	and	practical	context	–	or	the	specific	political	and	class	position	that	Dicey	came	from.	Dicey	vehemently	opposed	Irish	independence,	female	suffrage,	and	the	rights	of	the	working-class.	His	notion	of	the	rule	of	law	explicitly,	‘embraced	the	deployment	of	autocratic	powers	 to	 defend	 the	 British	 Empire	 and	 its	 ruling	 elites.’	 See	 Michael	 Head.	 Emergency	 Powers:	
Theory	and	Practice	(Surrey:	Ashgate,	2016),	at	99.		859	See	Charles	Tripp.	A	History	of	Iraq	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2000),	at	108-114.	860	Hansard,	cxv	880	(1	April	1851).	861	Capua,	supra,	ft.	854,	at	164	862	Ibid.	863	Ibid,	at	171-172.	864	R.W.	Kostal,	A	Jurisprudence	of	Power:	Victorian	Empire	and	the	Rule	of	Law,	(Oxford:	OUP,	2005),	at	10.	 	Martial	law	was	enforced	in	Barbados	in	1805	and	1816,	Damerara	in	1823,	Ceylon	in	1848,	Cephalonia	in	1849,	Cape	of	Good	Hope	in	1835,	1849-51,	St	Vincent	in	1863,	and	in	Jamaica	in	1831-
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in the colonial context with the aim of protecting British imperial interests and suppressing any 
form resistance from the native population. The proclamation of martial law was therefore 
considered a common law right for the maintenance of ‘the safety of the colony’ as Robert Peel 
accentuated during the parliamentary debate on the uses of martial law in Ceylon in 1848.865 Any 
threat against the established colonial order was deemed to necessitate the use of martial law to 
bring back public order and ensure that the uncivilized natives remain obedient.  The extremities 
of violence that would ensue during a period of martial law would always be justified, as passing 
this test of ‘necessity,’ for violent punishment or reprisal were central techniques to the practice 
of martial law.866 
 
 The codification of martial law into emergency codes was a corresponding part of 
colonial governance in the Empire. This institutionalization of martial law became more 
expansive as it was practically and widely applicable, for there was no need for the military to 
justify its actions under the common law test of strict necessity. As Brian Simpson has shown, it 
was in Ireland that Britain first decided to turn martial law into written law. Simpson considered 
the 1883 Act for the More Effective Suppression of Local Disturbances and Dangerous 
Associations in Ireland, as ‘the ancestor of the modern code of emergency law’.867 This Act, 
which gave the Lord-Lieutenant the power to declare a ‘state of emergency’ – suppress meetings, 
impose curfews, and try offenders by court martial. Most significantly, ‘nothing under the Act 
could be questioned by any court of law’.868 The Act was naturally aimed at crushing the Irish 
peasantry’s nationalist struggle. Ireland was therefore turned into a laboratory for experimentation 
on emergency law techniques that would later be exported to other parts of the Empire.	869 By the 
First World War, the exclusive use of martial law in the colonies ended, and a ‘sharp break from 
the centuries old tradition of martial law occurred,’ when the drafting of more comprehensive and 
																																																																																																																																																																																																									2	 and	 1865.	 See	 Charles	 Townshend.	 “Martial	 Law:	 Legal	 and	 Administrative	 Problems	 of	 Civil	Emergency	in	Britain	and	the	Empire,	1800-1940,”	The	Historical	Journal,	25,	1,	(1982),	at	168.			865	Quoted	in	Charles	Fairman.	“The	Law	of	Martial	Rule	and	the	National	Emergency,”	Harvard	Law	
Review,	Vol.	55,	(June,	1942),	at	1260.		866	Brian	 Simpson,	 Human	 Rights	 and	 the	 End	 of	 Empire:	 Britain	 and	 the	 Genesis	 of	 the	 European	
Convention,	(Oxford:	OUP,	2001),	at	62-63.	867	See	 the	Palestine	 (Defence)	Orders	of	Council	 of	 1931	 and	 1937.	 2	&	 3	 Government	 of	 Palestine	Ordinances,	Regulations,	Rules,	Orders	and	Notices	259	(19	April	1936	and	20	March	1937).		868	Simpson,	supra,	ft.	866,	at	79.	869	Reynolds	lists	the	pieces	of	legislation	passed	in	Ireland	that	institutionalized	emergency	powers,	and	where	‘a	notion	of	a	permanent	exception	[was]	developed’:	The	Crime	and	Outrage	Act	of	1847;	Habeas	Corpus	Suspension	Acts	(1848-49,	1866-69);	the	Protection	of	Life	and	Property	in	Ireland	of	1871;	the	Protection	of	Person	and	Property	in	Ireland	of	1881;	the	Prevention	of	Crime	(Ireland)	Act	of	1883	and	finally	the	Restoration	of	Order	(Ireland)	Act	of	1883.	Reynolds,	supra,	ft.	851,	at	13.				
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draconian emergency codes institutionalized emergency powers in Britain.870 Under a series of 
Defense of Realm Acts, the executive would make regulations, ‘for securing the public safety and 
the defense of the realm’.871 This transformed ‘the executive into the legislature,’ giving it wide 
powers and allowing it to surpass parliament. The DORA technique would later be exported to 
India, where ‘emergency powers were [to become] a regular feature of the legal system’.872 From 
there it was diffused into all corners of the Empire, including the Middle East (particularly 
Palestine) and eventually Iraq. 
 
B. The normalization of emergency rule in Iraq 
  
 
Martial law was already in use during the British administration of Iraq under the 
Mandate system. In fact, the subsidiary military agreement to the 1922 Anglo-Iraq Treaty, gave 
the British the right to compel the King to declare martial law and entrust its administration to a 
British officer.873 In other words, the administration of martial law was exercised by the British 
military rather than the Iraqi government. Moreover, as mentioned in a previous chapter, the 1922 
Anglo-Iraq Treaty was itself only ratified in Parliament in 1924 when Percy Cox, the High 
Commissioner, used this right to proclaim martial law when the king fell ill. This is quite 
significant as I will argue, for one must understand the ‘independence’ of Iraq and its ensuing 
semi-peripheral sovereignty (as governed by the 1930 Anglo-Iraq Treaty) in relation to the per-
formative functions of martial law and the doctrine of emergency. In other words, semi-
peripheral sovereignty and the doctrine of emergency came hand in hand. The Iraqi state needed 
martial law and emergency law to exercise its semi-colonial sovereignty. A weak sovereignty 
could only be (re)imposed over and over to be maintained and its hegemony held together, 
especially over its unsatisfied and distressed  population. 
 
Even before the controversial 1943 amendment, the Iraqi constitution of 1925 already 
contained a provision – Article 120 – that gave power to the King to proclaim martial law. It 
stated that, ‘should disturbances occur, or should anything happen indicating the likelihood of the 
																																																																				870	Simpson,	supra,	ft.	866,	at	80-81.	See	Oren	Gross	and	Fionnuala	Ni	Aolain.	Law	in	Times	of	Crises:	
Emergency	Powers	in	Theory	and	Practice,	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2006),	at	182.		871	Ibid.	872	Ibid,	at	83.		873	Daniel	 Silverfarb.	 Britain’s	 Informal	 Empire	 in	 the	 Middle	 East:	 A	 Case	 Study	 of	 Iraq	 1929-1941	(Oxford:	OUP,	1986),	at	9.	
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occurrence of events of such a character in any part whatsoever of Iraq, or should there be a 
menace of hostile attack upon any part whatsoever of Iraq, the King shall have power…to 
proclaim martial law…’874 However, this power was subject to the Council of Ministers and 
martial law could only be proclaimed ‘provisionally’ in the districts of Iraq ‘exposed to the 
danger of disturbances or attacks’.875 The Article goes on: ‘the application of existing laws and 
regulations may be suspended by the proclamation declaring martial law in force,’ and Parliament 
may pass a law exempting those charged with the execution of the proclamation.876 Finally, it 
states that, ‘the method of administration of the places in which martial law has been declared to 
be in force shall be prescribed by Royal Irda’ or ordinance. 877  Therefore, despite having the 
ability to proclaim martial law, the proclamation was explicitly provisional and limited to ‘a 
menace of hostile attack’ implying internal of external threat to the state. This was significantly 
altered by the 1943 amendment with the addition of a much wider and flexible power to declare a 
state of emergency.  
 
By 1935, Ordinance for Martial Law Administration – No. 18 was passed, which detailed 
the manner in which martial law would be administrated.878  The Military Court, for instance, was 
to be made up of a (military) president and four members (two military officers and two civilian 
judges). The procedures of the military court were detailed therein. The death penalty was the 
sentence to be applied to anyone who, ‘uses arms against the government or its military and 
police forces’; ‘participates in an armed rebellion against the government or armed forces’; 
disrupts the lines of communications; ‘gives assistance to rebels’; ‘spreads propaganda amongst 
members of the military or police forces’; or ‘conducts espionage’. Penal servitude was the 
sentence for anyone, who ‘gives [sensitive] news or information to rebels;’ ‘encourages the rebels 
to continue’ their activities; or ‘spreads false news’.879  Under this Ordinance, the Officer 
Commanding the Military forces had wide powers, including the imposition of curfews; 
conducting searches of persons and houses at any time of day; suspending seizing newspapers 
and periodicals; preventing or dispersing a public meeting; and making arrests.880  																																																																				874	The	Iraq	Constitution	(Organic	Law)	–	March	21,	1925,	passed	July	10,	1924,	as	amended	July	29,	1925	and	October	27,	1943.	875	Ibid.	876	Ibid.	877	Ibid.	878	‘Ordinance	for	Martial	Law	Administration	–	No.	18	of	1935’.	Iraq	Gazette,	No.	1420,	14-5-1935.				879	Ibid.	880	An	amendment	to	this	law	in	1936	(No.	38)	stated	that	a	law	must	be	passed	setting	out	how	each	district	was	to	be	administered	under	martial	law.	See	Mustafa	Kāmil.	Sharḥ	al-Qānūn	al-Idārī	al-
ʿIraqi	[A	commentary	on	the	administrative	law	of	Iraq],	(Baghdad:	Matba‘	al-Najah,	1949),	at	376.			 
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The constitution was amended in 1943 to strengthen the prerogative powers of the King, 
one of which was the ability to dismiss the prime minister and dissolve parliament.881 These 
major amendments emerged as a result of the 1941 anti-British coup of Rashid Ali, which 
threatened the existence of the monarchy and ultimately led to the second British occupation of 
Iraq that reinstalled the preceding order.882 The amendments were hence meant to ensure that 
such a coup against the monarchy would not reoccur. It did this by ensuring that the executive 
remained loyal to the monarchy and accordingly weakened the powers of parliament. 
Furthermore, it gave the King the authority to issue royal prerogatives that were upheld as law, 
when parliament was not in session, surpassing parliamentary scrutiny.  
 
One of the most significant amendments was to Article 120, incorporating the power of 
the crown to declare a state of emergency if he felt the monarchy was under threat.883 The 
addition to the article read: ‘upon the occurrence of danger or rebellion or anything which 
disturbs the peace, in any part of Iraq, the King may, with the consent of the Council of Ministers, 
notify a state of emergency in the whole of Iraq, or in any part thereof. The districts affected by 
the notification shall be administered in accordance with a special law, which shall provide for 
trial, by Special Courts, of those who commit specified offences, and prescribe the administrative 
measures to be taken by specified authorities.’884  
 
This amendment was inserted at the insistence of the British legal advisor to the Ministry 
of Justice, Edwin Drower, who was a member of the committee tasked with drafting the 
amendment.885 Drower argued that the proclamation of martial law was not enough by itself for 
the government to function effectively, especially since the proclamation of martial law could 
only be done within the narrow condition of wartime – i.e. if there ‘should there be a menace of 
[an external or internal] hostile attack’.886 In other words, in peacetime when this external or 																																																																				881 	See	 al-Hasani.	 Tārīkh	 al-Wizārāt,	 Vol.	 6,	 supra,	 ft.	 235,	 at	 121-142;	 for	 the	 details	 of	 the	constitutional	amendments.		882	The	Iraq	Constitution	(Organic	Law)	–	March	21,	1925,	passed	July	10,	1924,	as	amended	July	29,	1925	and	October	27,	1943.	883	Ibid.	884	Ibid.	885	Kāmil	 Chādirji.	 ‘Sin	 Qānūn	 al-Tawār’	 Yastabqī	 al-Mamlīka	 fī	 Hāla	 Ahkām	 ʿIrfīya	 Dā’īma’	 [‘The	Emergency	Law	Ensures	that	the	Monarchy	will	remain	in	a	Permanent	State	of	Emergency’],	Sadā	al-
Ahāli,	 3/1/1951;	 included	 in	Rifʿat	Chādirjī.	 fī	Haq	Mumārasa	al-Sīyāsa	wa	al-Dīmuqrātīya:	Iftitāhāt	
Jarīda	 al-Ahālī,	 1944-1954	 [The	 right	 to	 pursue	 politics	 and	 democracy:	 the	 openings	 of	 al-Ahali	newspaper,	1944-1954],	(Koln:	al-Jamal,	2003),	at	436. 886	Ibid,	at	437	
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internal threat was not present or unclear, the government would not have a justification for the 
proclamation of martial law. What was required was a legal justification for the proclamation of 
an emergency, and so Drower insisted that this could only be done by inserting such a power into 
the constitution itself – that is by constitutionalizing the executive power to declare a state of 
emergency. The majority in the drafting committee were strongly opposed to this suggestion, but 
despite this Nurī al-Saīd forcefully inserted this article into the list of amendments ensuring it 
would be passed.887 As Kāmil al-Chādirjī argued in Sadā al-Ahāli newspaper, the vagueness of 
the phrase, ‘danger or rebellion or anything which disturbs the peace’ ensured that a state of 
emergency could be declared in peacetime, and did not have to be provisional as with the 
proclamation of martial law in the first part of the Article. That is, it could become a permanent 
state of emergency,	888 which was in fact exactly what transpired, in particular after the Intifāda of 
1952 and later the Basra General Strike of 1953.  
 
C. The Intifāda of November 1952: the introduction of emergency as a governing technique 
 
Before moving to an analysis of the doctrine of emergency in Iraq, I will very briefly 
shift this narrative to the streets by recounting the events of the Intifāda, which once again 
brought military rule back to the fore. Some major events at the time shook the entire region and 
of course had a major impact on Iraqis; in particular only a few months earlier, the Egyptian 
Revolution instigated by the free Officers overthrew the British-sponsored monarchy there, while 
a movement for the nationalization of oil in Iran was underway. The Intifāda of November 1952 
could be considered as the ‘continuation’ of the Wathba, which will be dealt with in the next 
chapter, as it was an attempt to revive the vitality of that emancipatory event. The nationalist 
movement and especially the opposition parties became aware that without a properly organized 
and unified flank, they would fail to bring any real change to an order that was increasingly 
intransigent.  
 
It was this understanding that led the parliamentary opposition (the Independents, the 
National Democrats, the United Popular Front), and the communist-dominated Peace Partisans to 
negotiate an organized ‘Contact Committee’, with the aim of ‘facilitating the exchange of views 
and ensuring uniformity of action.’889 On October 28, the opposition sent petitions to the Regent 																																																																				887	Ibid,	at	438.	888	Ibid,	at	440.	889	Batatu,	supra,	ft.	41,	at	667.	
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that called for the following: the amendment of the constitution ‘to safeguard the sovereignty of 
the people’ by abolishing the power of the crown to dismiss cabinets, the granting of civil 
liberties and instituting a direct electoral system. The National Democrats and the Independents 
went further calling for the abrogation of the 1930 Anglo-Iraq Treaty, the eviction of all British 
forces, and a limit to landownership.890 Other significant demands included the end to all 
‘reactionary laws’, (a clear reference to the TCCDR and emergency law), the abolition of 
feudalism and the freedom to form trade unions.891 The Regents response was that reforms could 
only be enacted in a ‘constitutional’ manner, that is through Parliament and the responsible 
government in office.892  The opposition consequently decided to boycott the coming elections, 
which led the British Ambassador, Sir John Troutbeck, to refer to them in his dispatch as a ‘band 
of gangsters’ that must be ‘hit hard’.893   
 
On November 22, demonstrations erupted in Baghdad as students, workers, and street 
vendors sprang to action under the guidance of the newly formed committee.894 The shouts 
against the Regent were numerous but more significant were the slogans: ‘Anglo-American 
Imperialists Leave our Country!’895, and ‘O Allah, O People! Renew the Wathba!’896  Crowds 
clashed with armed police, who fired shots, leading to the killing of one person, while fifty-two 
others, including thirty-eight policemen were injured.897 On 23 November, the demonstrations 
intensified its organizational capacity and quickly broadened, assuming ‘a more distinct plebeian 
aspect’.898 The ICP who at that point dominated the rhythm of the streets, led the multitudes the 
next morning with the slogan, ‘We Want Bread not Bullets!’ eventually stormed the Qambār Alī 
police station.899 The anger intensified when in the afternoon the United States Information 
Service library was burned, while another police station was occupied and set ablaze.900 The poet 
																																																																				890	For	 the	 full	 transcripts	 of	 the	 petitions	 see:	 Sir	 J.	 Troutbeck	 to	 Mr.	 Eden,	 5	 November,	 1952,	‘Recent	Developments	in	the	Political	Situation	in	Iraq’,	EQ	1016/39,	FO	371/98735.				891	Ibid.	The	Independence	party’s	petition	referred	to	the	parliamentary	system	in	Iraq	as	a	‘fiction’	because	of	the	power	of	the	crown	to	dismiss	parliament	and	cabinets.			892	Ibid.	893	TNA.	Troutbeck	to	FO,	London,	14,	November	1952,	EQ1016/46,	FO	371/98735.				894	Batatu,	supra,	ft.	41,	at	668.	895	Ibid.	896	Baha’	al-Dīn	Nurī,	Muthākarāt	Baha’	al-Dīn	Nurī	[the	memoirs	of	Baha’	al-Dīn	Nurī],	(London:	Dār	al-Hikmā,	2001),	at	164.	897	Batatu,	supra,	ft.	41,	at	668.	898	Ibid.	899	Batatu,	supra,	ft.	41,	at	669.	900	Baha’	al-Dīn	Nurī,	the	Secretary	General	of	the	ICP	at	the	time	recounts	the	events	of	the	Intifada	in	 his	memoirs	 and	 states	 that	 the	 demonstrators	were	 not	 a	mob,	 but	 rather	well-organized	 and	peaceful,	 and	 that	 although	 there	 were	 two	 fires,	 these	 only	 occurred	 when	 the	 police	 violently	
	 195	
Badr Shākir al-Sayyāb would later describe the scene: ‘they burned and looted and destroyed, as 
if they were destroying colonialism itself and not tape recorders and burning exploitation rather 
than cinema reels’.901 The violence spiraled even further when after police gunfire brought death 
to several demonstrators, in an act of vengeance; a policeman was dragged by a mob and set a 
light.  
 
By sundown, the army was called into the streets of Baghdad for the first time in its 
modern history. Tanks rolled into the squares of the city. A special session was held in parliament 
where it was decided that martial law would be proclaimed in Baghdad Governante under Article 
120 of the Constitution.902 The application of ordinary laws ceased, and the civil courts shut 
down. General Nurī-ud-Dīn Mahmūd, a loyal Royalist officer of Kurdish origin, was given wide 
powers to form a new government and rule under military administration. Referring to the 
provisions of 1935 Ordinance for Martial Law Administration – No. 18, General Mahmūd issued 
decrees that prohibited further demonstrations, dissolved all political parties, arresting their 
leaders, suppressed the press, and imposed curfew.903 Despite these measures, demonstrations did 
not cease until they were violently crushed when military forces were ordered to shoot into the 
crowd.904 Military rule lasted for 318 days until direct elections were called and a civilian 
government was formed, but the state of emergency remained in place. 
 
The Intifāda was crushed even more violently than the Wathba before it but similarly 
with the use of the weapon of martial law. The process of normalizing the state of emergency in 
law now started to materially take pace and reveal itself into the everyday lives of Iraqis. The 
doctrine of emergency was clearly a technique of governance, and I would go so far as to argue 
that it was an integral part of the structures of the semi-colonial state. I will get to this argument 
in due course, but for now it is important to mention that if one read through the parliamentary 
records of this period, one would be astounded to find heated debates not only on the 
constitutionality of martial law, but the semi-colonial character of the Iraqi state. The 
parliamentary opposition openly attacked the government and the British, referring to the Iraqi 
																																																																																																																																																																																																									attacked	the	demonstrators,	who	were	only	armed	with	sticks	and	stones.	See	Nurī,	supra,	ft.	896,	at	170-171.	901	Badir	Shākir	al-Sayyāb,	Kuntū	Shūʿīyan	[I	was	a	communist],	(Cologne:	Manshūrāt	al-Jamal,	2007),	at	204-9.	 902	al-Hasanī,	Vol.	8,	ft.	235,	at	319.	903	Ibid,	at	321-322.	904	Ibid,	at	323.	
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state as a dictatorship disguised as a parliamentary democracy. It considered the prolonging of 
martial law and states of emergency as being unconstitutional.  
 
What is more, the opposition was in someway cognizant of the uses of emergency 
doctrine as a technique of governance. So, for instance, the foremost social democrat, 
Mohammed Hadīd claimed that the government could not govern or even survive without their 
uses of martial law.905 Hadīd emphasized that martial law was merely used to ‘protect the ruling 
classes’, turning Iraq into a ‘police state’.906 Hussein Jamīl, Hadīd’s colleague, made a similar 
point when he wrote in Sawt al-Ahālī that the government used martial law ‘to protect its back’ 
whenever it needed to.907 In one parliamentary session, Fā’iq al-Sāmurā’ī of the (right-wing) 
nationalist Independents stated that, ‘ever since Iraq became a member of the League of Nations 
until now, it has been ruled by martial law’ and that we have forgotten what ‘ordinary conditions’ 
look like and have become ‘accustomed to this type of rule’.908 This was not an exaggeration as I 
have shown earlier. In fact, only six months earlier, Nurī al-Saīd was endeavoring to pass another 
emergency law through parliament that would bring about such normalization of emergency 
before elections took place. This law would be ‘less restrictive than martial law’ and would allow 
civil courts to ‘continue to function’ in a state of emergency.909 This sort of normalization was in 
fact what would emerge as the next elections occurred when a state of emergency was still in 
place to the advantage of al-Saīd’s Constitutional Union Party910 and the ruling class.911 
 
 
 		
																																																																				905	Muhāthir	Majlis	al-Nūwwāb,	(3-5-1949)	[Iraqi	Parliamentary	Records],	at	481-482.	906	Ibid.	907Hussein	 Jamīl,	 “al-Ahkām	 al-ʿRfīya	wa	Atharuha	 fī	 Idtrāb	 al-Hayāt	 al-ʿĀma”,	Sawt	al-Ahālī,	 9-10-1949. 908	Muhāthir	Majlis	al-Nūwwāb,	(19-12-1948)	[Iraqi	Parliamentary	Records],	at	73.		909	TNA.	T.E.	Bromisy	to	Eastern	Department,	FO;	27	March	1952.	E	Q1016/10.		FO/371/98734.	910	It	was	surely	no	coincidence	that	al-Saīd	chose	this	name	for	his	new	party	as	he	was	adamant	on	asserting	the	constitutionality	of	his	actions	–	something	that	I	would	consider	as	a	characteristic	of	the	semi-colonial	state	in	general.			911	This	led	one	parliamentarian	to	condemn	al-Said’s	tactics	in	forming	a	majority	for	his	party	while	martial	law	was	in	place	–	i.e.	while	all	opposition	parties	were	suspended.	ʿAbdul	Jabbār	al-Jumarid	argued	that	al-Said’s	parliamentary	‘majority’	was	formed	using	‘dictatorial	methods’.	 	This	furthers	the	 argument	 here	 that	 the	 doctrine	 of	 emergency	 was	 a	 technique	 of	 governance.	 See	Muhāthir	
Majlis	al-Nūwwāb,	21st	Session	1952-53,	at	352.	
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D. The Rule of Semi-Colonial Law: Hussein Jamīl & the ‘legal aporia’ of emergency 
 
 
I will now turn to the work of Hussein Jamīl, a social democrat and opposition MP, 
lawyer and a brilliant legal scholar, who was one of the foremost critics of the uses of martial law 
in Iraq.912 He wrote extensively on the topic and in 1953 published a pamphlet entitled Martial 
Law: A Doctrinal Analysis.913 His overall argument was that martial law (and the doctrine of 
emergency) did not suspend the law, but rather was governed by the Iraqi constitution and 
therefore must be constrained by clearly identified parameters. In other words, he identified 
martial law as being rooted in law and therefore could not (legally) override the fundamental 
constitutional rights of the Iraqi people.914 Martial law, he wrote, ‘although provisional, is still not 
an absolute order, but rather is subject to the law… [as] the constitution being its source…it must 
be supervised by the judiciary’.915 Jamīl considered the proclamation of a state of emergency 
under Article 120 as creating a ‘political legal order that is based on constitutional rule, by 
reference to the constitution,’ and ‘within the limits of the law’.916 Not only was Jamīl an 
advocate of subjecting the military courts to appeals after the state of emergency ended, which 
would determine the constitutionality of its rulings, he also strongly criticized the composition of 
																																																																				912	Hussein	 Jamīl	 (1908-2002)	born	 in	Karbala	 in	1908,	where	his	 father	was	a	 judge.	He	moved	to	Baghdad	for	secondary	education,	and	eventually	attended	the	law	college	in	Damascus,	graduating	in	1930.	Jamīl	was	one	of	the	founders	of	the	reputable	social	democratic	al-Ahālī	newspaper,	and	he	was	 a	 leader	 of	 the	 National	 Democratic	 Party,	 which	 was	 founded	 in	 1946.	 He	 was	 elected	 to	parliament	in	1947,	1948	and	1954,	and	worked	for	the	Ministry	of	Justice	in	1949-1950.	He	became	the	 head	 of	 the	 drafting	 committee	 of	 the	 Iraqi	 constitution	 after	 the	 July	 revolution	 of	 1958.	 A	prominent	member	of	the	Iraqi	Lawyers’	Union	between	1953-1957,	he	served	as	secretary-general	of	the	Arab	Lawyers	Union	between	1956-1958.	He	died	in	Baghdad	in	6	January	2002.			913	Hussein	 Jamīl.	 al-Aḥkām	 al-ʿIrfīya:	 Baḥith	 Fiqḥī	 [Martial	 Law:	 A	 Doctrinal	 Analysis],	 (Baghdad:	Matbaʿa	al-ʿAnī,	1953).	914	Ibid,	at	3,	11.		Here	reference	should	be	made	to	Article	7	of	the	constitution	(‘There	should	be	no	violation	of,	or	interference	with,	the	personal	liberty	of	any	of	the	inhabitants	of	Iraq.	None	of	them	shall	be	arrested,	detained,	punished	or	obliged	to	change	their	place	of	residence,	or	to	be	placed	in	bonds,	 or	 compelled	 to	 serve	 in	 the	 armed	 forced,	 except	 in	 conformity	with	 law.	Torture	 and	 the	deportation	of	Iraqis	from	the	Kingdom	of	Iraq	are	absolutely	forbidden”);	and	Article	12	(“Freedom	of	 expression	 of	 opinion,	 liberty	 of	 publication,	 of	 meeting	 together,	 and	 of	 forming	 and	 joining	associations	is	guaranteed	to	all	Iraqis	within	such	limits	as	prescribed	by	law.”),	as	examples	Jamil	refers	to	of	the	constitutional	rights	that	were	violated	by	martial	law	and	the	military	courts.			915	See	 Abdul	 Hussein	 al-Shaʿbān.	 Jithūr	 al-Tayyār	 al-Dimuqrātī	 fi	 al-ʿIraq:	 Qira’a	 fī	 afkār	 Hussein	
Jamīl,	[The	Roots	of	the	Democratic	Current	in	Iraq:	A	study	in	the	thought	of	Hussein	Jamil],	(Beirut:	Bīsān,	2007),	at	210.	916Jamīl,	supra,	ft.	913,	at	11.	
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the military courts that had a majority of military rather than civilian judges as contravening the 
constitution.917  
 
Jamīl, was a social democrat of a liberal (Fabian) variety and so he had a strong affinity 
to the notion of the rule of law.918 He referred to the Magna Carta and the writ of habeas corpus 
in his pamphlet to emphasize the principles inherent in the Iraqi Constitution that all citizens have 
a right to be heard by the ordinary (civil) courts of the land.919 Furthermore, he argued that the 
ordinances issued by the military administrators during a state of emergency do not have the 
authority of law and cannot remain valid after a state of emergency ends, which was what often 
happened in Iraq. 920  In that sense, Jamīl believed that a clearly defined limitation to a 
proclamation of martial law and a state of emergency would prevent injustices from occurring.921  
 
Despite his sophisticated legal analysis, Jamīl was limited to a narrow doctrinal analysis, 
presenting a legal solution to a non-legal problem.  In other words, he refused to grasp the 
doctrine of emergency beyond a narrow legal lens by studying it from a historical lens and 
grasping its function as a social and political technique of governance in a semi-colonial context. 
The question of martial law in Iraq was not a question of legal or constitutional interpretation.922 
The semi-colonial state may be obsessed with its constitutionality, but that was merely a façade 
for its real intentions – the maintenance of its hegemony and the crushing of anything that would 
threaten its order. Jamīl thought that the ideal of the rule of law would solve the problem of 
martial law in Iraq.923  However, he did not realize that martial law and the doctrine of emergency 
had a specific function in the colonies and semi-colonies. Jamīl underscores more than once in his 
pamphlet that, ‘it is not the purpose of martial law to create a dictatorial order in a country which 
																																																																				917Ibid.	See	Hussein	 Jamīl,	 ‘al-Aḥkām	al-ʿirfīya	wa	Athāruhā	 fī	 Idtirāb	al- ḥayāt	al-‘Āma’	 [Martial	 law	and	its	effects	on	public	life],	Sawt	al-Ahālī	9-10-1949.	 918	One	 of	 his	 books,	Huqūq	 al-Insān	wa	 al-Qānūn	 al-Jinā’ī	 [Human	 Rights	 and	 the	 Criminal	 Law],	(Ma‘had	al-Bihūth	wa	al-Dirāsāt	al-‘Arabīya,	1972),	published	in	1972,	contained	an	epigraph	by	John	Locke	on	its	cover,	“Where-ever	law	ends,	tyranny	begins”.			919	Jamīl,	supra,	ft.	909,	at	10.	920	Ibid,	at	33-34.	921	Jamīl	refers	to	some	of	these	injustices	in	his	pamphlet,	illustrating	how	the	military	judges	would	take	on	cases	that	occurred	before	the	date	of	the	proclamation	of	martial	law;	while	in	some	cases	extend	 its	 jurisdiction	 to	 an	 area	 that	 was	 not	 under	 martial	 law	 just	 for	 the	 convenience	 of	constructing	the	legal	prerequisites	for	a	crime.	Ibid,	at	22.		922	Although	 the	 clarification	of	how	 law	should	be	 applied	was	 important	 for	 the	masses	 and	 that	was	his	purpose	in	writing	this	pamphlet.	923	This	was	also	the	argument	the	National	Democratic	Party	that	Jamīl	belonged	to,	who	argued	that	the	manner	in	which	General	Nuri	used	martial	law	to	suspend	political	parties	was	unconstitutional.	
See	al-Hasanī,	Tārīkh	al-Wīzārāt,	Vol	8,	supra,	ft.	235,	at	348.	
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is a democracy.’924 However, this was exactly the (performative) function of martial law for the 
semi-colonial Iraqi state if one looked at its effects on the ground – the maintenance of a semi-
colonial order, whether it was dictatorial or even democratic was not an issue.  
 
If one approached martial law as actually being governed by the rule of law of a genuine 
parliamentary democracy, then Jamīl’s analysis might arguably have some weight.925 In Iraq, 
however, martial law had a very specific function and Jamīl was merely describing what in his 
view should be (in law) rather than what was the semi-colonial reality. An important example of 
how the doctrine of emergency was used as a technique of governance occurred during the 
massive Basra General Strike of 1953,926 propelled on the first anniversary of the Intifāda, it was 
organized under the guidance of a Strike Committee, which was led by the renowned Iraqi 
communist Salām Ādil.927 The oil workers of the Basra Petroleum Company went on strike and 
eventually workers of the entire city joined the strike, including the port workers. The 
government at the insistence of the Minister of Interior, Saīd al-Qazzāz, decided that the 
proclamation of a state of emergency under the guise of ‘combating communism’ and 
reinstituting ‘law and order’ was necessary.928 Police were ordered to violently shoot into a crowd 
of striking workers, while newspapers that spread the strikers’ declarations were suppressed and 
their journalists arrested.929  
 
																																																																				924	Jamīl,	supra,	ft.	913,	at	3.	925	Even	 then	 there	 are	 reservations;	 for	 one	 thing,	 it	 is	 not	 possible	 to	 be	 so	 clear	 as	 to	 cover	 all	emergency	 situations.	 As	 Alexander	 Hamilton	 wrote,	 it	 is	 impossible	 ‘to	 foresee	 or	 to	 define	 the	extent	an	variety	of	national	exigencies,	 and	 the	correspondent	extent	and	variety	of	means	which	may	be	necessary	to	satisfy	them.	The	circumstances	that	endanger	the	safety	of	nations	are	infinite.’	This	 is	why	most	 constitutional	 emergency	provisions	are	 in	 fact	broad	and	 flexible	as	opposed	 to	Jamīl’s	point.	See	Oren	Gross	and	Fionnuala	Ni	Aolain.	Law	in	Times	of	Crises,	supra,	at	66.	926	Suʿād	 Khayrī	 considered	 this	 strike	 as	 ‘the	 Wathba	 of	 the	 workers’	 as	 it	 contributed	 to	 the	‘economic	liberation	of	oil	resources	from	imperial	hands’.	Khayrī,	supra,	ft.	562,	at	204.	927	Husain	 al-Radī,	 aka	 Salām	Ādil	 (b.1924,	 Najaf	 –	 d.	 24	 Feb	 1963);	 Ādil	was	 a	 schoolteacher	 and	poet,	who	rose	to	become	a	member	of	the	Central	Committee	of	the	ICP	in	1953.	He	represented	Iraq	in	 the	Second	London	Conference	of	 the	Communist	Parties	with	 the	Sphere	of	British	 Imperialism	the	 same	 year.	 He	 was	 heavily	 involved	 in	 the	 struggles	 of	 the	 labour	 movement	 in	 Basra	 and	especially	 the	oil	workers.	He	died	under	 torture	by	 the	Ba’athists	during	Black	February	 in	1963.	Batatu,	 supra,	 at	712-717.	For	his	biography	See	 ThamĪna	Nājī	Yūsuf	 and	Nizār	Khālid.	Salām	Ādil:	
SĪra	Mūnādil	[Salam	Adil:	The	Story	of	a	Struggler]	(Damascus:	Dār	al-Madā,	2001).			928	See	Abdul	Rahmān	al-Bayātī.	Saīd	al-Qazzāz	wa	Dourihu	fī	Sīyāsa	al-‘Iraq	 [Said	al-Qazzaz	and	his	role	in	Iraqi	politics],	Beirūt:	Mu’asasa	al-	‘Arabīya	lil-Dirāsa	wa	al-Nashir,	2001),	at	92-102.		929	ʿAzīz	Sbāhī.	Uqūd	Min	Tārīkh	al-ḥizb	al-Shīwʿi	al-ʿIraqi,	al-Juzu’	al-Thāni	[Decades	from	the	History	of	 the	Communist	Party	of	 Iraq,	 volume	2],	 (Damascus:	Manshourāt	 al-Thaqāfa	al-Jadīda,	2003),	 at	125-127.	
	 200	
A massive public outcry ensued against these violent measures and the use of emergency 
law against the working class. Only several months earlier one elder statesman, Mohammed 
Ridhā al-Shabībī made the argument in parliament that the government was using this technique 
to institute hikūm tabaqī (‘class rule’).930 In a sense, this was true, for the use of emergency rule 
to deal with economic and labour relations was unprecedented in scale, and certainly revealed a 
unique classist dimension – its use by the ruling-class to violently crush the stirring momentum of 
the working class movement. In the end, however, it illustrates exactly how a semi-colonial state 
functions in its governing capacity. Ironically, Jamīl was not unaware of this, for he wrote an 
article in the Saūt al-Ahālī newspaper condemning what transpired in Basra and stressed that this 
technique had become ‘the normal response to the everyday affairs of the people’; will an 
emergency be proclaimed, he continued, ‘every time a strike occurs…and…every time workers 
demand their rights?’931 The rule of law therefore that he claimed could (in theory) constrict a 
state of emergency in his pamphlet was rather useless in doing so in reality. The doctrine of 
emergency was more a Pandora’s box that was impossible to constrain by the law. 
 
In any case, the fact was that the Iraqi constitution and the legal structures of the Iraqi 
state, including its semi-peripheral sovereignty was the product of British [treaty and mandate] 
semi-colonialism and imperialism. One could refer to the impassioned speech in parliament by 
opposition MP ʿAbdul Razzāq al-Shaikhlī as a case in point. al-Shaikhlī infuriated the Speaker 
and others by arguing that it was in fact the constitution itself that ‘denied the rights of the 
people,’ as it was put into place by the British.932 He pointed out that the government was 
democratic and nationalist only in appearance, while in reality it was pieces of a ‘wooden prop, 
which the…colonizer hides behind…,’ manipulating it out of view.933 It was the ‘colonizer’, he 
continued, who manufactured Iraq’s independence, which he compared to the idols of pre-Islamic 
Jāhilīya that were made of mud. Referring to the constitutional rights of the Iraqi people, he 
emphasized that they were given by the government ‘with its right hand and taken with the left’, 
as the permanent state of emergency illustrates that Iraq was in fact a ‘dictatorship in its [very] 
eye [i.e. in its essence], even if they tell us we live in a democracy’.934 al-Shaikhlī suggested the 
redrafting of the entire constitution and the establishment of a nationalist government that truly 
served the people rather than the British –i.e. the end of the semi-colonialism and its legal 																																																																				930	Muhāthir	Majlis	al-Nūwwāb,	23rd	Session	of	the	years	1952-53,	(11-5-1953),	at	389.		931	Ṣawt	al-Ahālī,	20-12-1953.		932	Muhāthir	Majlis	al-Nūwwāb,	supra,	15-03-1953,	at	54.		933	Ibid.	934	Ibid,	at	55.	
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manifestations – in a word, an end to imperialism in Iraq. This, he said, was the ‘first step for the 
path to a truly democratic rule and towards liberation from the bonds of treaties and unjust 
agreements’ and it was the only way to end this interminable conflict between the government 
and the people.935 
 
Putting al-Shaikhlī and Jamīl into conversation, the limitations of the latter’s analysis 
becomes clear.  Of course, Jamīl admits that the constitution was the product of the British 
Mandate, but he claims to defend the actual ideals of the constitution and the rule of law, as it 
should be.936 This was how much he believed in the ideal of the rule of law.  This, however, did 
not change the fact that he regarded that there was a centrality to resolving the ‘legal aporia’ of 
martial law. That is, that emergency could somehow be constrained even if the structures of semi-
colonialism remained intact. However, my argument is that the violence of martial law could not 
be constrained by the rule of law per se, especially in a colonial and semi-colonial context. It was 
after all a manifestation of the semi-colonial Iraqi state. al-Shaikhlī’s speech exposed this fact, for 
the mere reform of law in itself would not bring real democratic change in Iraq.  
 
Stephen Morton has emphasized that one needs to distinguish between the violence of 
colonial sovereignty and martial law/emergency, as the ‘legal aporia of emergency’ is merely a 
‘colonial fiction’ for the colonized, who experiences violence regardless in his or her everyday 
life.937 In other words, the issue for the colonized is not that of martial law or emergency per se 
nor its legality or constitutionality, but rather the structures of (semi-)colonialism and -political 
and economic- sovereignty as a whole. The violence of emergency –and the ‘state of exception’ – 
is in this way already ingrained within (semi-)colonial sovereignty or rather (semi-)colonial 
sovereignty precedes the normalization of the state of emergency.  
   
We could go further and argue that the legal structures of emergency became even more 
important as a technique of governance in the semi-colonial state. Instead of being a mere 
‘political strategy’ or even a ‘tool of political management,’ as was the case in the British 
																																																																				935	Ibid.	 The	 president	 and	 speaker	 of	 parliament	 was	 infuriated	 with	 al-Shaikhlī’s	 speech	 that	 he	nearly	held	him	in	contempt	of	parliament	for	breaking	his	oath	of	upholding	the	constitution,	stating	that	he	‘crossed	the	line’	with	his	insulting	tone	towards	the	constitution.	936	Jamīl,	supra,	ft.	913,	at	10.	937	Stephen	 Morton,	 States	 of	 Emergency:	 Colonialism,	 Literature	 and	 Law,	 (Liverpool:	 Liverpool	University	Press,	2003),	at	9.	
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response in its colonies, such as Malaya, Kenya and Cyprus,938 emergency became more legally 
entrenched into the very structures of the semi-colonial state, which needed it to survive. The 
semi-colonial Iraqi state relied on martial law and the doctrine of emergency to preserve itself, 
while it remained obsessed with its own legitimacy and the constitutionality of its actions. As the 
late Nasser Hussein has revealed, ‘martial law [in the colony] seeks to effect not just the 
restoration of order, but the restoration of the general authority of the state. In doing so, it takes 
advantage of the absence of normative constraints on power not just to punish more…but to 
punish out of a different logic.’939 It is, in other words, he writes, ‘what is needed to construct the 
state all over again…[i.e.] the condition for the possibility of law’s existence’.940  
 
It was consequently these (pre-)conditions of the semi-colonial order which were the 
target of the counter-hegemonic movements rather than the actual interpretation of law. The semi-
colonial Iraqi state continuously used the doctrine of emergency to fracture the possibilities of the 
emergence of an alternative counter-hegemonic alternative space. Every time such a space sought 
to emerge, it was swiftly and violently suppressed. Hence, one could see the limitations of Jamīl’s 
legal idealism, which implied that the struggle between the people and the regime was more 
concerning law or its interpretation. As if the demonstrators evoked the rule of law (in their 
minds) in such a manner every time they took the streets, and that this was what produced these 
revolutionary spaces.  
 
This, however, was not the case. Firstly, what the masses were calling for with their very 
actions (whether during the Wathba or later the Intifāda) was a new social and legal order – and 
therefore a novel conception of law or what Gramsci referred to as a new ‘usage’ of the law. One 
that was free from semi-colonialism and imperialism. Secondly, the conditions for these counter-
hegemonic spaces emerged because of several intersecting local, regional and international 
factors and not (solely) because of the pluralistic uses of law by the movement. This analysis will 
become clearer when I closely examine the emergence of the spaces whereby these struggles 
occurred – namely when I provide what I refer to as a ‘conjunctural’ analysis of the Wathba 
uprising. In this chapter, I have shown the (legal) methods used by the Iraqi state to fracture the 
materiality of any potentially revolutionary space so as to re-impose its own hegemonic space and 																																																																				938	Frank	Furedi.	“Creating	a	Breathing	Space:	The	Political	Management	of	Colonial	Emergencies,”	in	Robert	Holland	 (ed.)	Emergencies	and	Disorder	in	the	European	Empires	after	1945,	 (London:	Frank	Cass,	1994),	at	94.		939	Nasser	 Hussein.	 The	 Jurisprudence	 of	 Emergency:	 Colonialism	 and	 the	 Rule	 of	 Law,	 (Ann	 Arbor:	University	of	Michigan	Press,	2003),	at	124.	940	Ibid.	
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order. In the next chapter, I will examine the brief counter-hegemonic and revolutionary space 
that emerged during the Wathba and analyze its consequences.   
 
IV. Conclusion  
 
This chapter detailed the uses of criminal law and martial law in Iraq before the 
revolution.  The Iraqi state and the ruling class used the law to violently crush opposition and 
safeguard its hegemony. I began by detailing the manner in which the Baghdad Penal Code was 
amended in 1938, basically making it a crime to be a ‘communist’ or even a progressive 
reformist. This was one of the harshest laws in the region. Moreover, the military courts found it 
very useful in sentencing thousands of Iraqis, including the leaders of the communist party. The 
fact was that martial law and criminal law came hand in hand as the latter was more effective in a 
state of emergency.  
 
 In the second part of this chapter, I trace the history of martial law and emergency 
doctrine and illustrate its uses in the colonies. I then make the argument that its uses in Iraq 
(especially after the Intifāda) had a specific performative function as it allowed the semi-colonial 
Iraqi state to reestablish itself and its hegemony. It was therefore a technique of governance that 
ensured that the fragmented and weak semi-peripheral sovereignty does not falter. This was clear 
in how it was used to deal with labour strikes, such as the Basra General Strike of 1953. My 
critique of the liberal views of Hussein Jamīl show that the law could not constrain the 
‘magically’ expansive power of the doctrine of emergency as it was only by ending its root cause 
– the semi-colonial conditions in place that the permanent state of emergency could finally come 
to an end. Returning to Benjamin’s quotation in the epigraph above, it is only by seeing things 
from the perspective (or tradition) of the colonial ‘oppressed’ could one grasp how permanent 
emergency emerges in the everyday materiality of life. One could add, that this ‘tradition’ also 
teaches us that just because the ‘emergency situation’ becomes the ‘rule,’ does not entail that it 
could be constrained by their (legal) parameters.     
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Chapter 7: The Defeat of the ‘Covenant of the Slave’: al-Wathba as an Anti-Colonial 
Conjuncture Against International Law 
 
 
O Portsmouth Covenant, we as a nation 
Reject an alliance with the traitorous enemy 
Stay at your border, for Iraq possesses 
Tremendous volition to crush any reckless fool.	941 
 
~ Mohammad Sālih Baḥr al-ʿŪlūm 
 
 
 
 
[al-Wathba,] a miracle? No, it was no miracle! If it were not, that would be the miracle.	942  
 
~ Khālid Bakdāsh 
 
It would be apt for the Iraqi people…to take advantage of the critical [geopolitical and strategic] location of their 
country to save themselves from the scourge of colonialism and to remember always and forever that their salvation is 
dependent on the unity of all peoples of al-Sharq [the East] and the defeat of colonialism in all Eastern countries.943 
 
~ ʿAbdul Fatāh Ibrāhīm 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
During the third session of the United Nations General Assembly held in Paris in 1948, 
the delegate for the Philippines, Carlos Romula, insisted on a broad interpretation of the 
ambiguous Chapter XI of the UN Charter, stressing that ‘the force of history which had brought 
about many changes in the British Empire was far stronger than legal or constitutional 
barriers’.944 Romula was directly referring to what he called the ‘impetus of revolutionary forces’ 
that was bringing about transformations on the ground in the Third World, to make a legal 
argument.945 This ‘non-juridical’ approach, which was used extensively by the ‘Afro-Asian bloc’ 																																																																				941	Muhammad	Sālih	Bāḥr	al-ʿŪlūm,	Diwan	Bāḥr	al-ʿŪlūm,	(Baghdad:	Matbʿa	Dar	al-Tadāmūn,	1968),	2:129.		942	Khālid	Bakdāsh	 (the	prominent	Syrian	communist	 leader)	 in	al-Tarīq,	 as	quoted	 in	Sbāhī,	 ʿŪqūd	(1),	supra,	ft.	191,	at	345.	943	Ibrāhīm,	supra,	ft.	492,	at	238,	my	emphasis.		944	Quoted	 in	 El-Ayouty,	The	United	Nations	and	Decolonization:	The	Role	 of	Afro-Asia,	 (The	 Hague:	Martinus	Nijhoff,	1971),	at	35.		945	Ibid,	at	34.	
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in the UN, demonstrates that the anti-colonial and anti-imperial struggles unleashed by Third 
World peoples at the time could not be ignored and had direct implications on international law 
and its interpretation.  
 
In this final chapter, the Wathba will be analyzed as a moment where all the seemingly 
confined labour struggles recounted earlier culminated into a much wider nationalist and 
internationalist anti-colonial arena. This chapter is concerned with the question of the revolutionary 
agency within international legal scholarship relating to the Third World. I will address certain 
limitations in the methodology and analysis of the Third World Approaches to International Law 
(TWAIL) scholarship by detailing an event of mass working-class agency in the historiography of 
anti-colonial and anti-imperial struggle in Iraq, situating it broadly within the international 
conjuncture of decolonization. The Wathba of 1948 was a great popular uprising of the Iraqi urban 
poor and working classes that successfully prevented the imposition of a revised unequal treaty 
between Iraq and Britain (the Anglo-Iraq Treaty), sparking the revolutionary process that would 
eventually overthrow the British-sponsored monarchy a decade later. The Wathba will be shown to 
be one historical manifestation of a wider conjuncture against international law in the Third World. 
I will argue that TWAIL must begin undertaking the study of the conjunctures that allowed certain 
movements ample room to act within counter-hegemonic spaces and maneuver against the 
structures of imperialism of international law. It is only through such an examination that the 
present conjuncture can be understood and the future transformed.  
 
 
II. The limitations of the study of revolutionary agency in TWAIL analysis 
  
TWAIL scholars have been at the forefront of exposing how colonialism and imperialism 
are constitutive of the history and discipline of international law.946 They have done so by 
reverting to an examination of history to expose the legacy of imperialism in international law. In 
fact, it is this particular method of historical analysis that has been said to be ‘the feature most 
fundamental’ to TWAIL scholarship;947 one which regards ‘historical perspective’ as the ‘key 
technique’ in understanding the current features of international law.948 TWAIL encompasses a 																																																																				946	For	a	good	overview	of	the	literature	see	Gathii,	supra,	ft.	351.	947	Karin	Mickelson.	“Rhetoric	and	Rage:	Third	World	Voices	in	International	Legal	Discourse,”	
Wisconsin	International	Law	Journal,	16,	No.	2,	(1998):	406.	948	Obiora	Okafor.	“Newness,	Imperialism	and	International	Legal	Reform	in	our	Time:	a	TWAIL	perspective,”	Osgoode	Hall	Law	Journal,	43,	No.1&2,	(2005):	178.	
	 206	
political commitment to counter traditional approaches that have disregarded the colonial past and 
considered it of trivial concern to international law. Moreover, international law as a discipline 
through its positivist predisposition tends to repress this colonial past, constructing and 
reproducing the version of the past that is better suited for its hegemonic discourse.949 TWAIL 
analysis resists this process, and aims to expose the hidden colonial origins of international law, 
and most importantly, emphasizes the continuity of ‘colonial relations’ in the contemporary 
structures of international law.950  
 
Despite this radical commitment of the TWAIL analysis, there still appears to be 
considerable limitations to it. This is primarily due to the manner in which TWAIL scholars often 
approach the question of agency in their analysis.  As Owen Taylor has argued, TWAIL scholars 
tend to invoke notions of ‘resistance’ (the word most often used to evoke agency) that are highly 
selective of the conceptual history of revolution.951  In other words, when TWAIL scholarship 
turns from an analysis of the structures of imperialism within international law to address the 
issue of agency, it does so in a highly idealized manner that locates the agency of social 
movements within a narrative of ‘resistance’ as a ‘re-conceptualization [of law] as an act of will’, 
while emphasizing the necessity of ‘radical legal pluralism’ as fundamental to emancipation. 952 
Balakrishnan Rajagopal, for example, takes such a position in situating the revolutionary potential 
of social movements in ‘non-institutional, non-party, and cultural terms’. 953  This narrow 
conception suggests that as long as revolutionary agency or resistance is ‘sanitized’ (i.e. 
spontaneous, without central or party organization, and non-violent), then it would bring about 
true political and democratic change within the liberal promise of international law, whatever the 
state of the structures in question.954  
 
The problem with this approach is that it assumes that law is abstract and can be re-
conceptualized into an emancipatory plural form, rather than already entrenched (and so 
constrained) within certain material social conditions and forms. What this also does is ignore the 
connection between agency and structure – i.e. the conjuncture, leading to a fanciful situation 
																																																																				949Anghie,	Anthony.	 “The	Evolution	of	 International	 Law:	 colonial	 and	postcolonial	 realities,”	Third	
World	Quarterly,	Vol.	27,	(2008):	739-753.	950Ibid.	951	Owen	Taylor.	“Reclaiming	Revolution”	“Reclaiming	Revolution,”	Finnish	Yearbook	of	International	
Law	(Vol.	22,	2011),	at	259-292.	952	Ibid,”	273.	953	Balakrishnan	Rajagopal.	International	Law	from	Below,	supra,	ft.	317,	at	293.	954	Taylor,	supra,	ft.	951,	at	263.		
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whereby ‘any kind of agency’ becomes possible and ‘the structure becomes entirely 
contingent’.955 The reality is that different forms of action are effective depending on the 
particular structural conditions pertaining at any given time.956 This chapter is concerned with this 
latter disconnect between the notions of structure and agency that is prevalent in TWAIL 
scholarship. My argument is that TWAIL scholars should shift their focus to a study of what I 
refer to as ‘conjunctural resistance’ or ‘conjunctural agency’ rather than ‘plural resistance’ (or 
agency) that is waged against international law at any given time. To do this is to realize that it is 
the conjuncture that should be studied to understand agency.    
 
The concept of the conjuncture is derived here from Marxist theory and analysis, in 
particular from the formulations of V.I. Lenin and, later, Antonio Gramsci. Louis Althusser 
defines the conjuncture as denoting, ‘the exact balance of forces, state of overdetermination of the 
contradictions at any given moment to which political tactics must be applied’.957 Referring to 
Lenin’s approach in the 1917 Russian revolution, Althusser demonstrates how ‘the history of 
imperialism’ was analyzed by Lenin in its current conjuncture as opposed to the typical Marxist 
theoretician and historian who was merely concerned with historical knowledge: ‘Lenin meets 
Imperialism in the modality of a current existence: in a concrete present. The theoretician of 
history or the historian meet it in another modality, the modality of non-currency and 
abstraction.’958 He goes on to argue that Lenin’s (conjunctural) approach to the ‘current situation’ 
at that time was unique as he was concerned with the ‘typicality of the contradictions, with their 
displacements, their condensations and the “fusion” in revolutionary rupture that they 
produced…[in other words] what makes it possible to act on History from within the sole history 
present… not [merely] to demonstrate or explain the “inevitable” revolutions post festum, but to 
make them in our unique present…’959 As Stuart Hall makes clear, the conjuncture is the product 
of ‘many determinations’, not of one.960 Conjunctural thinking therefore involves ‘clustering’ or 
assembling elements into a particular formation.961 In this way, the concept of the conjuncture 
can be used as an analytical tool for identifying strategic sites of political action that have 
emerged and when used properly would open up possibilities for transformation.  																																																																				955	Ibid,	at	274.	956	Ibid,	at	271.	957	Louis		Althusser.	For	Marx,	(London:	Verso,	2005),	at	250.	958	Ibid,	at	178.	959	Ibid,	at	180.	960 	Koivisto,	 ‘J.,	 Lahtinen,	 M.	 ‘Historical-Critical	 Dictionary	 of	 Marxism:	 Conjuncture,	 politico-historical’	Historical	Materialism	20.1	(2012)	267-277,	at	274.	961	Ibid.	
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TWAIL analysis has, for the most part, disregarded the significance of the conjunctures 
that allowed for the possibilities of ‘resistance’, and their implications within the context of 
international law. By shifting the focus on the conjuncture, TWAIL scholars would become more 
attentive to the pressing question of political action. Of course, TWAIL scholarship has often 
concerned itself with the question of the agency of Third World peoples, and there have been a 
significant number of works that have examined the role of social movements in the development 
of international law.962 What I am concerned with here, however, is the necessity of locating 
agency conjuncturally within the wider narrative of the imperialism of international law put 
forward by TWAIL. My intention in this chapter therefore is to extend certain aspects of the 
conjunctural analysis to TWAIL approaches, through this study of Iraqi history, so that one could 
more effectively grasp (and more importantly apply the lessons of) the history of revolutionary 
action and ‘resistance’ to international law’s imperialism in the present conjuncture.  
 
What follows is a detailed account of the Wathba, a revolutionary event of ‘conjunctural 
resistance’ in Iraq, which started out against the extension of the (unequal) treaty between Iraq 
and Britain ‘under the guise’ of its revision.963  The Wathba eventually turned into the rejection 
of the ‘semi-peripheral sovereignty’ that was granted to Iraq through the Mandate system in 1932. 
I refer to ‘conjunctural resistance’ as a kind of counterweight to TWAILian ‘plural resistance’ to 
illuminate the fact that it is the conjuncture that should inform one’s understanding of agency 
rather than its plural character. It will be clear from my analysis that resistance could only be said 
to be constitutive of international law (if at all) at certain conjunctures and not tout court (as 
TWAIL scholarship suggests). I will use the Wathba to illustrate an example of how a 
‘conjunctural analysis’ could be undertaken in relation to the history of Iraqi resistance to 
imperialism and Iraqi agency within international law. After detailing this narrative, I will return 
to the present analysis to tease out the unique conjunctural characteristics of this event by 
assessing how working-class agency (through the labour movement) attempted to subvert the 
imperialism of international law, eventually situating it more broadly within the conjuncture of 
decolonization in the shifting international legal order.   
 
																																																																				962 	See	 Pooja	 Parmar.	 Indegeneity	 and	 Legal	 Pluralism	 in	 India:	 Claims,	 Histories,	 Meanings,	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2015).	963	Batatu,	supra,	 ft.	41,	at	546.	 It	 should	be	noted	 that	 I	am	not	 referring	 to	 the	 ‘event’	here	 in	 the	same	manner	as	Alain	Badiou	does.						
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III. The British Empire’s ‘New Clothes of Treaties and Pacts’  
 
al-Wathba (literally, ‘the leap’) was a social uprising initially sparked by news of 
negotiations and then the signing of a revised unequal treaty between Iraq and Britain in 1948. In 
Chapter 3, I traced the evolution of the unequal treaty and its role in the manufacturing of what I 
call Iraqi ‘semi-peripheral sovereignty,’ a form of sovereignty that was particularly unique to the 
geopolitical specificities of the semi-peripheral Middle East. The Wathba should be understood 
within this context of the history of international law and the Mandate system, so as to appreciate 
why the Iraqi masses decided to wage a struggle against it. As I have argued in Chapter 3, the 
semi-peripheral sovereignty that was juridically constructed (and threaded in the 1930 Anglo-Iraq 
Treaty) to ensure Iraq’s ‘independence’ was in reality made to legitimize and legalize the 
extraction, production and transportation of Iraq’s most valuable natural resource (oil) across the 
region to the world – to the benefit not only of Britain, but the capitalist world economy. Hence, 
international law through the Mandate system produced a unique form of semi-peripheral 
sovereignty out of the Iraqi experience. However, this was not possible without the use of the old 
colonial instrument of the treaty, which ultimately ensured that the Iraqi state not only appeared 
independent but also was ‘independent’ under international law, although in reality it remained 
subservient to imperialism.  
 
The semi-colonial Iraqi state was unable to maintain its hegemony because the 
sovereignty it was granted constricted it from doing so successfully. Semi-peripheral sovereignty 
fragmented the governing capacity of the Iraqi sate. So, fragmentation was present not only, as I 
detailed in the Chapter 1, in rural Iraq, where there were two separate legal systems, but also in 
the oil fields which were imperial enclaves governed by the concessionary agreement, and the 
railways and the Port, which were semi-colonial enclaves. It was this type of fragmentation that 
made it very difficult for the semi-colonial Iraqi state to impose its hegemony without the 
violence of the emergency doctrine, and this made the counter-hegemonic movements, such as 
the illegal underground communist party, very popular with the masses. As will be shown, it was 
in a decisive moment in Iraqi history where imperialism schemed to reassert itself under the guise 
of international law did all the mini-struggles (of the workers, peasants and students) come 
together, and where the counter-hegemonic movement was now in a position to take the 
opportunity presented to it by history to wage an overall anti-colonial and anti-imperial struggle 
against the social order.    
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IV. The making of the 1948 Portsmouth Treaty & its implications 
 
 
Once the British and their Iraqi counterparts agreed that they needed to revise the now 
visibly outdated and much hated 1930 Anglo-Iraq Treaty, secret negotiations commenced as early 
as 1946. The 1930 Treaty was drafted under the Mandate system and League institutions that the 
Iraqi government found to be no longer viable in a post-war world. The British government saw 
this as an opportunity to update the treaty (redefining their corresponding hegemony) under the 
guise of the UN Charter that emphasized the notion of ‘equality’ between nations under 
international law. In that sense, rather than actually addressing the limitations of what I have 
refereed to as ‘semi-peripheral sovereignty,’ the new treaty merely redefined it in a manner that 
appeared to be acceptable for the Iraqis, but more specifically, to be consistent with the newly 
emerging post-war international legal order. It was for this reason that throughout the 
negotiations, Bevin was insistent that the treaty was being drafted ‘under strict conformity with 
the UN Charter’ and emphasized that it was ‘in spirit and in heart’ drafted on the basis of ‘perfect 
equality’964 or ‘complete equality in all respects’. Bevin hoped that this new arrangement would 
be as much a breakthrough for Iraq (and the region) as the Empire’s settlement with India.965       
 
If one examined the provisions of the treaty closely, it would become clear that although 
the treaty promised the eventual withdrawal of British troops and the surrendering of military 
bases to Iraq, it gave the British a say in Iraq’s military planning through the establishment of a 
Joint Defense Board (JDB), which continued the employment of British military ‘experts’. The 
JDB, which was a joint high-ranking military body tasked with the coordination of defensive 
plans, had explicit advisory powers under the treaty to make the (expert) decision of when Iraqi 
government may ‘invite’ British troops back into the country.966 In other words, the treaty 
ensured that the Iraqi government would surrender their bases to Britain in wartime, making it 
impossible for a stance of neutrality. Moreover, the treaty made a provision for the continued 
access for ‘operational forces’ of the R.A.F. to the Shu‘aybah and Habbaniyyah bases until 
withdrawal of the ‘allied armies’ from ‘all-ex-enemy countries’  (a far fetched possibility from 
																																																																				964	TNA.	‘Minutes	of	a	meeting	with	the	Iraqi	Delegation	held	at	the	Foreign	Office	on	the	afternoon	of	7th	 January,	 1948’,	 E	 409/27/93/G,	 FO	 371/68442	 [9359];	 ‘Minutes	 of	 a	 meeting	 held	 at	 Foreign	Office	on	January	9th	to	consider	the	Anglo-Iraqi	Treaty	at	2:30	p.m.’,	E	409/27/G,	FO	371/68442.	965	Ibid.	966	Article	 1(b),	 Treaty	 of	 Alliance	 between	 His	 Majesty	 in	 respect	 of	 the	 United	 Kingdom	 of	 Great	
Britain	and	His	Majesty	the	King	of	Iraq,	Portsmouth,	15th	January,	1948,	Cmd.	7309.		
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the Cold War reality).967 It also safeguarded British influence fifteen years beyond the time limit 
of the old treaty.968    
 
The Iraqi delegation, which arrived in London to secretly negotiate and sign the new 
treaty, were so overtly concerned with the nitty-gritty legalese and specific wording of the 
document that they ignored the larger implications of the treaty, which in fact so clearly 
entrenched Iraq further into imperialist control.969  In this way the Portsmouth Treaty as it came 
to be known turned out to be no more than an extension of the 1930 treaty couched in ‘new-
fashioned terminology’ that did not alter much of the old relationship.970 The PM himself was 
aware that what was being done was merely cosmetic and a matter of appearances when he 
bluntly stated during negotiations that despite the end of the Mandate in 1932, the Iraqi people 
considered ‘the present position of their country was that of an occupied country’ […] ‘it was 
[therefore] essential for the Iraqi government to show the people the effect of the treaty. The 
departure of British forces in Iraq would convince the people that their country had really gained 
full independence, even if these units were later invited to return.’971  One British official 
foreshadowed the troubles that would ensue when he cautioned in a minute that, ‘we should be 
careful not to take the line that the above provisions of the treaty cement to our retention of our 
strategic hold on Iraq i.e. that we have tricked the Iraqis into letting us continue our military 
occupation in practice at the expense of a few concessions’.972 As will be shown, the Iraqi people 
were in fact quite aware that the treaty was not merely a sham, but a form of skillful legal trickery 																																																																				967	Article	1(d).		968	Ibid.	969	A	good	example	is	when	discussion	revolved	around	the	word	‘grants’	in	the	draft	of	Article	1(d),	which	stated,	 ‘In	 time	of	peace	His	Majesty	 the	King	of	 Iraq	grants	His	Britannic	Majesty	 to	station	operations	units	of	the	Royal	Air	Force	at	the	air	bases’.		The	Iraqi	delegation	preferred	to	replace	the	word	‘grants’	with	the	words	‘may	invite’	instead	as	they	saw	a	distinction	between	war,	peace	and	the	 current	 state	 of	 neutrality.	 They	 did	 not	 believe	 that	 during	 a	 situation	 of	 ‘real’	 peace	 that	operational	 units	 should	be	 granted	 access	 to	 the	bases.	The	British	 eventually	 accepted	 this	draft	reluctantly,	as	they	argued	it	was	the	only	way	to	defend	Iraq	in	an	emergency.	However,	despite	this	change	of	wording,	the	JBD	still	had	the	final	discretion	to	decide	on	whether	it	was	a	time	of	peace	or	war.	 This	 illustrates	 the	 extent	 of	 negotiations	 between	 the	 contracting	 parties	 as	 the	 important	consequences	of	 the	 treaty	were	 ignored	 for	 its	 legalese	or	 (cosmetic)	wording.	TNA.	 ‘Appendix	 to	Brief	 for	 Iraq	 Treaty	 Negotiations’	 Anglo-Iraq	 Treaty:	 Brief	 for	 Secretary	 of	 State,	 16	 Jan	 1948,	E454/G,	FO	371/68442.	In	any	case,	as	Louis	writes,	‘the	ground	had	been	so	thoroughly	laid	that	the	meetings	 in	 London	were	 pensive	 and	 sometimes	 almost	 festive	 occasions	 rather	 than	 sessions	 of	hard	 bargaining,’	 Wm.	 Roger	 Louis.	 The	 British	 Empire	 in	 the	 Middle	 East	 1945-1951:	 Arab	
Nationalism,	 the	United	States	and	Postwar	 Imperialism,	 (Oxford:	 Oxford	University	 Press,	 1984)	 at	333.	970	Batatu,	supra,	ft.	37,	at	550.	971	TNA.	Minutes	of	a	meeting	with	the	Iraqi	Delegation	held	at	the	Foreign	Office	on	the	afternoon	of	7th	January,	1948’,	E	409/27/93/G,	FO	371/68442.		972	TNA.	FO	371/68442.	Signing	of	Iraq	Treaty:	Publicity.	E	541/G,	3	Jan	1948.		
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that did exactly that – prolong the imperial and military (semi-colonial) de facto ‘occupation’ of 
their country. Consequently, while the revision of the 1930 treaty was clearly meant to ensure the 
continuation of British intervention in Iraqi affairs, it was also explicitly meant to be a ‘model’ 
for the entire region, whereby all such treaties973 were to ultimately be brought together into a 
‘common defense system’ in the region.974 
 
V. The ‘Wathba of the people’ takes form 
 
Although Iraqis were continuously resisting the 1930 Treaty and its wide reach into every 
aspect of their lives, it was the event of the massive Wathba uprising that was the defining 
moment of revolutionary struggle against imperialism.	Despite its heterogeneous character, the 
working class was the Wathba’s quintessence. It was a robust alliance between workers and 
students that led the massive demonstrations on the streets of Baghdad. In the gripping words of 
Hanna Batatu, ‘an atmosphere redolent of social revolution enveloped Baghdad’ during the 
Wathba, as it was ‘the most formidable mass insurrection in the history of the monarchy … It was 
the social subsoil of Baghdad in revolt against hunger and unequal burdens. It was the students 
and the Schalchiyyah workers braving machine guns … and dying for their ideas … [I]t was the 
political representatives of the various layers of the middle class … resentful of constraints or 
plotting for political gains. It was the privileged stratum [of the ruling and landowning classes]  
… menaced in their political power and social interests. It was British overlordship shaken, the 
Anglo-Iraq Treaty of 1930 sapped, and the Portsmouth Agreement of 1948 abolished’.975   
 
The struggle of common Iraqis against the treaty started the day after the official 
announcement of negotiations on January 5, 1948.  Mass demonstrations originated at the Law 
College of Baghdad. Law students left their classes to demonstrate against the treaty, as well as 
the partition of Palestine.	976	 The police, taking ‘precautionary measures,’ attempted to disrupt 
their plans and prevented them from leaving the college building.977 Stones and bottles were 
thrown at police.978 Thirty-nine students were arrested.979 The Iraqi government headed by PM 
Sālih Jabr, decided to shut down the law college and launched a ‘criminal’ investigation into the 																																																																				973	Such	as	the	(failed)	Anglo-Egyptian	Treaty	of	1946	and	the	treaty	with	Jordan.	974	TNA.	FO	371/68442.	Signing	of	Iraq	Treaty:	Publicity.	E	541/G,	3	Jan	1948.	975Batatu.	supra,	ft.	41,	at	544,	551.			976	Humaīdī.	al-Tatwūrāt,	supra,	ft.	549,	at	519-525.	977	TNA.	British	Embassy,	Bagdad	to	FO,	London,	7	Jan,	1948.	E	197/27/93;	FO	371/68442.	978	Ibid.		979	Ḥumaidī,	supra,	ft.	549.		
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incident.980 This was in reality an excuse to purge the college of those involved in the protest. The 
cabinet claimed that the protestors were ‘anarchists’ looking to spread discord on campus.981 
Several law professors were suspended and the Dean was transferred to another city. The ensuing 
witch-hunt led to numerous sympathy protests in other colleges calling for the release of their 
fellow students. Those apprehended were eventually released a few days later, and the law 
college reopened.982 The movement at this point had a distinctive student character, and it would 
not be an overstatement to claim that the initial dynamo of organizational action originated at the 
level of the students’ political party organizations.983 In fact, one participant referred to student 
action as the ‘seed’ that led to the unification of Iraqi nationalist movement.984 
 
In no more than ten days, these seemingly circumscribed student demonstrations would 
erupt into an unprecedented fervor of discontent, composed of the majority of the underclasses of 
Iraq. Following the government clamp-down at the law school, the opposition—in particular the 
outlawed but popular Iraqi Communist Party (ICP)—began organizing all workers on the ground. 
The “Cooperation Committee” which united most leftist and nationalist parties under its 
leadership was formed a few months earlier; now an adjunct ICP-dominated “Student 
Cooperation Committee” was created and joined with it.985  These two committees would lead the 
movement’s demonstrations and strikes throughout the Wathba.  
 
The illusive stillness of the next week was broken when the official announcement was 
made on January 16 that the Portsmouth Treaty had been signed in London the previous day. A 
three-day general student strike exploded instantaneously. The students called for the resignation 
of the cabinet and the cancellation of the Portsmouth Treaty, eventually heading to the 
headquarters of the infamous Criminal Investigation Department (CID), calling for its downfall 
and referring to it as the ‘Gestapo of Iraq’986. On January 20, the Schālchīyyah workers and the 
famished sarīfa-dwellers (squatters) joined the student protests for the first time, broadening the 
event beyond narrow confines of parliamentary politics. It was also the day that police shot into 																																																																				980	Ibid,	at	521.		981	Ibid.	982	Ibid.	983	Sbāhī,	supra,	ft.	191,	at	335.	984	Editors,	‘al-Majid	lil-Wathba	al-Amis,	al-Thāfir	l’intifāda	al-Youm,’	[An	interview	with	participants	of	the	Wathba	on	its	40th	anniversary],	al-Thaqāfa	al-Jadīda,	193,	Issue	3	(35),	1988,	at	13.		985	For	a	detailed	account	of	the	role	of	students	in	the	Wathba,	see	Fārūq	Prwtw,	“Min	Thikrīyāt	al-Haraka	 al-Talābīya	 fī	Wathba	 Kānūn	 al-Thānī”	 [Memories	 from	 the	 student	movement	 during	 the	Wathba	of	January],	al-Thaqāfa	al-Jadīda,	Issue,	293,	Mar/Apr,	2000,	at	83.	986	Ḥumaidī,	supra,	ft.	549,	at	523.	
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the crowd. The next day, as students carried the dead to their resting place, the police fired shots 
in their direction and chased them while they were still on hospital grounds. Two died and 
seventeen wounded. Outrage spread throughout the city for what was considered the criminal 
actions of the police.987 A student who was shot in the head was carried by his colleagues to the 
office of the dean of his school in protest, leading to the dean’s resignation. The resignation of 
other deans and professors followed. The masses became bitter but remained defiant.  
 
The street became ‘a symbol of national unity’ as Muslims (Shia and Sunni), Jews and 
Christians, joined arms in solidarity.988 Karīm Murūwwa, who would later become one the most 
prominent Lebanese communists, participated in the demonstrations, which had an immense 
influence on him and further radicalized his political trajectory.989 He described the uniqueness of 
these days by revealing that there emerged ‘a kind of democracy [and freedom] that had no 
constraint,’ as illegal newspapers were distributed in the streets, while the leaders of outlawed 
political parties who lived in the underground for years, emerged from hiding in full view.990 
Eventually, more Baghdadis from other walks of life joined the protests. The Wathba rapidly 
spread to other parts of the country.991  
 
Overwhelmed, the Regent, against the advice of the British, capitulated, renouncing the 
treaty in a public statement, and guaranteed that it would not be ratified against the will of the 
people.992  This led to a splintering of the opposition, as some of the right-wing nationalist, as 
well as, the national-bourgeois parties recoiled, calling for the end of demonstrations. The left, led 
by the communists, refused to retreat, considering the Regent’s statement as a mere tactic. The 
ICP and its uncompromising position became the dominant force in the demonstrations, and the 
Wathba was transformed into an event of a categorical revolutionary character.993 The protests 
were now calling for more than the cancellation of the new treaty, but for the end of British 																																																																				987	Ibid.	As	Kamal	al-Chādirjī	wrote	in	an	opening	of	Ṣawt	al-Ahāli	newspaper,	the	police	contravened	‘…even	 the	 laws	 of	 war	 [which]	 make	 it	 illegal	 for	 the	 use	 of	 firearms	 in	 hospitals	 and	 health	organizations…’	Ṣawt	al-Ahāli,	9/2/1948.		988	Orit	 Bashkin.	 “A	 Patriotic	 Uprising:	 Baghdadi	 Jews	 and	 the	 Wathba,”	 in	 Nelida	 Fuccaro	 (ed.),	
Violence	 and	 the	 City	 in	 the	Modern	Middle	 East,	 (Stanford	 University	 Press,	 Stanford:	 2016),	 151-167at	163.	989	Karīm	Murūwwa,	Karīm	Murūwwa	Yatathakar	 [Karim	Muruwwa	Remembers],	 Saqir	Abu	Fakhir	(ed.)	(Damascus:	al-Mada,	2002),	at	42-43.	990	Ibid,	at	42-43.	991	Batatu,	supra,	ft.	41,	at	551.	992	Ibid.	993	According	 to	 one	 communist	 participant,	 ‘If	 we	 had	 followed	 the	 instructions	 of	 the	 national	bourgeois	parties	[of	easing	the	demonstrations],	there	would	have	been	no	Wathba”,	supra,	ft.	980,	at	14.	
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imperialism and the formation of a truly national democratic government. Their calls were not 
merely concerned with ‘political freedoms,’ but at its core were issues relating to economic and 
social injustice. This could be especially ascertained by their calls for ‘bread’.994 The Wathba 
quickly turned from a demand to replace the cabinet to a call for a profound transformation of the 
social and political order.995  
 
The respected social democrat and lawyer, Kamil Qazānchī, who was the head of the 
movement’s “Coordination Committee,” addressed the cheering crowd from the roof of the Wadī 
Coffeehouse, asserting that, ‘You must declare a great people’s revolution, and struggle to 
establish a people’s government that represents these [laboring] classes.’996 The crowds carried 
the renowned worker-poet, Mohammad Sālih Baḥr al-ʿŪlūm on their shoulders. Baḥr al-ʿŪlūm 
had been reciting his improvised thunderous poetry during the past few days, furiously 
condemning the government’s complicity with imperialism, giving voice to the people and 
mesmerizing the crowds. That day, he recited his most memorable poem, ‘The People’s Leap’:  
 
O Wathba of the People, rend apart 
With your maledictions this stupid treaty 
For the Portsmouth treaty is a chain 
The fetters of unconditional occupation 
 
O Wathba of the People, send away 
The grief and sadness of sheer evil 
That descends upon us, for Iraq 
Is the death of every shuttering fool 
The stronger logic lies in the struggle of the resisting people 
So Bevin will be shut up just as the villain Churchill was muzzled!997 
 
																																																																				994	In	 fact,	 the	government	of	Saleh	 Jabr	was	 labeled	 in	 the	protests	as	 ‘the	cabinet	of	black	bread,’	referring	 to	 the	miserable	 state	 of	 bread	 that	was	 being	distributed	by	 the	 state	 to	 the	 people.	al-
Thaqāfa	al-Jadīda,	193,	Issue	3	(35),	1988,	supra,	ft.	984,	at	15		995	Batatu,	Ibid,	ft.	41,	at	553.	996	Ibid.	997	M.	 Bahr	 al-‘Ulūm,	Dīwan,	 supra,	 at	 132-134.	 For	 his	 role	 in	 the	Wathba	 and	 the	 importance	 of	poetry	in	that	regard	see,	Kevin	M.	Jones.	‘A	horizon	lit	with	blood:	public	poetry	and	mass	politics	in	Iraq,’	Social	History,	2014,	Vol.	39,	No	4,	443-461.	Translation	of	Jones.		
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Qazānchī’s speech and Bahr al-‘Ulūm’s poem emphasized that the cancelation of the Portsmouth 
Treaty (or what he referred to in another poem as ‘the covenant of the slave’998) was in fact more 
about the liberation of the country from imperial and semi-colonial rule than the negotiation of 
the contents of the treaty. The statement released by the social democratic National Democratic 
Party explains this well, plainly stating that ‘the truth of the matter is that the British, since its 
occupation of Iraq, intended to make this country a strategic site in the Middle East, for its own 
interests … to exploit its resources, and control its markets’. It goes on to argue that the British 
were in fact merely ‘dressing up colonial [imperial] control with the new clothes of treaties and 
pacts.’ The Portsmouth Treaty was therefore merely ‘a new colonial [and imperial] project … a 
blatant attack on Iraq’s very being, its sovereignty and political future,’ and for this reason it 
should be resisted by Iraqis with all their might.999   
 
The Wathba came to a bloody culmination in Baghdad on January 27 when intense street 
battles were waged between the unarmed multitudes (carrying only canes and rocks) and the 
police equipped with machine guns and armored vehicles. A pendulum-like flowing movement 
between the two sides became a regular feature of the narrow streets of the city. The urban 
geography of Baghdad was taken advantage of by demonstrators, while the police were 
overwhelmed given that they had little experience in the tactics of riot suppression and crowd 
control.1000 Factories were turned into makeshift infirmaries, where injured demonstrators were 
stitched up.1001 A police car was burned and the headquarters of the British-owned newspaper, 
Iraq Times (which only weeks earlier described demonstrators as ‘a mob of looters,’	1002) was set 
alight. Baghdad, in the words of one writer, resembled a ‘war zone’.1003  The PM Salah Jabr 
transmitted a radio broadcast calling for demonstrators to end their disturbing of ‘the peace and 
order or [the] contravene[ing] of laws’ as this would expose people to ‘danger and death’.1004  
 
Police then scrambled to maintain barricades, while others were stationed on roofs and 
minarets, and had express orders from their commander to break up demonstrations and shoot to 
																																																																				998	Ibid,	at.	2:130.		999	For	the	full	text	see	al-Hasanī.	Tārīkh	al-Wizārāt,	Vol.	3,	supra,	ft.	235,	at	249.		1000	TNA.	G.C.	Pelham	to	FO,	21	Jan	1948.	FO	371/68443	E	880/27/93.	1001Thaqāfa	al-Jadīda,	193,	Issue	3	(35),	1988,	supra,	ft.	984,	at	15.		1002	TNA.	Pelham	to	FO,	Confidential,	25	Jan.	1948,	FO	371/68446/E2217.	1003	Ibid	1004 	TNA.	 ‘Broadcast	 Communiqué	 by	 Iraqi	 PM	 on	 27th	 January,	 1948’,	 E2020/27/93.	 FO	371/6646/27.		
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kill if necessary. Huge crowds gathered on both sides of the entrance of the Ma’mūn Bridge1005 
with the intention of meeting at the center of the bridge in defiance of the police. As the crowds 
courageously moved forward, police sprayed bullets in their direction. The shots only fell silent 
after a fifteen-year old girl (later coined ‘the girl of the bridge’) appeared out of the chaos and 
continued towards the midpoint of the old bridge.1006 The police pulled back and the two flanks 
of the masses ultimately converged. An estimated 300 to 400 died on the bridge that day.	1007 
Bodies hung from the bridge, and others floated in the Tigris River below.1008 This bloody event 
led to the resignations of over a dozen ministers, including the Speaker of the Majlis, who 
watched the entire incident from the balcony of the Parliament building.1009 The ‘Day of the 
Bridge’, as it came to be known endures in the annals of Iraqi history and folklore as the moment 
when ordinary unarmed Iraqis gave their lives to rid themselves from the chains of imperial and 
semi-colonial rule and expunge the ruling class’ black ink with which the treaty was signed, with 
their blood.  
 
 
 
 
																																																																				1005	After	this	day	the	bridge	would	be	renamed	as	‘The	Bridge	of	Martyrs’.	1006	Batatu,	ft.	41,	at	557.	1007	Ibid.	1008	Sbāhī.	supra,	ft.	191,	at	340 1009	al-Qassāb,	Abdul	Azīz.	Muthakarat	Abdul	Azīz	al-Qassāb	 [The	memoirs	of	Abdul	Aziz	al-Qassab],	(Amman:	al-Mu’asasa	al-Arabīya	lildirāsat	wa	al-Nashir,	2007),	at	286.		
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Figure	4:	Batatu's	map	showing	the	location	of	the	Battle	of	the	Bridge.	(Batatu,	the	Old	Social	
Classes,	at	556). 
 
 
Although the annulment of the Portsmouth Treaty was achieved, the new ‘caretaker’ 
government headed by Muhammad al-Sadr, a prominent religious leader, ultimately clamped 
down on all forms of dissent, declaring martial law, and shutting down newspapers and trade 
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unions on the basis of national security. It was moreover on the basis of the proclamation of 
martial law on May 15, 1948 during the Wathba that the Iraqi regime had another opportunity to 
re-try the leaders of the ICP. A wave of repression spread throughout the land and the military 
courts took every opportunity to make use of the Penal Code’s amendment described in the 
previous chapter – i.e. Law 51 of 1938- which was referred to in nearly every summary judgment 
made to sentence thousands of communists, leftists, nationalists and other Iraqis who participated 
in the Wathba demonstrations.1010 
 
On 10 February 1949, Fahad, and ICP Politburo members, Zakī Basīm and Mohammed 
Husayn al-Shabībī, were convicted of having led protests from prison and were sentenced to 
death once more. This time, however, the sentences were swiftly carried out the next day at dawn. 
Executed in three different squares in Baghdad, their bodies were left hanging as a clear warning 
to anyone who dared to challenge the semi-colonial Iraqi order. One British official at the scene 
vividly described these violent displays of power in the following manner: ‘…ordinary people on 
their way to work found still hanging these pathetic objects, each moving slightly as it hung from 
its temporary gallows, the rough prison clothes wrapped around the shrunken-looking body, the 
ghastly angle of the head behind the mask, the cheap notice describing the crime for which he 
suffered…Every man in Baghdad was nauseated by this display…’1011 It was reported in the 
communist press that Fahad’s last words were: ‘we are bodies and thoughts; if you destroy our 
bodies, you will not destroy our thoughts;’1012 while al-Shabībī kept repeating, ‘it is an honor to 
be executed in the same square where the Wathba of the people was launched’.1013 Basīm cried, 
‘if I was to return to life for a second time, I would not take any other path but this one, which I 
have already taken’.1014  It is unclear whether these statements were actually made. What is 
certainly clear was that these executions were meant as the regime’s retribution for what 
transpired during the days of the revolutionary Wathba.  
 
																																																																				1010	See	A	Secret	Encyclopedia	Concerning	 the	Secret	 Iraqi	Communist	Party	 (Mawsuʿa	sirīyya	khāssa	
bi’l	hizb	al-shuyuʿī	al-ʿiraqī	al-Sirī;	 1949	 (Baghdad:	Maktaba	al-Nahda	al-ʿArabiya).	 	This	 is	 a	 three-volume	collection	of	1,525	pages,	which	includes	confessions,	interrogations,	police	files	and	rulings	of	 the	 military	 tribunals.	 The	 police	 published	 it	 in	 1949	 with	 the	 hope	 of	 exposing	 the	 ICP	 and	discouraging	people	from	joining	the	party.	It	turned	out	to	have	the	opposite	effect	as	it	revealed	the	injustices	of	police	tactics	and	the	regime.		 1011	Caractacus,	supra,	ft.	37,	at	51.	1012	Batatu,	supra,	ft.	41,	at	569.	1013	As	quoted	by	Sbāhī,	supra,	ft.	191,	at	408.	1014	Ibid.	
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With these violent acts, however, the ruling class made a grave error. Not only was 
communism now, in Batatu’s words, ‘surrounded with a halo of martyrdom,’1015 but the people’s 
attempts to renew the emancipatory spirit of the Wathba persevered rather than dissolving into 
thin air. Despite the slow strangulation of the movement, it was the Wathba that was the spark 
that ignited the revolutionary process that would materialize in the July Revolution a decade later 
during the turbulent year of 1958.  
 
VI. The British Assessment of the Wathba & the ‘logic of the resisting people’ 
 
 
The British assessment of the Wathba and its causes was, as would be expected, 
considered as anything but a genuine nationalist movement.  A detailed report by G.C. Pelham, 
the Acting Charge d’Affaires at the time, surprisingly identified the causes of the ‘troubles’ as 
having ‘little connection to Anglo-Iraq relations’1016, but rather the peoples’ mistrust of corrupt 
government, which he described as an Ottoman legacy. 1017  Refusing to admit that the 
demonstrations were anti-British, he saw them solely (and ‘personally’) aimed at Sāleh Jabr and 
his cabinet.  Mentioning the government’s mishandling of the dire issue of economic situation 
during the year, he especially focused on the public outrage against the partition of Palestine as an 
underlying cause.1018  
 
It was nonetheless the speed in which the treaty was concluded that he argued intensified 
the suspicions of the people. ‘Colour was lent to the accusation’, he wrote, ‘… that the treaty was 
made in London and handed ready made to the Iraqi delegation for signature’.1019   The 
unavailability of an official Arabic translation of the treaty further fuelled such suspicion.1020 
Pelham’s reference to demonstrators as a ‘mob’ that was menacing ‘law and order’ and his 
warning that Iraq was threatened by ‘mob rule,’ illustrates the British view that the Wathba was 
																																																																				1015	Ibid.		1016	This	became	the	 ‘official’	British	narrative	as	Douglas	Busk	also	made	a	similar	argument	in	his	later	assessment	of	the	event.	1017	TNA.	G.C.	Pelham	to	FO,	21	Jan	1948.	FO	371/68443	E	880/27/93.	1018	The	 ‘Palestine	 argument’,	 as	 we	 have	 seen	 in	 an	 earlier	 chapter,	 has	 been	 frequently	 used	 by	British	 officials,	 even	 when	 assessing	 labour	 strikes.	 One	 official	 wrote,	 ‘if	 it	 had	 not	 been	 for	Palestine,	 we	 should	 have	 seen	 the	 treaty	 ratified’.	 Broadman	 to	 Bevin,	 1	 June	 1948,	 FO	371/68386/E7801.	1019	TNA.	G.C.	Pelham	to	FO,	supra.	1020	TNA.	 Telegram	 No.	 45,	 FO	 to	 Baghdad,	 14	 Jan,	 1948;	 ‘Iraq	 Treaty:	 Publicity’,	 E585/G;	 FO	371/68442.		
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an irrational event. 1021  He went on to critique Iraqi ‘student thought’, which he saw as 
conditioned by the view that ‘any foreign commitment takes away from full national 
sovereignty,’ stating that Iraqis suffer from ‘an inferiority complex’.1022 Admitting that the belief 
that the government of Sāleh Jabr must fall was ‘all but universal,’ he maintained that although 
such a situation would be ‘hopeless in a Europe country’, ‘in an Arab one there is perhaps a 
slender chance’ that the British connection would remain unscathed, as it would merely fall back 
on the old treaty.1023 This admission was nothing less than the recognition of the imperial 
characteristics of the treaty itself. 
   
Finally, one of the most recurrent analyses of the underlying causes of the demonstrations 
given by both the British and the Iraqi ruling class (namely the PM himself1024) was that common 
Iraqis were too illiterate to even understand the meaning of the treaty. The British blamed the 
Iraqi government for not educating the public about the contents of the treaty, going as far as 
saying that the population was ‘largely illiterate and…therefore incapable of reading the treaty 
itself’.1025 One official claimed that only ‘an ill-intentioned person could have misunderstood the 
Treaty’.1026 Douglas Busk wrote, ‘I had heard the vague slogans of the demonstrations in the 
streets, but I had not learned from them what were the [legal] points in the treaty to which they 
objected…’1027 Putting aside the racist connotations in this overall analysis and the fact that the 
organized committees detailed above made their demands quite clear, the very working actuality 
of the Wathba illustrates the exact opposite: the emergent consciousness of the Iraqi masses of 
how imperialism functions, especially through the law. One of Baḥr al-ʿŪlūm’s poems, entitled 
‘The colonial (Portsmouth) treaty,’ which he recited to cheering crowds during the early days of 
the Wathba, demonstrates how the masses grasped the meaning of the treaty in their minds (even 
if they had not read its every article):  
 
A draft law sent to pave the path for the invader 
The propositions of this bill sanctioned invasion 
Employing the language of bullets to impose itself 																																																																				1021	TNA.	G.C.	Pelham	to	FO,	supra.	1022	Ibid.	1023	Ibid.	1024	See	Najda	Fathī	Sūfwā,	Sālih	Jabr:	Sīra	Syāsīya,	(London:	Dar	al-Saqi,	2017).	1025 	TNA.	 Henry	 Mack,	 British	 Embassy,	 Bagdad	 to	 Michael	 Wright,	 London,	 9	 Feb	 1948.	E2693/27/93/G,	FO	371/68446.	1026	Ibid.	1027	TNA.	Douglas	Busk,	British	Embassy,	Bagdad	to	Bevin,	FO,	London.	6	Feb	1948.	E	2611/27/93.	FO	371/68446.		
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And compelling co-operation from the barking dogs 
While the people prepare for the tribulations of night 
A language for understanding the occupation of yesterday1028  
 
 Busk’s insistence therefore that the crowd give him a ‘legal argument’ regarding their rejection 
of the Treaty misses the point which is that the very existence of a ‘colonial’ treaty that 
practically ‘sanctioned occupation’ and prolonged their domination by an imperial power, was the 
problem.  The contents of the treaty mattered little if the intention of the contracting parties 
remained the same—the maintenance of the British connection. As Marx once wrote about the 
Paris Commune, ‘the great social measure of the Commune was its own working existence’. In 
other words, one should not measure a revolutionary event such as the Wathba based on its ideas 
or even law, but rather it should be measured based on its ‘working existence’ on the ground. 
Here, it is plain that the movement’s organization and committees – i.e. its very organized actions 
– was an indication of the type of social order that was being sought: one that allows for the 
participation of the majority of the Iraqi people and especially the working class and the peasants. 
It is this that could referred to as the ‘logic of the people’ rather than a legal argument or the logic 
of the law.   
 
 
VII. The Wathba from the lens of the labour movement 
 
 
Labour Unions, preserve the honorable people 
And erect for the workers some triumphal arches 
 The signs have begun and so their nobility proceeds 
In this movement, the Wathba, what a wonderful effect  
 
~ Mohammad Salih Bahr al-ʿUlūm1029 
 
 The Wathba has been largely interpreted as a nationalist anti-colonial struggle for the 
assertion of the constitutional rights of the Iraqi people, which were infringed and weakened by 
the 1930 Treaty.1030 However, it also contains a unique labour narrative underlying its history, 
																																																																				1028	M.	Bahr	al-ʿUlum,	Diwan,	supra,	ft.	310,	at	129. 1029	Ibid,	at	2:130. 1030	Al-Chadirjī,	Kāmil	 	Mudhakkirat	Kāmil	al-Chadirjī	wa	Tārīkh	al-Hizb	al-Watanī	al-Dīmuqrātī	[The	
Memoirs	of	Kamil	al-Chādirji	and	the	History	of	the	National	Democratic	Party]	(Beirut:	Dar	al-Tal’ia,	
1970).		
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which had a particular significance to the conjuncture in question, and which I have detailed in 
mini-histories in previous chapters. In other words, one way to understand the Wathba is through 
the lens of the labour struggle against the semi-peripheral sovereignty and its social and economic 
implications on the lives of the ordinary Iraqi working classes. As Eric Davis has emphasized, 
workers provided ‘the backbone’ of the Wathba.1031 The Iraqi labour movement was making 
strides in their continuous struggle against their British employers of the colossal industrial 
enterprises (namely the port, railways and oil refineries). Before the Wathba exploded, 
continuous labour strikes in these enterprises were rapidly becoming a concern for the British 
authorities.1032  The workers were not merely angered by their wretched conditions, but were also 
able, because of their unique location within the semi-colonial system (map) of capitalist 
exploitation, to make a direct correlation between their immediate material conditions and the far-
reaching issue of imperialism.  
 
To understand the role of the labour movement in the Wathba, one must recall the 
organizing efforts several years earlier of the railway, port and oil workers, described in previous 
chapters. During the years leading up to the Wathba, the workers continuously developed 
extensive experiences in organizational tactics and strategies of strike action and protest, which 
made all the difference when they were on the ground, hand in hand with their Iraqi brethren 
fighting against the Portsmouth Treaty. Moreover, the workers’ cognizance of the direct 
relationship between British imperialism and semi-colonialism, and the Iraqi state that they 
became gradually aware of during their labour struggles was now embedded into the overall 
national consciousness and ‘common sense’ of the majority of common Iraqis. The working class 
were after all, as shown earlier, the class that was most effected by the implications of the treaty 
and ‘semi-peripheral sovereignty’ in their everyday lives.  
 
An argument could therefore be made that the unique experiences of the workers and 
their movement contributed significantly to the momentum of the Wathba. If the students could 
be considered as those who ignited the Wathba, its organizational momentum was surely 
maintained by the workers and their concrete experiences, for throughout the months after the 
‘Day of the Bridge’, labour strikes intensified like never before. There was, in the words of Sʿuād 
Khayrī, an ‘awakening’ within the labour movement.1033 The strikes were so potent that Nurī al-																																																																				1031	Davis,	supra,	ft.	596,	at	293	1032	TNA.	British	Embassy,	Baghdad	 to	Foreign	Office,	21	May	1948,	 enclosing	minute	on	 strikes	at	IPC	[FO	371/68479].	1033	Khayrī,	supra,	ft.	562,	at	171,	173	
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Saīd publically remarked at the time that what he feared the most was not the actual 
demonstrations that led to the cancellation of the treaty, but rather the intensification of labour 
strikes, which he was afraid would lead to a communist revolution.1034 In that sense, the anti-
colonial nationalist struggle shifted into the ‘axis of labour’, turning strike action into the ‘beating 
heart’ of the Wathba movement.1035 Labour (economic) struggle and anti-colonial (political) 
struggle became precisely one and the same at this conjuncture. It was after all throughout these 
months that the massive successful Basra Port strike unfolded, and the legendary K3 pumping-
station strike, which carried the ‘liberationary [and solidarity] spirit of the Wathba,’1036 became a 
concrete reality. Martial law would ultimately be declared to violently repress these labour 
strikes. It is therefore not an overstatement to consider the Wathba as the wider reflection of a 
labour struggle against the semi-peripheral sovereignty that gave the juridical and ideological 
cover needed for the imposition of the capitalist economic structures on Iraq. 
 
 
VIII. The wide implications of the Wathba & its contribution to the conjuncture of 
decolonization in international law 
 
 
I will now return to my earlier analysis of TWAIL and its methodology by inserting the 
social and juridical implications of the Wathba into my theoretical argument. My contention was 
that TWAIL scholars should begin the study of the conjuncture in the history of international law 
– connecting their concern for the ‘micro-histories of resistance’ to a much broader understanding 
of the conjuncture in question. This would allow for the bridging of all these micro-histories into 
an overarching understanding of agency. Consequently, the conjunctural moment, which allowed 
anti-colonial and anti-imperial resistance to materialize in Iraq cannot be explained without an 
attempt to understand the wider conjuncture of decolonization in the region and the Third World. 
Decolonization, as Mohammed Bedjaoui reminds us, is by its very definition a ‘structural 
revolution on a world scale’.1037 For this reason a conjunctural analysis must begin ‘at the level 
of the international itself,’ ascertaining ‘a dominant combination of causes’ while evaluating ‘the 
																																																																				1034	Ibid.	1035	Ibid.	1036	al-Nūʿmān,	supra,	ft.	580,	at	266. 1037 Mohmmed	 Bedjaoui.	 Towards	 A	 New	 International	 Economic	 Order:	 New	 Challenges	 to	
International	Law,	(New	York:	Holmes	&	Meier,	1979),	at	88.		
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period characterized by the working out of that combination.’1038 It entails the necessity of 
simultaneously ‘looking inwards to examine the detailed movement of a given period and 
outwards to locate that period in the longer historical process which it forms a part.’1039  
 
A conjunctural analysis in international law, therefore, would have to be attentive to the 
organic movement within this wide scale while analyzing agency, focusing on, using the words of 
Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt, the ‘intersections’ and the ‘accumulation of struggles’ against 
international law.1040 Although TWAIL scholars are generally familiar with such an analysis – 
one which Gramsci would refer to as the study of the ‘long waves’ of history1041 (for instance 
Anghie’s return to the thought of Francisco de Vitoria in the sixteenth century) – what tends to be 
missing in general is how this connects to agency (or using TWAIL vocabulary: resistance). The 
conjuncture therefore acts as a bridging device for one’s analytic lens in relation to the notion of 
agency that could be used in tandem with the study of the imperial structures of international law. 
It is nevertheless not merely a matter of contextualization, but rather about continuously being 
attentive to the question of agency and action in one’s wide analysis. Before moving to assess 
Iraqi working-class agency, I will first address the structural implications of the Wathba on a 
variety of different interconnecting and intersecting levels – the Iraqi, regional and international.  
 
On the Iraqi level, the Wathba contained the origins of the revolutionary process that 
culminated in the overthrow of the British-sponsored Monarchy by the 1958 July revolution. It 
certainly inspired and stimulated the Free Officers to take matters into their own hands to defend 
the people from ‘the incubus of injustice that weighed upon them’.1042 I would go as far as to 
argue that the Wathba could be considered as the ‘dress rehearsal’ for the 1958 revolution, 
especially if one was to consider that the revolutionary process of struggle was sustained 
throughout the decade resurfacing as mini-Wathbas – namely, the Intifāda of 1952 and the 
Uprising of 1956. In many ways, it was the spark that started the process of the brewing and 
making of the revolution.  It is in that sense that the Wathba and the revolution were a part of the 
same Iraqi conjuncture. The July revolution was a genuine revolution that broke with the ancien 
régime. The Proclamation No. 1 that was read out on Baghdad Radio announced the 
establishment of a republic, promised that the Iraqi people would participate in shaping their own 																																																																				1038	Justin	Rosenberg	quoted	in	Koivisto,	‘Historical-Critical	Dictionary	of	Marxism’,	at	273.	1039	Ibid.	1040	Michael	Hardt,		&	Antonio	Negri.	Empire,	(Massachusetts:	Harvard	University	Press,	2000),	at	263	1041	See	Maaurice	Finocchiaro.	Gramsci	and	the	History	of	Dialectical	Thought	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2002),	at	164.	1042	Col.	Abdul	Karim	Qassim’s	words	as	quoted	by	Batatu,	supra,	ft.	41,	at	806.		
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future, and established a neutralist foreign policy (explicitly referring to Bandung), ending its 
close alliance with the West.1043 The revolutionary processes began with the drafting of a 
Provisional Constitution barely two weeks after the revolution, frustrating the subjugating 
structures of the old constitution or Organic Law, which limited popular sovereignty as shown 
earlier. Furthermore, the new Agrarian Reform law ended the ‘semi-feudal’ system that was the 
foundation of British policy and control, destroying the social power of the landed sheikhs by 
finally bringing the countryside under the purview of state law.1044 Finally, the position of urban 
workers and the working class were significantly enhanced by the revision and enactment of an 
updated progressive labour law for the protection of workers’ rights and their trade unions. As for 
the anti-hegemonic impact of the Wathba on the region, it was apparent in how it inspired 
countless sympathy strikes and demonstrations in Beirut, Damascus, and Cairo. A revealing 
clipping from a Cairo newspaper read, ‘the Iraqi people did not only save itself, but saved the 
entire Arab world from remaining under Western colonial subjugation.’1045  
 
To situate the Wathba internationally, one would need to analyze how its revolutionary 
impetus was partially successful in striking imperialism by preventing the imposition of a revised 
treaty. To do that it would be necessary to understand other regional and international events that 
rendered it the appropriate moment to attack (British) imperialism. Here, the weaving of other 
events of conjunctural resistance against imperialism and the international legal order that 
happened in the Third World that year is necessary to grasp the vulnerability of British 
imperialism at that particular moment. Frank Furedi has detailed the conjuncture that emerged 
during that unique year of 1948 for anti-colonial and nationalist liberation struggles in the Third 
World.1046  He demonstrates how 1948 was a year of widespread panic in Whitehall as a crisis of 
imperial rule emerged unexpectedly, where anti-colonial and anti-imperial resistance reached its 
utmost intensity: ‘No part of the empire seemed immune from what appeared to be an epidemic 
of unrest’.1047 Twelve days before the Wathba, Burma rejected Commonwealth membership, 
while February saw riots in Accra and in June emergency rule was established in Malaya.1048 Of 
course, regionally 1948 was the year that the tragic Palestinian Nakba (catastrophe) was 
																																																																				1043	See	 Juan	 Romero.	 The	 Iraqi	 Revolution	 of	 1958:	 A	 Revolutionary	 Quest	 for	 Unity	 and	 Security.	Maryland:	University	Press	of	America,	2011).	1044Marr,	supra,	ft.	212,	at	105.	1045	al-Nida’	Newspaper,	(Cairo,	February	5,	1948)	as	quoted	in	Ḥumaidī,	supra,	ft.	709,	at	546.	1046	Frank	 Furedi.	 Colonial	Wars	 and	 the	 Politics	 of	 Third	World	 Nationalism,	 (London:	 I.B.	 Tauris,	1994),	at	4,	88-108.	1047	Ibid,	at	89.	1048	Ibid.	
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unfolding, and more than anything else this event represented the injustices of colonialism and 
imperialism for the Arab peoples. A focus on the manifestation of the conjuncture on the 
international scale would take all of these into account in one’s analysis of this particular moment 
of Iraqi agency against the imperialism of international law. 
 
The Wathba could be situated in the conjuncture that was emerging within the 
international legal order and which manifested in the signing of the 1960 Declaration on the 
Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (GA Resolution 1514).1049 The 
significance of this document, sometimes referred to as the ‘Magna Carta’ of decolonization, 
should not be understated.1050 The UN Charter of 1945 failed to clearly condemn colonialism, 
and its imposition of a duty of administration of specific colonies could arguably be construed as 
recognizing the legality of colonialism.1051 The fact that the Portsmouth Treaty, as I have shown, 
was (legally) drafted in a manner that fully conformed to the UN Charter is evidence of this 
limitation. The 1960 Declaration was therefore the first instrument in the history of international 
law whereby colonialism and imperialism were deemed unlawful and in contravention of the UN 
Charter. As Christopher Quaye observed, the preamble of the Declaration, ‘decried colonialism 
… by observing the universal position against perpetuation of colonialism and expressing belief 
in liberation from anything that is colonial’.1052 In its words, the declaration: ‘Solemnly proclaims 
the necessity of bringing a speedy and unconditional end to colonialism in all its forms and 
manifestations’.1053 Despite its significance in international legal history, the Declaration did not 
fully accelerate the process of decolonization at a pace corresponding to the hopes of the peoples 
under colonial rule, as its implementation had to be continuously fought for by the bloc over the 
next few years.1054  Nevertheless, the contribution of the Iraqi anti-colonial and anti-imperial 
struggle to this Declaration was clear. 
 
The Wathba and its revolutionary consequences on the Iraqi plane was only one event 
amongst a series of similar revolutionary events in other parts of the Third World that had a direct 
influence on the way the representatives of the Afro-Asian bloc in the U.N., adhering to the 																																																																				1049	Declaration	on	 the	Granting	of	 Independence	 to	Colonial	Countries	and	Peoples	 (1960),	 G.A.	 Res.	1514	(XV),	UN	GAOR,	15TH	sess.,	947th	plen.	Mtg,	UN	Doc.	A/RES/1514	(XV)	(14	December	1960).			1050Quayson-Sackey,	 as	 cited	 in	 Quaye,	 Christopher.	 Liberation	 Struggles	 in	 International	 Law,	(Philadelphia:	Temple	University	Press,	1991).	,	111.	1051	Quaye,	Liberation	Struggles	in	International	Law,	supra,	at	108-109.	1052	Ibid,	at	112.	1053	Decelaration	on	the	Granting.	1054	Sharma,	D.N.	Afro-Asian	Group	in	the	U.N.	(Allahabad,	Chaitanya	Publishing,	1969),	at	205.	
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Bandung Spirit, were aggressively arguing for the drafting and liberal interpretation of this 
Declaration, while maintaining a firm anti-colonial stance.1055 It was clear that legal arguments 
were specifically made on the basis of ‘the political weather outside the [U.N.] Headquarters’.1056 
In other words, not only was the law rejected as a mechanism for dealing with the question of 
colonialism and imperialism, but the wave of events of decolonization on the ground were 
considered as necessary sources for the drafting and molding of international law and its 
instruments. The bloc continuously insisted that these anti-colonial struggles must be 
unconditionally recognized as legitimate – international ‘law should be modified according to 
changed circumstances’.1057  
 
The permanent representative of the revolutionary government of Iraq in the U.N., Adnān 
Pāchachī took part in the drafting of the 1960 Declaration.1058 The Iraqi delegation ended up co-
sponsoring, together with a number of Asian and African states, the Declaration when it was 
presented to the General Assembly. In an impassionate and eloquent speech to the Assembly, the 
new Iraqi Foreign Minister, Hāshim Jawād began by recounting the long history of colonialism in 
the Arab World beginning with the first experience of European imperialism with the French 
conquest of Algeria in 1830, eventually referring to the Mandate system as ‘a new form of 
colonialism’ that was imposed on the peoples of the Middle East.1059  Jawād accordingly directly 
rejected the ‘semi-peripheral sovereignty’ that the Iraqi masses attempted to abolish with their 
blood, sweat and tears during the Wathba and thereafter. He went on to state that although the 
Mandate in Iraq was terminated in 1932, it was replaced by a new relationship that retained for 
the former Mandatory Power great influence in the internal affairs of the country, stressing that ‘it 
took another twenty-six years and our great July Revolution of 1958 for the people of Iraq to rid 
the country finally of the last vestiges of foreign domination and influence.1060 Jawād then 
emphasized how he regarded all struggles for decolonization as interconnected by specifically 
referring to the Arab and Iraqi experience:   
 
																																																																				1055	Ibid.	1056	El-Ayouty,	supra,	ft.	944,	at	60.	1057R.P.	Anand.	“Attitude	of	the	Asian-African	States	Towards	Certain	Problems	of	international	Law,”	in	 Snyder	 and	 Sathirathai	 (eds.),	Third	World	Attitudes	Toward	 International	Law:	An	 Introduction,	Dordrecht:	Martinus	Nijhoff	Publishers,	1987),	at	14.	1058	Pachachi,	Adnan.	Iraq’s	Voice	at	the	United	Nations	1959-69:	A	Personal	Record,	(London:	Quartet	Books,	1991),	at	9.	1059	UN	GAOR,	15TH	Sess.,	937th	plen.	Mtg.,	UN	Doc.	A/PV	937	(6	December	1960),	at	120-138.	1060	Ibid.	
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I do not think I exaggerate when I say that few nations in the world have suffered as much as the 
Arab nation under colonial rule … the Arab people have known colonialism in its worst forms and 
manifestations. They have experienced at first hand its oppression and treachery and have suffered from it 
physically, materially and spiritually as few others have. This is one of the reasons why we have such a 
deep sympathy and understanding for the struggle of the other nations for freedom and independence.1061  
 
He went on to make clear that it was this unique ‘extensive’ and ‘tragic’ experience of (semi) 
colonialism in the Arab world in general and in Iraq in particular which solidified his delegation’s 
belief in the importance of an unequivocal anti-colonial wording in the Declaration.1062   
 
The Iraqi contribution to the drafting of this document was hence in ensuring that the 
semi-peripheral sovereignty that was skillfully weaved into international law in Geneva and 
granted to Iraq in 1932, as a recognized form of ‘independence’, would be unequivocally rejected 
in the Declaration. International law should instead postulate concrete sovereignty and full 
independence. N.M. Perrera, the representative for Ceylon (present-day Sri Lanka) plainly 
explained the meaning of this part of the Declaration when he emphasized that reference to the 
‘manifestations of colonialism’ specifically refers to ‘the various methods, procedures and legal 
figments which are used by colonial powers to cover the nakedness of rank colonialism’.1063  The 
semi-peripheral sovereignty described earlier and which was a significant part of the Iraqi 
experience was one of these more sophisticated legal figments that were recognized under 
international law. It is in this way that the Iraqi experience of the Wathba and its revolutionary 
consequences, in rejecting semi-peripheral sovereignty on the ground, could be linked through a 
conjunctural analysis to the wider changes within the international legal order. 
 
 
IX. The significance of labour & working-class agency to the conjuncture of decolonization 
 
 The analysis above has shown how ‘resistance’, or more broadly revolutionary agency, 
is conducive within a particular conjuncture that emerges from the structures in question. TWAIL 
scholars would traditionally have analyzed the Wathba in isolation of these structures, 
concentrating on certain characteristics of agency as being external and not contingent to these 
structures (in particular its spontaneity, non-violence, and heterogeneity). However, this narrow 
approach differs from the conjunctural analysis that brings agency and structure into one fold, 																																																																				1061	Ibid.	1062	Ibid.	1063	UN	GAOR,	15TH	Sess.,	926th	plen.	Mtg.,	UN	Doc.	A/PV	926	(28	November	1960),	1002.	
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while it romanticizes agency, approaching it as a form of resistance that is devoid of any 
revolutionary content. Many TWAIL scholars cannot conceive of emancipation without or 
beyond the law or the international legal order, despite it being the very target of their 
critique.1064 The Wathba, however, emerged for the very reason that the legal mechanisms of the 
state that were being manipulated by imperial instruments of international law were inept and 
completely dysfunctional. It eventually became (at least for the left) about the subversion of the 
law rather than its mere reform. Furthermore, the Wathba demonstrated that the effectiveness of 
what I refer to as ‘conjunctural resistance’ in the context of revolutionary action depends on its 
organizational capacity. It is not enough to put one’s hopes on the spontaneity of action as 
TWAIL scholars tend to do, for despite the unforeseen nature of the Wathba, the movement 
spurred at that particular moment because it was able to readily organize into effective steering 
committees. This was certainly possible because of some of its participants’ past experiences, 
especially those of the workers. In this manner, therefore, romanticizing the spontaneity of 
agency ignores the fact that spontaneity and organization must come together within a particular 
conjuncture to be effective. 
 
 I want to end by briefly returning to the significance of labour to the specific conjuncture 
in question. A focus on labour and working-class agency in this analysis demonstrates the strong 
affinity between capitalism, imperialism and international law, especially in the semi-periphery. 
This is what explains the significant role of labour in countering the manifestations of the 
international legal order within the conjuncture in question. I have already shown how semi-
peripheral sovereignty in the Iraqi context was manufactured as a mechanism to control the semi-
colonial Middle East.  The ‘independence’ of Iraq was more a mechanism to legalize the control 
of Iraqi oil and regulate its transportation across the region. While the Anglo-Iraq treaty 
maintained this control juridically, Iraqi labour was exploited to superintend the everyday 
functioning of this infrastructure of economic dominance. In this way, colonial and racial 
relations remained intact after Iraqi ‘independence’, especially in the colossal private enterprises 
and factories. The Anglo-Iraq treaty ensured British control of the most important economic sites 
of production and trade in the country. As I have shown, the semi-colonial framework of an 
‘independent Iraq’ created an atmosphere of racism that was common elsewhere in the Empire. 
Iraqi workers, like their counterparts elsewhere in the Third World, embodied the contradictions 																																																																				1064	See	for	example,	Luis	Eslava.	and	Sundhya	Pahuja.	“Between	Resistance	and	Reform:	TWAIL	and	the	Universality	 of	 International	 Law,”	 3(1)	Trade,	Law	and	Development,	 103	 (2011);	 B.S.	 Chimni.	“Third	World	Approaches	to	International	Law:	A	Manifesto,”	International	Community	Law	Review	8:	3-27,	(2006).	
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of the capitalist system within the (semi) colony, experiencing first hand the effects of 
imperialism and racism in their everyday lives, and so it should not be surprising that they would 
lead a significant role within the nationalist liberation movement.  
 
Iraqi workers reconstituted the question of labour as an anti-colonial and anti-imperial 
one. This is why their rejection of the Anglo-Iraq treaty was a rejection of the entire international 
legal and economic order imposed on the region. Fahad reveals the way the workers were 
thinking when he wrote: ‘… the working class did not separate the national [political] from the 
social [economic] content of liberation…[For them] national liberation is but a starting point of a 
fundamental change in the life of the people’.1065 The Iraqi labour movement combined claims of 
higher wages and better living conditions with anti-colonial demands of national liberation, 
ensuring its ‘full integration into the national movement’.1066  This wide analytic lens was unique 
to the international conjuncture in question. It was prevalent at the time in other parts of the Third 
World.1067 Furedi characterized this conjuncture as a ‘radical moment in anti-colonial politics,’ 
where there was a ‘tendency of protests to acquire a more fundamental anti-systemic and anti-
imperialist orientation, accompanied by increasing erosion of the boundaries between economic 
and political demands.’1068 This explains how ‘relatively ordinary demands could mushroom into 
a major challenge to imperial authority’.1069 Iraqi workers, therefore, were unable to articulate 
their rejection of their social, living and working conditions without at the same time rejecting the 
entire international legal and economic order that was imposed upon them.  
 
The British came to the conclusion that there needed to be an extensive development 
policy towards labour that would ‘ameliorate the dire labour conditions’ and ‘fend off 
Communism’.1070 It is revealing that before the eruption of the Wathba, the British were in the 
process of advising the Iraqi government in drawing up ‘regulations for the whole field of labour 
in Iraq’ and the establishment of an arbitration procedure that would address workers 
																																																																				1065	Batatu,	supra,	ft.	41,	at	589.	1066	Farouk-Sluglett	and	Sluglett.	‘The	Social	Classes	and	the	Origins	of	the	Revolution,”	in	Fernea	and	Louis	(eds.)	The	Iraqi	Revolution	of	1958:	The	Old	Social	Classes	Revisited,	(London:	IB	Tauris,	1991),	at	127-128.	1067	Walter	 Rodney.	 How	 Europe	 Underdeveloped	 Africa,	 (Washington:	 Howard	 University	 Press,	1981),	at	276.		1068	Furedi,	supra,	ft.	1046,	at	38.	1069	Ibid.	1070	TNA.	British	Embassy	 to	Baghdad,	 to	Rt	Hon	E.	 Bevin,	 Foreign	 Secretary,	 London,	 2	 July	 1946,	street	demonstrations	in	Baghdad	[FO	371/52406].		
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grievances.1071 It is this ultimately unsuccessful policy of development and conciliation that 
dominated British policy towards the region in the next decade. In a similar vein, a development 
framework manifested within international law and its institutions. The International Labour 
Organization for example sent technical assistance missions to advise on labour and social issues 
in the Middle East. The ILO’s technical assistance programs were conceived in the context of 
constricted notions of social and economic development with the aim of fighting the growing 
influence of communism.1072 Moreover, the 1961 Declaration of the United Nations Development 
Decade (GA Res. 1710) ensured that the effects of the 1960 Declaration would be limited in that 
it ‘bound together decolonization and development with a firm yoke’.1073 This maintained the 
subordination of society to the discipline of economics, and led to the continuation of the 
development of underdevelopment. 1074  Most importantly, this was what prevented the 
materialization of an alternative international economic order from the ‘salt-water’ decolonization 
that was won. In this way, the conjunctural shift did not ultimately produce the revolutionary 
changes sought after, whether it was within the international legal order or the Iraqi experience, 
where revolutionary processes were interrupted by a CIA-sponsored military coup in 1963.   
 
 
X. Conclusion 
 
 
The history of the Wathba recounted above is an illustration of how revolutionary action 
may be undertaken within a specific conjuncture to subvert the effects of the imperialism of 
international law. Although this affirms the transient and provisional nature of the foundations of 
international law, it is only in relation to the structures in question that agency could be 
evaluated.1075 It is nevertheless important to recall Gramsci’s warning that ‘a common error … 
consists in an inability to find the correct relation between what is organic and what is 
conjunctural. This leads to… [either]… an excess of “economism” … [or] … an excess of 
“ideologism”. In the first case there is an overestimation of mechanical causes, in the second an 																																																																				1071TNA.	 D.L.	 Busk,	 Baghdad,	 to	 Rt	 Hon	 E.	 Bevin,	 Foreign	 Secretary,	 London,	 21,	 August	 1946	[FO371/52456].	1072	Maul,	 D.	 “The	 Morse	 Years:	 the	 ILO	 1948-1970,”	 in	 ILO	 Histories:	 Essays	 on	 the	 International	
Labour	Organization	 and	 its	 impact	 on	 the	World	 during	 the	 Twentieth	 Century,	 (Bern:	 Peter	 Lang,	2010),	at	54.	1073	Pahuja.	“Decolonization	and	the	eventness	of	international	law,”	in	Fleur,	John;	Joyce,	Richard;	Pahuja,	Sundhya	(eds.),	Events:	The	Force	of	International	Law,	(London:	Routledge,	2011);	at	99.	1074	Ibid.	1075	Susan	Marks.	“False	Contingency,”	(2010)	62	Current	Legal	Problems	1–22,	at	10.		
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exaggeration of the voluntarist and individual element.’1076 It is necessary in the end to find an 
accurate correlation between the (organic) structure and (conjunctural) agency in one’s analysis if 
one is to correctly evaluate how agency was (or is to be) deployed within the structural constraints 
of the international legal, political and economic order. It was after all, on the one hand, the 
overly weak hegemony of the Iraqi state and its corresponding semi-peripheral sovereignty that 
made it unable to maintain itself or permanently suppress the emerging counter-hegemonic 
movements and spaces that continued to arise despite being fractured again and again by the 
violent uses of emergency law. The counter-hegemonic, on the other hand, cannot be understood 
in isolation of the conditions that make agency possible or at least that make even an initially 
unsuccessful attempt at revolution, such as the Wathba, encompass the revolutionary seed and 
have a long-term effect on the future than was expected.       
 
The prominent Iraqi poet Mohammed Mahdī al-Jawāhirī recited a celebrated poem 
eulogizing those who died on the bridge during the Wathba, his brother amongst them.  He begins 
with the following line: ‘Are you aware or not, that the wounds of martyrs are a mouth?’ 1077  It is 
not only a matter of allowing this ‘mouth’ to speak in one’s scholarship, but rather to focus on the 
very conjunctures that allow those who take action to liberate themselves to become ‘wounded 
martyrs’. It is, in other words, the opening (or ‘mouth’) of the conjunctures that should be one’s 
point of departure. 
 
 
 
 
 
 	
																																																																				1076	Gramsci,	supra,	ft.	295,	178.	1077	Jayyusi,	Salma	Khadra.	Trends	and	Movements	in	Modern	Arabic	Poetry.	(Leiden:	Brill,	1997).		199.						
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Conclusion  
 
 
 
 
While they bring glad tidings 
Of the free world, to the slaves 
And of the miracles 
Of their dollar – the hope of the peoples – 
And the giver of life to the dead. 
They frighten mothers 
And they soak 
The banner of your people, my little one, with blood. 
… 
While behind prison walls  
A great people awakens 
Destroying its chains, my beloved son, 
But you are busy and you do not answer.	1078 
 
 
~ ‘Abd al-Wahhāb al-Bayātī 
 
 
 
Mr. Speaker, the reports out of Iraq these days make 2008 sound an awful lot like 1930. That’s when the 
British strong-armed a so-called treaty to take control of Iraq’s oil wealth. And it remained that way for 
decades until the people in the Middle East nationalized their oil wealth to end outside control. But western 
oil interests and the neocons have wanted it back ever since… [They] want... [Iraq’s oil reserves]…just as 
they did 78 years ago. And like 1930, they plan to permanently occupy Iraq… In 1930, they didn’t call it 
occupation, they called it a treaty. And they are doing it all over again. 1080 
 
~ Jim McDermott  
 
 
 
I. The lines of expansion & contraction of the international legal order 
 
 
To return to the image of drawing ‘lines’ on maps made in the introduction, this legal 
history of Iraq is a history of lines: borderlines, property lines, oil pipelines, railway lines, ports 
leading shipping lines…etc. As Cornelia Vismann suggests, the law is itself a line or rather, ‘the 
primordial scene of the nomos opens with drawing a line in the soil…[the] very act [of which] 
initiates a specific concept of law, which derives order from the notion of space.’1081 This study 																																																																				1078	‘Abd	al-Wahhāb	al-Bayātī,	 [“A	Song	 for	my	Son	 ‘Ali”	dated	1955]	 in	Al-Majd	lil-Atfāl	wal-Zaytūn,	3rd	ed.	(Cairo:	Dār	al-Kātib	al-‘Arabi	lil-Tibā‘ah	wal-Nashr,	1967),	49-51.			1080	US	Congressional	Record,	House	of	Representatives,	July	9,	2008,	H6315.	McDermott	was	referring	to	the	US-Iraq	Status	of	Forces	Agreement	signed	in	2008.				1081	Cornelia	Vismann.	“Starting	from	Scratch:	Concepts	of	Order	in	No	Man’s	Land”	in	Bernd-Rudiger	Huppauf	(ed)	War,	Violence	and	the	Modern	Condition.	(Berlin:	Walter	de	Gruyter,	1997),	at	46.	
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shows how the straight lines of the law in all its scales –international, domestic, transnational, 
imperial, semi-colonial– produced and defined certain spaces with the aim of controlling, 
regulating and exploiting the strategic sites and the natural resources of the semi-peripheral 
Middle East. The Iraqi state itself was established through an amalgamation of legal instruments, 
doctrines and methodologies until it was, contrary to reality, proclaimed as independent. The 
retracing of these straight lines of the law exposes how imperialism operated to obscure reality, 
legitimate and expand its order.  
 
 This study however also shows that no matter how straight a line is drawn and no matter 
how sophisticated a ruler is used to (violently) draw a line, it could never dominate a map or 
surface, which already contains other free-moving, living lines. Tim Ingold, who has written a 
fascinating anthropological history of lines, describes the sovereignty of the straight line drawn 
by a ruler. He writes, ‘[a] ruler is a sovereign who controls and governs a territory. It is also an 
instrument for drawing straight lines. These two usages…are closely connected. In establishing 
the territory as his to control, the ruler lays down guidelines for its inhabitants to follow. And in 
his political judgments and strategic decisions –his ruling- he plots the course of action they 
should take. As in the territory so also on the page, the ruler has been employed in drawing lines 
of all kinds.’1082 The analogy above is apt indeed: to draw straight lines is the prerequisite for 
imperial control, but to do so you need a ‘ruler’. You need the law. The British at the behest of 
international legal institutions drew straight lines on the maps of Iraq and the region – they 
installed a ruler in Iraq and with the lines of the law developed a semi-peripheral sovereignty over 
this strategic territory, while they maintained their economic interests by drawing more lines – 
economic lines of capitalism (physically constructing the infrastructure of oil pipelines and 
railway lines).    
 
 Ingold contrasts the drawing of straight lines using a ruler with drawing by freehand, 
which he shows produces a life-like texture and contains an open-ended freedom as it is a 
movement along ‘a path of observation’ rather than the already defined sharp edges of the 
ruler.1083 The graceful lines of anti-colonial and anti-imperial agency –of the workers, students, 
peasants, squatters, lawyers, and the multitudes – described in this study move in such a 
freehanded manner as they struggle to disentangle themselves from the sovereignty of (imperial 
and legal) straight lines. As they move, partly in an improvised and partly in an organized 																																																																				1082	Tim	Ingold.	Lines:	A	Brief	History	(London:	Routledge,	2007),	at	160.	1083	Ibid,	at	166.	
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manner, they created their own alternative nomos with their very movements, with the aim of 
contracting the imperialism of the existing international legal order. The analysis of the 
international conjuncture in international legal history presented in this study could accordingly 
be considered as a science of the lines of imperial and anti-imperial movement – their 
coordination in relation to space and time, and their expansion and contraction. It is no doubt the 
most useful method to understand the manifestation and initiation of agency, and its counter-
hegemonic spaces in relation to the structures of capitalism, imperialism and international law.  
 
This dissertation makes several contributions to the existing literature that go beyond just 
putting law at the center of the modern history of Iraq. First, it substantiates the unique specificity 
of the semi-peripheral region of the Middle East in the history of international law. In other 
words, it shows that international law approached the semi-periphery quite differently than it did 
the periphery in the Third World. From this emerged new juridical formations of sovereignty in 
international law, such as what I describe as semi-peripheral sovereignty. These new categories 
were in fact attempts to conceal the reality of imperial control, colonialism and capitalist 
exploitation of the region. They were also threaded specifically for the Middle East, considering 
its important geo-strategic location in the globe, as well as, the valuable natural resources below 
its ground. By exploring these unique legal techniques and formulations and their ensuing effects, 
international legal scholars would better appreciate the different (subtle) ways in which 
international law was deployed to obfuscate reality and to further imperial agendas.  It is these 
hidden structures of the imperialism of international law that are most interesting to study as their 
deconstruction would ensure that they would not reemerge again. It would also add to the lesser 
known histories and genealogies of the concept of sovereignty in relation to the Third World. 
Secondly, this study contributes to the study of agency in relation to international law by 
proposing that with the use of a novel methodological approach relying on the conjuncture, the 
history of agency could be better grasped within international legal history. A broader and more 
open perspective towards the agency of the ordinary peoples of the Third World illustrates, not 
only that international law had a concrete material effect on those living under its guise, but that 
their struggles against these forms of control were a significant part of its history, and should be 
considered as such.   
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II. The juridical forms of sovereignty in international law & their relation to capitalism and 
imperialism  
 
I have recounted this history of Iraq not only to show that the law was continuously 
present in the political and socio-economic transformations of the period in question, but 
particularly as an attempt to present a historical case whereby it is clear how imperialism and 
international law are constitutive of each other. Of course, this study is not only a history of 
international law and its institutions (Chapter 3 & 7), but also an illustration of the simultaneous 
operations of (British) imperial law (Chapter 1), transnational law (Chapters 3 and 4), emergency 
law, criminal law (Chapter 6), and labour law (Chapters 2, 4 & 5). Nonetheless, it was generally 
with the structures of international law and the construction of semi-peripheral sovereignty in Iraq 
through the Mandate process that these laws above had the necessary scope to function within the 
context of semi-coloniality. Moreover, it was international law, through the provisions of the 
1930 Anglo-Iraq Treaty, which produced and maintained the spaces – the imperial and semi-
colonial enclaves of the oil fields, railways and the port – described in this study, that allowed for 
imperialism to function efficiently and maintain the flow of capital in this geo-strategic region. 
 
The making of semi-peripheral sovereignty in Iraq was a significant event in that it was 
the first time that the necessary juridical ingredients were weaved together to produce a unique 
non-European sovereignty through the Mandate process of international law that was reconciled 
with the post-war international legal order, and yet preserved the essential processes of 
imperialism in the region. As I have shown, there was a spatial and economic specificity to the 
semi-periphery that made these legal techniques vital for controlling the region as a whole. 
Furthermore, from a regional and international perspective, this experiment with sovereignty was 
valuable in that it revealed how far a restrained non-European sovereignty could be overextended 
without contradicting the main principles underlying the emerging international legal order.1084 
Semi-peripheral sovereignty in Iraq was in essence a skeletal form of sovereignty that ensured 
that Iraqi sovereignty was (in theory) complete under international law, but fragmented in reality 
– a fragmentation that was evident in the autonomous and semi-autonomous enclaves (of the oil 
fields, the port and the railways) that were described in the study, and which also included the 
two British (RAF) military bases that remained stationed in Iraq.1085  																																																																				1084	I	have	shown	that	the	legal	arguments	made	by	the	PMC	did	at	times	contradict	their	own	legal	principles	(especially	of	the	open	door),	but	the	point	 is	that	the	appearance	of	reconcilement	with	international	legal	doctrine	was	ensured.			1085	British	 enclaves	 were	 spread	 out	 throughout	 the	 region	 (in	 Egypt,	 Iran,	 and	 the	 Persian	 Gulf	states).	William	Roger	 Louis	 recounts	 Oliver	Harvey’s	 account	 in	 his	 diaries	 after	 visiting	 the	 RAF	
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At its crux this study therefore uncovers the constitutive relation between the juridical 
forms of sovereignty and capitalist expansion through imperialism in the region.  By tracing the 
economic dimensions of Iraqi semi-peripheral sovereignty and its link to the open door principle, 
I show exactly how these forms and processes were molded to further the commercial and 
economic interests of the imperial powers and capitalism in general. A close reading of the PMC 
discussions on Iraq’s readiness to be independent, with those concerning the oil concessions, and 
in turn with the pipeline agreements with the other Mandates in the region, suggests that the 
juridical forms embedded in Iraqi semi-peripheral sovereignty were in fact a juridical 
manifestation of the expansion and reproduction of capital in the region. I am hence furthering the 
argument that sovereignty, as a core concept of international law, has a constitutive correlation 
with capitalism and its imperialism. Sovereignty was in other words, not primarily ‘forged out of 
the confrontation between different cultures,’ which in turn produced the ‘dynamic of difference,’ 
but rather it was already embedded in the juridical forms of capitalism.1086 It is the economic 
rather than the cultural dynamics of sovereignty and international law that should be underscored 
in its history. The grasping of the doctrine of semi-peripheral sovereignty and its processes in Iraq 
would, it is hoped, explain its enduring characteristics, its continuities, and in turn its (current) 
limitations as a category for Third World states in a post-colonial world.     
 
This historical and legal study of Iraq therefore substantiates China Mieville’s claim that, 
‘the imperialism of international law means more than just the global spread of an international 
legal order with capitalism – it means that the power dynamics of political imperialism are 
embedded within the very juridical equality of sovereignty.’ 1087  The socio-economic 
transformation of Iraq described here is an illustration of how the legal form of ‘equality’ within 
the concept of sovereignty, as it was entrenched in the Anglo-Iraq Treaty, was used not only to 
uphold its military dominance there, but also to maintain its corresponding capitalist structures 
and processes, ensuring its operation with a certain efficacy. While capitalist relations were 
solidified within Iraqi society as we saw in Chapter 1, they were maintained within the 
industrialized spaces of oil production, railway and port apparatuses, as detailed in Chapters 4 and 
5. By exposing the effects of the juridical forms of semi-peripheral sovereignty and how Iraqi 																																																																																																																																																																																																									bases	 in	 Iraq	 during	 the	 Second	 World	 War,	 describing	 them	 as,	 ‘a	 complete	 bit	 of	 England	abroad….football,	cinema	and	a	pack	of	hounds.	All	very	Poona.’	Quoted	in	William	Roger	Louis.	The	
British	Empire	in	the	Middle	East,	supra,	at	745.	1086	Anghie,	supra,	ft.	21,	at	311.	1087	Mieville,	supra,	ft.	25,	at	270.	
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workers were materially affected by these structures, not only does this study strive to further 
ground the history of international law, but in its explicit consideration of anti-colonial and anti-
imperial (labour) struggle, it aims to move bottom-up to insert the agency of Third World peoples 
into its historiography. The hope is, as Upendra Baxi proposes, ‘international law [would no 
longer] be further understood merely as the history of the law of nations to the entire exclusion of 
the law of peoples.’1088 The actions of Third World peoples would finally be interpreted from the 
perspective of international legal transformation rather than its exclusion from this realm. 
 
 
III. Legality as a question of strategy and tactics in revolutionary struggles 
 
One theme running throughout this work concerns the manner that counter-hegemonic 
movements appropriated and referred to the law and its language in their struggles. In Chapter 2, I 
show how the labour movement was able to appropriate the (dead) labour law of 1936 on the 
books for its own advantage, using it as a reference point in its demands. Although the early 
labour movement had confidence in the principles of international law and its institutions (as its 
leaders were in direct contact with the ILO for instance), its communist-led successor referred to 
the law (whether international law or the labour law of the state) only from the perspective of 
strategy and tactics. This did not mean that the law was unimportant for them, but rather they did 
not consider legal reform as sufficient for defeating the structures of the semi-colonial order and 
ending British imperialism in the country.  
 
The oil workers relentlessly referred to the 1936 labour law in making their demands, in 
particular the formation of its independent trade union. However, they were aware of the 
limitations of the law and its application, were due to the constricting structures of international 
and transnational law imposed on their country. Their experiences after the Gāwūrbāghī strike 
and massacre confirmed their views, as not one person was held accountable under Iraqi law for 
the murder of oil workers. Similarly, the port workers explicitly fought for the inclusion of the 
right to strike into the labour law, which they argued was a part of their natural rights as workers. 
These legal demands went unanswered and the workers were forced to move to more militant 
tactics of wild strike action and sabotage during the Wathba. The uses of law in the struggle had 
some advantages (whether as rhetorical tool or for its educative function), but it definitely had its 																																																																				1088	Upendra	 Baxi.	 ‘What	 may	 the	 “Third	 World”	 expect	 from	 International	 Law’	 Third	 World	
Quarterly,	Vol.	27,	No.	5,	pp.713-725,	2006;	at	720.	
	 240	
limits as the overall anti-colonial and anti-imperial struggle itself was waged outside the confines 
of law. 
 
 Does the law in general, then, and international law and its concept of sovereignty in 
particular, have an emancipatory potential for counter-hegemonic, anti-colonial and/or anti-
imperialist movements? A central point that emerges from this study is that the practical 
usefulness of law depends entirely on the historical conjuncture in question. It is a matter of 
strategy and tactics and should not be pursued for the simple reason that it is law. Consequently, 
neither EP Thompson’s claim that the rule of law is an ‘unqualified human good’ in its 
malleability as a recourse for the plebian, nor Guha’s categorical renunciation of this statement as 
a reflection of the ‘hallucinatory effects of ideology,’ is accurate. 1089  As Pashukanis has 
emphasized, ‘legality is not an empty sack that can be filled with a new class content’.1090 In 
other words, the forms of (bourgeois) legality ensure its limited potential. Its usefulness, 
therefore, for any revolutionary movement is ‘a mere question of tactics’.1091 International law, 
including human rights discourse, therefore is not always a useful ‘counter-hegemonic tool of 
resistance’ as several TWAIL scholars have argued.1092 The same could be said of the concept of 
sovereignty and self-determination, for despite its inherently imperialistic juridical form, it could, 
provided the historical conjuncture is taken into account, contribute to a revolutionary struggle. A 
legal demand, including that of complete self-determination, in other words, could be made to 
further its revolutionary struggle, and this study has revealed how the Iraqi labour and nationalist 
movements did exactly that at certain conjuncture 
 
																																																																				1089E.P.	Thompson,	supra,	ft.	183;	and	Ranajit	Guha.	Dominance	without	Hegemony:	History	and	Power	
in	Colonial	India,	 (Cambridge:	Harvard	University	Press,	1997),	at	67.	 It	 should	be	noted	 that	Doug	Hay	 has	 clarified	 Thompson’s	 often-quoted	 phrase:	 ‘If	 it	 was	 anything,	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 was	 for	Thompson	 an	 aspiration,	 a	 standard	 that	 could	 be	 used	 by	 democrats	 and	 socialists	 in	 upholding	constitutional	 protections	 first	 imagined	 by	 radicals	 and	 then	 achieved	 by	 popular	 politics	 over	 a	hundred	 of	 years…He	 was	 well	 aware	 that	 the	 law	 is	 also	 a	 basis	 of	 rules…upholding	 a	 radically	unequal	 division	 of	 property…[T]hat	 critique	 was	 at	 the	 heart	 of	 his	 polemic	 journalism,	 and	 the	other	250	pages	of	Whigs	and	Hunters…’	‘Introduction	to	the	Second	Edition,’	in	Douglas	Hay,	Peter	Linebaugh,	 John	 G.	 Rule,	 EP	 Thompson	 and	 Cal	Winslow.	Albion’s	 Fatal	 Tree:	 Crime	and	 Society	 in	
Eighteenth-Century	England,	London:	Verso,	2011),	at	x1i.	1090	Evgeny	 Pashukanis.	 “Lenin	 and	 the	 Problems	 of	 Law”	 in	 Piers	 Beirne	 &	 Robert	 Sharlet,	 eds.	
Pashukanis:	Selected	Writings	on	Marxism	and	Law	(London:	Academic	Press,	1980),	at	143.	1091	G.	Lukacs.	History	and	Class	Consciousness,	(Boston:	MIT	Press,	1990),	at	264.	For	an	examination	of	 this	 question	 in	 detail	 see,	 Robert	 Knox.	 “Marxism,	 International	 Law,	 and	 Political	 Strategy’,	
Leiden	Journal	of	International	Law,	22	(2009),	pp.	413-436.	1092	Balakrishnan	Rajagopal.	 “Counter-Hegemonic	 International	Law:	Rethinking	Human	Rights	 and	Development	as	a	Third	World	Strategy”,	27(5)	Third	World	Quarterly	pp.	767-783.		
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IV. Conjunctural analysis & the writing of history for the present 
 
 
It has already been mentioned that a conjunctural analysis of history in relation to agency 
is meant as a modus to grasp the present conjuncture (or in Lenin’s 1917 expression, ‘the Present 
Situation’) so as to be able to formulate an organized plan of action today, which would be 
decisive. A conjunctural analysis, therefore, is not your typical analytic method for the academic, 
merely concerned with the elucidation of the historical past, but rather is meant to identifying 
strategic and tactical sites of political action today.  So the reader may wonder what was the 
purpose of writing and undertaking a study and analysis on the revolutionary history of Iraq. Why 
for instance are the past struggles of the oil, railway, and port workers significant to recall? Why 
should we study their organized actions and strategies? How could the revolutionary history of 
the Wathba be useful for Iraqis today – in an age of US imperialism, and amidst the devastation 
of the 2003 invasion, occupation, plunder and disintegration of Iraq? The legendary history of the 
Wathba and the vast hopes that came with the 1958 July Revolution seem to hardly register in the 
memories for today’s Iraqi youth – or if so are only considered as possibilities that were dashed 
by regional rivalries, left disorganization and imperialism – a too brief and turbulent 
revolutionary interlude filled with optimism that has long gone.  
 
Although, I do not claim to have substantive answers to these questions, it is certainly 
clear that the Wathba was a decisive moment in the modern history of Iraq and that its effects 
reverberated beyond the 1958 revolution in many ways.  As Hamit Bozarslan has argued the 
Wathba’s contemporary relevance in the post-1958 history of Iraq, including the Ba’thist period, 
and the region was that it was ‘the bearer of an unprecedented degree of radicalization in the Arab 
world,’ and that it was precisely the continuation of this process well after 1958 that ‘created a 
paradoxical situation and led to a radical bifurcation both in ideological and axiological 
terms’. 1093  This ‘radical bifurcation’ in ideology between Iraqis who were staunchly anti-
imperialist and favored concrete independence and non-alignment, and those who favored a 
connection with the West became permanently entrenched, stirring continuous tension, and this 
arguably remained in place throughout the history of Iraq and the region to this day.  
 
																																																																				1093	Hamit	Bozarslan.	 “Rethinking	 the	Ba’thist	Period”	 in	 Jordi	Tejel,	 Peter	 Sluglett,	Riccardo	Bocco,	Hamit	Bozarslan	(eds.),	Writing	the	Modern	History	of	Iraq:	Historiographical	and	Political	Challenges	(Singapore:	World	Scientific	Publishing),	at	144.			
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It is apparent then that without undertaking a re-examination of the past with the present 
in mind, it would be difficult to act to reconstruct an alternative future for the benefit of Iraq. It is 
in this way that one should recollect how Iraqis developed creative and resourceful ways of 
organized resistance in their struggles against imperialism and its legal manifestations.  What 
emerges therefore from this legal and historical study of Iraq is that ordinary working class Iraqis 
were able to see through the obfuscation of the legal structures imposed on their country and at 
certain points in time organized successfully against them. The reality is that these experiences 
remain deeply (even if subconsciously) ingrained in the collective memories of the masses of the 
region, and we know this because they tend to remerge without any warning as we saw happen 
during the 2011 Arab revolutions. Ordinary Iraqis continue to struggle against similar imperialist 
legal structures, organizing in novel ways, despite their portrayals by the media as passive victims 
of dictatorship and war.1094  The oil workers and their contemporary unions, for instance, 
undoubtedly following their militant tradition, were (and still are) at the forefront of an intense 
struggle against the imposition of an oil law in 2007, which intends to entirely open the oil 
industry to foreign investment, sanctioning the interests of foreign companies (with the help of 
international investment law), and completely reversing the process of nationalization that started 
in 1972.1095 
 
I want to end with a brief remark on the value and the techniques of writing history, 
especially of international law. Anne Orford has highlighted the uniqueness of the uses of the 
historical analysis by legal scholars, in particular TWAIL scholars.1096  She argues that legal 
scholars do not abide by the established methodology of historiography that rejects all forms of 
anachronism, emphasizing that everything should be placed ‘in the context of its own time.’1097 
Historians on the other hand are expected to solely recover ‘past meanings’.1098 Orford suggests 
that since law is inherently genealogical, depending on ‘the movement of concepts, languages and 																																																																				1094	See	Ali	Issa.	Against	All	Odds:	Voices	of	Popular	Struggle	in	Iraq,	(Tadween	Publishing,	2015).		1095	See	Greg	Muttitt.	Fuel	on	the	Fire:	Oil	and	Politics	in	Occupied	Iraq,	(London:	Bodley	Head,	2011).	Muttitt	details	the	current	struggles	of	the	oil	union	and	Iraqi	civil	society	in	organizing	against	this	law.	 On	 one	 of	 their	 strikes,	 he	 refers	 to	 their	 past	militant	 history	 and	 experiences,	 ‘The	 new	 oil	union	continued	this	tradition	[i.e.	of	the	communist-led	strikes	of	the	1940s	and	1950s	and	the	spirit	of	 Gawurbaghi],	 demanding	 immediate	 improvements	 for	 the	workers	while	 raising	 the	 long-term	structure	 of	 the	 industry	 and	 the	 economy,’	 and	 an	 opportunity	 to	 have	 a	 say	 on	 the	 new	oil	 law.	Muttitt,	at		254.	1096	Orford.	Anne.	“The	past	as	law	or	history?	The	relevance	of	imperialism	for	modern	international	law,”	 IILJ	Working	 Paper	 2012/2	 (History	 and	Theory	 in	 International	 Law	 Series),	 Finalized	 June	2012,	(www.iilj.org).		1097	Ibid,	at	6	1098	Ibid.	
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norms across time and even space,’ legal scholars are intuitively capable of breaking from this 
hallowed method through contextualizing past concepts, and considering how these concepts 
remerge in the present.	1099 In other words, legal scholars find it easier to use history and the past 
within the present context, and they do not abide by any stringent method.  
 
Although, Orford is correct in pointing out the affinity between law and history, and the 
constructive role of legal analysis in historical methodology, not all historians abide by this 
orthodox approach to historiography. In fact, many historians, especially of the left, see their craft 
as corresponding to the study of political action and its relation to the present. The writing of 
history is considered as a political act – the making of history and its production is therefore a 
technique to respond to the present, and is firmly rooted in the ‘possibilities of making 
futures.’ 1100   Walter Rodney, for instance, believed that history was ‘a way of ordering 
knowledge which could become an active part of the consciousness of an uncertified mass of 
ordinary people’ and utilized as ‘an instrument of social change’ to bring about an alternative 
future.1101  
 
David Scott suggests a similar view in his rereading of The Black Jacobins, C. L. R. 
James’s classic account of the only successful slave rebellion in the Caribbean, the Haitian 
Revolution of the 1790s1102: ‘The historical past’, he writes, ‘…is never anachronistic […] [T]he 
past is [not] only available through the present […] but […] morally and politically what ought to 
be at stake in historical inquiry is a critical appraisal of the present itself, not the mere 
reconstruction of the past. The present, then, not the past, is what histories of the present are 
supposed to be about.’1103 In this way, Scott considers James’s classic work as an ‘exercise in 
writing a history of the present,’ suggesting that James ‘directly challenges us to ask ourselves 
what kind of story might be best for the politicohistorical presents within which we now live and 																																																																				1099	Ibid,	 at	 9.	 	 The	methodological	 affinity	 between	 law	 and	history	 in	European	 thought	 could	 be	traced	back	to	at	least	the	sixteenth	century.	François	Baudouin	and	Jean	Bodin,	for	example,	argued	that	the	jurist	must	be	a	historian,	if	he	is	to	avoid	errors	of	interpretation	and	chronology,	and	the	historian	must	 be	 a	 jurist	 to	 set	 events	 in	 their	 proper	 political	 and	 social	 contexts.	 	 See	 Grafton,	Anthony.	What	was	History?	The	art	of	history	in	early	modern	Europe,	 (Cambridge	University	press,	Mass.,	2007),	at	69.	1100	Bill	Schwarz.	“‘The	people’	in	history:	The	Communist	Party	Historians’	Group,	1946-56,”	Making	
Histories:	Studies	in	history-writing	and	politics,	Johnson,	R.	ed.	(Hutchinson	&	Co,	1983),	at	95.		1101	George	Lamming’s	 ‘Forward’	 in	Walter	Rodney.	A	History	of	the	Guyanese	Working	People,	1881-
1905,	(John	Hopkins	University	Press,	London,	1981),	at	xvii		1102	C.L.R.	 James.	 The	 Black	 Jacobins:	 Toussaint	 L’Ouverture	 and	 the	 San	 Domingo	 Revolution,	 (NY:	Vintage,	1989).	1103	David	 Scott.	 Conscripts	 of	 Modernity:	 The	 Tragedy	 of	 Colonial	 Enlightenment,	 (Durham:	 Duke	University	Press,	2004),	at	41	
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write.’1104 It is revealing that James was, despite his silence on his initial intentions, it has been 
argued, motivated to begin writing The Black Jacobins when he arrived in London from his 
native Trinidad, by the US occupation of Haiti (1915-1934).1105 He was consciously weaving 
together a particular and romantic history of the Haitian revolution, while meditating on the 
underlying revolutionary potential of Africans and the people of the Caribbean, indirectly 
addressing the US imperialism of his time, and it’s flaunting of Haitian sovereignty. His hope it 
seems was to inspire revolutionary action in the imaginations of the Caribbean people, and to 
historically connect the Caribbean anti-colonialism against US imperialism with the revolutionary 
struggle of Toussaint L’Overture and the Haitian Revolution for black liberation. It was therefore 
no coincidence that his classic study of revolution was written and published during that period, 
in 1938.  
 
It is with a similar spirit that this history was written: as a (dare I say, romantic) 
reworking of the history and legacy of anti-colonial revolutionary struggle of Iraq for this present 
conjuncture of US imperialism, following the 2003 invasion, occupation and domination of Iraq, 
the devastating effects of which linger to this day. I would like to think that the conclusion of this 
study on the year of the centenary of the 1917 October Revolution (which is the same year of the 
British occupation of Iraq) is a nod to this effort.                  
 
The British Ambassador to Iraq, John Troutbeck, once wrote in a dispatch that ‘no 
country could owe more to imperialism than does Iraq’. One should add that the imperialism that 
he was referring to was more specifically the imperialism of international law that we have 
detailed in this study.  Iraq’s experience with international law and its institutions could be said to 
be quite unique. It was a state that was established and granted ‘independence’ through the 
mechanisms of the Mandate system and international law, so as to be exploited in ‘peace’ (‘an 
organization without occupation’ as one member of the Indian civil service put it1106). It would 
later be the target of foreign-backed coups, installed dictatorship, acts of war, bombs, economic 
sanctions, invasion, plunder, looting and military occupation – all with the aim of its re-
integration into the capitalist world economy and its subjugation into Western hegemony. Iraq’s 
modern state and its institutions – once the pride of the international community of the interwar 																																																																				1104	Ibid,	at	57	1105	See	Raphael	Dalleo.	 ‘”The	Independence	So	Hardly	Won	has	Been	Maintained”:	C.L.R.	 James	and	the	U.S.	Occupation	of	Haiti,’	Cultural	Critique	87,	Spring	2014,	pp.	38-59.	1106	See	Olaf Caroe. Wells of Power: The Oilfields of South-Western Asia, A Regional and Global Study, 
(London: Macmillan & Co, 1951).	
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period – first developed through the mechanisms of international law, would be entirely destroyed 
seven decades later, all under the purview of the same international legal order. This may seem 
paradoxical indeed, but this study indicates otherwise. International law as the juridical 
manifestation of imperialism is predicated on ‘civilizing’ violence. What is clear is that if Iraq 
were to ever gain its full independence and its people their freedom, the entire semi-peripheral 
region of the Middle East (including and especially Palestine) would have to be liberated from the 
shackles of imperialism and this certainly means the imperialism of international law.            
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